Gumbs v. State of Delaware Department of Labor

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION regarding MOTION to Dismiss (D.I. 9 ). Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 6/17/2015. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

TRINA GUMBS,
Plaintiff,

v.

C.A. No.: 15-00190-RGA

DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,
Defendant.

Tasha Marie Stevens, Esq., Fuqua, Yori, and Willard, P.A., Georgetown, DE. Attorney
for Plaintiff.

Oliver J. Cleary, Esq., and Kenisha L. Ringgold, Esq., State of Delaware Department of
Justice, Wilmington, DE. Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

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June
2015
Wilmington, Delaware

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Plaintiff Trina Gumbs filed this Equal Pay Act action against Defendant State of
Delaware Department of Labor pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216 and 206(d). Before the
Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss. (D.I. 9).

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began working for the State of Delaware Department of Labor's
(hereinafter "DOOL") Office of Anti-Discrimination (hereinafter "OAD") in 1996. (D.I. 1, ~
6). She held multiple positions before advancing to the Labor Law Enforcement
Supervisor position in 2006. (Id. at ~ 7). Plaintiff received a temporary promotion to
OAD Administrator in December 2011. (Id.

at~

8). Because of the promotion to OAD

Administrator, her pay and duties increased to correspond to her new position. {Id.)
In March 2012, the DOOL posted the job opening for the OAD Administrator
position, also known as the Regulatory Specialist position, for which Plaintiff applied.

(Id. at W 9-10). She did not receive the position. (Id.

at~

12). Instead, the DOOL hired

Daniel McGannon, a male, in June 2012. (Id. at~ 13). Because the DOOL filled the
Regulatory Specialist position, Plaintiff was then returned to her previous position of
Labor Law Enforcement Supervisor. (Id. at ~ 17). Her pay decreased to match the
position. {Id.).
After the hiring of McGannon, Plaintiff alleges that she was required to train him
and to continue to perform the duties of Regulatory Specialist. (Id.

at~

19). Plaintiff

also alleges that McGannon's and her "positions have required the same skill, effort,
and responsibility under similar working conditions in the same establishment." (Id.

at~

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20). Finally, she alleges that McGannon has been paid more than herself, asserting
that DOOL has violated the Equal Pay Act in doing so. (Id. at~ 21 ).
Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in
conjunction with a Title VII claim. (D.I. 10, p. 1). Defendant moved to dismiss that suit,
asserting that the Eleventh Amendment did not allow for Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim
against the State of Delaware in state court. (Id.). Plaintiff then filed the instant
complaint in this Court. (D.I. 11, p. 3). Plaintiff amended her complaint in Superior
Court to remove the Equal Pay Act claim, which the Superior Court allowed. (Id.).
Plaintiff's Title VII claim remains pending in Superior Court. (D.I. 10, p. 2).
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's instant complaint, asserting that Plaintiff
has failed to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Pay Act and has violated the
claim-splitting doctrine. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (D.I. 9). Under
Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement
to relief." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Although plaintiffs do
not have to provide "detailed factual allegations," plaintiffs "must do more than simply
provide 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action."' Davis v. Abington Mem'I Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d
306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Plausibility requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Parties may also
seek dismissal of a "later-filed action on the grounds that it is duplicative of an earlierfiled action" using Rule 12(b)(6). Leonard v. Stemtech Int'/, Inc., 2012 WL 3655512, at
*4 (D. Del. Aug. 24, 2012).
If a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal based on an affirmative defense, a
district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be
inequitable or futile. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Grayson

v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108) (3d Cir. 2002)). Dismissal without leave to
amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility. Id.
at 236.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1)
Plaintiff has violated the claim-splitting doctrine by filing the instant action in District
Court and (2) Plaintiff has not presented a cognizable claim under the Equal Pay Act.
Claim-Splitting
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has violated the claim-splitting doctrine by filing
this action in District Court after originally filing it in conjunction with her Title VII claim in
the Superior Court. (D.I. 10, pp. 10-11 ). The claim-splitting doctrine '"prohibits a
plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal, and requires that all claims arising out of a
single wrong be presented in one action."' Leonard, 2012 WL 3655512, at *5 (quoting

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Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (D. Md.

