Aime v. Lordes Valley Immigration Facility et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 2/18/16. (sar)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
OBENSON BIEN AIME,
Petitioner,
v.
Civ. No. 13-1686-SLR
WARDEN OF LORDES VALLEY
IMMIGRATION FACILITY, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.
Obenson Bien Aime. Prose petitioner.
Morgan Taylor Zurn. Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
February /B , 2016
Wilmington, Delaware
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the court is petitioner Obenson Bien Aime's ("petitioner")
application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1 (D.I. 1) Petitioner
filed the application while in federal custody subject to an Agreement to Return to serve
his Delaware Level 4 sentence; he has since been deported. 2 (D.I. 9 at 3 n.1) For the
reasons that follow, the court will dismiss his application.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner was arrested on May 31, 2012 and again on September 4, 2012. (D.I.
9 at 1) On November 21, 2012, he pied guilty to one charge of second degree robbery
and one charge of attempted second degree robbery. (D.I. 11, Del. Super. Ct. Crim.
Dkt. Crim. Act. No. PS120604411, Dkt. Entry 13; D.1.11, Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Dkt. Crim.
Act. No. PS 12090607 Dkt. Entry 8) The State no/le prossed the charges of underage
possession or consumption of alcohol, criminal trespass, and two other attempted
robbery charges. (D. I. 9 at1)
On January 11, 2013, the Superior Court sentenced petitioner as follows: (1) for
the second degree robbery conviction, five years at Level V with credit for 158 days
previously served, suspended for one year at Level IV in a residential substance abuse
1The
court notes that petitioner was in federal custody when he filed the instant
application and asserts his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, his arguments
are more properly considered under § 2254, because he is challenging his Delaware
state court convictions and sentence. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir.
2001 ).
Petitioner's deportation does not affect the court's jurisdiction to consider this case
because petitioner was "in custody" when he filed the instant application. See Spencer
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)(the "custody" requirement in§ 2254 is determined at
the time the application is filed).
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program, with the balance of the sentence suspended for one year at Level Ill; and (2)
for the attempted second degree robbery conviction, five years at Level V, suspended
for one concurrent year at Level Ill. (D.I. 11, Sentence Order (Del. Super. Jan. 11,
2013)) Petitioner did not appeal his convictions and sentence or seek post-conviction
review pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
On January 18, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security lodged a detainer
against petitioner, asserting reason to believe he was an alien subject to removal from
the United States. (D. I. 9 at 2) On July 17, 2013, petitioner filed in the Delaware
Superior Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Superior Court denied that
petition on July 24, 2013. Petitioner did not appeal that decision. Id.
Petitioner timely filed the instant application on October 10, 2013. (D.I. 1) He
was deported on December 17, 2013. (D.I. 9 at 2, 9) The State filed an answer (D.I. 9),
arguing that the court should deny the application because the claims are procedurally
barred.
Ill. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
A federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). One prerequisite to federal habeas review is that
a petitioner must exhaust all remedies available in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1 ). The exhaustion requirement is grounded on principles of comity to ensure
that state courts have the initial opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to
state convictions. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner
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satisfies the exhaustion requirement by "fairly presenting" the substance of the federal
habeas claim to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction
proceeding, and in a procedural manner permitting the state courts to consider it on the
merits. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.
346, 351 (1989).
A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural
rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d
153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although
treated as technically exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted.
Lines, 208 F.3d at 160; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Similarly,
if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court "clearly
and expressly" refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and
adequate state procedural rule, the claim is exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64 (1989).
A federal court cannot review the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless
the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice
resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court
does not review the claims. McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999);
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a
petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner must show that the
errors during his trial created more than a possibility of prejudice; he must show that the
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errors worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 494.
Alternatively, if a petitioner demonstrates that a "constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent," Murray, 477 U.S. at
496, then a federal court can excuse the procedural default and review the claim in
order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S.
446, 451 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2001 ). The miscarriage
of justice exception applies only in extraordinary cases, and actual innocence means
factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623
(1998); Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. A petitioner establishes actual innocence by asserting
"new reliable evidence - -whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - - that was not presented at trial,"
showing that no reasonable juror would have voted to find the petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2004).
IV. DISCUSSION
Petitioner's application presents the following three grounds for relief: (1) his
plea agreement is invalid; (2) he was prosecuted on the basis of his race in violation of
his due process rights; and (3) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.
The record reveals that petitioner never presented these arguments to the
Delaware Supreme Court because he did not file a direct appeal or a post-conviction
appeal. Although petitioner did file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, he
did not appeal the Superior Court's denial of that petition. Given these circumstances,
petitioner did not exhaust state remedies for any of his three claims.
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At this juncture, petitioner would be time-barred from presenting these claims to
the Delaware state courts in a new Rule 61 motion in order to have an opportunity to
appeal any adverse decision to the Delaware Supreme Court. See Tribuani v. Phelps,
820 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 n.2 (D. Del. 2011 ). Consequently, the court must excuse
petitioner's failure to exhaust but treat the claims as procedurally defaulted, meaning
that the court cannot review their merits absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or
that petitioner is actually innocent.
Petitioner has not alleged, and the court cannot discern, any cause for his default
of his claims. In the absence of cause, the court will not address the issue of prejudice.
Additionally, the court concludes that petitioner's default should not be excused under
the miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default doctrine, because he has
not provided new reliable evidence of his actual innocence.
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the court will deny claims one, two, and
three as procedurally barred from federal habeas review.
V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The court must decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 22.2 (2011 ). The court may issue a certificate of appealability only when a
petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This showing is satisfied when the petitioner demonstrates "that
reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the denial of a
constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Further, when a federal court denies a habeas application on procedural grounds
without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, the prisoner must demonstrate that
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jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the application states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was correct in its
procedural ruling. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that petitioner's habeas
application must be denied. Reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion
debatable. Consequently, petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right, and a certificate of appealability will not be issued.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will deny petitioner's application for habeas
relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. An appropriate order will be entered.
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