Ortiz-Garcia v. Morgan et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 3/25/14. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ANGEL ORTIZ-GARCIA,
Plaintiff,

v.

: Civ. No. 13-2017-RGA

PHILLIP MORGAN, et aI.,
Defendants.

Angel Ortiz-Garcia, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware,
Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

March ").{" 2014
Wilmington, Delaware

A~~~~dge:

Plaintiff Angel Ortiz-Garcia, an inmate at the Howard R. Young Correctional
Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (0.1. 5). The
Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(a).
On December 5, 2012, Plaintiff was classified to the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware, a maximum security institution, but as of the
date Plaintiff filed the Complaint, he remained housed at the HRYCI "surrounded by
unsentenced inmates. In return [he] got into a scuffle and [was] sent to the hole." (0.1.
3,

~

2). Plaintiff is afraid that he will hurt an unsentenced person and receive "extra

time." (Id. at ~ 3). He seeks a transfer to the VCC so that he may receive an
education, job skills, and readiness for his departure from incarceration when he returns
to society.
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma
pauperis and prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental defendant). The Court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se
plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to § 1915(e )(2)(8)(ii) and § 1915A(b)( 1) is identical to the legal standard used when
ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson

V.

Mayview State Hosp., 293

F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp.

V.

Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When determining whether dismissal
is appropriate, the court must take three steps: "(1) identify[] the elements of the claim,
(2) reviewD the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) 100kO at the
well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluat[e] whether all of the elements
identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus

V.

George, 641

F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the
complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2». Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." Id.

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It is well established that an inmate does not possess a liberty interest arising

from the Due Process Clause in assignment to a particular custody level or security
classification or a place of confinement. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22
(2005) (Constitution does not give rise to liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more
adverse conditions of confinement); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983).
The custody placement or classification of state prisoners within the State prison
system is among the "wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have
been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts." Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). '''As long as the conditions or degree of
confinement to which [a] prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him
and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in
itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.''' Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242
(1976». See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995). Therefore, Plaintiff can
succeed under the Due Process Clause only if state law or regulation has created a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in remaining free from administrative detention.
However, neither Delaware law nor Department of Correction regulations create a
liberty interest in a prisoner's classification within an institution. See 11 Del. C.

§ 6529(e).
In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that prison officials
have discretion to house inmates at the facilities they choose. Walls v. Taylor, 2004
WL 906550 (Del. 2004) (citing Brathwaite v. State, No. 169,2003 (Del. Dec. 29, 2003).
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate has no due

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process right to be incarcerated in a particular institution whether it be inside the state
of conviction, or outside that state. Olim v. Wakinekona,461 U.S. at 251. Plaintiffs
claim fails as a matter of law.
Therefore, the Complaint will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(8)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). The Court finds that further amendment is futile.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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