Arias et al v. Danberg et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 12/18/2015. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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Plaintiffs,
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CARL DANBERG, KARL HINES,
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PERRY PHELPS,
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CERTAIN UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL
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EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
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CORRECTION; AND STATE OF
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DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION;
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RITA LANDGRAF, KEVIN ANN
HUCKSHORN,CLARENCE
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WATSON,M.D., GREGORY A.
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VALENTINE, UNKNOWN
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES OF THE
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DELAWARE HEALTH
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ANDSOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF )
SUBSTANCEABUSEANDMENTAL
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HEALTH, DELAWARE PSYCHIATRIC )
CENTER, CORRECT CARE
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SOLUTIONS, LLC, CERTAIN
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UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES )
OF CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC )
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Defendants.

MELCHOR ARIAS, ADMINISTRATOR
OF ESTATE OF IAN ARIAS,
MARIE CRISTINA KURCAN
MOTHER OF IAN ARIAS, DECEASED,

C.A. No. 1:15-cv-00197-GMS

MEMORANDUM
I.

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs Melchor Arias, Administrator of the Estate of Ian Arias and brother of Ian

Arias, and Marie Cristina Kurcan, mother oflan Arias, (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), filed this
lawsuit on March 2, 2015. (D.I. 1.) A First Amended Complaint was subsequently filed on

March 20, 2015. (D.I. 6.) The Complaint asserts civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and a state law wrongful death and survivor action. The Complaint names as defendants the
State of Delaware, the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services ("DHSS"),
Delaware Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health ("DSAMH"), and Delaware
Psychiatric Center ("DPC") (collectively, the "State Agency Defendants"). The Complaint also
names DHSS Cabinet Secretary Rita Landgraf, former-DSAMH Director Kevin Ann
Huckshom, and DPC Director Gregory Valentine (collectively, the "State Officer Defendants"
and, collectively with the State Agency Defendants, the "State Defendants"). The complaint
also names the Delaware Department of Correction ("DOC"), and DOC officials Carl Danberg,
Commissioner of DOC, Karl Hines, as both the Acting Commissioner and the Bureau Chief of
Community Corrections, and Perry Phelps, as the Warden of James T. Vuaghn Correctional
Center (the "DOC Defendants"). Finally, the Complaint names Dr. Clarence Watson, MD
("Watson"). (Collectively the State Defendants, the DOC Defendants, and Watson are "the
Defendants.")
On May 8, 2015, Watson filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, (D.I. 18, 19),
the State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and opening brief, (D.I. 20, 21), and the
DOC Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and opening brief. (D.I. 23, 24.) On May 29,
2015, Watson filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (D.I.
26). On June 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed answering briefs in response to Watson's motion.
(D.I. 27, 28, 29.) On July 6, 2015, Watson filed a reply brief, (D.I. 30), the State
Defendants filed a reply brief, (D.I. 31), and the DOC Defendants filed a reply brief. (D.I.
32.) For the reasons stated below, the court will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss all
counts except for Count I as asserted against Watson.

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II.

BACKGROUND
This Complaint arises from the suicide oflan Arias in 2013 while in pre-trial detention.

Mr. Arias had a history of major depressive disorder with multiple suicide attempts. On June 28,

