Hall et al v. Pierce et al

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 1/4/2019. (ceg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JAMES E. HALL,
Plaintiff,

v.
WARDEN DAVID PIERCE, et al.,
Defendants.

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C.A. No. 14-890 (MN)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

James Hall, Washington County Detention Center, Hagerstown, Maryland. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Ryan Patrick Connell, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

January 4, 2019
Wilmington, Delaware

Plaintiff James Hall ("Hall"), a former pretrial detainee at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center ("VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware, now confined at the Washington County
Detention Center in Hagerstown, Maryland, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1

(See D.I. 3, 4, 5). Plaintiff appears prose and has been granted leave to proceed informa pauperis.
(D.I. 12). Before the Court are Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff's request
for counsel, motion to amend, and motion for injunctive relief. 2 (D.I. 68, 80). Plaintiff opposes
the motion for summary judgment. (D.I. 80).

I.

BACKGROUND
According to the allegations in the First Amended Complaint (D.I. 36), Plaintiff, a pretrial

detainee during the relevant time-frame, was transferred from B-Building to maximum housing in
Building 22 on June 9, 201 4, absent a disciplinary or institutional infraction. 3 (Id. at 1, 4). Plaintiff
states that he remained in Building 22 until he pleaded guilty to pending criminal charges.

(See D.I. 80 at 3). Building 22 is part of the MHU (i.e., Medium-High Housing Unit). 4 (D.I. 69
at 1). Plaintiff alleges his housing in Building 22 was unconstitutional because Defendants

When bringing a§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
2

Plaintiff's motions are contained in his opposition to Defendants' motion for summary
judgment and should have been docketed separately.

3

Plaintiff's original pleadings state that he was first housed in the MHU on May 19, 2014.
(See D.I. 5 at 1).

4

The MHU is a step down from the SHU (i.e., Security Housing Unit) and a step up from
the general VCC population. Inmates in the MHU have more privileges than inmates in
the SHU but fewer privileges than inmates in the general population.
See https://doc.delaware.gov/views/jtvcc. blade.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 20 19).

demonstrated "deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of Plaintiffs health and safety."
(D.I. 36 at 1, 4). Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to lengthy stays in "cell isolation with
prisoners who had disciplinary problems or who were in protective custody" and subjected to other
hardships such as lights on 20 hours a day, no drinking water in the yard, sleeping on a mattress
on the floor, inadequate food rations, and poor medical care. (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff alleges he was punished unnecessarily when he was housed in Building 22 for 217
days, and he suffered severe physical and emotional harm. (Id.). Plaintiff also asserts that he was
housed in MHU for eight months. (D .I. 80 at 7). The record reflects that Plaintiff was transferred
from the VCC to Morris Community Corrections Center in Dover, Delaware, on November 15,
2014. (D.I. 27 at 9). Using the MHU May 19, 2014 entry date from the initial pleading, Plaintiff
was housed in the MHU for 180 days or five months and 27 days. Using the MHU June 9, 2014
entry date from the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was housed there for 159 days or five
months and six days.
Count I is against Defendant David Pierce ("Pierce") the former VCC warden; Count II is
against Defendant Sgt. Austin ("Austin"); Count III is against Sgt. D. Doane ("Doane"); 5 and
Count V is against Delaware Department of Correction ("DOC") Commissioner Perry Phelps
("Phelps"). 6 The First Amended Complaint does not contain a prayer for relief although the

s

It is Defendants' position that Doane was not properly served but, regardless, the legal
arguments of Pierce and Austin are applicable to Doane. (See D.I. 68). Count III alleges
that Plaintiff complained to Doane about his housing assignment that as a pretrial detainee
he should not be housed with sentenced inmates, and Doane failed to take reasonable
measures to abate the risk of harm. (D.I. 36 at 3). While Plaintiff has made numerous
attempts to serve Doane, the Court now finds it unnecessary given the current posture of
the case.

6

The claims in Count IV were raised against Sgt. M. Williams who was dismissed as a
defendant on December 29, 2015. (See D.I. 38).
2

original pleadings sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.

