Colahar et al v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 10/31/14. (etg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

RUDOLPH COLAHAR and JAN'E
CO LAHAR,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
) Civil Action No. 14-426-SLR
)
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. and
)
US BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, )
)
)
Defendants.

Rudolph and Jan'e Colahar, Bear, Delaware. Pro se Plaintiffs.
Geoffrey Graham Grivner, Esquire, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C., Wilmington,
Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dated: October .JI ,2014
Wilmington, Delaware

R~~ge

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Jan'e Colahar ("Jan'e") and Rudolph Colahar ("Rudolph") (together
"plaintiffs") proceed pro se and have paid the filing fee. They filed this lawsuit against
defendants Wells Fargo Bank N.A. ("Wells Fargo") and US Bank, National Association
("US Bank") (together "defendants") alleging the wrongful foreclosure of real property
located at 53 Hempstead Drive, Newark, Delaware. (D.1. 2.) Before the court are
numerous motions filed by the parties. (D.1. 14, 19,20,22,26,27,29)

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The court construes plaintiffs' initial pleading, "notice of lis pendens," as a
complaint. The complaint was filed on April 7, 2014. (D.1. 2) It does not appear from
the court docket that the parties have been served as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
The complaint states that "this action comes from a foreclosure issue involving a
bankruptcy discharge." (D.1. 2, ~ 3) The complaint alleges that Wells Fargo is using an
in rem proceeding to take the property in question. (/d. at ~ 7) Wells Fargo is the
servicer of the mortgage on the property and US Bank is the holder/owner of the
mortgage. (0.1. 14) The complaint refers to an affidavit of obligation served upon Wells
Fargo, alleges that Wells Fargo has not rebutted the affidavit, that the affidavit creates a
commercial lien when not rebutted, and that the surety for the affidavit of obligation is
the real property at issue. (0.1. 2,

~~

8-11) The complaint alleges that property was

identified by the bankruptcy trustee on grounds there are liens against the property of
greater value than the property itself. (/d. at ~ 4) The complaint challenges a judgment
as "void" and alleges that "the expected end results are an offset of the balance that the

alleged bank claim[s] is owed on the property, even though the house was discharge[d]
in bankruptcy." (Id. at ,-r,-r 2, 12)
The court takes judicial notice that the real property at issue is the subject of a
foreclosure action in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle
County ("Superior Court"), U.S. Bank v. Colahar, C.A. No. N09L-11-024 JAP (Del.
Super.), that commenced on November 4, 2009. (0.1. 10, Ex. A) Default judgment was
entered against plaintiffs on May 27,2010. (0.1. 14, ex. A) The foreclosure proceeding
was stayed after Jan'e filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, In re Jane Colahar, Bankr.
No. 12-12014-BLS. (ld. at ex. B)
Jan'e's bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed on August 27, 2012 following a
motion to dismiss by the bankruptcy trustee noting that Jan'e had filed a Chapter 13
bankruptcy case on September 13,2010, Bankr. No. 10-12868 (converted to a Chapter
7 on January 18, 2011), that Jan'e was granted a discharge on April 19, 2011, making
dismissal appropriate. (Id. at ex. C) Jan'e also filed a lawsuit against US Bank
contesting the foreclosure proceedings, Colahar v. US Bank, Civ. No. N11 C-04-128
JAP (Del. Super.). (ld. at ex. D) The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 30,
2012. (ld. at ex. E)
The property was scheduled for a sheriffs sale on April 8, 2014, but the sale was
stayed when Rudolph filed a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland ("Maryland Bankruptcy Court") on April 3,
2014, In re: Co/ahar, Bankr. No. 14-15282-PM (Bankr. D. Md.). (0.1. 10, exs. A, B, C)
Rudolph also filed two other bankruptcy petitions in the Maryland Bankruptcy Court,
both of which resulted in an automatic stay. See In re: Co/ahar, Bankr. No. 11-25341
2

(Bankr. D. Md.) filed July 27, 2011; In re: Colahar, Bankr. No. 13-23620 (Bankr. D. Md.)
filed August 9,2-13. On April 22,2014, the Maryland Bankruptcy Court dismissed In re:
Colahar, Bankr. No. 14-15282-PM after Rudolph failed to pay the required filing fee. (ld.
at Ex. D) In the same order, the Maryland Bankruptcy Court terminated the automatic
stay that had been imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). (ld.) On July 17, 2014,
plaintiffs filed a writ of de novo alleged fraud upon the court in the State foreclosure
proceeding. (0.1. 24, ex.)
Defendants Wells Fargo and US Bank move to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 1 (0.1. 14) In turn, plaintiffs filed the following motions: motion for declaratory
judgment (0.1. 19),2 motion for time to respond to defendants' motion to dismiss (0.1.
20), motion for summary judgment (0.1. 22),3 motions to amend complaint (0.1. 26, 29),
and motion for entry of default of defendants (0.1. 27).4 Plaintiffs oppose the motion to

