Gardner v. State of DE Dept. of Health and Social Services

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 13-1647. (etg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JACQUELINE Y. GARDNER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) Civ. No.13-1647-SLR
)
STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT)
OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, )
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Jacqueline Y. Gardner, Lincoln, Delaware. Pro se Plaintiff.
Kenisha LaShelle Ringgold, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dated: January d-d-. , 2015
Wilmington, Delaware

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~~udge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jacqueline Y. Gardner ("plaintiff') proceeds pro se and has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. She filed this lawsuit on October 3, 2013 alleging
employment discrimination and retaliation by reason of race and religion pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5. (D.I. 2) An amended complaint was filed on January 9, 2014. (D.I.
6) Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint,
opposed by plaintiff. (D.I. 18) The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For the following reasons, the court will grant defendants' motion.

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by defendant State of Delaware Department of Health and
Social Services ("State of Delaware") as a social services technician. Plaintiff filed the
instant complaint alleging harassment, retaliation, and discrimination by reason of race
and religion, and that it "all happened very suddenly." Plaintiff's supervisor was
defendant Jessica Clarkson ("Clarkson"). Defendant Ray Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald") was
Clarkson's supervisor.
In September 2011, plaintiff was disciplined by Clarkson, her new supervisor, for
insubordination. Plaintiff ultimately received a one-day suspension. Plaintiff alleges
that there was a conspiracy and plot against her and that she has documents of the
"lies" about her. Plaintiff states that she was a team player and had been told by
Clarkson in March 2011 that she was doing an excellent job. Plaintiff alleges that, as a
result of the continuous harassment and false accusations from Clarkson, she was
forced to resign her employment. Exhibits attached to the amended complaint indicate

that plaintiff resigned due to a heart condition, hypertension, anxiety, and major
depression caused by issues at work. Plaintiff was on medical leave prior to the time
she resigned from her employment. Plaintiff verbally resigned on May 11, 2012 and
provided written resignation on May 14, 2012. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC on November 2011 and received a notice of right to sue dated July 22,
2013. The court was not provided with a copy of the charge of discrimination.
Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the
grounds that: (1) plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination; (2) plaintiff fails to
plead a prima facie claim for retaliation; and (3) individuals have no liability under Title
VII. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Ill. LEGAL STANDARDS
In reviewing a motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept
all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). A court may consider the
pleadings, public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint, and documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell At/. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations; however,
"a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

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action will not do." Id. at 545 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The "[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Id. Furthermore, "[w]hen
there are well-ple[d] factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroff v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). Such a determination is a context specific task requiring the
court "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. Individual Liability
Plaintiff names Fitzgerald and Clarkson as defendants in this Title VII action.
However, Title VII does not provide for individual liability. See Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e are persuaded that

Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII."). Therefore,
the court will dismiss with prejudice the claims raised against Fitzgerald and Clarkson.

8. Discrimination
Defendants move for dismissal of the discrimination claims on the grounds that
plaintiff has not adequately alleged claims of race and religious discrimination. In order
to state a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination based upon religion, plaintiff must
set forth sufficient factual allegations for this court to infer: (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she suffered some form of adverse employment action; and
(3) nonmembers of the protected class were differently treated. Abramson v. William
Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2001) (setting forth the elements of

a "disparate treatment" theory of religious discrimination). The same test applies to

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plaintiff's Title VII claim of race discrimination. See, e.g., Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852
F.2d 715, 726 (3d Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff's conclusory allegations fall short of the level of detail required to state a
discrimination claim. For example, plaintiff failed to indicate the nature of her own
religious affiliation (or lack thereof) or her race in order to establish membership in a
protected class, the specific details of how she was harassed and intimidated on
account of those religious views or her race, or any adverse employment action
stemming from the alleged discrimination because of her religion or race. Plaintiff has
filed a lengthy amended complaint with numerous exhibits. Her filings, however, do not
speak to race and religious discrimination. Instead, plaintiff alleges (in a conclusory
manner) that she was terminated based upon race and religion. These bare allegations
do not plausibly suggest that she is entitled to relief and do not suffice to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. Accordingly, the
court will grant the motion to dismiss the discrimination claims. Plaintiff will be given
leave to amend the claims as to the State of Delaware.

C. Retaliation
Defendants move for dismissal of the retaliation claim on the grounds that the
allegations fail to establish a prima facie retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits employers
from retaliating against "any individual ... because [s]he has opposed any ... unlawful
employment practice" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The crux of a retaliation
claim rests on whether plaintiff can show "there was a causal connection between the
employee's participation in [a] protected activity and the adverse employment action."

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Blakney v. City of Philadelphia, 559 F. App'x 183, 185 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished)

(citing Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Similar to the discrimination claims, plaintiff fails to provide facts to support a
claim of retaliation. Notably, there are no allegations that plaintiff engaged in protected
activity that gave rise to the disciplinary action taken against her. Accordingly, the court
will dismiss the retaliation claim. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend the claim as to the
State of Delaware.

V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss. (D.I.
18) Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint to cure the pleading
defects against the State of Delaware. The claims against Fitzgerald and Clarkson will
be dismissed with prejudice.
A separate order shall issue.

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