(See D.I. 5 at 12).
The record reflects that Plaintiff submitted a grievance in June 2014 complaining that he
was served cold food, his daily food rations were less than 2,000 calories, and he was sleep
deprived. (D.I. 80 at 38-4). Plaintiff complained that he did not receive proper food portions
because the servers would shake food from the serving spoons. (Id. at 61 ). During the grievance
procedure, Plaintiff was advised by Lise Merson that she would direct a tray assessment to ensure
proper serving sizes. (Id. at 63).
In Plaintiffs November 6, 2018 affidavit, he states that he spoke to Pierce in June or July
2014 in the hallway of Building 22 when Pierce was conducting a tour. (Id. at 74). Plaintiff states
that he told Pierce he was locked in his cell and not allowed out "but for two hours a day," and that
food service was "shaking the spoons." (Id.). Pierce instructed Plaintiff to speak to the Building
Sergeants who at the time were Doane and Austin. (Id.).

Plaintiff states that he raised other

concerns with Doane and Austin about cell temperatures, excessive lighting, and inadequate food
portions. (Id.). Plaintiff states that his main concern was his placement in punitive segregation
absent a notice or hearing to contest his placement in MHU 22 indefinitely. (Id.).
According to Pierce and Phelps, during the relevant time-frame, they were not personally
familiar with Plaintiff and were not personally responsible for Plaintiffs housing or classification.
(D.I. 69-1 at ,r,r 1, 3; D.I. 69-2 at ,r,r 1, 3). Pierce and Phelps state the majority of VCC pretrial
inmates are housed in Building 22 and have been for almost a decade. (Id. at

,r 4).

Some are

housed in the facility's infirmary for medical reasons and some are housed in SHU for reasons
such as escape risks or for their own protection. (Id.). Neither Pierce nor Phelps were made aware
of any significant threats to health and safety in Building 22. (Id.).

3

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has uncovered
no evidence to support his deliberate indifference claims; and (2) Defendants are shielded by
qualified immunity. In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that more discovery is needed. The Court,
however, extended the original discovery deadline multiple times (see D.I. 47, 56, 58, 67),
discovery closed in November 2017, and the dispositive motion deadline expired in January 2018.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Wishkin v. Potter,
476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). A dispute is "genuine" only if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material
when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986).
The nonmoving party bears the burden to establish the existence of each element of his
case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In doing so, the non-moving party must
present specific evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude in his favor.
Anderson, 411 U.S. at 248; Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000).
Summary judgment should be granted if no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving
party. Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d Cir. 1989).

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III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Personal Involvement

The Court first observes there is a paucity of evidence as to either Pierce's or Phelps'
involvement in Plaintiffs housing or classification. Nor is there evidence ofrecord that Doane or
Austin were responsible for Plaintiffs housing assignment. Both Pierce and Phelps state they
were neither personally familiar with Plaintiff nor responsible for Plaintifrs housing or
classification. At most, Plaintiff spoke in passing to Pierce when he was touring Building 22 and
complained that he was only allowed out of his cell for two hours per day. As is well-known, "a
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable,
and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated
in nor approved," Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F .3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007), although "[p]ersonal
involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Given Defendants'
lack of personal involvement, their motion for summary judgment will be granted.

B.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants allege that they are shielded from liability by reason of qualified immunity.
"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known·." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects 'all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)
(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))).

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To survive a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time
of the challenged conduct." Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts have the discretion to perform the two-step
qualified immunity test in the order deemed most appropriate in the case at issue. Santini v.
Fuentes, 195 F.3d 410,418 (3d Cir. 2015). As will be discussed, the evidence of record does not

support a finding that Defendants violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights and, therefore, they are
shielded from suit by reason of qualified immunity.
1.

Housing/Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that, as a pretrial detainee, his placement in MHU Building 22 violated his
right to due process. Plaintiff does not indicate if he raises a substantive due process claim or a
procedural due process claim, and his allegations appear to combine the two.
The record does not support Plaintiff's due process claims. Unlike sentenced inmates,
pretrial detainees have a liberty interest in being free from punishment prior to conviction under
the Due Process Clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979). "Absent a showing of an
expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally
will tum on whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
[to it]." Id. at 538. Therefore, "if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees." Id. at 539.

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Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective components.
See Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). The objective component requires an

inquiry into whether "the deprivation [was] sufficiently serious" and the subjective component
asks whether "the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]" Id. (citations
omitted).

