Tue v. Wilmington City Police Department

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 3 Complaint. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 9/19/2013. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
SGT. JONATHAN T. TUE,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civ. No. 13-1203-RGA

WILMINGTON CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

Sgt. Jonathan T. Tue, Wilmington, Delaware, ProSe Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

\q ,

2013
September
Wilmington, Delaware

Plaintiff Sgt. Jonathan T. Tue filed this action alleging discrimination by reason of
color. He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(D. I. 5.) The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b).
Plaintiff alleges that his vehicle was taken from him and that Officer Holden
made false statements, gave him false information, would not conduct an investigation,
and would not recover Plaintiff's vehicle. In addition, Plaintiff is in the Army Reserves
and there was military equipment in the vehicle. Plaintiff filed this action as a result of
Holden's "misconduct." Plaintiff filed his complaint on an employment discrimination
complaint form, but the civil cover sheet indicates that the action is brought pursuant to
Delaware criminal statutes, 11 Del. C.§§ 206, 253, and 263. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages.
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma
pauperis actions, including ones that fail to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the
light most favorable to a prose plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F .3d
224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to§ 1915(e)(2)(8)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8), the

Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to

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"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere

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conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When determining whether dismissal

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is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are
separated. /d. The Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions. /d. at 210-11.
Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at
211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement
to relief; rather, it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. /d. A claim is facially
plausible when its factual content allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." /d. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitlement to relief."' /d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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Because Plaintiff proceeds prose, his pleading is liberally construed and his
Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
While not clear (since Plaintiff's cover sheet cites Delaware law as the basis for
filing suit), it could be Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When
bringing a§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a
federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state
law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff does not do that here.
The sole defendant is the Wilmington City Police Department. Because the
Wilmington Police Department falls under the umbrella of the City of Wilmington, for
screening purposes, the Court analyzes the claim as if the Wilmington Police
Department were a municipality. A plaintiff seeking to recover from a municipality under
§ 1983 must (1) identify an allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom, (2) demonstrate
that the municipality, through its deliberate and culpable conduct, was the "moving

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force" behind the injury alleged; and (3) demonstrate a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the alleged deprivation of federal rights. Board of the Cnty.

Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
Plaintiff has not pled that Wilmington Police Department was the "moving force"
behind any alleged constitutional violation. Indeed, the Complaint contains no
allegations against the police department other than to name it as a defendant. Absent
any allegation that a custom or policy established by the Wilmington Police Department,

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directly caused harm to Plaintiff, his § 1983 claim cannot stand. However, since it is not
inconceivable that Plaintiff may be able to articulate a claim against it (or, more
plausibly, name alternative defendants), he will be given an opportunity to amend his
pleading. See O'Dell v. United States Gov't, 256 F. App'x 444 (3d Cir. 2007) (leave to
amend is proper where the plaintiff's claims do not appear "patently meritless and
beyond all hope of redemption").
For the above reasons, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(ii). Plaintiff will
be given leave to amend the complaint.

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An appropriate order will be entered.

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