Nicholson v. State of Delaware Department of Justice et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 8/25/2015. (klc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

MARTIN W. NICHOLSON,
Plaintiff,

v.

)

)

)

)

) Civ. No. 15-467-GMS

)

STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT )

OF JUSTICE, et al.,
)

)

Defendants.
)

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Martin W. Nicholson ("Nicholson"), filed this lawsuit seeking damages as a
result of rulings made in the Delaware state court. (DJ. 2.) He appears pro se and was granted
permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D.I.4.)

I. BACKGROUND
The complaint raises issues regarding Nicholson's obligation to pay child support.
Nicholson alleges that the defendants failed to recognize his disability, failed to allow multiple
physicians' statements, tried to force him to return to work, failed to recognize the definition of
the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), and supported a ruling that forced Nicholson to pay
child support with arrears that exceeds $10,000. Nicholson alleges the ruling is in contravention
of an order that stipulates he has full residential custody of the child, and that the defendant Judge
Arlene Minus Coppadge ("Judge Coppadge") refused to recognize the order. Nicholson has been
threatened with incarceration ifhe fails to pay the child support and his driver's license and
hunting license have been suspended. As a result, Nicholson is unable to drive to his physical
therapy appointments, and he is unable to take advantage of the disability program for Delaware
hunters. Nicholson seeks ten million dollars in damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions
of28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2) (in

forma pauperis actions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and
take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515
F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,93 (2007). Because Nicholson
proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a
complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill,
878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused
to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, before

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dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant Nicholson leave to
amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A
plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson
v. City o/Shelby, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed, however,
for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346. When
determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court must take three steps: "(1) identify!] the
elements of the claim, (2) review[] the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then
(3) look[] at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluat[e] whether all of the
elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint
"show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

III. DISCUSSION
It is clear in reading the complaint that Nicholson's claims revolve around his

dissatisfaction with State court child support rulings. To the extent Nicholson seeks review and
rejection of Delaware state decisions, the claims fall under the purview of the Rooker-Feldman

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doctrine and, therefore, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction. I To the extent the child support
action remains pending in State court and has not yet reached final resolution, the court must
abstain by reason of the abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
which has been extended to civil cases and state administrative proceedings. See Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420

U.S. 592 (1975).
In addition, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this type of dispute in the
first instance. The parties are not diverse, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and, even were the parties
diverse, the court lacks diversity jurisdiction over cases involving domestic relations, as follows:
the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States, has been
interpreted by the federal courts to apply with equal vigor in suits brought pursuant
to diversity jurisdiction. This application is consistent with Barber's directive to
limit federal courts' exercise of diversity jurisdiction over suits for divorce and
alimony decrees. We conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations exception, as
articulated by this Court since Barber, divests the federal courts of power to issue
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (citations omitted). See also Magaziner v.
Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Domestic relations is a field peculiarly suited to

state regulation and control and peculiarly unsuited to control by federal courts.").
Based upon the foregoing, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

IThe Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District o.fColumbia Court ofAppeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Because the doctrine divests the court of subject matter
jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time by the court sua sponte. Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77
(3d Cir. 2003).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The court will dismiss the complaint for want ofjurisdiction and based upon the
defendants' immunity2 from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). In light of the nature
of Nicholson's claims, the court finds that amendment would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 111; Borelli v. City ofReading, 532 F.2d 950, 951­
52 (3d Cir. 1976).
An appropriate order will be entered.

&.,-:2-p

""5 ,2015
Wilmington, Delaware

2The State of Delaware Department of Justice, State of Delaware Family Court, and
Delaware Division of Child Support Enforcement are immune from suit by reason of the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution which protects an unconsenting state or
state agency from a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens, regardless of the
relief sought. See Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Judge Coppadge
has absolute judicial immunity as a judicial officer in the performance of her duties and she is not
be liable for her judicial acts. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006).

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