Kilson v. Coupe et al
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 12-11-14. (mas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
CARLTON V. KILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
: Civ. No. 14-343-RGA
ROBERT COUPE, et al.,
Defendants.
Carlton V. Kilson, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware,
Pro Se Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
December l f , 2014
Wilmington, Delaware
~,.~.
istrict Judge:
Plaintiff Carlton V. Kilson, an inmate at the Howard R. Young Correctional
Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
appears prose and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 5). The
Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint (D.I. 3) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(8) and§ 1915A(a).
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Robert Coupe, Commissioner of the Delaware
Department of Correction, has negligently allowed the drug Risperdal 1 into the HRYCI.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Fran Carlin "boss of mental involvement" allowed
defendant Dr. Michelle Marcantoun to prescribe Plaintiff Risperdal when all he wanted
was a sleeping pill. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Collenin Bell "CCS medical boss"
did not have a nurse monitor his blood pressure or respond to his symptoms. Plaintiff
"looks at this as negligent and malpractice." (D.I. 3).
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8) and§ 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,
452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28
U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison
conditions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and
take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of
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Used to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia, episodes of mania or mixed
episodes in bipolar disorder, and behavior problems. See http://www.nlm.nih.gov
/medlineplus/druginfo/meds. (Dec. 11, 2014).
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds prose, his pleading is liberally construed and his
Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and
§ 1915A(b)(1 ), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional"
factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774
(3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and
refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to§ 1915(e)(2)(8)(ii) and§ 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when
ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a
claim under§ 1915(e)(2)(8)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a
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court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief."
Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though "detailed factual
allegations" are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide "labels and
conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Davis v.
Abington Mem'I Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts
LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).
To determine whether a complaint meets the pleading standard, the Court must:
(1) outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief; (2) peel away
those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the
assumption of truth; and (3) look for well-pied factual allegations, assume their veracity,
and then "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian
v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent when Risperdal was allowed in
the HYRCI, and when they treated Plaintiff by administering the medication to him
which, while not clear, appear to have caused some side effects. Plaintiff alleges that
instead of giving him a sleep aid as he requested, he was administered Risperdal.
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-105 (1976). However, in order to set forth a cognizable
claim, an inmate must allege (i) a serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by
prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
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U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is
deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious
harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by
"intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
at 104-05.
"[A] prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment," so long
as the treatment provided is reasonable. Lasko v. Watts, 373 F. App'x 196, 203 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-140 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted);
see a/so Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986) (negligence is not
compensable as a constitutional deprivation).
Even when reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he fails
to state an actionable constitutional claim against Defendants for deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Rather, the Complaint alleges that Defendants acted in a
negligent manner with regard to Risperdal, its presence at the HRYCI, and its
administration to Plaintiff when he wanted a sleep aid instead. At most, the allegations
fall under the aegis of a medical malpractice/negligence claim, rather than deliberate
indifference to serious medical need.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
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§ 1915A(b)(1 ). However, because it appears plausible that Plaintiff may be able to
articulate a claim against Defendants, he will be given an opportunity to amend his
pleading. See O'Dell v. United States Gov't, 256 F. App'x 444 (3d Cir. 2007).
An appropriate order will be entered.
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