J.S. et al v. Red Clay Consolidated School District

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING re 1 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by C.S., J.S., A.S. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 10/8/2015. This order has been emailed to local counsel. (rpg) (Main Document 16 UNSEALED and replaced on 10/9/2015) (ntl). Modified on 10/9/2015 (ntl).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
J.S., C.S., and A.S., minors by and through
their mother, S.S.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

_C.A. No. 15-876-LPS

RED CLAY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court is the motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction filed by Plaintiffs, J.S., C.S.,

a~d

A.S. ("Plaintiffs"). (D.I. 1) Having reviewed the

parties' submissions (D.I. 2, 8, 11, 14), and heard oral argument yesterday (October 7, 2015), IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs' motion (D.I. 1) is DENIED. 1
. 1.

By their motion, Plaintiffs seek an order requiring Defendant, Red Clay

Consolidated School District ("Red Clay" or "Defendant"), to enroll Plaintiffs at Skyline Middle
School ("Skyline") and to provide transportation to Skyline from their current residence, which
is outside of Red Clay. (Id.) Plaintiffs are minors who, during the previous school year,
attended school in Red Clay when they were living with their mother. (D.I. 3 at ,-r 1)
Unfortunately, during the recent summer break, Plaintiffs' mother was placed on Un.paid medical
leave from her job, resulting in her being unable to pay rent and causing her to lose the

1

All parties agree that it is imperative for the Court to make a decision as quickly as possible, in
hopes of eliminating the ongoing uncertainty as to where Plaintiffs will attend school. Hence,
the Court has moved expeditiously following the filing of this action on September 29·(D.I. 1)
and will not take the time to write with any greater detail than is absolutely necessary.
1

apartment in Red Clay where she and Plaintiffs had lived during the previous school year. (Id.)
Over the summer, Plaintiffs' mother took the children to live with their father, who lives in the
Christina School District ("Christina"). (Id.) The father rents an apartment that he currently
shares with four adults and one other child. (Id.)
2.

While some of the facts are understandably a bit murky at this extremely early

stage of the case, it appears that at a certain point during the summer the father enrolled
Plaintiffs in Bayard Middle School ("Bayard") in Christina. (D.I. 9

at~~

5-6) Since the current

school year began, Plaintiffs have attended Skyline for one day and Bayard for two weeks;
otherwise, they have not attended school. (Id.

at~~

9-10, 12) Most recently, apparently

sometime last week, Plaintiffs' mother moved them from their father's residence to the residence
of their godmother, which is located in the Colonial School District ("Colonial"). (D.I. 11-2)
3.

Of crucial importance is the fact that Plaintiffs' mother and father share joint

custody of the children. (D.I. 11, Ex. A) Sadly, the parents are not in agreement as to the best
school for their children to attend. The mother wants Plaintiffs to attend Skyline (and there is
indication that Plaintiffs themselves prefer Skyline) (id.

at~~

11-15, 42), while the father wants

them to attend Bayard (D .I. 9 at ~ 14).
4.

The Court has decided to deny the requested temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that they are
entitled to the "extraordinary remedy" they seek. NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176
F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). In assessing Plaintiffs' request for this rarely-granted relief, the.
Court is required to consider four factors:
(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of
success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably
injured by denial of relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief
2

will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4)
whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public
interest.

Council ofAlt. Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997). If, as here,
Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, a
preliminary injunction is not warranted, "regardless of what the equities seem to require."

Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000).
5.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits for

several reasons. First, Plaintiffs' claim is predicated on the McKinney-Vento Homeless
Education Assistance Improvements Act ("Act"), yet the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs
became "homeless" under the Act when they moved in with their father in August. Section
11434a of the Act provides:
(2) The term "homeless children and youths"(A) means individuals who lack a fixed, regular, and
adequate nighttime residence (within the meaning of
section 11302(a)(l) of this title); and
(B) includes(i) children and youths who are sharing the housing
of other persons due to loss of housing, economic
hardship, or a similar reason ....
42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2)(B)(I). As an initial matter, it is unclear based on the current record
whether Plaintiffs' mother's decision to let her children move in with their father meant that
Plaintiffs lacked a "regular, fixed, and adequate nighttime residence" at the time of the move.
This is particularly true in light of the suggestions iri the record that Plaintiffs had previously
spent some amount of time at their father's residence. (D.I. 9 at~~ 3-4) Moreover, as
demonstrated by the Court's exchange with Plaintiffs' counsel at the end of yesterday's hearing,
3

there is substantial ambiguity in the application of the statutory definition of "homeless children
and youths" in this case, in particular with respect to who qualified as "other persons" when
Plaintiffs moved in with their farther. Plaintiffs' counsel argued both that "other persons" in this
case consists of the adults and child who share the father's housing (thereby implying that ifthe
father had lived alone, Plaintiffs would not be "sharing the housing of other persons" and, thus,
not be homeless), and, alternatively, that the father himself is an "other person[]" because
Plaintiffs would not be living with him but for their mother's loss of housing or economic
hardship.
6.

At this stage, the Court agrees with Defendants that both of these interpretations

appear to constitute an unprecedented expansion of the reach of the Act, since adopting either of
Plaintiffs'

propos~ls

would potentially classify as "homeless" countless children who move from

the home of one parent with joint custody to the home of another parent with joint custody.
Plaintiffs' proposals would also appear to predicate the "homelessness" analysis in a joint
custody situation on a possibly fine-grained inquiry into the specific motivations and causes of a
shift in residential status as between joint custodial parents. ·At this point, the Court has been
provided no persuasive basis for concluding that the protections afforded by the Act tum on (or
are intended to tum on) such an inquiry by a federal court.
7.

