Community Legal Aid Society, Inc. v. Coupe

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 3/16/2016. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

COMMUNITY LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC., )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
ROBERT M. COUPE, solely in his official
)
capacity as Commissioner of the Delaware
)
Department of Correction,
)
)
Defendant.
)

C.A. No. 15-688-GMS

MEMORANDUM
I.

INTRODUCTION
On August 6, 2015, Community Legal Aid Society, Inc. ("CLASI") filed this action for

declaratory and injunctive relief alleging unconstitutional treatment of prisoners with serious
mental illness by the Delaware Dep3:rtment of Correction ("DOC"). (D.I. 1.) The Complaint
claims that the Commissioner of DOC, Defendant Robert M. Coupe ("Coupe"), violated the
Eighth Amendment and the Delaware Constitution, Article I, Section II, by confining prisoners
with mental illness in solitary confinement, without providing proper medical and mental health
treatment and without allowing adequate out-of-cell time. (Id. at 1.) It seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief. (Id.) 1

As Coupe argues in his reply brief (D.I. 13 at 10), CLASI does not address Coupe's argument that
Count II, which claims violations of the Delaware Constitution, must be dismissed under the Eleventh
Amendment. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 116 (1984). Therefore, the court
-will treat this argument as unopposed and dismiss Count II.

On October 1, 2015, Coupe filed a motion to dismiss and supporting brief pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). (D.I. 6, 7.) Coupe argues that (1) CLASI
lacks standing to bring the action solely on its behalf; (2) CLASI fails to state a claim of
deliberate indifference against the Commissioner Coupe; and (3) the relief CLAS I seeks is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (D.I. 7 at 2.) For the reasons stated below, the court will
deny Defendants' motion to dismiss, except for Count II.

II.

BACKGROUND
According to CLASI, approximately 300 prisoners in James T. Vaughn Correctional

Center's ("JTVCC") Secure Housing Unit ("SHU") were housed in small cells. These prisoners
were kept in solitary confinement except for three days out of the week when they were
permitted to exit their cell for an hour to exercise in solitude and shower. Approximately 100 of
the 300 prisoners in SHU were prisoners diagnosed with a mental illness. (D.I. 1 at

if 24.)

Subsequent to discussions in preparation for the litigation of this case, approximately 50 of those
prisoners -were moved to a newly created unit, called the Secured Transitio:n Unit ("STU"). (D.I.
11 at 8.). CLASI alleges that the cells in SHU and STU are approximately 11 x 8 inches with
four solid walls, broken only by two four-inch-wide windows. (Id.) Prisoners cannot control the
lights, which remain lit from approximately 6:00 a.m. to 11:30 p.m.

(Id.)

They cannot

participate in therapeutic or educational programs~ attend religious services, hold prison jobs, or
receive books from the general prison library. (D.I. 1 at if 36.)

Prisoners in SHU may only see

a ·certified nurse practitioner once every three months and a therapist occasionally without
meaningful follow-up. (Id.

ifif 43, 45, 47). CLASI further alleges that Coupe knows that this

· treatment of prisoners with serious mental illness will exacerbate their symptoms of mental
illness and cause serious harm to their mental and physical health. (Id.

2

ifif 58, 60-62.)

Ill.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A niotion to dismiss for want of standing is ... properly brought pursuant to Rule

12(b)(l), because standing is a jurisdictional matter." Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806,
810 (3d Cir. 2007). A district court must determine whether a Rule 12(b)(l) motion presents a
"facial" attack or a "factual" attack on the claim at issue. In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron,
678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). ·Coupe's motion raises a facial attack. on subject matter jurisdiction,
and therefore the court will apply the same standard of review it would use in considering a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), by construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving
party. See Constitution Party ofPennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 2014)
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal where the
plaintiff "fail[s] to state aclaim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
considering a motion to dismiss, the court "accept[s] all factual allegations as true, construe[s]
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine[ s] whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty. of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). The issue for the court is "not whether the plaintiff
will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
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claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). As such, the touchstone of the pleading
standard is plausibility. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 365 (3d Cir. 2012).

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IV.

