Gibbs v. Coupe et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 11/6/2015. (klc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ARSON I. GIBBS, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT COUPE, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
) Civ. No.14-790-SLR
)
)
)
)

Arson I. Gibbs, Sr., Dover, Delaware. Pro se Plaintiff.
Roopa Sabesan, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants Robert Coupe, David Pierce, and
James Welch:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dated: November (Q , 2015
Wilmington, Delaware

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Arson I. Gibbs, Sr. ("plaintiff''), a former inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware, proceeds pro se and has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 1 He filed this iawsuit on June 20, 2014, raising
medical needs claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 1, 7) Presently before the
court are State defendants' motion to dismiss (D.I. 30) and plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment (D.I. 35). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For the following reasons, the court will deny the motions.

II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who has worn eyeglasses for more than forty-five years, alleges
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when, based upon
prison policy, his wire frame prescription eyeglasses were taken from him upon his
incarceration. Plaintiff's glasses were taken on April 13, 2014 and, as of the date of the
filing of the amended complaint, July 24, 2014, he had not been provided with
prescription glasses. Plaintiff alleges the delay in medical care harmed him.
In addition, plaintiff alleges that defendant Delaware Department of Correction
Commissioner Robert Coupe ("Coupe") failed to train defendant VCC Warden David

Plaintiff was hospitalized in August 2014 and released from prison. (See D.I. 11) He
is on community supervision with a scheduled release date of November 2015. See
https://www.vinelink.com/vinelin k/detailsAction. do?siteld=8000&agency= 1&id=0006698
2&searchType=offender (Nov. 5, 2015).

1

Pierce ("Pierce") on policy writing and that Pierce was indifferent to plaintiff's needs
through his written policy of confiscating prescription eyeglasses and the failure to
replace them within a reasonable time. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bureau Chief
James Welch ("Welch") violated his rights when he affirmed the denial of plaintiff's
grievances seeking his prescription eyewear. Welch denied plaintiff's grievance on July
3, 2014. ·As alleged by plaintiff, he had yet to receive prescription eyeglasses as of July
24, 2014. 2
State defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, in the alternative, that they
are protected from liability by reason of qualified immunity. (D.I. 30) Plaintiff opposes
the motion and requests summary judgment. (D.I. 35)

Ill. LEGAL STANDARDS
In reviewing a motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept
all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). A court may consider the
pleadings, public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint, and documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell At/. Corp.

Filings do not indicate when, or if, plaintiff was provided prescription glasses prior to
his release from the VCC.

2

2

v. Twombly, 550 u~s. 544, 545 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations; however,
"a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do." Id. at 545 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The "[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Id. Furthermore, "[w]hen
there are well-ple[d] factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). Such a determination is a context specific task requiring the
court "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to State a Claim
As noted above, State defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that the
allegations against them fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling
on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F. 3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999).
This court previously reviewed plaintiff's allegations and found that he stated
cognizable and non-frivolous claims. Nothing has changed since the court's ruling.
Plaintiff adequately alleges constitutional claims against Coupe, Pierce, and Welch.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (When an Eighth Amendment claim

3

is brought against a prison official it must meet two requirements: (1) the deprivation
alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official must have
been deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety.); Dinote v. Danberg, 601 F.
App'x 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (Supervisory liability is available only if the
supervisor with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, or
(2) participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the
person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's
unconstitutional conduct.). Therefore, the court will deny State defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

8. Qualified Immunity
State defendants also seek dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity. They
argue that they relied, justifiably, upon medical personnel to meet the medical needs of
plaintiff and there are no allegations to show this justification was not reasonable.
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person wou,ld have known." Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The
question of "whether an officer made a reasonable mistake of law and is thus entitled to
qualified immunity is a question of law that is properly answered by the court, not a
jury." Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). "[l]t is generally unwise to
venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to
develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases." Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F.

4

App'x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished). A full analysis of whether qualified
immunity applies to plaintiff's claims against State defendants is premature because
there are unresolved questions of fact relevant to the analysis.
Therefore, the court will deny the motion to dismiss on the grounds of a qualified
immunity defense at this stage of the litigation, without prejudice to State defendants'
ability to later raise the defense.

V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will: (1) deny State defendants' motion to
dismiss (D. I. 30); and (2) deny without prejudice to renew and as premature plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment (D.I. 35).
A separate order shall issue.

5