Jones v. Waste Management Inc.
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/18/15. (rwc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
MARCUS JONES,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 13-1765-LPS
v.
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. OF
DELAWARE,
Defendant.
Marcus J ones, Middletown, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Laurence V. Cronin, Esquire, Smith, Katzenstein & Jenkins, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware and
Barbara Rittinger Rigo and Holly Rich, Esquires, Littler Mendelson, P.c., Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Counsel for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
March 18,2015
Wilmington, Delaware
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Marcus Jones ('Jones" or "Plaintiff') filed this action on October 28, 2013, against
Defendant Waste Management, Inc. of Delaware ("Waste Management" or "Defendant") pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964, as amended, alleging employment discrimination by
reason of race and retaliation.! (D.l. 1,4) Initially, Jones was represented by counsel, but he now
proceeds pro se. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.l. 33)
J ones did not file an opposition to the motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the
motion.
II.
BACKGROUND
Jones began his employment with Waste Management' at its Wilmington, Delaware facility
as a residential driver in May 2007. (D.l. 36 Ex. L at APP119-121, 126) A few months later, he
became a swing driver and held that position until his employment was terminated effective March
1,2012. (Id. at APP122) Swing drivers serve as backup drivers for routes that need coverage; either
commercial, residential, or roll-ofe (Id. at APP121, 129) Jones mostly covered residential and rolloff routes. (Id. at APP163) Jones' supervisors included residential managers Tim Richards
("Richards") and Andrew Short ("Short") and roll-off manager Douglas Sorantino ("Sorantino").
(Id. at APP124-26, 207) Richards is African American and Short and Sorantino are Caucasian. (Id.
at Exs. H; L at APP227, 262; M at APP276)
lThe original complaint named the defendant as Waste Management, Inc.
'-Waste Management provides waste disposal and recycling services to residential and
commercial customers.
3Roll-off drivers move large containers of waste, typically from construction sites. (D.l. 36
Ex. L at APP162, 255)
1
During the Spring of 2010, Waste Management found it was unable to compete for major
contracts because of its driver pay rates. (1d. at Ex. S at ~ 3) Waste Management conducted a
comparative analysis of its drivers' pay against that of its competitors, including the region where
Jones worked - in Wilmington, Delaware
and discovered that it paid its drivers substantially more
than its competitors. (Id. at ~ 4) The pay differential detrimentally affected its business in many
districts, including Wilmington. (Id. at ~ 5) As a result of its analysis, Waste Management
implemented a new hourly rate banding system that took into account a driver's years of experience,
current rate, and market rate for the region. (Id. at ~ 6) According to Liz Bieler ("Bieler"), a human
resources generalist for Waste Management, an employee's race was not taken into account when
making the pay rate determination. (1d. at ~ 7)
All drivers were given advance notice of the new system and the new pay rates became
effective in August 2010. (Id. at Exs. L at APP140-42, 147; S at ~ 9) Jones testified that he worked
with two other swing drivers, Wayne Gilley ("Gilley") and John Shields ("Shields"), both of whom
he believes are Caucasian. (1d. at Ex. L at APP127-28) Jones, Gilley, and Shields were affected by
the new system and all had their pay reduced by varying degrees, depending upon their years of
service. (1d. at Ex. S at ~~ 10-12)
Waste Management has a confidential, toll-free, integrity helpline ("helpline") available to
employees year-round, twenty-four hours per day, seven days a week. (Id. at Ex. L at APP165-66)
Jones called the helpline on March 10,2011 to complain that Richards, his supervisor, was looking
for ways to terminate him after Richards discussed the attendance policy with Jones following Jones'
violations of the attendance policy. (1d. at Exs. E; R at ~ 4) Jones found it suspicious that Richards
approached him about attendance issues only after Jones complained that he was not paid as much
as his co-workers following the August 2010 wage adjustments. (1d. at Ex. E)
2
During the relevant rime, Waste Management had a policy regarding preventable accidents
that was published in the company's employee handbook. (Id. at Exs. B; L at APP134-37, 219-20)
The policy provided that drivers were progressively disciplined for accidents deemed preventable as
follows: (1) a first offense in any twelve-month period resulted in a written warning; (2) a second
offense in any twelve-month period resulted in a three-day suspension and a final warning; and (3) a
third offense in any twelve-month period resulted in termination. (Id. at Exs. B at ~ 5; L at APP136
38; T
at~
4)
Jones was involved in three safety-related accidents during a twelve-month period: on April
20,2011, October 24, 2011, and February 24, 2012. Each accident was investigated and it was
determined by Waste Management that each accident was preventable. (Id. at Exs. F, G, I) Jones
received a written warning for the first accident. (Id. at Exs. C, F, L at APPl77-79) Jones signed
the written warning indicating that he understood the discipline. (!d. at Ex. F)
Following the second accident, Jones was issued and served a three-day suspension. (Id. at
Exs. G, L at APPl96-97, 199-200) Jones called the helpline and complained that the suspension
was unfair, but he does not recall if he complained of race discrimination or retaliation. (Id. at Ex. L
at APP200, 201-03, 243) At this point, Jones suspected retaliation for complaining about his
decrease in pay and requested a copy of his personnel file from various Waste Management
personnel. (Id. at APP271) Human resources looked for Jones' file, but could only find Jones'
