Blind Trust MarQuita Rucker/Howard of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. GM Financial et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 8/31/2015. (klc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

BLIND TRUST MARQUITA RUCKER/ )

HOWARD OF THE COMMONWEALTH)

OF PENNSYLVANIA,
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

) Civ. No.15-588-SLR
)
)
)
)

)

GM FINANCIAL, et aL,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
1. Introduction. Plaintiff Blind Trust Marquita Rucker/Howard of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("plaintiff') proceeds pro se and has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 1 Plaintiff flied this lawsuit on July 10, 2015. Plaintiff
asserts jurisdiction by reason of diversity citizenship of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332.
2. Standard of Review. A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is
frivolous or malicious. fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d CiL 2013). The court must accept all factual allegations in a
complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips

The complaint is signed "Attorney in fact Marquita" and plaintiff is identified as
"Rucker/Howard, Marquita 0 Cestui Awe Trust." (0.1. 2 at 8)

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v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson

V.

Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 93 (2007). 8ecause plaintiff proceeds pro se, its pleading is liberally construed and
its complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson

V.

Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations

omitted).
3. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."

Neitzke

V.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(i), a

court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.

Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson
Deutsch

V.

V.

Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g.,

United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995).

4. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(8)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on
Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscherv. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under

§ 1915(e)(2)(8». However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson

V.

Mayview State Hosp., 293

F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
5. A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations
in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a
court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief."
2

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though "detailed factual

allegations" are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide "labels and
conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Davis v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). In addition, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has
substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347
(2014); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint may not

dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim
asserted. See Johnson 135 S.Ct. at 346.
6. To determine whether a complaint meets the pleading standard as set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal, the Court must: (1) outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a

state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) look for well-pled
factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then "determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)
(internal citations omitted) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Argueta v. United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 73 (3d Cir. 2011)). The last step

is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
7. Discussion. The allegations in the complaint are not a picture of clarity, but it
seems that at issue is a vehicle that has been repossessed. Plaintiff appears to allege
that it purchased a vehicle that was financed with a loan from defendant GM Financial
("GM Financial") through its agent. GM Financial's agent made a claim in the Superior

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Court of the State of Delaware ("Superior Court"), who is also a named defendant. It
appears that some sort of judicial action was taken on June 8, 2015, and plaintiff alleges
that the "courthouse through the deceit of words is committing fraud and piracy,
usurping persons and property of man, female or male, by aiding corporations such as
GM Financial." (0.1. 2 at 5) Plaintiff alleges defamation, restraint of trade, and
discrimination. It seeks $100,000 in damages.
8. Jurisdiction. Federal courts have an obligation to address issues of subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d
412,420 (3d Cir. 2010). Because there appear to be no federal questions, jurisdiction
is not appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Therefore, the court must discern whether
jurisdiction is proper by reason of the diversity of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332.
9. In a diversity action, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over state
law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, if a plaintiff is a citizen from a state different
from each defendant and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Werwinski
v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 666 (3d Cir. 2002). Complete diversity is required
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Braun v. Gonzales, 557 F. App'x 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2014)
(unpublished) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999)). This
means that each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978).

10. For purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, a corporation has dual
citizenship and is deemed a citizen of two states: its state of incorporation and the state
of its principal place of business. 28 U.S .C. § 1332(c)(1); Mennen Co. v. Atlantic Mut.

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Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 1998». A proper invocation of diversity jurisdiction
requires that the plaintiff allege where a corporation has "its principal place of business."
See S. Freedman & Co., Inc. v. Raab, 180 F. App'x 316,320 (3d Cir. 2006)
(unpublished) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a complaint alleging where the
plaintiff corporation maintained "a principal place of business," rather than "its principal
place of business").
11. The complaint: (1) provides a Delaware address for plaintiff; (2) makes no
mention of the status of GM Financial; and (3) names the Superior Court as a
defendant. The face of the complaint does not indicates that the parties are completely
diverse. Plaintiffs domicile is in Delaware as is the Superior Court's. The complaint
does not provide the state of incorporation or the principal place of business for GM
Financial. Based upon the face of the complaint, diversity is destroyed by reason of the
same citizenship of plaintiff and the Superior Court. Nor is adequate information
provided to determine GM Financial's status for purpose of diversity jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
12. Rooker-FeldmanNounger Abstention. In addition, it is clear in reading the
complaint that plaintiffs claim revolves around its dissatisfaction with the Superior
Court's handling of plaintiff's case. To the extent plaintiff seeks review and rejection of
a Delaware state decision, the claim falls under the purview of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and, therefore, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction. 2 To the extent the action

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Because the doctrine divests the court of
subject matter jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time by the court sua sponte. Desi's
2

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remains pending in State court and has not yet reached final resolution, the court must
abstain by reason of the abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), which has been extended to civil cases and state administrative proceedings.
See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982);
Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
13. Conclusion. For the above reasons, the court will abstain by reason of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention and will also dismiss the complaint
for want of jurisdiction. The court finds amendment futile. A separate order shall issue.

UNITED STA
Date:

S DISTRICT JUDGE

,2015

Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003); Nesbitv. Gears
Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2003).

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