Parkell v. Markell et al

Filing 77

MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/10/18. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

DONALD D. PARKELL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civ. No. 14-601-LPS

ROBERT COUPE, et al.,
Defendants.

Donald D. Parkell, SCI Retreat, Hunlock Creek, Pennsylvania, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Joseph Clemente Handlon, Deputy Attorney General, and Ophelia Michelle Waters, Deputy
Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

September 10, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware

-r ~ .f ./21 ~
S<J:ARK, U.S. D1str1

I.

t/.udge:

,

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Donald D. Parkell ("Plaintiff'), an inmate currently in the custody of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at SCI Retreat, in Hunlock Creek, Pennsylvania, proceeds

pro se, and has been granted in Jonna pattpetis status. Plaintiff was housed at James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware, when he commenced this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights. (D.I. 3) The Amended Complaint
is the operative pleading. (D.I. 19) Presently before the Court is the motion for summaiy judgment
of Defendants Robert Coupe ("Coupe") and Phillip Morgan ("Morgan") (together "Defendants")
and Plaintiffs opposition thereto. (D.I. 70, 72, 74, 75, 76)

II.

BACKGROUND
The Amended Complaint. The Court's March 19, 2018 Memorandum Opinion contains

the histoiy of this case. (See D.I. 68) The only claim that remains is the use of four-point restraints
during Plaintiff's October 2013 hospitalization. (See id. at 12) Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected
to a practice or policy that denied him adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment
when Defendants enacted or maintained a policy or practice that caused him to be held in handcuffs
and shackles in four-point restraints during his hospitalization. (D.I. 19 at ,r VII. B. 95) The
Amended Complaint alleges that following an October 2013 assault when Plaintiff was housed at the
Howard R. Young Correctional Institution ("HRYCI") in Wilmington, Delaware, he was taken to
Christiana Hospital for treatment. (Id. at ,r,r 64-65, 68) During the week he was hospitalized,
Plaintiff was held in four-point restraints. (Id. at ,I 72) The verified Amended Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff was chained at both ankles and wrists, forbidden to move at all, and required to urinate in
this manner with one wrist uncuffed only long enough to evacuate his bladder. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
that "this policy/practice resulted in pain, humiliation, and torture as a chest-tube was draining fluid
from [his] lungs, a cruel and unusual punishment." (Id.)

1

Evidence of Record. After his assault, Plaintiff was treated at the HRYCI infirmary for a
laceration to his scalp, rib pain, and for his eyes to be flushed with eyewash. (D.I. 64 at Ex. B) He
was transferred to Christiana Hospital for treatment of his injuries. 1 (D .I. 34 at 350, 364; D .I. 64 at
Ex. B) Plaintiff was held in four-point restraints during his hospitalization. (D.I. 55 at 2) Plaintiff
submitted a grievance complaining that while hospitalized for four days, with severe trauma to his
ribs and lungs, multiple broken ribs, and a chest tube, he was held in four-point restraints, which
were "painful." (D.I. 56-1 at 223-31) An investigation determined that Plaintiff's hospitalization
and treatment were "on par with Department Policies and Procedures" and that Plaintiff was not
mistreated by hospital or security staff. (Id. at 224, 229) Defendants admit that Plaintiff was held in
four-point restraints for the entire time he was housed at the Christiana Hospital, with only one cuff
released to allow him to evacuate his body waste in full view of correctional officers, both male and
female. (D.I. 55 at 2)
HYRCI Standard Operating Procedure ("SOP") 100.08, with an effective date of January 1,
2001 and revised April 15, 2013, governs the supervision of offenders at hospitals and other health
care facilities by correctional officers. (D.I. 70 at 18, 22-25) SOP 100.08 provides that offenders
must be restrained in four points minimum unless a written doctor's order specifies three points.

