Dejesus et al v. The State of Delaware et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge Colm F. Connolly on 11/8/2019. (nmf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ORLANDO & PAULETTE
DEJESUS, FATHER AND
MOTHER AND NEXT OF KIN OF
BLAISE DEJESUS, DECEASED,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 15-1065-CFC

v.
THE STATE OF DELAWARE, et.
al.,
Defendants.

Daniel C. Herr, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL C. HERR LLC, Wilmington,
Delaware

Counsel for Plaintiffs
Joseph C. Handlon, Ryan P. Connell, DEPARTMENT OF WSTICE, Wilmington,
Delaware

Counsel for Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

November 8, 2019
Wilmington, Delaware

COLMF.C OLLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT ruDGE

I.

INTRODUCTION
Defendants Todd Drace, John Kirlin, and Tiffani Starkey have moved for

summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for damages brought under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. D.I. 57. Defendants are correctional officers who worked in the
segregated housing unit ("SHU") of the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center the
day Blaise DeJesus committed suicide in an SHU cell. Plaintiffs, the parents of
DeJesus, base their § 1983 claim on alleged violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. For the reasons
discussed below, I will grant Defendants' motion.
II.

BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
On August 1, 2014, DeJesus was convicted of violating the terms of his

probation. D.I. 58 at 3. Based on his previous heroin use, he was sentenced to
complete the CREST Substance Abuse Program and was immediately committed
to the Central Violation Probation Center to await transfer to the CREST program.
D.I. 11113-15. When DeJesus exhibited withdrawal symptoms at the probation
center, he was transferred to Vaughn's infirmary for treatment. Id. 1116-17. At
the infirmary, medical professionals treated DeJesus for four days before

discharging him on August 5, 2014. Id.

,r,r 18-20.

Upon his release, an order was

placed to transfer DeJesus to Vaughn's general inmate housing. Id.

,r 21.

But

when it was discovered that DeJesus's brother worked at Vaughn, DeJesus was
instead transferred to the SHU to separate him from other prisoners for safety
reasons. Id.

,r,r 23-24.

Officer Drace escorted DeJesus to his single cell in the SHU at around 3 :3 0
p.m. on August 5, 2014. D.I. 59 at A-29. A few hours later, DeJesus hung himself
in his cell. D.I. 1 ,r 43. Prison staff found DeJesus's body at 9:35 p.m. D.I. 63 Ex.
A; D.I. 59 at A-34 ,r 7. DeJesus was pronounced dead at 10:05 p.m. D.I. 63 Ex.

A.
The parties agree that DeJesus interacted with Defendants during his brief
time in the SHU. The parties very much dispute, however, the extent and nature of
those interactions.
In their opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs rely
on the deposition testimony of four witnesses who were incarcerated in the SHU
on the day of DeJesus' s suicide. That testimony is conflicting, but viewed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, at least one inmate witness testified that DeJesus
told Officers Starkey and Kirlin that he did not belong in the SHU, D.I. 61 Ex.Bat
8:15, Ex.Eat 14:15-16; D.I. 59 at A-34 ,r 2, that he could not "take being in the
[SHU]," D.I. 61 Ex. D at 6:8-9, Ex.Fat 5, that he wanted to speak to someone, id.
2

Ex.Eat 13:12-13, 14:3-5, Ex.Bat 8:13-14, Ex. D at 5:21, 8:4, that he needed to
make a phone call, id. Ex.Eat 6:11-13, 13:11-12, Ex.Cat 6:6-7, 16:5, that he
"wasn't in his right state of mind," id. Ex.Bat 6:13-14, that he felt sick and was
"not right," id Ex.Bat 10:12-13, that he was feeling anxious, id. Ex.Bat 14:2-5,
and that he was going through withdrawals, id. Ex.Bat 8:16-24. One of the
inmate witnesses testified that he "think[s]" but is "not ... sure" that DeJesus told
Officer Drace "to call mental health or something like that," id. Ex.Cat 14:19-23,
15:13-23, and that DeJesus told Officer Starkey "[s]omething about the mental
health," id. Ex.Cat 17:6-7. One of the inmate witnesses testified that Officers
Starkey and Kirlin "kept brushing [DeJesus] off." Id. Ex.Bat 6:15. Another
inmate similarly testified that those officers "blew [DeJesus] off." Id. Ex. D at
16:2-4. One of the inmate witnesses testified that DeJesus cried during a
discussion with Officer Starkey and that Officers Starkey and Kirlin laughed about
the discussion. Id. Ex.Eat 10:17-20, 12:4-21. Finally, an inmate witness
testified that DeJesus looked "disheveled." Id. Ex.Bat 5:7.
Officer Drace recalled nothing notable about DeJesus in his interactions with
him. Drace observed that DeJesus's posture was "just more head down," but
Drace did not recall any crying or weeping on DeJesus's part. D.I. 59 at A-31.
Officer Starkey testified that, while in the SHU, DeJesus mentioned "something
about not belonging in this cell" but she noted that "[n]othing seemed off with
3

him." Id. at A-34 ,r,r 2-3. She also stated that DeJesus did not express any
thoughts of suicide or self-harm. Id at A-3413. Finally, Officer Kirlin stated
that nothing about DeJesus's behavior suggested to him "that he posed a suicide
risk." Id. at A-35 ,r 4.
Staff at Vaughn performed an investigation into the circumstances regarding
DeJesus's suicide. See D.I. 61 Ex.Fat 1. An official memorandum describing the
investigation stated that area checks and phone punches 1 had not been completed
on A-tier (the tier on which DeJesus was located) for two and a half hours the
evening ofDeJesus's suicide. Id. Officer Kirlin was suspended for three days
because of his failure to ensure that the area checks and punches were performed
that night. Id. SHU inmates testified that Officer Kirlin often failed to conduct the
required checks. Id. Ex.Eat 22:4-23:17, Ex.Bat 7:22-8:9, Ex.Cat 9:6-7, Ex. F
at 5.
B. Procedural Background
In Count II of their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged their single cause of action
against Defendants: a claim for deliberate indifference to DeJesus's particular
vulnerability to suicide in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