2012, Ian Arias was arrested for criminal charges and placed in the custody of the Department of
Correction ("DOC"). During pre-trial detention, Mr. Arias attempted to commit suicide at least
twice and continually verbalized suicidal ideations. By court order, Mr. Arias was transferred
from the DOC under the Treatment Review Committee (TRC) admission process to Delaware
Psychiatric Center (DPC), Jane E. Mitchell Forensic Unit (the "Mitchell Unit") for psychiatric
stabilization. (D.I. 6 at 6.) He was admitted on November 16, 2012 and placed on a 1:1 monitor
until December 10, 2012 when he denied suicidal ideations and was placed on 15 minute checks.
On December 25, 2012, Mr. Arias again started expressing suicidal ideations and returned to 1:1
monitoring. Id. One day later, Mr. Arias was taken off of 1: 1 monitoring and placed back on
fifteen minute checks. Id. Mr. Arias' verbalizations about committing suicide did not cease with
medication. Id.
On February 13, 2013 Watson discharged Mr. Arias from the Mitchell Unit even though
Arias exhibited psychomotor retardation and reported feeling suicidal. Id. at 7. Mr. Arias
informed Dr. Watson and the DPC staff that he would attempt suicide again. Id. Arias' social
worker informed Watson and the other DPS employees that Mr. Arias was not ready to be
transferred back to the DOC. Id. Despite all of this, Mr. Arias was transferred to the James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center for pre-trial supervision. Shortly after, Mr. Arias entered the
infirmary in the care of the CCS.

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On February 13, 2013, Mr. Arias was discharged from the infirmary by CCS and
transferred back to pre-trial supervision despite continuous suicide threats by Mr. Arias. Id. at 78. Mr. Arias was not placed under constant supervision. At approximately 10:10 a.m. on March
5, 2013, Mr. Arias was found unconscious in his cell by prison officials, having hung himself
with bed sheets. Id. at 8.
Count I of the Plaintiffs' complaint alle~es Cruel and Unusual Punishment in violation of
his Civil Rights under state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts II, III and IV allege Failure to Train
and/or Maintenance of Wrongful Customs, Practices and Policies in violation of Civil Rights
under state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count V Alleges Wrongful Death under Delaware Code
Annotated Title 10, § 3724. Count VI is a Survival Action under Delaware Code Annotated
Title 10, § 3701. Count VII alleges Deprivation of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Rights 0£
Personal Security, Physical Integrity and Privacy, Count VIII alleges Deprivation of Plaintiffs'
Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Personal Security, Physical Integrity and Privacy Special
Relationship. Finally, Count IX alleges Deprivation of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Rights
of Personal Security, Physical Integrity and Privacy-State Created Danger. 1

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal where the

plaintiff "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The
touchstone of the pleading standard is plausibility. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 365 (3d Cir.

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Watson filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' medical negligence claims for failure to comply
with the requirements of Delaware Code Annotated Title 18, § 6853(a) to file an Affidavit of Merit in support of
their medical negligence claims. (D.I. 25). On March 16, 2015 the court granted a sixty-day extension to the
Plaintiffs to file an Affidavit of Merit, (D.I. 4), which the Plaintiffs did not meet. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs
withdrew any claims regarding medical negligence. (D.I. 28 at 5). Therefore, the court will dismiss Counts V and
VI and will not address these claims on the merits.

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2012). Plaintiffs must provide sufficient factual allegations "to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In considering a
motion to dismiss, the court "accept[s] all factual allegations as true, construe[s] the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine[ s] whether, under any reasonable reading
of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2:008). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

IV.

DISCUSSION
The Defendants argue that each of the Plaintiffs' nine counts should be dismissed for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court will examine each of the Plaintiffs' claims in turn.
A. Civil Rights Violations under Section 1983
The Plaintiffs assert various § 1983 claims. The Defendants respond that the
Plaintiffs' § 19 83 claims are barred by the statute oflimitations and.the sovereign immunity
doctrine. The Court will address each of these claims in tum.

1. Statute of Limitations
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. (D.I. 19 at 5-11, D.I. 21 at 10-11.) The Plaintiffs respond that the statute of
limitations does not bar their claims and that (1) the Continuing Wrong exception applies,
(2) the Date of Discovery exception applies, and (3) the Federal Equitable Tolling Doctrine
applies. (D.I 28 at 9-15.)