Given that penological considerations are peculiarly within the province and

professional expertise of corrections officials, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record
to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response, courts should ordinarily defer to the
expert judgment of corrections officials in determining whether restrictions or conditions are
reasonably related to the Government's interest in maintaining security and order and operating
the institution in a manageable fashion. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23.
Plaintiff contends that he was housed in Building 22 as a form of punishment. There is no
evidence, however, that Plaintiff's housing in Building 22 was designed to punish him. Instead,
the uncontroverted evidence is that the majority of pretrial inmates are housed in Building 22 and
have been for ten years. And, in the professional judgment of Pierce and Phelps Building 22 is the
appropriate housing area for most pretrial inmates.
After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find a
violation of Plaintiff's substantive due process rights. The record reflects that the restrictions
imposed upon Plaintiff were reasonably related to the legitimate goal of maintaining his safety,
and there is no evidence of record of purposeful intent on the part of prison officials to punish
Plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to the substantive due process issue.
To the extent Plaintiff raises a procedural due process claim, "[a]lthough pretrial detainees
do not have a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population, they do have a
liberty interest in not being [segregated] indefinitely . . . without explanation or review of their

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confinement." Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d at 69. "The protections due to sentenced inmates
provide a floor for what pretrial detainees may expect." Id. at 69. "The degree of process required
under the Fourteenth Amendment varies depending on the reason for the transfer to more
restrictive housing, with greater process accorded to prisoners who are confined for disciplinary
infractions than those moved for purely administrative reasons." Id. at 70.

If a restraint is imposed for disciplinary reasons, a pretrial detainee is entitled to the process
noted in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). "'Prison officials [however] must provide
detainees who are transferred into more restrictive housing for administrative purposes only an
explanation of the reason for their transfer as well as an opportunity to respond.' Stevenson, 495
F.3d at 70. This notice must be within a 'reasonable time' following the transfer, id. (quoting

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,476 n.8 (1983)), and the opportunity to respond can be satisfied by
written grievances, see Helms, 459 U.S. at 476."' Kanu v. Lindsey, 739 F. App'x 111, 117
(3d Cir. 2018).
There is no evidence that Plaintiff was confined to MHU for disciplinary reasons.
Consequently, he was not entitled to the process outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell. Plaintiff was
housed in MHU, as most pretrial detainees are. He was not housed there indefinitely; for no more
than five to six months, and only until his criminal charges were resolved. At most, procedural
due process required only an explanation of the reason for Plaintiffs transfer and an opportunity
to respond to the transfer. The record is void of any notice given to Plaintiff regarding his transfer
to MHU. It is evident, however, from the record that Plaintiff availed himself of the prison
grievance process and had available to him the means to complain or respond to the transfer to
MHU by means of a grievance.

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In light of the forgoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff received the minimal procedural
due process protections he was due. In addition, as discussed above, the evidence of record does
not support a finding of personal involvement on behalf of any Defendant regarding Plaintiffs
procedural due process rights. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to this issue.

2.

Conditions of Confinement Claims

Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims brought by pretrial detainees.

See Hubbardv. Taylor ("Hubbard f'), 399 F.3d 150, 158 n.13, 166 (3d Cir. 2005).
As discussed above, to establish a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a pretrial detainee plaintiff would have to plausibly allege that the challenged
conditions of confinement amount to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538. When
analyzing whether a condition of confinement amounts to punishment, the inquiry generally turns
on whether the challenged conditions have a purpose other than punishment and whether the
conditions are excessive in relation to that purpose. See id. at 538-39 ("A court must decide
whether the [particular restriction or condition accompanying pretrial detention] is imposed for the
purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental
purpose."); Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 158 (discussing analysis of whether condition of confinement
constitutes punishment for Fourteenth Amendment purposes). In addition, the Court considers the
totality of the circumstances in assessing whether a prisoner's conditions of confinement violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hubbard v. Taylor ("Hubbard If'), 538 F.3d 229, 236, 238
(3d Cir. 2008) (examining totality of circumstances to determine whether conditions of
confinement constitute Fourteenth Amendment violation); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67

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(3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that "to determine whether conditions of confinement violate the Eighth
Amendment, it is necessary to examine the totality of the conditions at the institution").
In addition, because prison officials must ensure that pretrial detainees receive adequate
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must '"truce reasonable measures to guarantee [their]
safety[,]'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 835, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526-27 (1984)), a§ 1983 claim asserting a conditions of confinement claim must also allege
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to that plaintiff's health or safety.

See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991); see also Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App'x 169,
173 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("'[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial harm.exists, and he must also draw that inference.'")
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

An unconstitutional punishment under the Fourteenth

Amendment typically includes both objective and subjective components.