(Id.) Hospitals are unsecure facilities and present challenging security issues to supervising officers.
(Id. at 20) SOP 100.08 is designed to provide safe, secure, and courteous correctional supervision of
offenders while hospitalized. (Id. at 22) The policy provides guidelines for correctional officers in
order to prevent an inmate's escape while hospitalized. (Jd. at 23)
Written orders for three-point restraints must be reviewed by the HRYCI shift commander,
who can override a doctor's order for security concerns. (Id. at 18, 23) According to Lt. Brian
Vanes ('CVanes"), a correctional officer at HRYCI, restraining an offender at a hospital in four-point
1

The record does not contain Plaintiff's medical records from Christiana Hospital.
2

restraints does not mean that the offender is restrained in an uncomfortable position or for the
purpose of causing discomfort. (Id.) Typically hands are restrained by cuffs connected to the sides
of the hospital bed, which permit some movement of the offender's arms. (Id. at 18-19) Hands are
not bound above the inmate's head. (Id. at 19) Officers typically use two sets of handcuffs for each
arm to provide even greater movement or flexibility. (Id.) This is done with two regular handcuffs
or one regular set with a set of flexcuffs. (Id.) Legs are restrained with leg shackles at the bottom of
the bed, not at the corners. Offenders are not restrained in a "spread eagle" position. (Id)
SOP 100.08 requires correctional officers to log information relative to an offender's
hospital stay, including all movement in and out of the room, use of cuffs and restraints, and any
"special" information and/ or instructions received. (Id. at 22) The logbook for Plaintiffs
hospitalization indicates that he was admitted to Christiana Hospital on October 13, 2013 and
moved to a different room later that night. It appears that initially Plaintiff was placed in three-point
restraints. (Id. at 28) The next day, there was a discussion regarding the use of three-point versus
four-point restraints. (Id. at 29) HRYCI Deputy Warden Emig ("Emig") ordered Plaintiffs
placement in four-point restraints at all times. (Id. at 29) The logbook indicates that Plaintiff was
moved from his bed to a chair on October 14, 15, and 16, 2013. (Id. at 30-32) It further indicates
that on October 16, 2013, Plaintiff was "up to urinate." (Jd. at 32) The logbook also states that
correctional officers used flexcuffs with regular handcuffs which, according to Vanes, provided
maximum comfort and movement while still maintaining necessary security. (Jd. at 19)
Plaintiff states in his declaration that during the five days he was hospitalized he had a chest
tube. (D.I. 75 at 1) He was under constant four-point restraints; having his arms cuffed was painful
due to the chest tube. (Id.) Of the three officers assigned to Plaintiff, one was armed with a
handgun. (Id. at 2) Plaintiff states that he was not aggressive, disruptive, or agitated, and he was
pleasant to all present. (Id. at 1) Plaintiff complained to correctional officers and nurses but was
3

told the decision was "straight from the warden himself. (Id.) Plaintiff states that nurses "repeatedly
told officers that at least [his] right arm should not be cuffed due to [his] injuries and the officers
told them that it was the warden's policy [and] they must follow it." (Id. at 2)
Whenever Plaintiff sat in a chair it was under "further" four-point restraints and it was "in
no way a relief from a slightly different form of the same restraint." (Id. at 1) Every time Plaintiff
needed to evacuate his bladder or bowels it was in full view of the three officers, and he was never
permitted to access the bathroom. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he defecated in his bed and a nurse had
to clean him, which was very embarrassing. (Id.)
Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff fails to allege
plausible personal involvement by either Defendant; and (2) Defendants are shielded from liability
by reason of qualified immunity. (D.I. 70) Plaintiff contends that summary judgment is not
appropriate because: (1) he has been "thwarted from all relevant discove1y requests"; (2) there are
issues of fact regarding: (a) the personal involvement of Warden Morgan; (b) the use of three-point
restraints versus four-point restraints; (c) the manner in which he was required to urinate; (d) the
manner in which he was restrained while sitting in a chair; and (e)the manner Plaintiff was restrained
with the use of handcuffs and flexcuffs; and (3) Vanes' declaration is inadmissible.

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Mats11shita Blee. Indtts. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Cotp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be - or, alternatively,
is - genuinely disputed must be supported either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
4

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish
the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). If the moving party has carried its
burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court will "draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
586; see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating party opposing
summary judgment "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks omitted). The "mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment;" a factual dispute is genuine only where "the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. LiberD'

Lobl?J, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also

Celotex Cotp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated
"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"). Thus,
the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's position is

5

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be "evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find" for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Discovery Issues