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Federal courts apply the statute oflimitations that governs personal injury tort claims in
the forum state for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 387, 127 (2007); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). A§ 1983 claim is
characterized as a personal-injury claim. Dique v. NJ. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). The Delaware statute oflimitations for actions seeking redress of personal injury claims
is two years. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 8119; Estate ofMiller ex rel. Miller v. Hudson, 528
F. App'x 238, 240 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year
statute oflimitations. See e.g., Lamb-Bowm[j-n v. Del. State Univ., 1999 WL 1250889, at *8 (D.
Del. Dec. 10, "1999) (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 § 8119 and applying a two-year statute of
limitations to a§ 1983 claim).
While tolling of the statute oflimitations is governed by state law, the date of the
claim's accrual is governed by federal law. Tearpock-Martini, 756 F.3d at 232, 235 (2014)
(citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). "A section 1983 claim accrues when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his cause of action."

Carrv. Town ofDewey Beach, 730 F. Supp. 591, 603 (D. Del. 1990) (citing Deary v. Three
Un-named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 197 n.16 (3d Cir. 1984)).
Mr. Arias received treatment at DPC from November 16, 2012 to February 13, 2013.
(D.I. 6 at 7-8.) His suicide occurred on March 5, 2013. The Complaint was filed on March 2,
2015. (D.I. 1.) The court concludes that March 5, 2013 is the date when the statute of
limitations began to accrue because that is the date when the injury occurred. Given this
finding, the action is not barred by the statute of limitations.

2. Sovereign Immunity
a. State Agencies

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The State Defendants and the DOC Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (D.I. 21 at 6-10, D.I. 24 at 6-11.) "[T]he Eleventh
Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction."
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)). Courts have

consistently held that the "test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from
federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one." Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011)
(citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999)). A state's waiver of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed."
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. "Absent a state's consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil

rights suit in federal court that names the state as a defendant." Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661
F.2d 23, 25. (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). The Eleventh
Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal
court. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-101 (1984); Regents
of the Univ. ·of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).

The state has not given its consent to be sued, nor has it authorized suit against any of
the named agencies, which are all subdivisions. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars this
action as to these defendants.

b. State Agency Officials
Defendants argue that the complaints against the various officials are official capacity
claims barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (D.I. 21 at 6-10, D.I. 24 at 6-11.)
Plaintiffs deny that they raise official capacity claims and dispute that the qualified
sovereign immunity doctrine applies. (D.I. 27 at 9, D.I. 28 at 8-11, D.I. 29 at 9).
Additionally, Dr. Watson argues that he is protected by the derivative sovereign immunity

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doctrine as a contractor who works for the government under appropriately conferred
authority. (D.I. 19 at 12-13); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988). This
argument will be addressed in the subsequent section.
As with a suit against a state as a whole, the ability to bring a suit against state officials
in their official capacities requires a state to explicitly waive sovereign immunity. See
Rodriguez v. Stevenson, 243 F.Supp.2d 58, 63 (D. Del. 2002) (holding that state defendants in

their official capacity were immune from suit "unless the state has waived its immunity or
Congress has abrogated the state's immunity."). Qualified Immunity shields government
officials from civil damages liability unless the official personally violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Taylor v.
Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam). A right is clearly established when "every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Id.
(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)).
In Taylor, the Supreme Court addressed a§ 1983 claim against the commissioner of the

Delaware Department of Correction and the warden ofHRYCI for failing to prevent an
inmate's suicide by "failing to supervise and monitor the private contractor that provided the
medical treatment." 135 S. Ct. at 2043. The Court held that '"an incarcerated person's right to
the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols 'was not a clearly
established right at the time of the inmate's death.'" Id. at 2044. Therefore, the Court held that
the commissioner and the warden had not violated a clearly established law and, as a result,
were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the supervisory claim against them. Id.
Similarly, the court concludes in this case that the State Agency Officials and the DOC
Officials are entitled to qualified immunity. The proper implementation of adequate suicide

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prevention protocols is not a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Thus, the State
Defendants and the DOC Defendants are shielded from civil damages. Dr. Watson is not
protected by derivate sovereign immunity because, as discussed below, the Plaintiffs assert
facts which suggest that the Doctor violated an established constitutional right, and did so in his
individual capacity.

