Sammons v. Doe (alias)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 3/2/2016. (nmfn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
WALTER SAMMONS,
Plaintiff,
v.
RONALD ANAYA,
Defendant.
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) Civ. No. 14-260-SLR
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Walter Sammons, Smyrna, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Roopa Sabesan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for
Defendant Ronald Anaya.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dated: March J..
, 2016
Wilmington, Delaware
RJiN4,N,.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Walter Sammons ("plaintiff") proceeds pro se and has paid a partial filing
fee. 1 He filed this lawsuit on February 25, 2014. (D.I. 3 at 2) Plaintiff is currently
incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("JTVCC") in Smyrna,
Delaware and was incarcerated at the JTVCC at the time of the incident giving rise to
this litigation ("incident"). (Id.) Defendant Ronald Anaya ("defendant") is currently
employed as a correctional officer at the JTVCC and was employed as such at the time
of the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant used excessive force against him
and violated his civil rights during the incident. Presently before the court is defendant's
motion for summary judgment. (D.I. 44) This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. ยง 1331.
The incident took place on April 16, 2012 in a transport van in an inmate holding
area of the Kent County Courthouse in Dover, Delaware. (D.I. 3 at 2) Plaintiff and
defendant agree that plaintiff refused to obey an order from defendant regarding the
seating of inmates in the van, which precipitated the incident. (Id., D.I. 45 at 3) Plaintiff
claims that, during the process of being transported from the courthouse to the JTVCC
along with other inmates, he was "physically attacked" by defendant while plaintiff was
seated in an inmate transport van and wearing shackles, handcuffs and other restraints.
(D.I. 3 at 2) Plaintiff alleges that prior to the incident, defendant ordered another prison
inmate to "sit on the [p]laintiff's lap" so that a fourth inmate could sit in the back of the
On March 6, 2014, the court granted plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (D.I. 5) and on March 19, 2014, the court determined that "the plaintiff is
required to pay an initial partial filing fee of $13.39." (D.I. 8 at~ 3)
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van, and that "both the [p]laintiff and [the other inmate] refused." (Id.) Following this
refusal, plaintiff claims that defendant "climbed in the van and on top of the [p]laintiff, put
his knee in the middle of the [p]laintiff's chest, choked the [p]laintiff with his left hand and
hit the [p]laintiff with the blunt end of a mace canister held in his right hand." (Id.)
Plaintiff states that, as a result of the incident, he experienced "choke marks" on his
neck, which then "turned to bruises." (Id.)
Although plaintiff alleges that other inmates witnessed the incident, no witness
reports are in the record. (D.I. 48, ex. D) Plaintiff filed a grievance form detailing his
account of the incident. 2 (D.I. 52) Plaintiff also submitted a photograph of himself
indicating red marks around plaintiff's neck following the incident. (Id.) In addition,
plaintiff submitted a sworn statement regarding the veracity of the contents of his
answering brief and the copied documents contained in the appendix to the answering
brief. (D.I. 51) Further, plaintiff stated that defendant acted unreasonably because he
"ordered inmates to sit on other [inmates'] laps," and that defendant's actions made
compliance impossible. 3 (D.I. 54at111)
Defendant asserts that because plaintiff refused to move and allow another
inmate to sit in the van, he "went into the second to last row of the van, directly in front
of [p]laintiff, faced [p]laintiff, and closed [p]laintiff's legs that were spread wide open."
(D.I. 45 at 3) Defendant claims that he then "proceeded to hold on to [p]laintiff's shirt
Plaintiff's handwritten statement on the grievance form appears to contain the same
allegations that were made in plaintiff's complaint, as well as a statement by plaintiff that
another officer witnessed the attack and did not support the actions taken by defendant
with respect to plaintiff. (D.I. 52)
3 Plaintiff follows this assertion with a hand drawn diagram to illustrate what would have
occurred, had defendant moved plaintiff by his collar. (D.I. 54at114)
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near the collar and attempted to move [p]laintiff to [p]laintiff's right." (Id. at 3-4)
Defendant also states that, after plaintiff became uncooperative in moving over, he then
"ceased attempting to move [p]laintiff and exited the van," and that "[a]t no time did [he]
stand in the last row of the van and place his knee on [p]laintiff's chest." (Id. at 4)
Furthermore, defendant states that "at no time did [he] ever choke [p]laintiff or hit him
with a can of Cap-Stun."4 (Id.)
