Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC v. TC Heartland LLC et al

Filing 437

MEMORANDUM ORDER re 321 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Heartland Packaging Corporation, TC Heartland LLC is DENIED in all respects except that it is GRANTED with respect to pre-suit damages. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 1/12/17. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF :DELAWARE

KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS
LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

C.A. No. 14-28-LPS

TC HEARTLAND,LLC d/b/a
,
HEARTLAND FOOD PRODUCTS
GROUP and HEARTLAND
PACK.AGING CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

1.

On July 6, 2016, TC Heartland, LLC and Heartland Packaging Corporation

("Heartland" or "Defendants") moved for summary judgment of invalidity of U.S. Patent Nos.
8,511,472 (the '"472 patent") and 8,603,557 (the '"557 patent"). (D.I. 321) The parties have
fully briefed the motion (see D.l. 322, 355, 387; see also D.I. 419, 420, 421) and the Court heard
argument on this and other motions on August 30, 2016. (See D.I. 416 ("Tr."))
2.

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585.:86 (1986).
3.

According to

Heart~and,

undisputed facts show thatthe '557 patent is invalid

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because (i) it claims obvious subject matter (under 35 U.S.C. § 103 1), (ii) its claims are
inadequately described and enabled with respect to their "flavoring" element (under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112), and (iii) it violates the statutory prohibition on double-patenting.

4.

. Section 103: Obviousness. 2 ·"A patent may not be obtained ... ifthe differences

between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art ...." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In assessing an invention's obviousness, the
Court must consider: "(l)the scope and content ofthe prior art, (2) differences between the prior
art and the claims at issue, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and (4) the presence
of secondary considerations of nonobviousness such as commercial success, _long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, and unexpected results." In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376,
1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Heartland relies on KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), and In re

Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Heartland's view, overlap between the prior art and
the '557 patent claims establishes "aprimafacie case of obviousness" und~r Peterson. (D.I. 322
at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted)) Kraft contests the applicability ld effect of
Heartland's cases and emphasizes that the prior art relied upon by Heartland does not disclose

1

All citations to Title 3 5 of the United States code are to pre-AIA versions of the relevant
sections.
2

In a November 8, 2016 letter to the Court, Kraft argues that the Patent Trial & Appeal
Board's (PTAB) decision in a parallel inter partes review (IPR2015-01131) collaterally estops
Heartland from pursuing its obviousness defense here. (See D.I. 420 at 3of3) The Court need
not address the impact of the PTAB' s decision at this time, as it would not alter the conclusion to
deny summary judgment.
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any express or inherent pH limitation. (See D.I. 355 at 5)
The Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment of
invalidity under§ 103. The record reveals disputes regarding at least (i) whether Heartland's
prior art references disclose claimed concentrates and containers; (ii) whether a person of skill in
the artat the time of the invention of the '557 patent would have had a sufficient reason to select
the claimed combinations from the prior art references; (iii) whether such a person would ~ave
had a reasonable expectation of success; and (iv) objective indicia ofnonobviousness, including
evidence of copying, the commercial success of Kraft's products, and whether "[t]he inventors'
finding that artificial flavorings were capable o{resisting degradation for several weeks ... at a
very low pH" was surprising and unexpected (D.I. 355 at 25). A reasonable factfinder, taking all
the evidence iri the light most favorable to one or the other of the parties, could find for either of
the parties on each of these issues.
5.

Section 112: Written Description and Enablement. 3 A·patent's specification must

contain "a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ...
. to make and use" the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ~ 1. Heartland asserts its entitlement to
summary judgment of invalidity under§ 112 on two grounds: (i) the '557 patent's failure to
enable a skilled artisan to make the invention's "flavoring" element; and (ii) an assertion that the

