Becker v. Beechcraft Corporation et al

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM ORDER re 59 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION is ADOPTED; 33 MOTION to Dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Plaintiff is GRANTED fourteen (14) days to file an amended complaint; Judge Burke's ORAL ORDER (D.I. 75) is AFFIRMED and 52 MOTION to Stay is DENIED. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 1/29/18. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
DARREN DALE BECKER, Individually
and as Executor of the Estate of DONALD
DALE BECKER,
Plaintiff,

v.

C.A. No. 15-675-LPS-CJB

CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC., et al.,
· Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
WHEREAS, Magistrate Judge Burke issued a 13-page Report and Recommendation
("Report") (D.I. 59), dated September 21, 2017, recommending that the Court (i) grant without
·prejudice Defendant Continental Motors Inc.' s ("Continental") motion to dismiss Counts IV, V,
and VI of Plaintiff Darren Dale Becker, individually and as executor of the estate of Donald Dale
Becker's ("Plaintiff') Complaint (D.I. 33) and (ii) permit Plaintiff fourteen (14) days to file an
amended complaint;,
WHEREAS, on October'S, 2017, Plaintiff objected to the Report ("Report Objections")
(D.1. 60);

WHEREAS, on October 19, 2017, Continental responded to Plaintiffs Report Objections
("Report Response") (D.1. 63);
WHEREAS, Magistrate Judge Burke issued an oral order ("Order") (see D.I. 75) on
October 27, 2017, denying Plaintiffs motion to stay this action pending resolution of a parallel
suit in South Carolina state court (D.I. 52);
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WHEREAS, on November 13, 2017, Plaintiff objected to the Order ("Order Objections")
(D.I. 77), specifically to Judge Burke basing his decision on an abstention doctrine, rather than
the Court's inherent discretionary power to stay litigation;
WHEREAS, on November 27, 2017, Continenta! and Defendant Engine Components,
Inc. (collectively, "Defendants") responded to Plaintiffs Order Objections ("Order Response")
(D.I. 79);
WHEREAS, the Court has reviewed the parties' objections and responses to the Report

- de novo, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195
(3d Cir. 2011), and the parties' objections and responses to the Order under the "clearly
erroneous and contrary to law" standard, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);

Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he phrase 'contrary to law'
indicates plenary review as to ·matters of law.");
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1.

Plaintiffs Report Objections (D.I. 60) are OVERRULED, Judge Burke's Report

(D.I. 59) is ADOPTED, Continental's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 33) is GRANTED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff is GRANTED fourteen (14) days to file
.

an amended ..
'

complaint.
2.

Plaintiffs Order Objections (D.I. 77) are OVERRULED, Judge Burke's Order

(D.I. 75) is AFFIRMED, and Plaintiffs Motion for Stay (D.I. 52) is DENIED.
3.

Plaintiff objects to the Report's finding that Plaintiff did not adequately plead

. proximate causation. (See D.I. 60 at 1) Plaintiff contends that the Report misapplied the
pleading standard, arguing that the Complaint adequately pleads "how defects in the engine
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resulting [in] power loss caused the underlying accident," whether South Carolina or Delaware
law is applied. (See id. at 3-4, 6)
4.

Evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

requires the Court to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d ~18, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). The Court may grant a motion to dismiss only if, after
"accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." .Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472,
482 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). However, to survive a motion to dismiss, "[t]he
complaint must st~te enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of [each] necessary element" of the plaintiffs claim. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech.

Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
5.

Under South Carolina law, 1 establishing proximate cause requires a plaintiff to

prove causation in fact (or "but for" causation) and legal cause .. See McKnight v. S. C. Dep 't of

Corr., 684 S.E.2d 566, 569 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). Under Delaware law, a plaintiff must "prove
that but for the tortious conduct of the defendant, the injury which the plaintiff has suffered

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Sitting in diversity, the Court must apply the applicable state's substantive law to
Plaintiffs state law claims. See Robertson v. Allied Signal Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir.
1990). However, as the Report explained, neither party has addressed which state's law is
applicable (including the fact that Delaware does not recognize strict products liability claims).
(See D.I. 5.9 at 5; see also Cline v. Prowler Indus. ofMd., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 974 (Del. 1980))
Instead, Plaintiff addresses both South Carolina's and Delaware's proximate cause standards,
contending it does not matter which applies. (See D.I. 60 at 3-4) Continental simply does not
address the issue. (See D.I. 63) Nonetheless, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the result is the
same under either standard, and therefore the Court need not decide the choice of law question to
resolve the objections. (Accord D.I. 59 at 11 (concluding Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead
proximate cause "pur.suant to South Carolina law on proximate causation· [and] (indeed, under
Delaware law too)"))
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would not have occurred." Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Tr. Fund, 596
A.2d 1372, 1375 (Del. 1991).
6.

