Merritt v. Pierce et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 8/23/16. (nmb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
DAVID MERRITT,
Petitioner,
v.
DAVID PIERCE, Warden
and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. 13-1734-GMS
MEMORANDUM
I.
BACKGROUND
In 2010, a Delaware Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner David Merritt ("Merritt")
on eight counts of first degree rape, one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, and two
counts of first degree unlawful sexual contact. The convictions stemmed from Merritt's sexual
abuse of his older daughter. He was sentenced to a total of 127 years of imprisonment. The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Merritt's convictions. See Merritt v. State, 2011 WL 285097
(Del. Jan. 27, 2011).
Merritt tiled a Rule 61 motion in the Delaware Superior Court, which was denied. The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision. See Merritt v. State, 77 A.3d 272 (Table), 2013
WL 5432824 (Del. Sept. 24, 2013). Thereafter, Merritt tiled in this court a petition and an
amended petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("petition"), challenging
his 2010 convictions. (D.1. 2; D.1. 7; D.L 8) The petition alleges three grounds for relief:
insufficient evidence, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the unconstitutional denial of
counsel during his Rule 61 proceedings in the Delaware state courts. The State tiled an answer
to the petition, arguing that claim one should be denied as procedurally barred, claim two should
be denied as meritless, and claim three should be denied for failing to assert an issue cognizable
on federal habeas review. (D.1. 15 at 4)
Merritt filed a reply to the answer (D.!. 20), a supplemental reply (D.1. 23), and a second
supplemental memorandum (D.1. 34). When granting Merritt's motion to file his second
supplemental memorandum, the court informed Merritt that briefing was complete and it would
not entertain any future amendments. (D.1. 33) Eighteen days later, on March 21, 2016, Merritt
filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking issuance of the writ. (D'!.36)
II.
DISCUSSION
Although not the standard practice, it appears that a party may technically file a motion
for summary judgment in federal habeas proceeding. See Rule 12 of Rules Governing 2254
Cases, 28 U.S.C. foIl. § 2254. Summary judgment will only be appropriate when "the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact
exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party has the
initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The existence of a factual dispute will not preclude
summary judgment when the dispute does not involve a material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248.
The instant motion for summary judgment merely duplicates the arguments asserted in
Merritt's habeas petition, supplementing his argument that there was insufficient evidence of
penetration to support his rape convictions and his contention that the transcripts were
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"fabricated." When viewed in context with the fact that Merritt filed the instant motion with
eighteen days of being informed that the court would not consider any future
supplements/amendments, the instant motion appears to be an effort to circumvent the court's
notice that it would not entertain any further supplements/amendments. On this basis alone, the
court is inclined to deny the motion.
In addition, the factual assertions in the State's answer contradict Merritt's argument that
there was no basis for his rape convictions and his argument that defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance. I These factual disputes are "genuine issues of material fact" since they go
to the very essence of Merritt's arguments. As such, the court will deny the instant motion for
summary judgment because the genuine issues of material fact preclude it from ruling in
Merritt's favor at this juncture. The court will address the merits of the petition in due course.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Merritt's motion for summary
judgment should be denied because he is unable to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated:
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,2016
IThe State contends that the insufficient evidence claim is procedurally defaulted and therefore
procedurally barred from federal habeas review. The genuine issues of material fact affect
Merritt's ability to satisfy the miscarriage ofjustice exception to the procedural default doctrine
as it applies to his insufficient evidence claim.
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