Jackson v. Russell

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 6/2/2016. (nmfn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
RICHARD JACKSON,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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RORY RUSSELL.

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Defendant.

Civ. No. 14-1034-SLR

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Richard Jackson, Georgetown, Delaware. Prose Plaintiff.
Kenisha L. Ringgold, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dated: June J.. , 2016
Wilmington, Delaware

Ms~~ct Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Jackson ("plaintiff"), an inmate at the Sussex Correctional Institution
("SCI"), Georgetown, Delaware, proceeds prose and has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. He filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc to 2000cc-5. (D.I. 1 at 5) The case proceeds on the amended complaint filed
on April 1, 2015, with service on the remaining defendant named therein, Rory Russell
("defendant"). 1 (D.I. 20) Presently before the court is defendant's motion for summary
judgment. (D.I. 58)

II. BACKGROUND
In 2005, plaintiff was approached by Charles Saunders, an inmate at SCI, who
asked for plaintiff's help taking pictures of inmates as part of the "Chapel Picture
Project." (D.I. 62, ex. G at 34-35) Plaintiff met with the chaplain at the time, Larry Lilly,
who asked for his help taking pictures and preparing for religious services. (Id. at 35)
Plaintiff agreed to help and assisted the chaplain as part of the project. (Id. at 36)
However, plaintiff was never officially classified as an employee. (Id., ex. A at 33-34)
In 2012, defendant was hired as the SCI chaplain. (D.I. 59, ex. A at il 1) To assist with
his duties as chaplain, defendant created a position called the "Nehemiah Chapel

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In his amended complaint, plaintiff named Dean Blades, James Chandler, Truman
Mears, and Perry Phelps as defendants. (D.I. 20) These defendants were withdrawn at
request of plaintiff on July 1, 2015. (D. I. 35)

Clerk". 2 (Id., ex. A at 1J 4) The position involved janitorial and administrative duties,
including photographing inmates for the picture project.

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(Id., ex. E)

Plaintiff alleges that on March 28, 2014, defendant asked him why he did not
attend chapel services. (D.I 62, ex. G at 26) Plaintiff alleges when he replied he did not
attend because he was a Mormon, defendant responded: "You're one of them, huh.
You know what they are about." (Id.) Plaintiff responded that he did not want to discuss
the matter further. (Id.) On April 3, 2014, plaintiff was relieved of his duties as a
photographer. (Id. at 38) Plaintiff was not officially notified, and instead was informed
by another inmate that he would no longer be photographing inmates as part of the
project. (Id. at 39) Plaintiff used a scheduling book provided by SCI to determine when
photographs should be taken. (Id.) The book was removed from his possession when
he was told he would no longer be taking pictures. (Id.)
On April 4, 2014, defendant accepted applications for the "Nehemiah Chapel
Clerk" position. (D.I. 59, ex. F) Defendant evaluated applicants based on their answers
to four questions, which focused on computer skills and an interest in the position. 4

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The name of the position came from the history of the SCI chapel which was built in an
initiative called the "Nehemiah Project" and was dedicated as the "Nehemiah Chapel."
(Id.)
3 The position duties and responsibilities included: preparing and delivering chapel
correspondence, maintaining the chapel calendar, camera duties, setting up the chapel
for religious service, librarian duties, maintaining chapel files, operating the PA system
for services, transporting chapel mail, and producing chapel material. (D.I. 59, ex. E)
4 The four interview questions were:
"(1) Do you have any computer experience? Have you completed the
class offered by the education department?
(2) What is your work history and have you ever been fired from a job?
(3) Why do you want this job?
(4) If you and someone else were both qualified for this position why
should we pick you?"
(D.l. 59, ex. G)

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(Id., ex. G) Each question was given three possible points. (Id.) No interview
questions pertained to an applicant's religion. (Id.) Plaintiff did not possess the
necessary computer skills and received five points out of a possible twelve, the lowest
score out of all applicants. (Id., ex. I) After learning he was not selected for the
position, plaintiff filed a grievance which was denied on appeal by the Resident
Grievance Committee ("R.G.C.") by a vote of 4-0. 5 (Id., ex. J)

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 415 U.S. 475, 586 n. 10 (1986). A party asserting that a fact
cannot be-or, alternatively, is-genuinely disputed must support that assertion either
by citing to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motions only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1 )(A) & (B). If the moving party has
carried its burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 415 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation

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The committee stated there was no evidence of staff wrongdoing because there were
no questions in the interview that referenced religion. (D.I., ex. J)

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marks omitted). The court will "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence."
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87; see also Podohnik v. U.S. Postal Service, 409 F.3d
584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating party opposing summary judgment "must present more
than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of
a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the "mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment," a factual dispute is genuine where "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at
249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial").