3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims
a. Deliberate lndifference
The Plaintiffs assert that the vulnerability of Arias to suicide constituted a serious
medical need that the Defendants failed to address. They claim this inaction constituted
deliberate indifference which could be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary injury and
which did in fact lead to the death of Mr. Arias. (D.I. 6 at 8.) The Defendants respond that the
Plaintiffs have not asserted facts to meet the deliberate indifference standard. (D.I. 24 at 16-18).
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments impose upon prison officials a duty to address
the serious medical needs of a pretrial detainee, including psychiatric needs. Colburn v. Upper

Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1988). If prison officials know of a particular
detainee's vulnerability to suicide, they may not be deliberately indifferent to that vulnerability.

See Simmons v. City ofPhiladelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1064 (3d Cir.1991); Williams v. Borough of
West Chester, 891F.2d458, 464 (3d Cir.1989); Serafin v. City ofJohnstown, 53 F. App'x 211,
213 (3d Cir. 2002). In order to make out a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation against a
prison official, a defendant must prove: (1) the dep1ivation was "objectively, sufficiently serious"
and (2) the prison official had "a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834, (1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A culpable state of mind requires
that a prison official is "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

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substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837; BeersCapitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001).

In analyzing the facts at issue, the court relies on the cases Freedman v. City ofAllentown
and Colburn v. Darby Township as guides for the deliberate indifference analysis. In Freedman,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent
after failing to act in a case where they saw that the prisoner had large prominent scars on his
wrists from previous suicide attempts. 853 F.2d 1111, 1113 (3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit
held that the failure of the prison officials to recognize the scars as "suicide hesitation cuts" was
merely negligence, and therefore, did not support a§ 1983 claim. Id. at 1116. On the other
hand, in Colburn, the Court of Appeals found reckless indifference where there were visible
scars on the prisoners wrists, the township's police knew that the prisoner.h~djumped :from a
window the preceding day, the detaining officer had to prevent her from swallowing three
Valium pills, and the prisoner shot herself with a gun she had concealed on her person while
detained. Colburn, 838 F.2d 663, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Estate ofPuza v. Carbon
Cty., 586 F. Supp. 2d 271, 278 (M.D. Pa. 2007) aff'd sub nom; Barker-Puia v. Carbon Cty., 304

F. App'x 47 (3d Cir. 2008).
The court finds that the facts pled are insufficient to plausibly establish that the State
Defendants and DOC Defendants were deliberately indifferent. In contrast, as to Dr. Watson, the
Plaintiffs' allegations at least cross the plausibility threshold. State and DOC officials may not
have been actually aware of the substantial suicide risk that Arias posed. On the other hand, the
Plaintiffs' averments are sufficient to establish for purposes of this motion that Watson was
aware of the risk for suicide. Dr. Watson was the psychiatrist assigned to Arias after he
attempted suicide twice while in the custody of the DOC. Dr. Watson was aware of Mr. Arias'

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history of mental illness and suicide attempts and knew Arias' threatened suicide if released.
Furthermore, Dr. Watson's colleagues warned him that Arias was not ready to be released. In
spite of this counsel, Watson released Arias back into pre-trial detention without any special
instructions or precautions. Less than one month later, Arias took his own life. These averments
are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under the circumstances. In other words, the
allegations of the Plaintiff's complaints with regards to Dr. Watson are substantially closer to