Andrew Gilliss ("Officer Gilliss"), another correctional officer present during the
incident, filed a declaration stating that plaintiff refused to follow defendant's order
regarding seating inside the van, and that defendant "behaved reasonably and in
accordance with protocol in attempting to have [p]laintiff follow an order and move over
in the transportation van." (D.I. 47 at
,.m 4, 8)
Further, Officer Gilliss' declaration states
that "[a]t no time did [he] tell [p]laintiff that [defendant's] behavior was inappropriate or
that [he] would be writing an incident report regarding it." (Id.
at~
8) In addition, the
incident reports filed by both defendant and Officer Gilliss state that, at the time the
inmates were unloaded from the van at JTVCC following the incident, plaintiff did not
complain about any injuries. (Id., ex. A, C)
Multiple reports filed by employees of JTVCC also describe the incident. These
incident reports state that defendant confronted plaintiff after plaintiff made remarks
indicating his intent not to follow defendant's order. 5 (D.I. 48, ex. C) Further, the
These assertions, made in defendant's opening brief accompanying defendant's
motion for summary judgment, are reflected in defendant's declaration. (D.I. 46)
5 The incident reports indicate that plaintiff did not cooperate with defendant's order to
move inside the van, and that plaintiff remained uncooperative. Specifically, the reports
state that when plaintiff refused to make room for another inmate in the van, plaintiff told
defendant, "you have to spray me I am not [going] into the back seat" (D.I. 48, ex. B),
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reports indicate that after plaintiff refused to obey defendant's order and accommodate
an additional inmate in the back of the van, defendant grabbed plaintiff by his collar in
an attempt to move plaintiff to create additional seating room. (Id., ex. A, B) Further,
the reports state that following the incident, JTVCC medical staff evaluated plaintiff and
that plaintiff "did appear to have red irritated marks on his right neck area and was
photographed by [Officer Justin K. Weeks]." (Id., ex. D) While one report indicates that
other inmates "allege that they were in the van and witnessed the alleged assault," it
also states that "[n]o statements were taken from the inmate witnesses." (Id.)
A report documenting a medical examination of plaintiff upon his return to the
JTVCC indicates that the examining nurse considered plaintiff to be in normal physical
condition. (D.I. 48, ex. G) Further, in commenting on any abnormal findings, the
examining nurse wrote, "no current bruising on neck," and "[patient] claims to have been
choked out by an officer ... [patient] claims pain." (Id.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 415 U.S. 475, 586 n. 10 (1986). A party asserting that a fact
cannot be-or, alternatively, is-genuinely disputed must be supported either by citing
to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
and "[y]ou're going to have to[] [s]pray me ... .You're going to have to[] [s]pray me."
(D.I. 48, ex. C)
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electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motions only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1 )(A) & (B). If the moving party has
carried its burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 415 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court will "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87; see also Podohnik v. U.S. Postal Service, 409 F.3d
584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating party opposing summary judgment "must present more
than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of
a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the "mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment," a factual dispute is genuine where "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at
249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to
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make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial").
Ill. DISCUSSION
Because plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident, plaintiff's
allegations are considered under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
which prohibits the State from imposing punishment on those who have not yet been
convicted of a crime, rather than the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979). The United
States Supreme Court has held that courts must apply an objective standard when
considering a pretrial detainee's claim of excessive force. Kingsley v. Hendrickson,_
U.S._, 2015 WL 2473447, *5 (June 22, 2015). The Court concluded that a "pretrial
detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was
objectively unreasonable." Id. Objective reasonableness "turns on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case." Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396 (1989)). The Court identified several factors relevant in determining whether the
force used was excessive. This nonexclusive list includes:
[T]he relationship between the need for the use of force
and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's
injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit
the amount of force; the severity of the security problem
at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer;
and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id. at *6.
In announcing the objective standard, the Court recognized that operating a
prison is "an inordinately difficult undertaking" and "that the safety and order at these
institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial
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discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face." Id. at *7 (quoting
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. _ , 132 S.
Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012)). The Court further explained that "an officer enjoys qualified
immunity and is not liable for excessive force unless he has violated a 'clearly
established' right, such that 'it would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."' Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 202 (2001 )).
In the instant case, the majority of plaintiff's assertions simply deny the
statements made by defendant in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment
in that plaintiff merely reiterates his factual allegations that conflict with those presented
by defendant. The record demonstrates that defendant's conduct was objectively
reasonable in light of the standard articulated above. The record reflects that plaintiff
was seated inside the van. Although the parties' accounts of the incident differ, it is
established that an altercation occurred between the parties on the van, and that
plaintiff refused to cooperate with defendant's order to move within the van while
defendant was arranging for the transport of other inmates. The medical report
demonstrates that whatever force was used by defendant resulted in minimal injury to
plaintiff. The evidence of record (including incident reports suggesting that plaintiff did
not complain of injuries at the time of the incident; the medical report showing that
plaintiff had no bruises or other serious injuries; and the declaration of Officer Gilliss) all
indicate that defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable. The court concludes that,
even considering the underlying facts surrounding the incident and all reasonable
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inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendant's use of force was
objectively reasonable. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court concludes that defendant's use of force was
objectively reasonable. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.I.
44) is granted. An appropriate order shall issue.
Given this conclusion, the court does not address the second argument made in
support of defendant's motion for summary judgment, that defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity. (D.I. 45 at 2)
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