Ampro Computers Inc. v. LXE LLC et al.

Filing 157

MEMORANDUM ORDER re 121 MOTION for Reargument is DENIED. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/6/17. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
AMPRO COMPUTERS, INC., a California :
corporation,
Plaintiff,

.·

v.

: Civil Action No. 13-1937-LPS-MPT

LXE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, METROLOGIC
INSTRUMENTS, INC. d.b.a.
HONEYWELL SCANNING AND
MOBILITY, a New Jersey Corporation,
and DOES 1-10, inclusive,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER

1.

Plaintiff Ampro Computers, Inc. ("Ampro") moves for reargument of the Court's

July 1, 2016 Memorandum Order (D.I. 114), in which the Court denied Ampro's Motion for
Partial Relief (D.I. 57 ("Motion for Partial Relief')) from the Court's September 9, 2015 Order
granting Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 52 ("Partial Motion to Dismiss")) and
Ampro's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (D.I. 59 ("Motion for Leave to
Amend")).
2.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7 .1. 5, a motion for reconsideration should be granted only

"sparingly." The decision to grant such a motion lies squarely within the discretion of the district
court. See Dentsply Int'/, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 385, 419 (D. Del. 1999);
Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (D. Del. 1990). These types of motions

are granted only if the Court has patently misunderstood a party, made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented by the parties, or made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.

\
,I

1\

See Shering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 293, ~95 (D. Del. 1998); Brambles, 735 F.
I

Supp. at 1241. "A motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded on a request that a court
rethink a decision already made." Smith v. Meyers, 2009 WL 5195928, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 30,
2009); see also Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa.
1993). It is not an opportunity to "accomplish repetition of arguments that were or should have
been presented to the court previously." Karr v. Castle, 768 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Del.

1~91).

A motion for reconsideration may be granted only if the movant can show at least one of the
following: (i) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (ii) the availability of new
evidence not available when the court made its decision; or (iii) there is a need to correct a clear
error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. See Max's Seafood Cafe by Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). However, in no instance should reconsideration be
granted if it would not result in amendment of an order. See Schering Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d at
295.
3.

Having reviewed the parties' submissions (D.I. 121, 126), the Court concludes

that Plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate that reargument of these motions is
appropriate. Ampro' s "new evidence" does not cure the deficiencies of its earlier motion; as the
Court noted in its prior order, even if Ampro diligently pursued the evidence ppon which it now
seeks to rely, this later diligence does not retroactively excuse Ampro's lack of reasonable
diligence in pursuing such evidence prior to argument on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss.
(D .I. 41) The Court did not misunderstand Ampro' s earlier factual allegations or legal arguments
regarding when Ampro discovered the evidence supporting its Motion for Partial Relief. Instead,
the Court found that they did not warrant relief from the Court's order granting partial dismissal.
(See D.I. 114 ~ 5 (explaining that even if Court did credit Plaintiffs assertion that it discovered

evidence in September 2015, "that would merely shift the problem for Plaintiff from having had
actual knowledge in March 2015 to having constructive knowledge by that date"))
4.

With respect to its Motion for Leave to Amend, Ampro merely invites the Court

to reconsider the arguments it presented in its Motion for Partial Relief. As the Court explained
in its July 1 Order on that motion, granting Ampro's Motion for Leave to Amend would be
prejudicial to Defendants because it would force them to re-litigate issues already resolved in
their favor. Given that Ampro's Motion for Leave was unduly delayed due to Ampro's own
failure of diligence, such prejudice is unwarranted. The Court's analysis on this point is
unchanged by Ampro's identification, in the instant Motion for Reargument, of cumulative
evidence supporting the claims it would like to add.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs motion for reargument is
DENIED.

March 6, 201 7
Wilmington, Delaware