Kabbaj v. Google Inc. et al
Filing
97
MEMORANDUM OPINION regarding pending motions to dismiss, motions to amend, discovery motions, and a motion for sanctions (D.I. #26 , #28 , #39 , #46 , #56 , #64 , #76 , #81 , #90 , #92 , #96 ). Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 4/7/2014. (nms)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
YOUNES KABBAJ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. No. 13-1522-RGA
GOOGLE, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Younes Kabbaj, Plantation, Florida. ProSe Plaintiff.
lan Robert Liston, Esquire, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Georgetown, Delaware.
Counsel for Defendants Google, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc.
A. Thompson Baylis, Esquire, Abrams & Bayliss LLP, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel
for Defendant Yahoo! Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
April1._, 2014
Wilmington, Delaware
AND~~~
JUDGE:
Plaintiff Younes Kabbaj filed this action asserting jurisdiction by reason of
diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and raising claims under Delaware law. (D.I. 2,
23). He appears prose and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (D. I. 5),
but he paid the filing fee on October 2, 2013. Presently before the court are numerous
motions, including motions to dismiss, motions to amend, discovery motions, and a
motion for sanctions. (D. I. 26, 28, 39, 46, 56, 64, 76, 81, 90, 92, 96). The matters have
been fully briefed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on August 28, 2013 (D.I. 2, 7), followed by an amended
complaint (0.1. 23) on November 12, 2013, subsequent to the filing of a motion to
dismiss by Defendants Amazon.com, Inc. and Google, Inc. (D.I. 19). The amended
complaint alleges that unknown third parties authored and posted online content that
defamed Plaintiff. 1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable because this content was
allegedly hosted on services operated by Defendants Google, Inc., Amazon.com, Inc.,
and Yahoo! Inc. Plaintiff raises claims against Defendants for: (1) declaratory and
injunctive relief; (2) tortious interference with a contract; (3) negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and (4) libel per se. The amended complaint alleges
that Defendants "hosted" the content (0.1. 23
services (id.
1
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12, 33), "administered" the underlying
12), and provided a "platform[]" for others' content (id. at W 25, 37).
The amended complaint is similar to the original complaint, but added numerous
other fantastical allegations that the court finds no need to address. Having reviewed
the amended complaint in its entirety, suffice it to say, the seventy-four page amended
complaint fails to comply with the requisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) which provides
that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."
More particularly, the amended complaint alleges that: (1) Google administered a
blogger service and profile pages that contained defamatory and threatening
communications (id. at 11 12-13); (2) Amazon created several accounts wherein it
published/sold novels authored by third-parties and published user comments that
defamed Plaintiff (id. at 1111 17-22), and (3) defamatory content was created and sent by
users of Yahoo's email and internet service platform (id. at 1111 25, 37). The amended
complaint identifies John Doe Defendants as the content creators. (D.I. 231111 6, 22,
123). In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks discovery, injunctive relief, and
compensatory and punitive damages.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Defendants seek dismissal (D.I. 39, 46) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff opposes (D.I. 45, 48) the motions. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss
may be granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those
allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). "In deciding motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
courts generally consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim."
Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to
legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action
supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When determining
2
whether dismissal is appropriate, the court must take three steps: "(1) identify[] the
elements of the claim, (2) reviewO the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and
then (3) lookO at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluat[e] whether
all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus
v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011 ). Elements are sufficiently alleged when
the facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a
"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense." /d. Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally
construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that:
(1) they are immune from suit pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 230(c); 2 (2) the amended
complaint disregards Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) requirements that a pleading's averments
be simple, concise, and direct; and (3) the amended complaint fails to state a claim for
relief. In addition, Defendants contend that further amendment is futile.
47
u.s.c. § 230
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred by § 230 of the
2
An affirmative defense that may be apparent on the face of a complaint, like
immunity, can provide the basis of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 461 (3d Cir. 2013).
