Anderson v. Pierce et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 7/9/2015. (aah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
LESTERF. ANDERSON,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 14-684-RGA
DAVID PIERCE, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lester F. Anderson. Pro se Petitioner.
Morgan Taylor Zum, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.
July
C? ,2015
Wi1~n, Delaware
~
TATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Petitioner Lester F. Anderson ("Petitioner") has filed an Application for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (D.l. 1; D.l. 7) The State filed an Answer in
opposition. (D.!. 17) For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny the Petition as barred by the
limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
I. BACKGROUND
In February 1992, a Delaware Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree
murder for fatally beating a person in the head ten to fifteen times with a baseball bat. See State
v. Anderson, 1996 WL 769265, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1996). On July 10, 1992, the
Delaware Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment. (D.!. 17 at 1) Petitioner
appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on
May 14, 1993. See Anderson v. State, 625 A2d 278 (Table), 1993 WL 169121 (Del. 1993).
On May l3, 1996, Petitioner filed his first motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"). See State v. Anderson, 1996
WL 769265 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1996). The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion on
December 17, 1996, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision on June 6, 1997.
Id; Anderson v. State, 696 A.2d 396 (Table), 1997 WL 346191 (Del. June 6, 1997).
Petitioner filed a second Rule 61 motion on December 28, 1999, which the Superior
Court denied on March 24, 2000. (D.l. 17 at 2) Petitioner appealed, but the Delaware Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction because the notice of appeal was untimely.
See Anderson v. State, 757 A2d 1277 (Table), 2000 WL 1152440 (Del. July 27, 2000).
Petitioner filed a third Rule 61 motion on March 25, 2008, and the Superior Court denied that
motion on April 9, 2008. See State v. Anderson, 2008 WL 1724257 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 9,
2008). Petitioner did not appeal that decision.
Petitioner filed his fourth Rule 61 motion on February 22,2013. See State v. Anderson,
2013 WL 1196332 (DeL Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2013). The Superior Court denied the motion,
along with a motion by his co-defendant, Joe Travis, advancing a similar theory, on March 25,
2013, and the Delaware Supreme Court affinned that judgment on June 26, 2013. See Anderson
V. State,
69 A.3d 370 (Table), 2013 WL 3326827 (DeL June 26,2013).
The instant Petition is dated May 2014, and asserts the following three grounds for relief:
(1) the Superior Court erred by addressing and denying his fourth Rule 61 motion in the same
written order as his co-defendant's motion; and (2) the attorney who represented him during his
first Rule 61 proceeding provided ineffective assistance. The State contends that the Court
should deny the Petition as time-barred. (D.I. 17)
II.
ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
AEDPA prescribes a one-year period of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by
state prisoners, which begins to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l). AEDPA's limitations period is subject to statutory and equitable tolling.
See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling); 28 U.S.c. § 2244(d)(2)
(statutory tolling).
Here, Petitioner does not allege, and the Court cannot discern, any facts triggering the
application of § 2244(d)(1)(8), (C), or (D). As such, the one-year period oflimitations began to
run when Petitioner's conviction became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Pursuant to
§ 2244( d)( 1)(A), if a state prisoner appeals a state court judgment but does not seek certiorari
review, the judgment of conviction becomes final ninety days after the state appellate court's
decision. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565,575,578 (3d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Morton,
195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).
In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence
on May 14, 1993, and he did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. As a result, Petitioner's convictions became final on August 13, 1993.
However, state prisoners whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA's effective date of
Apri124, 1996 have a one-year grace period for timely filing their habeas applications, thereby
extending the filing period through April 23, 1997. 1 See McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206,
IMany federal circuit courts have held that the one-year grace period for petitioners whose
convictions became final prior to the enactment of AEDP A ends on April 24, 1997, not April 23,
1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001)(collecting cases). Although
the Third Circuit has noted that "[a]rguably we should have used April 24, 1997, rather than
April 23, 1997, as the cut-off date," Douglas, 359 F.3d at 261 n.5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d)), it
appears that April 23, 1997 is still the relevant cut-off date in this Circuit. In the present
situation, however, Petitioner filed his Petition well-past either cut-off date, rendering the one
day difference immaterial.
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213 (3d Cir. 2007); Douglas v. Hom, 359 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2004); Bums v. Morton, 134
F.3d 109, III (3d Cir. 1998). Consequently, Petitioner had until April 23, 1997 to timely file his
Petition.
