Jackson v. Gott et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 1/15/14. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
NATHANIEL L. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
JEFFREY A. GOTT, et al.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. No. 13-1705-SLR
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MEMORANDUM
1. Introduction. Plaintiff Nathaniel L. Jackson ("plaintiff') is a pretrial detainee
at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware, who proceeds
pro se and has been granted in forma pauperis status. He filed this complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violations of his constitutional rights. 1 (D.I. 3) He also
requests counsel. (D.I. 7)
2. Standard of Review. This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable
time, certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to
state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in

which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
(prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all
factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a
prose plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);
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When bringing a§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has
deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because plaintiff proceeds prose, his

pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

3. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(i) and

§ 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional"
factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmi/1, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir.
1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to
give it back).
4. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(8)(ii) and § 1915A(b)( 1) is identical to the legal standard used
when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a
claim under§ 1915(e)(2)(8)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court must grant plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

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5. A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements." /d. at 1949. When determining whether dismissal is
appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are
separated. /d. The court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions. /d. at 210-11. Second, the court must
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff
has a "plausible claim for relief." 2 /d. at 211. In other words, the complaint must do
more than allege plaintiff's entitlement to relief; rather it must "show" such an
entitlement with its facts. /d. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has
not shown- that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
6. Allegations in the Complaint. In the early morning of August 10, 2013,
plaintiff was detained by the Dover Police Department, arrested, and taken to the police
station where he was questioned by defendant Jeffrey A. Gott ("Gott"), a detective with
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A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." /d. "Where a
complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief."' /d.

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the Dover Police Department, about an assault. Gott was told that a fellow officer had
seen two individuals running in the direction of the house where plaintiff was sleeping.
Gott was also told that plaintiff had been awakened by gunshots. The house was not
plaintiff's home; he was only spending the night there. During questioning, Gott told
plaintiff that, "because he couldn't help him by giving information," plaintiff would be
charged with possession of weapons that were found in the basement ceiling of the
residence. Plaintiff indicated to Gott that "he knew nothing and he couldn't be charged
with weapons due to it not being his home .... plaintiff explained that he had a job that
he needed to get to." (D. I. 3)
7. That evening, plaintiff was charged with assault first degree, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, possession by a person prohibited, and
conspiracy second degree. Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely charged with the crimes.
Plaintiff alleges Gott did not conduct a proper and full investigation and that he lost his
job due to the charges. Plaintiff further alleges that he was maliciously prosecuted,
arrested, and detained without probable cause "due to original suspects were identified
before transported" to the

vee.

8. With regard to defendant Delaware State News ("State News"), plaintiff
alleges that he was defamed in a newspaper article and when the news station ran the
story that he was involved in assault in the first degree. Plaintiff alleges that defendant
Tim Stump ("Stump"), the captain of the Dover Police Department, made several
comments to the State News that plaintiff and other individuals were chased into the
home where plaintiff spent the night. Plaintiff seeks lost wages and compensatory
damages.

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9. Unlawful Detention and Arrest. Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully
detained and arrested because Gott did not conduct an adequate investigation and
arrested plaintiff simply because he was unable to provide Gott with information of the
alleged crimes.
10. "To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without
probable cause." 3 James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012); see
also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994). A claim for false imprisonment

arises when a person is arrested without probable cause and is subsequently detained
pursuant to that unlawful arrest. See Adams v. Se/horst, 449 F. App'x 198, 201 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). A claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a
detention pursuant to that arrest refers only to the period of incarceration lasting from
the moment of arrest until the first legal action, e.g., an arraignment. See Groman, 47
F.3d at 636. "False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of
the latter," Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007), and the damages recoverable
under such claims are limited to those ensuing from the period of detention until the first
legal action. See Connelly v. Wren, 2013 WL 74233, at *4 (D. N.J. Jan. 4, 2013).