See Stevenson v.

Carroll, 495 F .3d at 68.
Here, Plaintiff complains of excessive lockdown in cells, extreme cold temperatures,
lighting, and inadequate food portions. (D.1. 80 at 7). He also complains that as a pretrial detainee,
he should not have been housed with sentenced inmates. Plaintiff states that he made complaints
to Defendants regarding the conditions under which he was housed, particularly, that he was not
receiving adequate food portions and there were excessive lockdown times. The evidence of
record, however, does not support a finding that the totality of the circumstances violated
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Both Pierce and Phelps state that they were never made aware of any significant threats to
health and safety in Building 22. Regarding Plaintiff's claim that pretrial detainees and sentenced
inmates were housed together, there is no evidence of record to suggest that sentenced prisoners

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at the VCC, posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff as a pretrial detainee. To the extent
Plaintiff claims a constitutionally protected interested in being housed apart from sentenced
prisoners, the claim fails as a matter of law. See Hoover v. Watson, 886 F. Supp. 410, 417
(D. Del. 1995) (finding no authority "to support the assertion that pre-trial detainees who are being
lawfully held pending a trial have a liberty interest in being housed separately from sentenced
inmates"), ajf'd, 74 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir. 1995) (table).
Although Plaintiff alleges generally that was subjected to extreme cold, the evidence of
record is that Building 22 is equipped with climate control. Plaintiff complains of food portions
and asked Austin to advocate for him about the food rations. (D.I. 36 at 2). There is no evidence,
however, that Plaintiff was denied food, only that he considered the portions too small and that he
took exception to servers shaking food off the serving spoon. While Plaintiff makes the conclusory
assertion that he did not receive adequate food portions, he provided no specifics as to how
frequently this occurred or how many calories he received.
Plaintiff alleges that Building 22 was illuminated 20 hours a day. Requiring inmates to
live in constant illumination may, under certain circumstances, rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. See Bacon v. Minner, 229 F. App'x 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2007). This, however, is not the
case here. Plaintiff was not subjected to continuous light. Notably in Bacon, the Third Circuit
concluded that a claim that the main lights in a segregated housing unit which "were turned on
between the hours of 8:30 am and 11 :30 pm" as well as between "4:45 am and 7:00 am" did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation because the plaintiff did not allege that he was subject
to constant illumination or had suffered any significant medical problem due to the purportedly
excessive illumination and it concluded the inmate's claims "were not objectively serious to
warrant constitutional protection." Id. Plaintiffs lighting claim fails for the same reason.

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Finally, Plaintiff complains he was only allowed out of his cell two hours per day. His
complaints of lack of drinking water in the yard indicate that Plaintiff was given time for exercise.

(See D.I. 36 at 2). Moreover, the allegations do not state a claim of constitutional dimension.
See Brooks v. Barnes, 2012 WL 3637621, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (plaintiff's amended
complaint fails to state a claim because allegations regarding "21 hour lock down" and a general
lack of outside recreation do not rise to the level of constitutional concern); Kinser v. County of

San Bernardino, 2011 WL 4801899, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) ("[plaintiff] alleges that she
has been confined to her cell more than 22 hours a day and that she has had to eat all her meals in
her cell in close proximity to her toilet. These allegations by themselves do not state a Fourteenth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim."); 0 'Mara v. Hillsborough Cty. Dep 't of Corr.,
2008 WL 5077001, at *4 (D.N.H. Nov. 24, 2008) ("[plaintiffs] allegations are insufficient to state
a cognizable constitutional claim. His complaint that he was afforded only two hours of out-ofcell time a day does not state a claim of constitutional dimension.").
Having considered the foregoing allegations separately, the Court also considers them in
their totality. Even when considering the totality of the conditions, the record fails to plausibly
establish that the conditions of confinement in Building 22 amounted to punishment. See e.g.,

Hubbard II, 538 F.3d at 232-35 (concluding that triple-celling of pretrial detainees, some of whom
were made to sleep on floor mattresses for three to seven months, and housing of detainees in gym,
weight room, and receiving area due to overcrowding, did not amount to punishment). No
reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on this issue. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the conditions of confinement claim.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment

(D.I. 68); and (2) deny as moot Plaintiff's request for counsel, motion for leave to amend and
motion for injunctive relief (D.I. 80).
An appropriate order will be entered.

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