Plaintiff contends that the Court should not rule on Defendants' motion because he has
been "thwarted from all relevant discovery requests." (D.I. 74) Plaintiff argues that he did not
receive his hospital medical records and other requested discovery even though he signed a
confidentiality agreement. Plaintiff takes particular exception to the fact that the requested policies
and logbook documents were not provided to him in discovery, yet Defendants used those
documents in their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues he has been extremely
prejudiced through the discovery process.
Defendants reply that Plaintiff did not respond to their April 17, 2018 motion until recently
and only after the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond. They further note that after the Court granted
Defendants' summary judgment on March 19, 2018 as to all claims except the restraint claim and
ordered further briefing on that claim, Plaintiff took no discovery and made no complaints that
additional discovery was necessary to prosecute the restraint claim.
On February 11, 2016, Plaintiff had sought any and all policies, directives, or instructions to
staff concerning four-point restraint usage at an outside hospital. (D.I. 23, Request No. 2.AA)
Plaintiff filed a second request for production of documents on April 18, 2016. (D.I. 28) That
request made no reference to the use of restraints in a hospital setting. In response to discovery
requests, Defendants objected to the extent Plaintiff sought confidential and privileged documents,
but provided Plaintiff with 867 pages of discovery, plus a copy of the Department of Correction
("DOC") medication management policy. (See D.I. 32 at 5; 45 at 2) Plaintiff moved to compel
discovery responses.
6

Plaintiff's motion to compel and amended motion to compel were ruled on by the Court in
March 2017. (D.I. 45, 46) The Court found that Plaintiff's motion did not inform the Court which
discovery requests were the subject of the motion. As a result, the Court could not discern why the
responses were inadequate. In the same order, the Court granted Plaintiff's amended motion to
compel responses to an April 18, 2016 request for production of documents and a February 2016
combined request for admissions and interrogatories. Request No. 1 concerned the issue of fourpoint restraints and Defendants responded to it as ordered by the Court. (See D.I. 22, Request No.
1; D.I. 55, Response to Request No. 1) Finally, the Court granted Plaintiff's request for a 90-day
extension of time to complete discovery. (D.I. 45 at 7) Plaintiff's subsequent discovery requests did
not address the restraint issue.
Defendants provided Plaintiff his DOC medical records. Plaintiff complains that he does
not have his hospital records. The hospital is not a party to this action and there is nothing on the
record that indicates Plaintiff sought a subpoena to obtain his hospital records. It is Plaintiff's
responsibility to seek discovery he requires from non-parties.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants submitted the HYRCI

restraint policy and the logbook correctional officers kept while Plaintiff was hospitalized. Plaintiff
had sought in discovery all policies, directives, or instructions to staff concerning the use of fourpaint restraints in an outside hospital setting, and Defendants objected to the request. However,
when Plaintiff sought to compel responses, he failed to advise the Court that he was not provided
with the policy. Nor, at any time, did he renew a motion to compel following the Court's order that
advised him the motion was denied because the Court was unable to determine what discovery had
not been provided. The Court cannot assist in discovery disputes unless it is given the necessary
information for resolution. In addition, it does not appear that Plaintiff sought the hospital

7

logbooks that Defendants filed with their dispositive motion. Plaintiff raised the restraint issue and
it was his responsibility to seek discovery on the issue.
The Court finds no unfair prejudice to Plaintiff in his pursuit of discovery. Nor does it find
there were blatant violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although Defendants should
not have relied upon the objections to disclosure of the policy if their intent was to use it to support
a dispositive motion. The restraint policy issue would have been addressed had it been brought to
the Court's attention. Also, Plaintiff was able to review the documents and rely upon them in his
opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (See D.I. 74)
Finally, while not a discovery issue, Plaintiff argues that Vanes' affidavit is not admissible
because is it not signed or stamped by a nota1y public or other court authority. Vanes' declaration is
made under penalty of perjmy and contains a "/ s/" signature block. (Id.) Thus, the declaration
conforms with this Court's CM/ECF Administrative Procedure (H)(3) and will be considered.

B.

Due Process

In Plaintiffs opposition, he appears to argue that both his due process and Eighth
Amendment rights were violated through the use of four-point restraints. (D.I. 74 at 6) The
Amended Complaint alleges; "Plaintiff was subjected to a practice or policy that denied him
adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment" when "both defendants enacted or
maintained a policy or practice that caused the plaintiff to be held in handcuffs and shackles in a
four-point restraint while he was at Christiana Hospital for an entire week unintermpted." (D.I. 19
at 20-21)
Plaintiff did not raise a due process issue in his Amended Complaint. He may not amend his
complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. See e.g., Md..,attd v. Indttshial Resottrces, Inc. 715 F. App'x 115 n.5 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2017)

8

(citing Shanahan v.

