Stokes v. Rockford Center et al

Filing 72

MEMORANDUM - Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 2/8/16. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

DIMITRIOUS STOKES,
Plaintiff,
v.

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ROCKFORD CENTER and
MOLL Y JOHNSON,

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Defendants.

Civ. No. 13-20S7-GMS

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MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Dimitrious Stokes ("Stokes"), who appears pro se and was granted
permission to proceed informa pauperis, alleges employment discrimination pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pending are Stokes' motion for reconsideration (D.!. 61),
the motion for protective order (D.!. 68) of the defendants Rockford Center ("Rockford") and
Molly Johnson ("Johnson") (together "the defendants"), and Stokes' motion to strike the
defendants' motion (D.1. 71).
I.

Motion for Reconsideration
On December 29,2015, the court entered an order that denied Stokes' emergency motion

for expedited consideration or a protective order. (See D.L 60.) As stated in the order, it
appeared that Stokes sought relief with regard to appearing at his deposition. On January 6,
2016, Stokes filed a motion for reconsideration of emergency sanctions. (D.I. 61.) In addition,
he seeks a review of sealed filings maintained in the Clerk's Office, as opposed to those of
defense counsel, "for any inconsistencies." (ld.)

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to "correct manifest errors of law or fact or
to present newly discovered evidence." Max's Seafood Cafe ex rei. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669,677 (3d Cir. 1999). "A proper Rule 59(e) motion ... must rely on one of three
grounds: (l) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or
(3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Lazaridis v.

Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance
Co., 52 F.3d 1194,1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded
on a request that a court rethink a decision already made. See Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of

Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.O. Pa. 1993).
Stokes has failed to demonstrate any of the necessary grounds to warrant reconsideration
of the court's December 29,2015 order. Moreover, nothing in the record hints that emergency
sanctions against the defendants are warranted. In addition, the defendants advise the court that
documents filed under seal were also provided to Stokes. Therefore, the court will deny the
motion for reconsideration.

II.

Motion for Protective Order
The defendants move for a protective order. (0.1.68.) Stokes moves to strike the

motion. (0.1. 71.) The court will deny the motion to strike.
On January 22, 2015, the court entered a scheduling order for the completion of all
discovery on or before July 23, 2015. (D.l. 20.) The defendants state that on January 7, 2016,
Stokes contacted, or attempted to contact, Johnson (who is represented by counsel) at her place
of employment to inform Johnson of his intent to depose her. The defendants state that Stokes
never requested Johnson's deposition prior to January 7, 2016.
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Subsequently, the defendants asked Stokes to direct any discovery inquiries to counsel,
and not to Johnson, but Stokes refused citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4). The defendants request
that, to the extent Stokes seeks to obtain discovery, all efforts be made through defense counsel.
The defendants further request that Stokes refrain from calling Johnson's employer in an attempt
to contact her. With regard to the discovery deadline, the defendants ask that Stokes be barred
from seeking additional discovery. They note that Stokes made no effort to depose any
individuals during the six month discovery period. Finally, the defendants ask the court to
impose sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees.
In Stokes' motion to strike (D.L 71), he discusses tampering of his property, interference
with mail delivery, and speculates that his deposition transcript was either not delivered or it was
stolen from his mail. Stokes states that he only contacted Johnson after he received no response
from defense counsel. Finally, Stokes reminds the court that he acted in accordance with the
December 10, 2015 order that mandated his participation in his deposition.
A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order,
and the court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). At this juncture,
the court will deny the motion for protective order and for sanctions. Stokes proceeds pro se and
indicates that he only sought to contact Johnson after receiving no response from defense
counseL Hence, the court accords Stokes some leeway. Stokes, however, is placed on notice
that, in the future, he should not contact Johnson directly and should communicate only with her
attorney. Finally, the court notes that the discovery deadline has long expired, it has not been
extended and, while Stokes may serve discovery or attempt to depose individuals, the defendants

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are under no obligation to respond to his discovery requests. The court will consider a renewed
motion for sanction should Stokes disregard this memorandum and order.
For the above reasons, the defendants' motion is denied.

III.

Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the court will deny: (1) Stokes' motion for reconsideration

(0.1.61); (2) the defendant's motion for protective order (0.1.68); and Stokes' motion to strike
(OJ. 71).

An appropriate order will be entered.

E

ftki

,2016
Wilmington, Delaware

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