3
Communications Decency Act. 3 Under the Act, interactive computer service providers
are immunized against liability for third-party-created content. Section 230 of the Act
provides in relevant part:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider. . . . [Further, n]o cause of action may be
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that
is inconsistent with this section.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1 ), (e)(3). Section 230 "precludes courts from entertaining claims
that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role, and therefore bars
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions." Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d
Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Under§ 230(c)(1 ), immunity requires three elements: (1) defendant must be a
provider or user of an "interactive computer service;" (2) the asserted claims must treat
defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the challenged
communication must be "information provided by another information content provider."
First, each moving Defendant is an interactive computer service provider. Under the
Act, an interactive computer service is "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
3
Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56 (1996), is known as the "Communications Decency Act of 1996." The main goal of
the CDA was to protect minors from harmful material on the internet. See Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). In 1997, the United States
Supreme Court found that portion of the statute abridged "the freedom of speech"
protected by the First Amendment. (/d.) The section at issue in this case,§ 230,
remains intact. See DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
4
computer server." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). The allegations in the amended complaint are
premised upon the fact that third parties were provided access to Defendants' online
services. A number of courts have held that Google's online services, Amazon's
services (including its online bookstore), and Yahoo's online services fit the definition of
an interactive computer service provider. See, e.g., See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570
F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (Yahoo is a provider of an interactive computer
service); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630-31 (D. Del. 2007); Parker
v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F.
Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (E. D. Cal. 201 0); Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885
(E.D. Wis. 2009), aff'd, 623 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Yahoo! should be entitled to
immunity because it acted as an interactive computer service."); Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL
3813758, at *15 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (Yahoo is a provider of an interactive computer
service and therefore falls within the class of entities entitled to the protections of §
230); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2004 WL 4910036, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (finding it
"irrefutable" that Amazon's bookstore met the definition because "[i]ts primary function
is to allow multiple users to a computer service the ability to purchase various items,
including but not limited to, books"), aff'd, 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Schneider v.
Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("Amazon's website enables
visitors to the site to comment about authors and their work, thus providing an
information service that necessarily enables access by multiple users to a server. This
brings Amazon squarely within the definition.").
Second, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for information provided by
third-parties, namely, the John Doe Defendants. An information content provider
5
includes "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). If a defendant did not create or author the
statement in controversy, but rather is provided that statement by a third-party
information content provider, then that defendant cannot be held liable under the Act.
See e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]o
long as a third party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive
service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection
process.").
The amended complaint does not allege that any Defendant created or authored
the defamatory statements. Rather, the amended complaint alleges that Defendants
hosted content, administered services, and provided a platform for others' content.
Because Plaintiff seeks to impose liability for Defendants' actions involving information
provided by another information content provider (i.e., the Doe Defendants), § 230(c)
applies to his claims.
Finally, Plaintiffs claims seek to treat Defendants as the publisher of a third
party's statements. Traditional acts of an editorial, or publishing, nature include
"deciding whether to publish, withdraw, or alter content." Green v. America Online, 318
F.3d at 471. Courts have repeatedly held that defamation claims against qualified
providers are barred by the Act. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d at
500-01 (dismissing plaintiffs claims against Google regarding allegedly defamatory
messages posted on a website because the Act "was intended to provide immunity for
service providers like Google on exactly the claims Plaintiff raises here"); see also Ben
6
Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000);
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir.1997).
Defendants contend that they are immune from each of Plaintiff's claims. The
case law supports this contention. Courts have found that the Act bars claims for
tortious interference with a contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
defamation. See DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App'x 280, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming
denial of amendment as futile in view of§ 230 when plaintiff sought leave to add claims
of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation); Shrader v. Beann, 503 F.
App'x 650, 654 (10th Cir. 2012) (owner/operator of internet trade website immune under
the Act from liability for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Getachew v. Google, Inc., 491 F. App'x 923, 925-26 (10th Cir. 2012) (internet search
engine immune under the Act from state law claims stemming from search results that
yield content created by third party); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,
Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 257-58 (4th Cir. 2009) (the Act precludes liability for defamation and
tortious interference with business expectancy); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates. Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (any activity
that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek
to post online is perforce immune under§ 230); Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Pub. Library,
2011 WL 7462038, at *9 (0. Mont. 2011) (section 230(c)(1) of the Act barred tortious
interference with employment claim); Novak v. Overture Services, Inc., 309 F. Supp .2d
446, 452-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (section 230(c)(1) barred claim for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp.
