Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al v. Watson Laboratories Inc. et al

Filing 350

MEMORANDUM ORDER providing rulings regarding Motions in Limine (see Memorandum Order for further details). Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 10/26/2015. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICTCOURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

RECKITT BENCKISER
PHARMACEUTICALS INC., RB
PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED, and
MONOSOL RX, LLC,
Civil Action No. 13-1674-RGA

. Plaintiffs,
v.
WATSON LABORATORIES, INC. and
ACTAVIS LABORATORIES UT, INC.,
Defendants.

RECKITT BENCKISER
PHARMACEUTICALS INC., RB
PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED, and
MONOSOL RX, LLC,
· Plaintiffs,

v.

Civil Action No. 14-422-RGA

PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. and
INTELGENX TECHNOLOGIES CORP.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court are: (1) the Motion in Limine of Plaintiffs Reckitt Benckiser
Pharmaceuticals Inc., RB Pharmaceuticals Limited, and MonoSol Rx, LLC (collectively,
"Plaintiffs") (D.I. 341-1); (2) the Motion in Limine of Defendants Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. and

IntelGenx Technologies Corp. ("Par") and Defendants Watson Laboratories, Inc. and Actavis
Laboratories UT, Inc. ("Watson") (collectively, "Defendants") (D.I. 341-4); and (3) Watson's
Motion in Limine to preclude Plaintiffs from Relying on "Partitioning" Analysis (D.I. 341-7).
For· the reasons stated below, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Plaintiffs' motion to preclude Defendants' expert Dr. Mansoor Amiji from

testifying regarding the invalidity of the '514 and '832 patents is GRANTED. Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, the Court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of "needlessly presenting cumulative evidence:" Dr.
Amiji relied on the expert reports of Defendants' other experts, Dr. Dyar and Dr. Bley, in
forming his opinions regarding whether the asserted claims of the '514 and '832 patents were
obvious in light of the prior art. (D.I. 341-1 at 7-8, 12-13). Dr. Amiji's obviousness opinions
with respect to the asserted claims of the '514 and '832 patents lack reasoning or analysis. (See

id.). I therefore conclude that the probative value of his testimony regarding those opinions
would be substantially outweighed by its being needlessly cumulative of testimony provided by
Dr. Dyar and Dr. Bley. 1

2.

Defendants' motion to preclude Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Langer from relying on

certain post-dated references in support of his nonobviousness opinion as to the asserted claims
of the '514patent is DENIED. Defendants maintain that the references are inadmissible hearsay
if offered to prove that drug content uniformity was a problem in the field at the time of the
invention. (D.I. 341-4 at 3). Plaintiffs offer the references not for the truth of the matter
asserted, but rather to show the state of the art, and therefore as bases upon which Dr. Langer
concludes that the '514 patent was novel and not obvious. (See D.I. 341-4 at 27). Further, an

1

The general rule of thumb, in this District, at least, is that a party is not allowed to present more than one expert to
say the same thing.

2

expert may rely on inadmissible evidence "[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably
rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject." Fed. R. Evid. 703.
The facts or data relied on by the expert must be reliable and "good grounds" for his opinion. In

re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Fed. R. Evid. 702). Defendants argue that Dr.
Langer's opinions regarding the references at issue do not satisfy the Daubert standards because
he "merely recites the teaching of these references without independently assessing the reliability
of the techniques described in those references, and without connecting the analyses in those
references to the prior-art relied upon in this case." (D.I. 341-4 at 3). Defendants further argue
that the references do not contain any facts or data upon which an expert in his field would
reasonably rely because many of them do not contain facts or data at all. (Id.).
Plaintiffs respond, and I agree, that "literature[] written by scientists unaffiliated with the
parties and before any litigation" can be a reliable basis for Dr. Langer's opinion. (D.I. 341-5 at
2); cf United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1143 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
expert reports "prepared for purposes oflitigation are not, by definition, of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition to
the fact that the references were not prepared for litigation or authored by the parties, as peerreviewed journal articles, a master's thesis, and a patent application, the references can be "~ood
grounds" for the limited purposes for which Dr. Langer relied on them because they are the types
of references vetted, if to varying degrees, by other members of the authors' field. I therefore
conclude that Dr. Langer could reasonably rely on the references to evaluate whether drug
content uniformity was an unresolved problem in the field and whether there existed objective
indicia of nonobviousness such as praise for the invention.

3

Defendants argue that, even ifthe post-dated nonobviousness references at issue are
admissible under Rule 703, they are irrelevant because they bear no relationship to the prior art
asserted to prove obviousness. (D.I. 341-4 at 4). First, as Plaintiffs point out, the references are ·
not irrelevant simply by virtue of having been published after the patent priority date. (D.I. 3415 at 4); see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm., Inc., 748 F.3d 1354, 1360
(Fed. Cir.) (recognizing that evidence ofnonobviousness arising after the date of invention can
be relevant), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 759 (2014). Second, Defendants' argument that Dr.
Langer's reliance on the references is not responsive to their expert's obviousness opinion relates
to the proper weight to be afforded Dr. Langer's testimony rather than its admissibility.
Defendants' motion is denied for the reasons stated above. By denying the motion, Ido
not mean to indicate that any particular use of the references is proper, and thus Defendants
should renew any objections they want to preserve at the appropriate time in the trial.
3.

Watson's motion to preclude Plaintiffs from relying on Dr. Yau's "partitioning"

infringement analysis is DENIED. Watson argues that Dr. Yau's partitioning analysis relating
to infringement of the '150 patent should be excluded because it is irrelevant in light of the claim
limitations and prosecution history. (D.I. 341-7 at 2). The partitioning analysis, according to
Watson, does not address whether Watson's ANDA Products comprise a combination oflow
average molecular weight polyethylene oxide ("PEO") and high average molecular weight PEO,
as required by the '150 patent. (D.I. 341-7 at 4). Plaintiffs respond that Dr. Yau's testimony is
eminently relevant because it "will show that although Watson's ANDA Product is made from
one commercial grade of [PEO], that grade contains a combination of 'low molecular weight
[PEO] ... 'and 'highermolecularweight[PEO] ... 'as recited in claim 1 ofthe '150Patent."

4

(D.I. 341-9 at 2). Watson's motion raises questions appropriate for the trier of fact and it is
therefore denied.

Entered this 2f, day of October, 2015.

·ct Judge

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