1The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set forth by the Supreme
Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
"cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
2The motion refers to "Exhibit B." The exhibit is not attached.
3The motion is a combined motion for summary judgment and objection to
defendants' motion to dismiss.
4Plaintiffs recently requested a hearing on the motion for entry of default (D.L
31)

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dismiss on the grounds that they were never served with a copy of the motion. 5 (0.1.
22)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). "In
deciding motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts generally consider only
the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public
record, and documents that form the basis of a claim." Lum v. Bank of Am., 36'1 F.3d
217,221 n.3 (3d Gir. 2004). Though "detailed factual allegations" are not required, a
complaint must do more than simply provide "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765
F.3d 236, 241 (3d Gir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To survive a motion
to dismiss under Fed. R. Giv. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See
Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Gir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

To determine whether a complaint meets the pleading standard as set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal, the court must: (1) outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a

5The motion to dismiss does not contain a certificate of service, however,
defendants filed a notice of certificate of service indicating that the motion to dismiss
was served upon plaintiffs on June 6, 2014. (0.1. 16) Plaintiffs filed their opposition on
July 30, 2014. (0.1. 22)

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state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) look for well-pled
factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then "determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)
(internal citations omitted) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Argueta

V.

United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60,73 (3d Cir. 2011). The last step is
"a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Because plaintiffs proceed
pro se, their pleading is liberally construed and their complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson

V.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for dismissal on the grounds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars plaintiffs' claim because the relief they appear to seek would require this court to
determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or to take action that
would negate the state court's judgment. Plaintiffs do not address this issue in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Defendants further move to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs respond that they were not
served with a copy of the motion to dismiss. The court finds that, even if plaintiffs were
not served with a copy at the time the motion to dismiss was filed, no prejudice has
occurred, given that they were ultimately served a copy of the motion to dismiss (see

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0.1. 16), and plaintiffs filed their objection to the motion. Plaintiffs further argue that
dismissal is not appropriate because "there was no reason why Wells Fargo [] should
have hired an attorney when they failed to answer the affidavit of obligation prior to the
filing of this case." (0.1. 22)
The court turns first to the Younger abstention doctrine which the court may
raise sua sponte. See O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
Under Younger, a federal district court must abstain from hearing a federal case which
interferes with certain state proceedings. 6 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Abstention is appropriate when: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial
in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state
proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Lazaridis v.
Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010). The doctrine applies to proceedings until all

appellate remedies have been exhausted, unless the matter falls within one of the
Youngerexceptions. 7 Huffman

v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).

The Younger elements have been met and none of the exceptions apply. First,
there are on-going state proceedings for the foreclosure of real property. Second,

6The abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
provides that federal courts are not to interfere with pending state criminal proceedings.
The Younger doctrine has been extended to civil cases and state administrative
proceedings. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
7Exceptions to the Younger doctrine exist where irreparable injury is "both great
and immediate," Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, where the state law is "flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions," id. at 53, or where there is a showing of
"bad faith, harassment, or ... other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable
relief." Id. at 54.

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Delaware has an important interest in resolving real estate issues, and a ruling in the
Delaware courts implicates the important interest of preserving the authority of the
state's judicial system. See e.g., Almazan v. 1st 2nd Mortg. CO. of NJ, Inc., 2011 WL
2670871 (D.N.J. June 2,2011) (finding that the State has important interests in the
foreclosure of property under the Younger doctrine); Greg v. Pagano, 287 F. App'x 155
(3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (court abstained under the Younger doctrine where
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the judge was not authorized to nullify transfer of title
and for an order enjoining the sheriff from conducting a sheriff's sale.). Finally, plaintiffs
have an adequate opportunity to raise any potential claims in state court. 8 Accordingly,
the court must abstain pursuant to Younger and its progeny. See Pennzoi! Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (stating that Younger abstention is favored even
after the plaintiffs failed to raise their federal claims in the ongoing state proceedings).
In the alternative, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this court from
maintaining subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' complaint which effectively seeks
to vacate orders of the Superior Court. "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the
lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by 'state-court
losers' challenging 'state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.'" Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (citations omitted). The
court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine claim bars plaintiffs' complaint because
the relief they seek would require "(1) the federal court [to] determine that the state court

8Plaintiffs have filed two motions to amend the complaint. (0.1. 26,28) The
proposed amendments include numerous allegations such as mail fraud, mortgage
fraud, conspiracy, violations of constitutional rights, violations of federal law, and alleged
criminal conduct. (0.1. 26, 29) The court does not consider the motions to amend or
the proposed amendments given that plaintiffs have the opportunity of raising said
claims in the foreclosure case pending in the State Court.

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judgment was erroneously entered in order to grant the requested relief, or (2) the
federal court [to] take an action that would negate the state court's judgment, , ,," In re
Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 2005).

V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will deny as moot plaintiffs' motions and will
grant defendants' motion to dismiss. 9 (0.1. 14, 19,20,22,26,27,29) The court finds
amendment futile.
A separate order shall issue.

91nasmuch as the court abstains from this proceeding, it sees no need to address
the issue of whether the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

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