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff sues defendant in his individual and official capacities, and seeks
punitive damages of $75,000. (D.I. 1 at 1) Plaintiff alleges that defendant denied him
equal protection and free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth

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Amendments and the RLUIPA. (D.I. 1 at 5) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant
terminated him from his job at the "Nehemiah Picture Project" because he is a Mormon. 6
(Id. at 6)
Plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against defendant in his official capacity
are in essence claims against the State of Delaware. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a claim against a state official in his or

her official capacity for monetary relief is a claim against an official's office, and is a suit
against the state). Therefore, these claims are prohibited under the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
121 (1984) ("[A] claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official
responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh
Amendment."); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendant argues that he is protected by qualified immunity from suits in his
individual capacity. The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to protect officers from
civil liability "when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223 (2009). Accordingly, it gives "ample room for mistaken judgments." Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991 ). Qualified immunity prevents a suit against a

government official regardless of whether the official makes "a mistake of law, a mistake

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Plaintiff alleges that his counselor Aleta Jett ("Ms. Jett") told him that he was not given
the job because he is a Mormon. (D.I. 62, ex. G at 45) Yet Ms. Jett's testimony
expressly contradicts plaintiff's allegations. (D. I. 59, ex. D 111112-13) She states that she
expressed disbelief when plaintiff told her that he was not selected for the position
because he was a Mormon. (D.I. 59, ex. D 1112)

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of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." Pearson, 555 U.S. at
231 (internal citations omitted).
Whether defendant is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry:
whether his acts violated a constitutional or statutory right and, if they did, whether that
right was clearly established at the time of the violation. See Yarris v. County of
Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Saucierv. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
(2001 ), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 235). If no constitutional right has
been violated, "there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity."
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
The Third Circuit has held that inmates do not have a liberty or property interest
in a job assignment that provides Due Process protection. James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d
627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989). Therefore, plaintiff cannot establish that he had a constitutional
right to the job because he has no liberty or property interest to the job as an inmate.
Even if plaintiff possessed a constitutional right, there is no evidence that defendant
violated that right. Defendant chose the most qualified candidate using answers to
objective questions in the interview process that related to the position's responsibilities.
Plaintiff's lack of computer skills and understanding of the position resulted in a lower
score. There is no evidence that defendant's decision not to hire plaintiff for the chapel
clerk position was based on plaintiff's religious beliefs. Because there is no violation of
a constitutional or statutory right, defendant is protected by qualified immunity which
bars plaintiff's claims.7 Plaintiff's claims under the RLUIPA also fail because the Third

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Because the doctrines of sovereign and qualified immunity defeat plaintiff's claims, the
court declines to address the issues regarding the First or Fourteenth Amendment
raised by plaintiff.

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Circuit has held the RLUIPA does not permit monetary damages against state officials
in their individual capacity. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant renamed the "Chapel Picture Project" to the
"Nehemiah Picture Project" in violation of the Establishment Clause. (D.I. 62 at 4)
Defendant alleges that naming the position "Nehemiah Chapel Clerk" was merely an
informal reference to the history of the chapel and the position is formally named
"Chapel Clerk." (D.I. 63 at 5) The State may not impose a substantial burden on an
inmate's free exercise of his or her religion without demonstrating that the practice is
reasonably related to a legitimate interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, (1987).
The practice must be considered in light of the burden on the inmate and if there are
other alternative available at a "de minimis cost". Id. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any
burden on his religious exercise, therefore, his claim that the project and the position
were renamed to express religious preference fails. 8 Plaintiff may still practice his faith
without holding the chapel clerk position.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.I.
58) is granted. An appropriate order shall issue.

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Another inmate stated that he did not apply for the "Nehemiah Chapel Clerk" position
because he was a non-Christian. (D.I. 64 at 3) However, there was no religious
requirement for the position, therefore, there was no burden on plaintiff's free exercise
of his religion.

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