Ciry of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781

(7 th Cir. 1996)). To the extent Plaintiff attempts

to raise a due process claim, it is not being considered by the Court.

C.

Personal Involvement

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that they had no personal
involvement in the conditions of Plaintiff's five-day hospitalization and the need to restrain him.
Plaintiff contends that SOP 100.08 was implemented at HRYCI by the Warden (i.e., Morgan) and
the use of restraints as set forth in the policy requires the Warden's approval. Plaintiff does not
address the personal involvement of Coupe.
Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature and, to be liable, a defendant must
have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct. In other words, defendants are "liable only
for their own unconstitutional conduct." Barkes v. First Corr. Med, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.
2014), rev'd on othergrotmds sttb nom. Tq_ylor v. Barkes, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). Thus,
respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability. See Evancho v. Fishe1~ 423 F.3d 347,353 (3d
Cir. 2005); see also Alexander v. Forr, 297 F. App'x 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2008) (instructing that
constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on fact that defendant was prison supervisor
when incidents set forth in complaint occurred). "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ...
§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
"There are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if
they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional
harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated in violating plaintiff's rights,
directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in
their subordinates' violations." Parke!! v. Danbe,;g, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

9

SOP 100.08 became effective January 1, 2001, and it was revised April 25, 2013, when
Morgan was the warden at HRYCI. In addition, Plaintiff's declaration states that he was repeatedly
told that the decision to place him in four-point restraints was "straight from the warden himself."

(D.I. 75) Plaintiff also states that nurses repeatedly told officers that at least his right arm should not
be cuffed due to his injuries. (Id.) While these statements are hearsay, the "United States Supreme
Court [has] rejected the view that the non-moving party must produce evidence in a form that would
be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment."

J.F. Feeser, Inc.

v. Serv-A-Pottion, Inc., 909

F.2d 1524, 1542 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex Cotp., 477 U.S. at 324). "[H]earsay evidence ... may be
considered if the out-of-court declarant could later present the evidence through direct testimony
(i.e., in a form that would be admissible at trial)." Id. There is no indication that Warden Morgan, a
party in this case, would not be able to testify at trial or that Plaintiff's nurses are not available to
provide testimony. Thus, the Court may consider Plaintiff's statements.
Defendants argue that it was Deputy Warden Emig who gave the order to place Plaintiff in
four-point restraints, as indicated in the logbook. Conversely, Plaintiff contends that the order to
keep him in four-point restraints came "straight from the warden." There are genuine issues of fact
regarding Morgan's personal involvement in placing Plaintiff in four-point restraints. Therefore, as
to Morgan, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of his personal involvement will
be denied.
With regard to Coupe, no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff based on the evidence of
record. There is no evidence that Coupe directed Plaintiff's placement in restraints. Nor is there
any evidence of record that Coupe established or maintained the policy at issue. While Plaintiff
alleges that both Defendants enacted or maintained a policy or practice that caused him to be held in
four-point restraints, the evidence of record does not support the claim against Coupe. Accordingly,
Coupe will be granted summary judgment for his lack of personal involvement.
10

D.

Eighth Amendment (Medical Needs, Conditions of
Confinement, Excessive Force) and Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in fourpoint restraints during his hospitalization. Plaintiff frames the claim as a denial of adequate medical
care. Given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will analyze the claim as a medical needs claim, as well
as a conditions of confinement claim and excessive force claim, all of which fall under the Eighth
Amendment. Defendants contend they are shielded from liability by reason of qualified immunity.

Qualified Immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from insubstantial
claims in order to "shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform
their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). "When properly applied, it
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Mallry v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity shields
government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as:
(1) the official's conduct does not violate "a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) ... the right
was 'clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735
(2011); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
"A Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the
challenged conduct, '[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' that every 'reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right."' al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). "In other words, there must be sufficient precedent
at the time of action, factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put defendant on notice that his
or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited." Md.,attghlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir.
2001). To determine if a right is clearly established, the Third Circuit directs the Court to first look
for Supreme Court precedent. See Mammaro v. New Jersry Div.