2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va 2003) (section 230(c)(1) barred claims for intentional infliction of
7
emotional distress); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 2006 WL 66724, at *2-3
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (section 230(c)(1) barred tortious interference with a business
relationship claim).
The Defendants are immune under the Act against Plaintiff's allegations.
Defendants cannot be held liable for state law claims because they opted to publish a
third party's statements, acts identified as a traditional editorial function. The Court
further finds that the amended complaint does not state, nor will it be able to state, any
viable claims against Defendants with respect to their decision to publish third party
statements. Thus, the Court grants the Defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice.
Further, as discussed below at pp. 9-12, even were Defendants not protected by§
230(c), the amended complaint fails to state any claims against them upon which relief
may be granted under Delaware law.
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
The amended complaint raises a claim for "declaratory and injunctive relief," for
Defendants to "immediately provide to Plaintiff all evidence in their possession that will
help identify the John Does defaming and threatening Plaintiff via their facilities." (D.I.
231f 124).
Injunctive and declaratory relief are remedies rather than causes of action. See,
e.g., Birdman v. Office ofthe Governor, 677 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2012). Such relief
cannot be obtained without stating an underlying cause of action. Accordingly, the
Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss the claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief.
8
Tortious Interference with a Contract
Plaintiff attempts to raise claims for tortious interference with a contract. (D.I. 23,
mf 126-129).
He alleges that the acts of the Doe Defendants tortiously interfere with a
settlement agreement Plaintiff entered into with his former employer, the American
School of Tangier and Marrakesh. Because the identity of the Doe Defendants are
unknown to Plaintiff, he attempts to sweep moving Defendants into his tortious
interference with a contract claim by alleging they "are also engaging [in] tortious
interference with the contract if they do not immediately act to provide all information
necessary to identify" the Doe Defendants. (/d. at 1f 127).
A claim for tortious interference with contract has five elements under Delaware
law: "(1) a valid contract; (2) about which the defendants have knowledge; (3) an
intentional act by the defendants that is a significant factor in causing the breach of
contract; (4) done without justification; and (5) which causes injury." Gill v. Delaware
Park, LLC, 294 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645 (D. Del. 2003) (citing Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v.
WM. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983, 992 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
Even liberally construing the amended complaint, as the Court must, it falls far
short in its attempt to state a claim for tortious interference with a contract. The
amended complaint does not allege that any moving Defendant had knowledge of the
settlement agreement or that any Defendant played any role in the alleged breach of
the contract Rather, Plaintiff seeks information from Defendants to identify John Does.
Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss the claim for tortious
interference with a contract for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
9
Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The amended complaint raises a claim of negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (D. I. 23 at 1f1f 130-132). The amended complaint alleges that
Defendants' actions constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress when they
failed to secure their facilities to prevent the John Does from publishing false and
defamatory communications about Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that he would be willing to
"forgo any financial compensation" from Defendants should they be able to produce
evidence to identify the Doe Defendants. The amended complaint also alleges
intentional infliction of emotional distress because the Defendants' actions were
"deliberate, intentional and designed to harm [Plaintiff] with violence if possible." (/d. at
1f132).
To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must allege
negligent conduct that proximately causes emotional distress and that the emotional
distress is accompanied by non-transitory, recurring physical phenomena. See Greene
v. United States Postal Serv., 462 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 (D. Del. 2006) (citing Lupo v.
