Flamer v. Carr et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 11/25/14. (etg, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
: Civ. No. 14-1277-RGA
VINCENT CARR, et aI.,
John Flamer, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware,
Pro Se Plaintiff.
Plaintiff John Flamer, an inmate at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution,
Wilmington, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He appears pro
se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (0.1.4). The Court
proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)
and § 1915A(a).
Flamer alleges that Defendant Vincent Carr falsely stated that the medical
department prescribed Flamer testosterone. Flamer alleges medical negligence
because no blood work was conducted to determine if the medication is needed and his
"outside" physicians indicate that it is not needed. Flamer alleges that the medical
department has failed to address the fact that he is losing strength and muscle mass in
both arms and legs and has failed to send him to a neurosurgeon. Flamer also alleges
that he was injured when he fell from his bunk on August 21, 2014, but the medical staff
has not addressed his injuries. He seeks compensatory damages and immediate
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famig/io, 726 F.3d 448,
452 (3d CiL 2013); see a/so 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect
to prison conditions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89,93 (2007). 8ecause Flamer proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and
his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(i) and
§ 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional"
factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774
(3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and
refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to § 1915(e)(2)(8)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when
ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§
1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a
court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief."
Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though "detailed factual
allegations" are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide "labels and
conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Davis v.
Abington Mem'l Hasp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams
LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).
To determine whether a complaint meets the pleading standard, the Court must:
(1) outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief; (2) peel away
those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the
assumption of truth; and (3) look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity,
and then "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian
Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). The last step is "a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense." Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,103-05 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim, an
inmate must allege (i) a serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison
officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle
Gamble, 429 U.S.
at 104; Rouse v. Plan tier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is
deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious
harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer V. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by
"intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
"[A] prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment," so long
as the treatment provided is reasonable. Lasko v. Watts, 373 F. App'x 196, 203 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-140 (2d Cir. 2000». An
inmate's claims against members of a prison medical department are not viable under
§ 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but believes that more should be
done by way of diagnosis and treatment and maintains that options available to medical
personnel were not pursued on the inmate's behalf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at
107. Moreover, allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a
constitutional violation. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986)
(negligence is not compensable as a constitutional deprivation). Finally, "mere
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment" is insufficient to state a constitutional
violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
When reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to Flamer, he fails to
state an actionable constitutional claim against Carr for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. Rather, the Complaint alleges that Flamer received treatment
via testosterone therapy, but he disagrees with the treatment provided. The allegations
against Carr fall under the aegis of a medical malpractice/negligence claim, rather than
a deliberate indifference claim. In addition, the allegation that Carr made a false state
statement regarding Flamer's medical treatment does not rise to the level of a
With regard to the remaining Defendants, they are listed in the caption of the
Complaint and in the defendant information section of the Complaint, but there are no
allegations directed towards them. Flamer does allege, however, that the medical
department has not provided treatment for injuries he received as a result of an August
2014 fall. It appears plausible that Flamer may be able to articulate a claim against the
defendants or name alternative defendants. Therefore, Flamer will be given an
opportunity to amend his pleading. See O'Dell v. United States Gov't, 256 F. App'x 444
(3d Cir. 2007).
For the above reasons, the Complaint will be dismissed for as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(8)(i) and (ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff will be given leave to file an
An appropriate order will be entered.
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