application of employment. (Id.) During his deposition, Jones was shown various documents from
his personnel file, all of which contained his signature. (Id. at APP271-72)
After the third accident on February 24, 2012, Jones was notified by Sorantino and Short on
February 27, 2012 that he would be suspended pending investigation and that he might be
terminated. (Id. at Exs. B, I, L at APP208-11, 216-17) On the same day he was suspended, Jones
3
called the helpline after he had spoken to Sorantino and complained that Sorantino and/or Short4
had discriminated agamst him based upon his race, they did not treat everyone equally, and
Caucasian employees who had similar accidents were not terminated. (Id. at Exs. H, U) Jones
testified that he had never before complained about Sorantino, but felt that Sorantino was a bigot
because he and Short are related through marriage. (Id. at Ex. L at APP225-26, 240-241) Jones had
prior issues with Short, but he had never accused Short of racism. (Id. at APP242-43)
Jones testified that he did not know when the decision was made to terminate his
employment. (Id. at Ex. L at APP236) Unbeknownst to Jones, Sorantino had made the decision to
terminate Jones' employment prior to the time Jones called the helpline, as it had been determined
that Jones had three preventable accidents in twelve months in violation of Waste Management
policy. (Id. at Ex. U) Sorantino was never infonned ofJones' February 27, 2012 helpline telephone
call. (Id.)
A termination document, dated March 1,2012, states that Jones was terminated pursuant to
Waste Management policies, effective March 1,2012, due to a third preventable accident within a
twelve-month period. (Id. at Ex. I at APP066-67) Jones was infonned of his termination by
Sorantino and Short on March 2, 2012. (Id. at Ex. L at APP222-23, 235-36) Following his
termination, Jones called the helpline and complained that the accident was not attributable to him,
as there was a mechanical issue with the brakes. (Id. at Ex. H) Jones was advised on March 6, 2012
that Lumpkin would investigate his complaint. (Id.) Lumpkin called Jones on March 29, 2012 and
asked him to provide a copy of the driver's incident report for the accident, but Jones refused. (Id.)
.vrhe helpline notes refer to Sorantino, but the affidavit of human resources manager Shawn
Lumpkin ("Lumpkin") states that Jones complained about Short. (See id. at Exs. H, U)
4
Jones did not cooperate with Lumpkin because he did not know who to trust. (Id. at Ex. L at APP239)
Jones filed a charge of discrimination on May 30, 2012, alleging race discrimination and
retaliation in the form of suspension and discharge. (Id. at Ex. J) The charge of discrimination
states that John Quick (presumably a reference to John Quirk) remained employed despite receiving
three suspensions in one year for four different incidents. (!d.) The evidence of record indicates
that John Quirk is identified as an American Indian and that during the time he was employed by
Waste Management, he did not incur three preventable accidents within a rolling twelve-month
period. (Id. at Ex. T)
The charge of discrimination also alleges Jones' termination was a result of retaliation after
he telephoned the helpline on February 27, 2012 and was discharged within four days. (Id. at Exs. J,
K) Jones testified that the February 27, 2012 helpline telephone call was the cause for the
retaliation. (Id. at Ex. L at APP250-51) According to Waste Management, during agency
proceedings, Jones also complained of his pay reduction and alleged that Waste Management denied
him access to his personnel file. (O.!. 34 at ~ ULK) Jones received a right-to-sue letter dated July
29,2013 and filed this action on October 28, 2013.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entided to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
fJ.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 ES. 574,586 n.10
(1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be - or, alternatively, is - genuinely disputed must be
supported either by citing to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
5
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,"
or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R.
Civ. p. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then
"come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court will "draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,150 (2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
586; see also Podohnik v. United States Postal SertJ., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cit. 2005) (stating party
opposing summary judgment "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment;" and a factual dispute is genuine only where
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. LibertY Lobf?y, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations
omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment
is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial").
Thus, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the non-moving party's position is
6
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be "evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find" for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
With respect to summary judgment in a discrimination case, the Court's role is "to detennine
whether, upon reviewing all the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, there exists sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." Hankins v. Temple Univ.,
829 F.2d 437, 440 (3d Cit. 1987).
Jones did not file a response to Waste Management's motion. The Court, however, will not
grant the entry of summary judgment without considering the merits of Defendant's unopposed
motion. See Stackhouse v. MaiJIrkiewic:v 951 F .2d 29, 30 (3d Cit. 1991) (holding that district court
should not have granted summary judgment solely on the basis that motion for summary judgment
was not opposed).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Jones alleges race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.c. § 2000e, et seq.