DISCUSSION
A. CLASI has standing
Coupe argues that all of CLASI's claims should be dismissed for lack of standing. (D.1.

7 at 8-14.) CLAS I responds that it meets the requirements for organizational standing as the
Delaware Protection and Advocacy system ("P&A") for the State of Delaware under the
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et seq.
("PAIMI"). (D.I. 11 at 5-11.) The court must consider whether CLASI meets both the statutory
and constitutional requirements for standing.
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977),
'

the Supreme Court held that an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when
"(a) its. members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor
the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." United

Food & Comm. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1996). The
first two requirements are constitutional, while the third is "prudential" and can be abrogated by
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statute. Id. The court finds that in this case, the third Hunt requirement is not applicable in light
of the role Congress assigned under P AIMI to advocacy organizations such as CLASI. Oregon

Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United Food, 517 U.S. at
548-49, 558) (holding that by authorizing PAIMI P&As to sue on behalf of individuals with
mental illness, Congress abrogated the third, prudential standing requirement). Thus, the court
will consider the first two requirements in turn.

Under Hunt, an organization may have standing to sue on behalf of its constituents if its
constituents possess "all of the indicia of membership in an organization," 432 U.S. at 395.

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PAI.MI. requires that the governing board of a PAI.MI Act P&A ("PAIMI P&A") "shall be
composed of ... members ... who broadly represent or are knowledgeable about the needs of the
clients served by the system," where such members are defined to include "individuals who have
received or are receiving mental health services and family members of such individuals." 42
U.S.C. § 10805(c)(l)(B). Also, aPAIMIP&Amust:
establish an advisory council ... which shall include ... individuals who have received or
are receiving mental health services, and family members of such individuals, and at least
60 percent the membership of which shall be comprised of individuals who have received
or are receiving mental health services or who are family members of such individuals;
and ... which shall be chaired by an individual who has received or who is receiving
mental health services or is a family member of such an individual.

Id. § 10805(a)(6)(B-C) Id. § 10805(a)(9).
In its complaint, CLASI avers that it has been Delaware's PAIMI P&A since PAIMI was
enacted in 1986. (D.I. 12.) Accordingly, CLASI claims that it established an advisory council,
interviewed mentally ill prisoners, evaluated the records of mentally ill prisoners with the aid of
a psychiatrist, discussed deficiencies in DOC's treatment of prisoners with serious mental illness
with Coupe's counsel and has members who broadly represent or are
needs of mentally ill prisoners. (Id. at 3-4.)

~owledgeable

about the

The court considers the facts in the light most

favorable to CLASI and accepts these assertions as true.
CLAS! avers that it meets the second Hunt factor because protecting and advocating for
people with mental illness is central to CLASI's statutory purpose. (D.I. 12 at 1); 42 U.S.C. §
1080l(b). The court agrees that CLASI meets the second Hunt requirement. Considering the
facts asserted in the light most favorable to CLASI, its constituents possess the indicia of a
membership organization, thereby establishing organizational standing. See Doe v. Stincer, 175
F.3d 879, 886 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a PAI.MI organization "may sue on behalf of its
constituents like a more traditional association may sue on behalf of its members").
5.

Coupe further argues that even assummg CLASI has standing to sue on behalf of
Delaware's prisoner, the Complaint still fails to establish standing due to the prolific generalities
and vague language of its allegations. (D.I. 13 at 2.) The court must disagree. Though the
complaint does not refer to the prisoners by their real names, the facts alleged are sufficient to
plausibly conclude that these are actual persons who could be adversely affected by the outcome
of this litigation. 2

B. CLASI Raises Valid Claims of Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Coupe claims that CLASI' s asserted facts are too vague to support a claim of cruel and
unusual punishment under the deliberate indifference standard. (D.I. 24 at 16-18). Coupe
further, claims that there is a sufficient non-punitive justification for segregating inmates in
restrictive quarters. (D.I. 7 at 14). CLASI contends that it has pled a claim for cruel and unusual
punishment with sufficient specificity. (D.I. 11 at 11.)
An Eighth Amendment claim for relief against a prison official exists if ( 1) prisoners are

"incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm"; and (2) the prison
official is '"deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]' to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). A substantial risk of
serious harm exists when prison officials fail to address serious medical needs, including those
posed by mental illness. Goodrich v. Clinton Cnty. Prison, 214 F. App'x 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007)
(finding that the plaintiffs mental illness was a serious medical need where "[h]is mental
illnesses were diagnosed by psychiatrists as requiring treatment"). In order to make out a claim
for an Eighth Amendment violation, a defendant must prove: (1) the deprivation was
"objectively, sufficiently serious" and (2) the prison official had "a sufficiently culpable state of

2

The court agrees with CLASI that Coupe's failure to acknowledge the PAIMI statute or CLASl's
designation as a P& A is "disingenuous" because this is publically available information. (D.I. 11 at 9.)

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mind.'.' Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, (1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
A culpable state of mind requires that a prison official is "aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference." Id. at 837; Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001).
CLASI insists that placing individuals with serious mental illness in solitary confinement
is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. In support of
this assertion, CLASI cites to a collection of decisions from district courts across the country.
See Ind. Protection & Advocacy Services Comm 'n v. Comm 'r, No. 1:08-cv- 01317-TWP-MJD,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974, at *60-61 (S.D. Ind., Dec. 31, 2012) (holding that the Indiana
Department of Correction's practice of placing prisoners with serious mental illness in
segregation constituted cruel and unusual treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment);
Jones 'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101-02 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (granting injunctive relief

to prisoners with serious mental illness housed in a supermax prison); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that conditions in the prison's administrative
segregation unit violated constitutional standards when imposed on mentally-ill prisoners), rev'd
on other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001), adhered to on remand, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D.
Tex. 2001); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995) ("[D]efendants'
present policies and practices with respect to housing of [prisoners with serious mental disorders]
in administrative segregation and in segregated housing units violate the Eighth Amendment
rights of class members."); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(concluding that placing mentally-ill inmates "in the SHU is the mental equivalent of putting an
asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe"), rev'd on other grounds, 190 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
1999); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1549-50 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding an Eighth

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Amendment violation when "Despite their knowledge of the harm to seriously mentally ill
inmate~,

ADOC routinely assigns or transfers seriously mentally ill inmates to [segregation

units]"); Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that evidence of
prison officials' failure to screen out from SHU "those individuals who, by virtue of their mental
condition, are likely to be severely and adversely affected by placement there" plausibly rises to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment.)
Although persuasive, the cases that CLASI would have the court consider are not
controlling. Still, the court concludes that considering the facts in the light most favorable to
CLASI, it is plausible that Coupe was aware that placing mentally ill patients in solitary
confinement could deprive inmates in a manner that is "objectively, sufficiently serious" that
Coupe would draw the inference that a "substantial risk of serious harm exists." Id. at 837;

Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001). In short, CLASI has alleged facts
which could support a viable Eighth Amendment claim.

C. CLASl's Claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment
Next, Coupe argues that the complaints against him raise serious Eleventh Amendment
concerns. (D.I. 7 at 18-20.) CLASI responds that it seeks prospective relief to prevent
Coupe from continuing to violate the Eighth Amendment and therefore there is no Eleventh
Amendment issue. (D.I. 11 at 17-18.)
Generally, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for prospective relief against a
state official violating federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908). While Coupe
argues tp.at the Eleventh Amendment forbids suit against a state official where the state is the
real substantial party in interest, Coupe fails to acknowledge "an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against

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the State." Id. at 160. At issue in this case is whether Coupe is indeed violating the
Constifution by restricting mentally ill inmates to solitary confinement. While Coupe
characterizes the complaint as generally challenging the prison's restrictive housing policies,
CLASI seeks relief regarding the solitary confinement of mentally ill patients in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to CLASI, CLASI asserts
a valid Claim of cruel and unusual punishment and seeks

inju~ctive

relief to prevent Coupe from

continuing to violate the Constitution. Thus, there is no Eleventh Amendment bar.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the court will deny Coupe's motion to dismiss (D.I. 6), except

for Count II of the Complaint.

Dated: 'March ~' 2016

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