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Kraft claims that Heartland failed to disclose any non-enablement argument in its
invalidity contentions and expert reports and urges the Court to reject Heartland's attempt even
to raise the defense. (See D.I. 355 at 28) The Court does not agree that Heartland waived the
opportunity to make its argument. (See generally D .I. 3 71 at 16-17) However, if Kraft believes
it needs ad4itional, limited discovery in order to fully defend against the non-enablement defense
at trial, it should propose a schedule to do so.
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"flavoring" element is a "functional term that encompasses literally any and every composition
that has the effect of imparting flavor." (D.I. 322 at 24-25) Kraft counters that the specification
need not instruct a skilled artisan "how to make each component of the invention," that ''the term
'flavoring' has meaning to one skilled in the art," and that the skilled artisan would know that
"flavoring is purchased from flavor houses." (D.I. 355 at 29)
The record reveals a genuine dispute of material fact at least regarding whether the '557
patent's disclosure is sufficiently enabling given the knowledge and understanding of a person of
ordinary skill in the art. In addition, Heartland has not shown that the "flavoring" term should be
construed as broadly as its argument requires or that it is a functional or means-plus-function
term. For at least these reasons, summary judgment under § 112 is inappropriate.
6.

Double Patenting. Heartland seeks summary judgmentthat the claims of the '557

patent are invalid due to double patenting. Heartland argues that the April 2010 provisional
applications, whose contents were fully incorporated in another Kraft patent,4 are invalidating
prior art under§ 102(e). (See D.I. 322 at 25-26) In response, Kraft accuses Heartland of
impermissibly "cloak[ing]" an undisclosed anticipation defense under the guise of double
patenting. (Tr. at 49)
The Court agrees with Kraft that Heartland has not clearly articulated either the type of
double-patenting it alleges or how the law applies to the facts of this case. (See Tr. at 26-27 ("[I]t
could be characterized as an anticipation defense . . . . This is a statutory double patenting
argument. ... It's not obvious-type double patenting. This is a different species of double

4

See U.S. Patent No. 8,293,299, of which the '557 patent is a continuation- despite
lacking of any of the same named inventors.
4

patenting.")) The statutory restriction on double patenting "only prohibits a second patent on
subject matter identical to an earlier patent." Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349.
F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Heartland has not shown it is entitled to
summary judgment on this basis. To the extent that Heartland asserts a species-genus
anticipation defense, the record, taken in the light most favorable to Kraft, would support a
reasonable finding that there is not clear and convincing evidence of invalidity; therefore,
summary judgment for Heartland is not warranted. See Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am.,
605 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Nor is the Court persuaded that the filing of a terminal
disclaimer is irrelevant under the circumstances. See generally Perricone v. Medicis Pharm.
Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The double patenting doctrine generally prevents
a patentee from receiving two patents for the same invention ... [and] polices the proper
application of the patent term for each invention."). On this record, summary judgment is
inappropriate.
7.

Heartland's motion for summary judgment as to the '557 patent is DENIED.

8.

Heartland also seeks summary judgment with respect to the '4 72 patent.

Heartland contends that the '472 patent's claims are invalid as obvious combinations of prior art.
(See D.I. 322 at 26-29) Kraft responds that (i) Heartland's prior art references do not combine to
disclose containers that dispense fluid in the required "jet" (see D.I. 355 at 19-21, 37);
(ii) Heartland has failed to show motivation to combine (see D.I. 355 at 38-40); and
(iii) Heartland ignores "clear evidence of [its own] copying," which is a "persuasive secondary
consideration ofnonobviousness" (D.I. 355 at40). There are genuine disputes of material fact as
to both the scope and content of the prior art and whether a person of skill in the art would have
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had·reason to combine Heartland's asserted prior art references to create the claimed invention.
For at least these reasons, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find in favor of either
party on the issue of the '472 patent's validity, so Heartland's motion for summary judgment as
to the '472 patent is DENIED.
9.

Finally, Heartland seeks summary judgment with respect to pre-suit damages.

Heartland contends that Kraft did not mark its products or otherwise notify Heartland of any
alleged infringement prior to filing this action. (See D.l. 322 at 30-32) . Kraft does not contest
this part of Heartland's motion. (See Tr. at55) Accordingly, Heartland's motion for summary
judgment with respect to pre-suit damages is GRANTED. See 35 U.S.C. § 287.
In sum, Heartland's motion for summary judgment ofinvalidizy (D.I. 321) is DENIED in

all respects except that it is GRANTED with respect to pre-suit. damages. ·

HON. L ONARD P. STARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Wilmington, Delaware
January 12, 2017

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