Waste Management moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Jones is unable
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) Jones cannot point to any discriminatory
inference with regard to his claim related to his personnel file; (3) Jones cannot rebut Waste
Management's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decisions; (4) Jones'
retaliation claims fails because he failed to adduce evidence to suggest a causal connection between
his protected activity and employment tennination; and (5) Jones cannot refute Waste
Management's legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for ending his employment.
7
A.
Tid~
VII, Race Discrimination
The amended complaint alleges that Waste Management discriminated against Jones on the
basis of his race when it: (1) disciplined Jones in a manner that was inconsistent with Waste
Management's treatment of Caucasian employees involved in similar, if not more severe, incidents;
(2) treated Jones differently from similarly situated employees of a different race by demoting Jones
to a lower pay grade than the Caucasian swing drivers, with no explanation besides advising Jones
that he was "making too much money;" and (3) failed to provide Jones with the full resources and
cooperation of the human resources department, including denying Jones the opportunity to inspect
his personnel file upon request pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 730 ef seq. (D.L 4, Count I)
Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ...
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a). A plaintiff may prove race
discrimination by direct evidence as set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 C.S. 228, 244-46
(1989), or indirectly through the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Cop. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Because there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the Court turns to the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under this framework, Jones must first establish a prima facie
case of race discrimination by proving that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered
some form of adverse employment action; and (3) this action occurred under circumstances that
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might occur when a similarly situated
person not of the protected class is treated differently. See Jones t'. School Dist. rifPhiladelphia, 198 F.3d
8
403,410 (3d Cit. 1999). The elements of a prima facie case may vary depending on the facts and
context of the particular situation. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys. Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352 (3d Cit. 1999).
If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
employer to proffer a "legitimate non-discriminatory" reason for its actions. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). If the defendant meets this burden, the burden again
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's
rationale is pretextual. Id. at 142-43. To do this, a plaintiff must "point to some evidence, direct or
citcumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer'S action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d
759, 764 (3d Cit. 1994) (citations omitted). "[f]o avoid summary judgment, the plaintiffs evidence
rebutting the employer'S proffered legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that
each of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason is a
pretext)." Harding v. Careerbuilder, U£, 168 F. App'x 535, 537 (3d Cit. Feb. 27,2006) (quoting
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764) (internal citations and other citations omitted).
Jones points to three instances of alleged race discrimination: (1) when his pay was
decreased; (2) when, following the second accident that occurred on October 26, 2011, he requested
his personnel file but he was given access only to his employment application; and
(3) when Waste Management determined that his third accident was preventable, he was disciplined,
and his employment terminated.
In two of these instances, Waste Management argues that Jones failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under Tide VII. With regard to the pay decrease, Waste Management
9
argues that Jones failed to establish that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might occur when a similarly situated person not
of the protected class is treated differently. To make a comparison ofJones' treatment to that of an
employee outside his protected class for purposes of a Title VII claim, he must show that he and the
employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects. See Houston v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 355 F.
App'x 651, 654 (3d Cir. Dec. 8,2009) (citations omitted). Whether a factor is relevant for purposes
of a similarly situated analysis must be determined by the context of each case. See id. at 654.
J ones is not required to show that he is identical to the comparator in each relevant factor,
"but he must show substantial similarity." Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, in order to establish
an appropriate class of similarly situated comparators, Jones must identify employees who share
characteristics that are relevant to the facts of this case. The evidence of record does not
demonstrate that J ones was treated differently from Caucasians with regard to the pay cut, but
instead that Waste Management implemented a district-wide pay reduction that affected the salaries
of all Wilmington drivers. Similar to Jones, his two comparators, Gilley and Shields, both of whom
are Caucasian, each received severe pay cuts. s In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Watson
has failed to meet his burden to establish a prima fade case of race discrimination.
With regard to the discipline that followed his third preventable accident, including his
termination, Waste Management again argues that Jones failed to establish that the discipline
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might
occur when a similarly situated person not of the protected class is treated differently. In a
5Jones made several complaints following his reduction pay, but did not directly relate the
pay reduction to race discrimination. However, he did testify that he told Short that he felt he was
being discriminated against because of the pay reduction (without mentioning race) and he also
speculated that Short did not like him because he is an African American. (D.l. 36 Ex. L at
APP153, 54, 268-69)
10
severance case, the relevant factors may include the positions held, policies or plans in effect, the
decisionmakers, and the timing of the separation. See Houston, 355 F. App'x at 655 (citing MtGuinnw
v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49,54-55 (2d Cit. 2001) (plaintiff established she was similarly situated to a
colleague who received more money in severance where the two employees "held positions of
roughly equivalent rank ... were fired at roughly the same time, [and] the decisions with respect to
the severance were both made at the highest levels of the company")).
