Pierre v. Beebe Hospital / Medical Center et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 4/29/14. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
RAYMOND PIERRE,

)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
) Civ. Action No. 13-2102-SLR
)
BEEBE HOSPITAL/MEDICAL CENTER,)
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et al.,
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Defendants.
)

MEMORANDUM
1. Introduction. Plaintiff Raymond Pierre ("plaintiff''), proceeds pro se and has
been granted in forma pauperis status. He filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 (a) and § 1985(3) and appears to assert civil rights, wrongful termination/
employment discrimination, and conspiracy claims.
2. Standard of Review. This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable
time, certain in forma pauperis actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim,
or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true
and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007). Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations
omitted).

3. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g.,
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit
alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
4. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on
Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscherv. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under

§ 1915(e)(2)(8)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hasp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
5. A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When determining whether dismissal
is appropriate, the court must take three steps: "(1) identify[] the elements of the claim,

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(2) review[] the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) look[] at the
well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluat[e] whether all of the elements
identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the
complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

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6. Allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiff was employed by the Beebe Medical
Center ("Beebe"), a not-for-profit community medical center with campuses located
throughout Sussex County, Delaware. Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully terminated on
an unnamed date by reason of race. The complaint alleges that defendant Cheryl Graf
("Graf'), who apparently works in human resources, did not "want to hear a word" from
plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Billy Graham ("Graham") 1 called him
names and, thus, defamed him. Finally, the complaint alleges that Beebe engaged in a
conspiracy. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
7. Discussion. The complaint, as it now stands, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Initially the court notes that there are no allegations
directed towards defendants Beebe Medical Center Pavillion, The Honorable William
Swain Lee, Jacquelyn 0. Wilson, Jeffrey M. Fried, Catherine C. Halen, Steven Rhone,

1

This case was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania before it was transferred here. Prior to the transfer, plaintiff
filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Graham as a defendant. (See D. I. 6)

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Alex A. Snydor, Allison "Rick" Lewis, Paul Temple, and Kathy Fryling. In addition,
plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner employment discrimination based upon a race
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 2 Finally, the complaint alleges that Beebe engaged in a
conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), again in a conclusory manner. 3 The
claims as currently pled are deficient. Accordingly, the court will dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. However, since it appears
plausible that plaintiff may be able to articulate a claim against defendants (or name
alternative defendants), he will be given an opportunity to amend his pleading. See
O'Dell v. United States Gov't, 256 F. App'x 444 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (leave to

amend is proper where the plaintiff's claims do not appear "patently meritless and
beyond all hope of redemption").

2

The elements of a 42 U.S. C.§ 1981 claim are identical to those for a claim of
employment discrimination under Title VII. See Seldon v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 604, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citations omitted). Section 1981
prohibits "racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts." Wallace v.
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 214 F. App'x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
Section 1981 applies to employment contracts and provides a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race. Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). In order to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he
satisfactorily performed the duties required by his position, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) either similarly-situated non-members of the protected
class were treated more favorably or the adverse job action occurred under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. Wallace, 214 F. App'x at
144-45.

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3

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: "(1) a
conspiracy of two or more persons; (2) motivated by racial or class-based discriminatory
animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of person to the
equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an
injury to person or property or to the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States." Petrossian v. Collins, 479 F. App'x 409, 410 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001)).

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8. Conclusion. For the above reasons, the complaint will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the complaint. A
separate order shall issue.

Dated: April

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, 2014

UNITED STAT S DISTRICT JUDGE

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