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'"Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and the circumstances within
the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable
person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested."' Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). The arresting
officer must only reasonably believe at the time of the arrest that an offense is being
committed, a significantly lower burden than proving guilt at trial. See Wright v. City of
Phi/a., 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005).

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Liberally construing the allegations as the court must, the allegations suffice to state a
claim that plaintiff was arrested without probable cause. Plaintiff will be allowed to
proceed with the unlawful detention and arrest claim raised against Gott.
11. Malicious Prosecution. Plaintiff alleges malicious prosecution. "To prevail
on a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the
plaintiffs favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the
defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice;
and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure
as a consequence of a legal proceeding." See McKenna v. City of Phi/a., 582 F.3d 447,
461 (3d Cir. 2009).
12. It appears that plaintiff's criminal case remains pending as indicated by
Vinelink, a database that provides for the location of inmates and whether charges are
pending in the State of Delaware. See www.vinelink.com. Because there has been no
final determination in plaintiffs criminal proceeding, the complaint fails to allege the
elements of a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court will dismiss the claim
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(i) and§ 1915(A)(b)(1).
13. Defamation. Plaintiff raises a supplemental State claim of defamation
against State News and Stump. Under Delaware law, generally, the elements of
defamation are: (1) a defamatory communication; (2) publication; (3) the
communication refers to the plaintiff (4) a third party's understanding of the
communication's defamatory character and (5) injury. Bickling v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
872 F.Supp.1299, 1307 (D. Del.1994).

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14. Plaintiff alleges that Stump told the State News that plaintiff and other
individuals were chased into the home where plaintiff was spending the night. Plaintiff,
who denies that he was involved in the assault at issue, further alleges that State News
defamed him in an article and news station story when it stated that plaintiff was
involved in the assault.
15. Liberally construing the allegations, the court finds that plaintiff has alleged a
supplemental State claim of defamation against Stump and State News. Plaintiff will be
allowed to proceed with the claims.
16. Request for Counsel. Plaintiff requests counsel on the grounds that he has
limited access to legal materials, he cannot properly investigate this matter due to his
incarceration, he has little knowledge of litigation procedure, and counsel has "more
free range of motion in properly investigating this matter." (0.1. 7)
17. A prose litigant proceeding in forma pauperis has no constitutional or
statutory right to representation by counsel. 4 See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F. 3d 187,
192 (3d Cir. 2011); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). However,
representation by counsel may be appropriate under certain circumstances, after a
finding that a plaintiffs claim has arguable merit in fact and law. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155.

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18. After passing this threshold inquiry, the court should consider a number of
factors when assessing a request for counsel, including:
( 1) the plaintiffs ability to present his or her own case;

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See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296
(1989) (§ 1915(d) (now§ 1915(e)(1 )) does not authorize a federal court to require an
unwilling attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant, the operative word in the statute
being "request.".

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(2) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; (3) the degree
to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability
of the plaintiff to pursue investigation; (4) the plaintiffs capacity
to retain counsel on his own behalf; (5) the extent to which a
case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; and
(6) whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses.
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57; accord Parham, 126 F.3d at 457; Montgomery v. Pinchak,

294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002).
19. Plaintiff's filings indicate that he possesses the ability to adequately pursue
his claims. Moreover, this case is in its early stages. Upon consideration of the record,
the court is not persuaded that representation by an attorney is warranted at this time.
The court can address the issue at a later date should counsel become necessary.
Therefore, the court will deny the request for counsel without prejudice to renew.
20. Conclusion. For the above reasons, the court concludes that, with the
exception of the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff has alleged what appear to be
cognizable and non-frivolous claims against defendants. Plaintiff will be allowed to
proceed with the unlawful detention and arrest and defamation claims. The malicious
prosecution claim will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
and§ 1915A(b)(1 ). Plaintiffs request for counsel will be denied without prejudice to
renew. (D. I. 7) A separate order shall issue.

Dated: January

15 , 2014

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