Colburn than Freedman. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
b. Supervisory Liability
The Plaintiffs' deliberate indifference claims assigning responsibility to the supervisors
for their deficient custom practices and policies require a different analysis. The Plaintiffs
argue they have asserted facts, which if proven demonstrate that Dr. Watson, State Agency
Officials, and DOC Defendants were aware of a "pattern" of suicides. (D.I. 28 at 15-17, D.I.
29 at 11-12.) Between 2006 and Arias' suicide, at least six inmates died of suicide while in
the custody of the DOC. (D.I. 1 at 4.) The Plaintiffs allege that these events led to a federal
investigation.
Initially, the actions of an employee alone will not result in § 1983 liability under the
theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. New York City Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978). "A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she
neither participated in nor approved." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
In Baraka, the Third Circuit noted that personal involvement may be established through: (1)
personal direction or actual participation by the defendant in the misconduct; or (2) knowledge of
and acquiescence in the misconduct. Id. Failure to assert facts showing personal involvement

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of the defendant will result in dismissal. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117-18 (3d Cir.
1989); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54.
Here, there are no allegations that State Official Defendants were directly or indirectly
involved in Mr. Arias' care. 318 F. 3d 575 (3d Cir. 2003). Absent allegations of personal
involvement in the alleged wrongdoing, supervisor liability cannot be proven. Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.
2005).

c. Failure to Train
The Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Arias death was the direct result of the customs, practices,
policies and procedures of the DOC Defendants, for failing to properly train and supervise DOC
personnel to recognize suicidal inmates, to evaluate whether an inmate suffering from suicidal
ideations should be returned to the general prison population, and to institute appropriate
procedures for the timely transmission of important medical information to appropriate
personnel. (D.I. 6 at 9-11). The DOC Defendants and Dr. Watson claim that the alleged failure
to train, supervise or implement policies must be dismissed for failure to plead any
supporting facts. (D.I. 19 at 13-15).
Section 1983 liability results only if the defendants caused an employee to violate
another's constitutional rights, through execution of an official policy or settled informal custom.

See id. at 691-94; Serafin, 53 F. App 'x 211 at 213. The Third Circuit follows a four-part test
based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The
plaintiff must identify a specific policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ and show
that: (1) the existing policy or practice created an unreasonable risk of the Eighth Amendment
injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor

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was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or practice. See
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118; Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001). This

four-part test may be satisfied by showing either that the state actor failed to respond adequately
to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries or that the City failed to respond adequately to a great
and obvious risk of constitutionally cognizable harm. Id. at 136-37; Sera.fin v. City of
Johnstown, 53 F. App'x at 214. ("Particularly after Iqbal, the connection between the

supervisor's directions and the constitutional deprivation must be sufficient to demonstrate a
plausible nexus or affirmative link between the directions and the specific deprivation of
constitutional rights at issue.") (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n. 5 (3d
Cir. 2010)).
The court finds that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the policies at issue in this
case are deficient. In particular, the court notes that policies are not deficient simply because
they are not the best. See Serafin v. City ofJohnstown, 53 F. App'x at 215 ("The fact that the
City's policy was not the most effective policy possible, however, does not, without more, create
an unreasonable risk to detainees' safety or demonstrate the City's indifference to such a risk,
and there is no 'more' here.") Here, it is clear that the DOC Defendants did not completely fail
to act; Arias spent three of his eight months incarcerated in treatment at the DPC. (D.I. 24 at 8).
The Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of the Defendants' management practices led to a specific
deficient policy or custom.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the prison considered and rejected
other more effective measures of suicide prevention. The Plaintiffs have not identified specific
training that could reasonably have been expected to prevent Mr. Arias' suicide nor
demonstrated that the risk reduction associated with the proposed training was so great and so

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obvious that the failure of those responsible for the content of the training program can
reasonably be attributed to deliberate indifference. Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 325. Estate ofPuza v.

Carbon Cty., 586 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280-81 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ajf'd sub nom. Barker-Puza, 304 F.
App'x 47. While the record suggests that some defendants were negligent, negligence is simply
not enough. See id.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the court will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss all counts

against the Plaintiffs, except for Count I against Dr. Watson (D.I. 18, 20, 23). The court declines
to dismiss Count I as asserted against Dr. Watson at this time.

Dated: December -1.ii._, 2015

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