Regardless of which state's law applies, the Complaint lacks sufficient factual

allegations of proximate cause. The only sentence in the Report Objections addressing this
deficiency highlights the problem. Plaintiff writes, "The engines were not generating sufficient
thrust to assist the pilot in his recovery." (D.I. 60 at 4) (quoting D.I. 1 ~ 49) Rather than pointing
to where the Complaint alleges why "but for" the alleged defect the engine would have· generated
sufficient thrust, Plaintiff simply moves on: "As the aircraft descended and impacted the pole,
several components separated from the airframe." (Id.) (quoting D.I. 1 ~ 50) While these two
events happened sequentially, simply pointing out that fact - the tact~c Plaintiff takes in both the
Report Objections and, more importantly, in the Complaint (see D.I. 1 ~~ 48-50) - is not enough
to sufficiently plead that the engine's lack of thrust was caused by (or even can be caused by) the
alleged engine defect. That is, the Complaint's single sentence alleging the engine did not
generate sufficient thrust is insufficient to plead that the alleged -"premature wear of the engine's
cylinder assemblies, valve assemblies, bearings, cracking, and other malfunctions" did or can
cause the I0-520 engine to lose thrust. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
("Where a complCJ.int pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.") (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, the Court agrees with the Report that the Complaint lacks sufficient
"factual articulation or explanation as to whether and how the identified defects in Continental' s
engine. are said to be responsible for the lack of power or crash" and, therefore, fails to
adequately plead proximate causation. (D.I. 59 at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted)

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7.

Plaintiff also objects to the Order denying Plaintiffs motion to stay this action

pending resolution of Plaintiffs original suit against Defendants in the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas. (See D.I. 77) Plaintiff contends that Judge Burke failed to address his
discretionary power to stay the present action - the basis on_ which Plaintiff sought the stay (see
D.I. 52 at 2)- choosing instead to deny the stay based on the Colorado River abstention doctrine
(see D.I. 77 at 2-3; see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976)). Though Plaintiff never says so explicitly- indeed, Plaintiff never explicitly contests the
ColOrado River doctrine's applicability to this case (or Judge Burke's application of that doctrine
to the facts of this case) (see D.I. 77)-the implication of the Order Objections is that doing so
was improper. Thus, the Court understands Plaintiff to contend, even if only implicitly, that
Judge Burke applied the incorrect legal standard when deciding Plaintiffs motion to stay.
8.

"A Magistrate Judge's order is contrary to law when the magistrate judge has

misinterpreted or misapplied the applicable law." Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme
Parks, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 437, 441 (D. Del. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
objecting party "bears the burden of demonstrating that the magistrate judge's decision was
clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Degussa v. Materia Inc., 2011WL3707067, at *2 (D. _
Del. Aug. 24, 2011).
9.

To start, Plaintiff, having never contested the Colorado River doctrine's

applicability to its motion to stay, cannot now complain about its application to the case. See D.
Del. L.R. 72(5) (requiring objecting party to "certify[] that the objections do not raise new
legal/factual arguments"). Before ruling on Plaintiffs motion, Judge Burke specifically asked
Plaintiffs counsel whether they "agree[d] that [the Colorado River] doctrine [wa]s implicated"
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in the "question ... as to whether or not to stay this case in favor of South Carolina," to which
Plaintiffs counsel responded, "Yes." (D.I. 75 at 48-49; see also id. at 51-52 (answering
substantively, and not contesting doctrine's applicability, when asked, "Is there anything further
you [Plaintiffs counsel] would like to say ... about the Colorado River factors and how they
relate to the stay issue that I need to decide?")) Indeed, Plaintiff argued to the Court that the
doctrine applied and should guide Judge Burke's determination of whether to stay the case. (See
D.I. 58 at 1-2)
10.

Therewas good reason for Plaintiff to do so. Whether to stay litigation is

committed to the Court's discretion. See Dentsply Int'! Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 734 F. Supp. 656,
658 (D. Del.

1990)~

In exercising this discretion, courts typically consider three factors:

(1) whether a stay will simplify the issues for trial, (2) whether discovery is complete and a trial
date has been set, and (3) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical
disadvantage to the non-moving party. See St. Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants v. Sony
Corp., 2003 WL 25283239, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2003). However- as both sides expressly

agreed (see D.I. 75 at 48-49, 62-63) - in the context of a motion to stay in favor of parallel state
proceedings, the Colorado River doctrine is implicated. See Moses H Cone Mem 'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983); McMurray v. De Vink, 27 F. App'x 88, 92 (3d

Cir. 2002) ("The stay that was entered is nothing more than the procedural mechanism for
abstaining in favor of the concurrent state litigation."); Summa Four, Inc. v. AT & T Wireless
Servs., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 575, 580 (D. Del. 1998) (applying Colorado River doctrine to decide

defendant's motion to stay federal proceedings pending parallel state court proceeding); Horack
v. Minott, 1995 WL 330730, at *5 (D. Del. May 26, 1995) (same). The Colorado River doctrine
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recognizes that while "the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction," certain "exceptional"
circumstances warrant staying federal proceedings pending resolution of parallel state
proceedings. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817-18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
Colorado River and its progeny, courts consider numerous factors to determine whether a federal

court should defer to a pending parallel state court litigation and enter a stay. See BIL Mgmt.
Corp. v. N.J. Econ. Dev. Auth., 310 F. App'x 490, 492 (3d Cir. 2008) (listing factors). That is

precisely the analysis Judge Burke undertook here. (See D.I. 75 at 62-72)
11.

Plaintiff has not cited any authority suggesting either that (1) this was incorrect or

(2) that Judge Burke's decision to exercise his broad discretion to decide Plaintiffs motion in
this way (as opposed to considering the particular factors Plaintiff initially, and now again,
suggests the Court should) was inappropriate. See Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers' Int'!
Union ofN. Am., AFL-CJ0,.544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the Court agrees

with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to show "that Judge Burke's Order is either 'clearly
erroneous' or 'contrary to law."' (D.I 79 at 4) (citations omitted)

~~

LELEONARDP. STARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

January 29, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware

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