Petitioner did not file the instant § 2254 Petition until May 27, 2014,2 more than
seventeen full years after the expiration of AEDPA's statute of limitations. Therefore, the
Petition is time-barred, unless the limitations period can be statutorily or equitably tolled. The
Court will discuss each doctrine in tum.
A. Statutory Tolling
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed state post-conviction motion tolls AEDPA's
limitations period during the time the action is pending in the state courts, including any postconviction appeals, provided that the motion was filed and pending before the expiration of
AEDPA's limitations period. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417,420-24 (3d Cir. 2000).
However, the limitations period is not tolled during the ninety days a petitioner has to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court regarding a judgment denying
a state post-conviction motion. See Stokes v. Dist. Attorney ofPhiladelphia, 247 F.3d 539,542
(3d Cir. 2001).
When Petitioner filed his first Rule 61 motion on May 13, 1996, eighteen days of
AEDPA's limitations period had already expired. The first Rule 61 motion tolled the limitations
period through June 6, 1997, the date on which the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
Superior Court's denial ofthat motion. The limitations clock started to run on June 7, 1997, and
2Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, the Court adopts as the filing date February 26,2014,
which is the date on the Petition. See Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758, 761 (3d Cir.
2003)(the date on which a prisoner transmitted documents to prison authorities for mailing is to
be considered the actual filing date).
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ran the remaining 347 days without interruption until it expired on May 20, 1998. Consequently,
Petitioner's three subsequent Rule 61 motions have no statutory tolling effect because all three
motions were filed after the expiration of AEDPA's limitations period.
Thus, even with the statutory tolling triggered by Petitioner's first Rule 61 motion,
Petitioner filed the instant Petition approximately sixteen years too late. Accordingly, the
Petition must be dismissed as time-barred, unless equitable tolling is available.
B. Equitable Tolling
The one-year limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons in rare circumstances
when the petitioner demonstrates "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Holland, 560
U.S. at 649-50. With respect to the diligence inquiry, equitable tolling is not available where the
late filing is due to the petitioner's excusable neglect. Id. As for the extraordinary circumstance
requirement, "the relevant inquiry is not whether the circumstance alleged to be extraordinary is
unique to the petitioner, but how severe an obstacle it creates with respect to meeting AEDP A's
one-year deadline." Pabon v. Mahoney, 654 F.3d 385, 400 (3d Cir. 2011). Notably, an
extraordinary circumstance will only warrant equitable tolling if there is "a causal connection, or
nexus, between the extraordinary circumstance [] and the petitioner's failure to file a timely
federal petition." Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784,803 (3d. Cir. 2013).
In this case, Petitioner does not allege, and the Court does not discern, that any
extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing the instant Petition in a timely manner.
To the extent Petitioner's untimely filing was the result of his own miscalculation of the oneyear filing period, such mistakes do not warrant equitably tolling the limitations period. See
Taylor v. Carroll, 2004 WL 1151552, at *5-6 (D. Del. May 14,2004).
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Additionally, to the extent Petitioner's citation to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309
(2012) (D.l. 1 at 12; D.l. 2 at 2,3, 14; D.1. 7 at 4) should be construed as an attempt to assert a
basis for equitable tolling, the argument is unavailing. By its own terms, the Martinez decision
provides a petitioner with an opportunity to overcome a procedural default of an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim, but does not in any way impact a petitioner's obligation to
comply with AEDPA's limitations period. See Willdnson v. Pierce, 2015 WL 366057, at *4 (D.
Del. Jan. 26,2015).
For all ofthese reasons, the Court concludes that that the equitable tolling doctrine does
not apply in this case. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the instant Petition as time-barred.
III.
PENDING MOTIONS
During the pendency of this proceeding, Petitioner filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel
(D.l. 23) and a Motion to Expand the Record with eight items from his criminal case (D.l. 26).
None of the items requested in the Motion to Expand the Record appear to bear on the timeliness
on the instant Petition. Thus, having already concluded that the Petition is time-barred, the Court
will dismiss both Motions as moot.
IV.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether
to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011); 28 U.S.c. § 2253(c)(2).
When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
underlying constitutional claims, the court is not required to issue a certificate of appealability
unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was
correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000).
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The Court has concluded that the instant Petition is time-barred. Reasonable jurists
would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court will not issue a certificate
of appealability.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court concludes that the Petition must be denied as time
barred. An appropriate Order will be entered.
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