11

if Child Protection and Petmanenry, 814

F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016). If there is none, then the Court may rely on a '"robust consensus of
cases of persuasive authority' in the Court[s] of Appeals." Id. (quoting Tqylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. at
2044). "[A]lthough earlier cases involving fundamentally similar facts can provide especially strong
support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessaty to such a finding."

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
The Court exercises its discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis to address first "in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand."

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see also Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 648-49 (3d Cir. 2017). The twostep test as set forth in Salfcier v. Kat:{; 533 U.S. 194 (2001), is often appropriate when analyzing
qualified immunity. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Under the Sattciertest, the Court first examines
whether or not the alleged conduct, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, violated a
constitutional right. See 533 U.S. at 201. "If no constitutional right would have been violated were
the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity."

Id. If the allegations amount to the violation of a constitutional right, the Court proceeds to the
second inquiry and determines if the right was "clearly established in the specific context of the
case." Brosseatt v. Hattgen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (noting that officer
is entitled to qualified immunity unless "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted").

Adequate Medical Care. Denial of medical care violates the Eighth Amendment where a
prison official is deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical need. See Rottse v. Plantiet~ 182
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference can occur where a prison official "knows of a
prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it" or "prevents a prisoner
from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment." Id. Neither "mere allegations of
malpractice" nor a prisoner's disagreement with prison medical professionals as to the proper
12

method of treatment rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Monmottth Cnry. Corr.

Instittttional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
The evidence of record does not support a finding that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. The logbook correctional officers kept while
Plaintiff was hospitalized details the medical personnel attending Plaintiff while he was hospitalized.
The logbook indicates that Plaintiff was first placed in three-point restraints followed by placement
in four-point restraints. There is no evidence that while he was under four-point restraints, Plaintiff
did not receive adequate medical care or that his medical care differed under either type of restraint.
While hospitalized and under four-point restraint, Plaintiff's vital signs were monitored, he was
administered medication, he was fed, he was moved from the bed to a chair, and on at least one
occasion he was "up to urinate." In his declaration, Plaintiff does not claim that he was deprived of
medical care or treatment during the time he was in restraints.
The evidence of record does not support a finding that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights
were violated under the theory that he was denied adequate medical care while restrained. Because
there was no constitutional violation under this theory, Defendants have qualified immunity and are
shielded from liability.

Conditions of Confinement. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment and has been inte1preted by the Supreme Court to impose affirmative duties on
prison officials to "provide humane conditions of confinement." See Fatmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994). Claims concerning conditions of confinement require a plaintiff to show that the
conditions "pos[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm" and that the prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard in
that the prison official must actually have known of or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate
safety. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
13

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint can be read as asserting that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent in denying him the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, such as the ability to
use the restroom, during the time he spent in the four-point restraints. See Parke// v. Danberg, 833
F.3d at 335. "A prison official is deliberately indifferent if the official 'knows that [the] inmate[]
face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.'" Id. at 335 (quoting Chavatiagga v. New Jersry Dep't ef Corrs., 806 F.3d 210,229
(3d Cir. 2015)).
Here, there is no evidence of record that Defendants were deliberately indifferent. Indeed,
there is no evidence that either Defendant was present during Plaintiffs hospitalization. Also, while
Plaintiff states that the nurses repeatedly told officers that at least the right arm should not be cuffed
due to his injuries, there is no evidence that this information was provided to Defendants. Plaintiffs
main complaint, however, revolves around the use of the bathroom. Yet there is no evidence of
record that Plaintiff was not allowed to void his bladder or evacuate his bowels. SOP 100.08
concerns the security or control of an offender while at a hospital. Plaintiff complains that during
his hospitalization, he was never permitted access to the bathroom and, when he needed to evacuate
his bladder or bowels, he was required to do it in full view of the officers. But even had Plaintiff
been given access to a bathroom (presumably he was given a portable urinal and/ or bedpan), SOP
100.08 provides that when an offender is escorted to the bathroom he shall be in cuffs and leg
restraints, is not allowed to secure or close the door, and must remain in the officer's view at all time
without any exceptions. (D.I. 70 at 23)
Prison officials have a legitimate and important security interest in restraining offenders
while they receive off-site medical care in unsecured hospitals. Here, the evidence does not support
a finding that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm faced by
Plaintiff or that they disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Instead,

14

the record indicates that steps were taken both to provide Plaintiff humane conditions of
confinement while also maintaining security and safety during his hospital stay. Because Defendants
did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights under a conditions of confinement theory, they have
qualified immunity and are shielded from liability.
Excessive Force. The Eighth Amendment bars prison officials from using excessive force
against inmates. See Httdson v. MiMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). "[f]he unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment." Whitlry v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (alteration in original, quotation marks
omitted). Claims of use of excessive force require consideration of "the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, and the extent of
injury inflicted." Whitlry, 475 U.S. at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether
this standard has been met "ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."