Further, even if Plaintiffs can ultimately convince the Court they are "homeless,"

they have not shown they are likely to succeed in establishing that the proper relief under the Act
is admission and transportation to Skyline. Section 11432g of the Act provides:
(3) Local educational agency requirements
(A) In general
The local educational agency serving each child or youth to
4

be assisted under this part shall, according to the child's or youth's
best interest(i) continue the child's or youth's education in the
school of origin for the duration of homelessness-

(I) ,in any case in which a family becomes
homeless between academic years or during
an academic year; or
(II) for the remainder of the academic year,
if the child or youth becomes permanently
housed during an academic year; or
(ii) enroll the child or youth in any public school
that nonhomeless students who live in the
attendance area in which the child or youth is
actually living are eligible to attend.
(B) Best interest
In determining the best interest of the child or youth under
subparagraph (A), the local educational agency shall-

(i) to the extentfeasible, keep a homeless child or
youth in the school of origin, except when doing so

is contrary to the wishes of the child's or youth's
parent or guardian ....
42 U.S.C. § 11432g(3)(A) (emphasis added). Each of the highlighted portions of the statute
appear at this juncture to pose hurdles that will likely prevent Plaintiffs from succeeding on the
merits on their request for relief.
8.

First, the ultimate relief the Act would entitle Plaintiffs to (should they prevail) is

set out in alternatives, only one of which would be to return them to Skyline (assuming for the
moment that Plaintiffs can prove that Skyline is the "school of origin"); alternatively, the Court
could order that Plaintiffs need only be given the opportunity to attend a school that
nonhomeless students also living "in the attendance area where the [homeless] child or youth is

5

actually living" attend. The "attendance area" where Plaintiffs are "actually living" is currently

in Colonial, recently it has been in Christina, and it is uncertain where it will be when this case is
resolved on the merits. Second, in formulating relief on the merits, the Court would be required
to consider the "best interests" of the children, accounting for what is "feasible." Given the
realities of Plaintiffs' parents' disagreement as to what is best for Plaintiffs, and the repeated
moves they have had to endure already this school year, it is far from clear that the Court would
be persuaded that it is in the "best interests" of Plaintiffs, and "feasible," to order Red Clay to
transport them to Skyline. Finally, and more importantly, any statutory right to continued
attendance at the school of origin (even assuming that is Skyline) is expressly subordinated to
the wishes of the child's parent or guardian. Here, one of Plaintiffs' parents has unambiguously
stated his preference that Plaintiffs not attend Skyline.
9.

Separate from the failure to show likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs

have also failed to show that the public interest favors awarding the relief they seek. The Court
is concerned that while Plaintiffs present their request under a federal statute, at essence what
confronts the Court is a custody dispute between two parents who share joint custody over
Plaintiffs. The Court is highly reluctant to address questions that are within the core competence
and jurisdiction of the State of Delaware Family Court ("Family Court"). This is all the moreso
given that there is at this very moment ongoing litigation between Plaintiffs' mother and father
in Family Court. (D.I. 9 at if 7) Particularly in the absence of any authority applying the Act to a
situation in which two custodial parents disagree as to the preferred school for minor children to
attend, the Court deems the interest in comity between federal and state courts to weigh heavily
against exercising its discretionary authority in a manner that could interfere with those ongoing
state court proceedings. See generally Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
6

Ass 'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434-37 (1982); Smith v. Delaware, 2009 WL 395227, at *2 (D. Del. Feb.
17, 2009) (citing Middlesex for proposition that "Younger abstention doctrine generally requires
federal courts to abstain from adjudicating a matter where there are ( 1) ongoing state judicial
proceedings, (2) implicating important state interests, and (3) in which there is an adequate
opportunity to raise constitutional challenges").
10.

Plaintiffs argue that the Act contains a provision that strongly favors, if not

mandates, granting them the relief they seek during the pendency of the parties' dispute in this
Court. This provision provides: "If a dispute arises over school selection or emollment in a
school ... the child or youth shall be immediately admitted to the school in which emollment is
sought, pending resolution of the dispute." 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(3)(E)(i). The Court disagrees.
The relief contemplated by the provision is that the child be admitted to "the school in which
emollment is sought." Id. (emphasis added). Here there is uncertainty as to the school at which
emollment is sought. Under these circumstances, it cannot be that the statute requires the Court
on an expedited basis to decide where the children should attend school.
11.

Given the Court's conclusions above, and in the interests of issuing this Order as

soon as possible, the Court need not address the many remaining arguments raised by the parties.
The Court has carefully considered each of them.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
A.

The parties shall meet and confer and shall, no later than October 18, submit a

joint status report, including their proposals for how this case should now proceed. The parties
shall address, among any other issues they wish, whether this matter should be stayed until the
earlier of (i) a decision from the Family Court pertinent to the issues raised in this case, or
(ii) Plaintiffs' mother's return to work and return to housing of her own (potentially in Red
7

Clay). 2
B.

This Order has been issued under seal, just as the parties' filings to date have been

filed under seal. The parties shall meet and confer and shall advise the Court in writing, no later
than October 9, whether they request any redactions to this Order. The parties' filing may be
under seal. Thereafter, the Court will issue a public version of this Order.
C.

The parties shall file redacted versions of the filings to date no later than October

18.

October 8, 2015
Wilmington, Delaware

HONORABLE LEONARD P. STARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Plaintiffs' mother anticipates being permitted to return to paid status in around mid-November
and hopes thereafter to move back to her home in Red Clay and have Plaintiffs attend school at
Skyline. (D .I. 1, Ex. A at ~ 15)
8