Medical Ctr., 1996 WL 111132, at *3 (Del. Super. 1996)). Where a plaintiff claims the
emotional distress was caused directly by another's negligence, the plaintiff must show
the actor's negligent conduct created "an unreasonable risk of causing ... emotional
disturbance to another." /d. "In addition, the plaintiff must show that the distress was
sufficient to cause physical injury." /d. (quoting Lloyd v. Jefferson, 53 F. Supp. 2d 643,
675 (D. Del. 1999)). Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that one
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intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional distress to another by conduct that a
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reasonable person would consider extreme or outrageous. Rhinehardt v. Bright, 2006
WL 2220972, at *4 (Del. Super. 2006).
When alleging a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that "defendant owed
plaintiff a duty of care; defendant breached that duty; and defendant's breach was the
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury." Pipher v. Parsell, 930 A.2d 890, 892 (Del. 2007).
Courts have repeatedly held that under the Communications Decency Act, Internet
service providers do not owe a duty to police the Internet, remove content, or otherwise
protect users from the speech of third parties. See Green v. America Online (AOL),
318 F.3d at 471 ("There is no real dispute that Green's fundamental tort claim is that
AOL was negligent in promulgating harmful content and in failing to address certain
harmful content on its network. Green thus attempts to hold AOL liable for decisions
relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from its network - actions
quintessentially related to a publisher's role. Section 230 'specifically proscribes liability'
in such circumstances."). Hence, the claim fails.
In addition, the negligent and/or intentional or infliction of emotional distress
claim is not supported by sufficient factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss.
The amended complaint fails to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress in that it fails to allege that Plaintiff experienced any physical consequences or
symptoms as a result of his alleged emotional disturbance. With regard to the
allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the amended complaint fails to
allege facts indicating that the Defendants' conduct was extreme or outrageous, or that
Plaintiff suffered emotional distress so severe as to give rise to an actionable claim.
Indeed, the claims are merely conclusory.
11
In light of the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss the
claim of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Defamation
The amended complaint raises a claim for libel per se. (D.I. 23,
1f1f 133-136).
It
alleges that Plaintiff has been damaged by the malicious and willful defamatory
published statements made by Doe Defendants. The amended complaint further
alleges that in the event Defendants are unable to provide evidence to identify the John
Doe Defendants, Defendants are "additionally liable for damages to the Plaintiff for
libel." (/d. at 1f 136).
To state a defamation claim, "a plaintiff must satisfy five elements: (1)
defamatory communication; (2) publication; (3) the communication refers to the plaintiff;
(4) a third party's understanding of the communication's defamatory character; and (5)
injury." Esposito v. Townsend, 2013 WL 493321, at *7 (Del. Super. 2013).
The amended complaint fails to state a claim for defamation. It does not allege
any of the moving Defendants authored a single statement regarding Plaintiff,
defamatory or otherwise. It is evident that Plaintiff's intent in naming them as
Defendants is to gain discovery. The Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss
the defamation claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
MOTION TO AMEND
Plaintiff has filed three motions to amend the amended complaint. (DI. 81, 92,
96). In the first motion, he seeks to identify a Doe Defendant as Brian Albro. (D.I. 81 ).
In the second motion, Plaintiff seeks to add the American School of Tangier as a
12
Defendant. (D. I. 92). In the third motion, Plaintiff moves to file a second amended
complaint that adds both Albro and the American School of Tangier. (0.1. 96).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course within twenty-one days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to
which a responsive pleading is required, twenty-one days after service of a responsive
pleading or twenty-one days after service of a Rule 12(b) motion, whichever is earlier.
Otherwise, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
consent or the court's leave. Rule 15 provides that court should freely give leave to
amend when justice so requires.
The Third Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to the amendment of pleadings
to ensure that "a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities." Dole v. Arco Chern. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted). Amendment, however, is not automatic. See Dover Steel Co., Inc. v. Hartford
Accident and lndem., 151 F.R.D. 570, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Leave to amend should be
granted absent a showing of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); See a/so Oran v.
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000). Futility of amendment occurs when the
complaint, as amended, does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). If the
proposed amendment "is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally
13
insufficient on its face, the court may deny leave to amend." Harrison Beverage Co. v.
Dribeck Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 468 (D.N.J. 1990).