2004)). It "applies 'when, like here, two suits are pending at the same time."' Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'/, Inc., 2009 WL 2016436, at *3 (D. Del.

July 9, 2009) (quoting Sensormatic, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 579 n. 4).
Plaintiff has not violated the claim-splitting doctrine. Although originally a part of
the action currently in the Superior Court, Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim arises out of a
separate wrong from her Title VII claim. Plaintiff's Title VII claim focuses on the
allegation that DOOL did not hire Plaintiff for the position of Regulatory Specialist
because of her gender. (D.I. 11, Exhibit C). Plaintiff's claim in this Court focuses on the
discrepancy in pay between employees of opposite genders who are performing equal
work. These allegations would allow for independent relief from the Title VII claim.
Therefore, claim-splitting is not an issue in this case.
Equal Pay Act
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim resembles a failure to promote claim and
that it is not covered under the Equal Pay Act. (D.I. 10). To state a valid Equal Pay Act
claim, a plaintiff must assert that "an employer pays different wages to employees of
opposite sexes 'for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skills,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.'"
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). Alleged discrimination in

promotion goes "beyond the scope of the Equal Pay Act." Gaul v. Zep Mfg. Co., 2004
WL 234370, at *4, n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2004) (quoting Sche/lbaecher v. Baskin
Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989)).

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Defendant characterizes Plaintiff's claim as failure to promote because Plaintiff
temporarily held the position of Regulatory Specialist before DDOL hired Daniel
McGannon for the position. (D.I. 10, p. 7). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim arises
out of her failure to be chosen for Regulatory Specialist and her subsequent demotion to
Labor Law Enforcement Supervisor. {Id.). Although Plaintiff's complaint discusses her
temporary promotion and subsequent demotion, her complaint does not allege
discrimination in the hiring process. (D.I. 1). The focus of Plaintiff's claim is on what
occurred after DDOL hired Mr. McGannon and the alleged discrepancy in pay between
Plaintiff and McGannon despite performing the same work and holding the same
responsibilities. (Id. at mf 18-21 ). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim is not synonymous with a
failure to promote claim and does not go beyond the Equal Pay Act's scope.
Although Plaintiff's claim may not go beyond the Equal Pay Act's scope, she has
not met her pleading obligation. She alleges that she has performed the same duties
and that her position has required the same skill, effort, and responsibility as her male
co-worker while being paid less than him. (D.I. 1, mf 20-21 ). However, her allegations
are conclusory and do not equate to more than a recitation of the elements of an Equal
Pay Act claim. Under Twombly, plaintiffs must do more than provide a "formulaic
recitation of a cause of action's elements." 550 U.S. at 545.
Plaintiff does not have to provide a detailed account but her allegations should go
beyond the conclusory statements in the complaint. Plaintiff notes in the complaint that
Regulatory Specialist holds more duties and receives higher pay than the Labor Law
Enforcement Supervisor. (D.I. 1, mf 8-9). Therefore, a plausible complaint might
describe the duties and responsibilities of the Regulatory Specialist which necessitate

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the higher salary. It would then also include allegations of Plaintiff performing those
same duties and responsibilities.
In addition, a plausible complaint might describe the relationship between the
Regulatory Specialist and Labor Law Enforcement Supervisor positions. If the
Regulatory Specialist is a supervisory role, as Defendant asserts in its brief (D.I. 10, pp.
7-8), who does the Regulatory Specialist supervise? If the Regulatory Specialist is
responsible for overseeing Plaintiff in her role, then it does not seem plausible that the
two positions have equal duties and responsibilities. Therefore, the Court will grant
Defendant's motion to dismiss. However, because it is possible that Plaintiff may be
able to revise her factual allegations in order to state a claim, she will be given an
opportunity to amend the complaint.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently met her pleading obligation, the Court will
grant Defendant's motion to dismiss. (D.I. 9). Plaintiff will be given leave to file an
amended complaint, as it is possible that she could successfully replead it, based on
additional, non-conclusory facts. Plaintiff will have twenty-one days to file an amended
complaint.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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