Id. at 320-21 (quotation marks omitted); see also Wilkins v. Gadrfy 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010); Giles v.
Kearnry, 571 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2009).
Hope v. Pelzet; 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002), is the controlling case on the constitutionality of
mechanical restraints. See Yotmg v. Mattin, 801 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2015). In Hope, the Supreme
Court identified the following criteria relevant to the use of excessive force test: "(1) where the
inmate had 'already been subdued, handcuffed, [and] placed in leg irons,' and (2) there was a 'clear
lack of an emergency situation' such that '[a]ny safety concerns had long since abated,' then
(3) subjecting the inmate to 'substantial risk of physical harm' and 'unnecessary pain' serves no
penological justification." Yottng, 801 F.3d 172, 180 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 738).
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint can be read as asserting that Defendants used excessive force
in restraining Plaintiff as he alleges they enacted or maintained a policy or practice that cause him to
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be held in handcuffs and shackles in a four-point restraint during his entire hospitalization. Plaintiff
alleges the policy/ practice resulted in pain, humiliation, and torture, constituting cmel and unusual
punishment.
In his grievance, Plaintiff, acknowledges that there are security risks in every inmate action,

but contends certain situations call for changes in the policy. Plaintiff states that having his arms
cuffed to the bed was painful due to the chest tube, but he does not complain that the restraints
were too tight or that the use of the restraints resulted in physical injury. Nor did Plaintiff provide
any information on whether treatment was required as a result of the use of restraints. He also
argues, without providing evidence (for example through his Declaration), that Defendants
incorrectly describe the extension of restraints for mobility. Plaintiff argues they were not.
It seems that the chest tube may have exacerbated Plaintiff's discomfort when he was placed
in four-point restraints, but there is no evidence of record that the fact of this discomfort was
relayed to Defendants. Also, Defendants provided evidence, through Vance's declaration, that
typically an offender is restrained by cuffs connected to the sides of the hospital bed, and this
permits some movement of an offender's arms. In addition, typically two sets of regular handcuffs
or one regular set of handcuffs and a set of flexcuffs are used for each arm to provide the offender
greater movement or flexibility. The inventory in the logbook reinforces the statements in Vance's
declaration as it indicates that there were two sets of handcuffs, two sets of shackles, and four
flexcuffs. (D.I. 70 at 27-34) In addition, the October 14, 2014 logbook states, "[it] should be noted
that I/M Parkell has flexcuffs in addition to his handcuffs. He is currently 4 pointed." (Id. at 30)
The use of handcuffs and flexcuffs was also noted on October 17, 2013. (Id. at 32)
In applying the Hope factors, the first factor weights in Plaintiffs favor. Plaintiff was in a

hospital setting for treatment and, thus, it appears he had been subdued. The other two factors
weigh in favor of Defendants. With regard to the second factor, Plaintiff was placed in restraints to

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maintain a safe and secure environment during his hospitalization. This is not a case in which any
safety concerns had long since abated; instead, security remained a continuing issue throughout
Plaintiffs hospitalization. As to the third factor, the use of four-point restraints served a penological
justification of providing security and supervising an offender in an unsecure facility. As
acknowledged by the Third Circuit, "[p]rison officials have a legitimate and important security
interest in restraining those in their custody while they receive off-site medical care in unsecured
hospitals. Hqyte v. Wagnet; 2009 WL 215342, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2009). In addition, "there is
nothing wrong with the use of restraints regardless of whether the person in custody is a detainee or
a convicted prisoner." Id.
The record contains no evidence that Defendants acted maliciously or sadistically. Rather,
the record evidence is that prison officials exercised their discretion in following SOP 100.08 while
Plaintiff was hospitalized. No reasonable jury could find that Defendants used excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because there was no constitutional violation under an
excessive force theory, Defendants have qualified immunity and are shielded from liability.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

(D.I. 72)
An appropriate Order will be entered.

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