In the instant case, Quirk, with whom Jones compares himself, is not slmilarly situated.
Quirk (who is not Caucasian, but American Indian), did not have three preventable accidents within
a year. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Watson has failed to meet his burden to
establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.
With regard to the failure to provide Jones his complete personnel file for review, Waste
Management argues that even if the act constitutes an adverse action, Jones cannot point to any
discriminatory inference. The evidence of record demonstrates that during his deposition Jones was
shown the documents from his personnel file, all of which he had signed, an indication that he had
seen the documents. In addition, there is no evidence of record that the personnel file was not
produced to Jones based upon his race. Finally, an adverse employment action is one "that is
serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment." Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cit. 2004). "Not everything that
makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action." Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,
441 (7th Cit.1996). Here, the Court cannot say that a missing personnel file significantly changed
Jones' employment status, particularly when all the items contained in the file were signed by Jones,
indicating that at least at some point he had knowledge of the documents.
11
Assuming arguendo that Jones established a prima facie case of discrimination, Waste
Management provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decisions it made.
The evidence indicates that Jones' pay was decreased in accordance with corporate policy, and that
he was suspended and tenninated in accordance with company policy following his second and third
preventable accidents. There is nothing before the Court that contradicts the proffered reason for
the employment actions taken by Waste Management. Nor are Waste Management's proffered
reasons for its actions weak, incoherent, implausible, or so inconsistent that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence. See Sarullo P. United States Postal Ser., 352 F.3d 789,
800 (3d Cir. 2003). Construing the record in the light most favorable to Jones, he has not provided
evidence from which a fact finder could either disbelieve Waste Management's articulated reasons,
or believe that a discriminatory reason was more likely than not the cause of the employment
actions. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
B.
Retaliation
The amended complaint alleges that Waste Management: (1) discriminated against Jones in
retaliation for Jones' continued follow-up and protest regarding his decrease in pay grade compared
to the other (Caucasian) swing drivers, as well as the three-day suspension he received; and (2)
retaliated against Jones when it purposefully disciplined Jones in a manner that was inconsistent with
Waste Management's treatment of similar situated Caucasian employees, which eventually resulted in
Jones'tennination. (D.l. 4, Count II) Waste Management moves for summary judgment on the
grounds that J ones failed to establish a causal connection between his helpline call and his
tennination from employment.
The elements of retaliation claim are that: (1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) the
employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection
12
between the protected activity and the employer's action. See LeBoon v. L:mcasterJewish Comty. Ctr.
Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217,231 (3d Cit. 2007). A materially adverse employment action is an action that
"well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimIDation." Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,68 (2006) (citation and
internal quotation omitted). Whether an action is materially adverse "often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed." Id.
With respect to the causation prong, the Court considers whether a reasonable jury could
link the employer'S conduct to retaliatory animus. See Moore v. City ofPhilodelphia, 461 F.3d 331,342
(3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he ultimate question in any retaliation case is an intent to retaliate ....") (citation
omitted). In assessing this, the Court considers the "temporal proximity" between the plaintiffs
protected activity and the employer's allegedly retaliatory response, and "the existence of a pattern
of antagonism in the intervening period." ld. at 450 (quotations and citations omitted). "The cases
that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an
adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case
uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be very close." Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (citing Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (three
month period insufficient); Hughes v. Denvinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (four month
period insufficient)).
Jones testified that his March 1,2012 termination by Sorantino was in retaliation for his
February 27, 2012 telephone call to the helpline, but conceded that he did not know when the
decision was made to terminate him. The evidence of record is that Sorantino made the decision to
terminate Jones prior to the time Jones made the February 27, 2012 helpline call. In addition, the
13
evidence of record is that Sorantino had no knowledge that Jones had called the helpline.
Accordingly, Jones has failed to adduce evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find a
causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse employment action taken against
him.
Even assuming arguendo that Jones had established a prima facie case of retaliation, Waste
Management has proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the actions it took. Jones was
involved in three preventable accidents within a one-year time-frame, each accident was investigated,
and pursuant to company policy Jones was disciplined following each accident, culminating in his
discharge from employment following the third preventable accident. Defendant's proffered
reasons for the actions it took are not so weak, incoherent, implausible, or inconsistent that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence. See Sarul/o v. United States
Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789,800 (3d Cir. 2003).
The Court finds that no reasonable jury could find for J ones on the retaliation issue, and,
therefore, will grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the retaliation issue
V.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(D.L 33).
An appropriate Order follows.
14
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