The Court will deny the motions. The proposed second amended complaint
raises claims against Albro and the American School ofT angier relating to an alleged
breach of contract with regard to settlement in Kabbaj v. American School of Tangier,
Civ. No. 10-431-RGA (D.Del.) and a separate defamation claim against Albro. (D.I. 96
proposed First, Second, and Fifth Claims). Plaintiffs remedy against Albro and the
American School of Tangier lies in Civ. No. 10-431-RGA, wherein Plaintiff is required to
gain permission before filing a civil claim against the American School of Tangier and
Mark Simpson (or his family members). 4 (See Civ. No. 10-431-RGA, at D.l. 54 at 2).
With regard to the Google, Amazon, and Yahoo, the claims will be dismissed as
discussed above.
Finally, Plaintiff names John Doe Defendants. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21,
"the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party." A court my drop John
Doe Defendants under this rule. See Adams v. City of Camden, 461 F. Supp. 2d 263,
271 (D.N.J. 2006). Because Plaintiff has failed to identify the John Doe Defendants,
other than Albro, an individual for whom Plaintiff must seek permission to sue and,
because Plaintiff's claims otherwise fail for the reasons discussed above, the Court
dismisses the John Doe defendants. The Court finds amendment futile.
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
4
~
Piaintiff states that Albro is the "possible husband" of Simpson. (See D. I. 81,
1 ).
14
Yahoo moves for Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff to "deter him from using the
judicial system to make barbaric and heinous threats against this Court, the attorneys
involved in this matter, and the unrelated parties improperly included in this action."
(0.1. 65 at 1). Yahoo contends that Plaintiff makes it patently clear that he filed this
case for improper purposes, including to obtain discovery by improper means, to harass
parties to the litigation, and to threaten violence against the parties. (See id.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires that the party making a submission
to the court make a reasonable inquiry into both the facts and law. 5 See Schering Corp.
v. Vitarine Pharm., Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 1989). Rule 11 sanctions do not
require a showing of bad faith: the party to be sanctioned need only have engaged in
objectively unreasonable conduct in making the submission at issue. See In re Taylor,
655 F.3d 27 4, 282 (3d Cir. 2011 ). It goes without saying that filings made in bad faith
or for an improper purpose, necessarily violate Rule 11. See Lony v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 616 (3d Cir. 1991).
The Court notes that Plaintiff's filings have included threats of violence,
derogatory language, and pornographic photographs. The Court revoked Plaintiff's
electronic filing rights. (See 0.1. 50). Also of concern to the Court is that Plaintiff
acknowledged in his motion for extension of time to respond/stay of litigation (0.1. 76)
5
Rule 11(b) provides as follows: "By presenting to the court a pleading, written
motion, or other paper--whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an .
. . unrepresented party certifies that to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being
presented for any improper purpose ... ; [and] (2) the ... contentions are warranted by
existing law ... "
15
that he initiated the instant action against Google, Amazon, and Yahoo "to attempt to
obtain the information requested." (/d. at 2,
1f 04).
Although the Court does not hold Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, to the same
standard applicable to an attorney, the obligations of Rule 11 still apply to him. See,
e.g., Toll v. American Airlines, Inc., 166 F. App'x 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming
award of monetary sanctions under Rule 11 against a pro se plaintiff). At this juncture,
the Court will not sanction Plaintiff and will deny Yahoo's motion. The Court, however,
warns Plaintiff that if he continues inappropriately, his actions may be addressed by
sanctions, including monetary sanctions.
DISCOVERY AND MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS
Inasmuch as the Court will grant the motions to dismiss and finds amendment
futile, the court will dismiss as moot the remaining pending motions (D.I. 26, 28, 56, 76,
90).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) GRANT Defendants' motions to
dismiss (D. I. 39, 46); (2) DENY Defendant Yahoo's motion for sanctions (D. I. 64);
(3) DENY plaintiff's motions for leave to amend (DI. 81, 92, 96); and DISMISS as moot
the remaining motions (D.I. 26, 28, 56, 76, 90). An appropriate order will be entered.
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