1

"A 'phone punch' involves the correctional officer looking into each individual[]
inmate's cell." Hall v. State, 12 A.3d 1123, 1125 (Del. 2010).
4

D.I. 1 at 7-8. Plaintiffs' claims against other parties were previously dismissed
with Plaintiffs' consent. D.I. 14; D.I. 57.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Count II. D.I. 57. In
support of their motion, they assert that Plaintiffs have failed to establish an Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference. D.I. 59 at 2. They also allege that
qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs' claim. Id.

Ill.

LEGALSTANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986). If the burden of persuasion at trial would be on
the non-moving party, then the moving party may satisfy its burden of production
by pointing to an absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's case,
after which the burden of production then shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Williams v. Borough of West
Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989).
Material facts are those "that could affect the outcome" of the proceeding.

Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011). "[A] dispute about a
5

material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A non-moving party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support such
an assertion by: "(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations, ... admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;
or (B) showing that the materials cited [by the opposing party] do not establish the
absence ... of a genuine dispute ...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l). The non-moving
party's evidence "must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in
the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Williams, 891 F.2d at 460-61.
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Wishldn v.

Potter, 4 76 F .3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). "[T]he facts asserted by the nonmoving
party, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, must be regarded as
true ...." Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir.
1996). If "there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a
reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party's] favor may be drawn, the moving
party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment." Id.

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IV.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE CLAIM

When a plaintiff seeks to hold a prison official liable for failing to prevent a
detainee's suicide under the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 2 the plaintiff must show:
( 1) that the individual had a particular vulnerability to
suicide, meaning that there was a strong likelihood,
rather than a mere possibility, that a suicide would be
attempted; (2) that the prison official knew or should
have known of the individual's particular
vulnerability; and (3) that the official acted with
reckless or deliberate indifference, meaning
something beyond mere negligence, to the
individual's particular vulnerability.
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In this case, the record evidence does not support a finding that
DeJesus had a particular vulnerability to suicide, that Defendants knew or should
have known about any such vulnerability, or that Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference.

2

Plaintiffs confusingly argue in their brief that "the risk of suicide - once again, is
not the only form of deliberate indifference Plaintiffs alleged and maintained," D.I.
61 at 7, and that "a claim based on the lack of medical treatment prior to an
inmate's suicide" differs from "damages flowing from the suicide itself," id. at 6 n.
4. I am not sure what Plaintiffs mean by these statements. As best as I can tell,
Plaintiffs are trying to make the point that they can recover damages for pain and
suffering DeJesus endured before he committed suicide. The scope of damages,
however, has no bearing on Defendants' liability, which is the sole question raised
in Defendants' summary judgment motion.
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A. Whether DeJesus Suffered from a Particular Vulnerability to Suicide
First, the record does not support a finding that DeJesus suffered from a
particular vulnerability to suicide. To establish such a vulnerability, there "must be
a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-inflicted harm will
occur." Id. at 222 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The strong
likelihood of suicide must be so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for preventative action; the risk of self-inflicted injury must not only
be great, but also sufficiently apparent that a lay custodian's failure to appreciate it
evidences an absence of any concern for the welfare of his or her charges."
Woloszyn v. Cty. ofLawrence, 396 F.3d 314,320 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Here, the record evidence does not suggest that DeJesus' s physical condition
or the statements he made while in the SHU would have made his risk of suicide so
obvious that a lay person would have easily recognized the necessity for
preventative action. Plaintiffs point to inmate testimony that DeJesus looked
disheveled and that he told Defendants he wanted to speak to someone, wanted to
leave the SHU, did not feel well, was going through withdrawals, and wanted
"mental health." That testimony, however, even if true, does not support a finding
that DeJesus would likely harm himself.
That DeJesus looked "disheveled" would not have made it obvious that he
was likely to commit suicide. DeJesus may have looked disheveled for many
8

reasons unrelated to his intent to harm himself. Moreover, DeJesus' s alleged
statements to Officers Kirlin and Starkey that he needed to speak to (or call)
someone, that he needed help, and that he couldn't take being in the SHU would
not have made it obvious to a layperson that he would likely commit suicide.
DeJesus may have wanted to speak to someone, receive help, and leave the SHU
for reasons that had no connection to suicidal thoughts. In the same conversations
in which he stated that he needed to speak to someone and needed help, he also
said he "did not belong in the SHU." D.I. 61 Ex.Bat 8:15, Ex.Eat 14:15-16. As
common sense suggests and as Officer Starkey noted, "it is not uncommon for
inmates to say that they should not be in SHU." D.I. 59 at A-34, 3.
DeJesus's statements that he was sick, "not right," feeling anxious, and
suffering withdrawal symptoms and his two requests (each made separately to one
officer) to "call mental health" also would not have made it obvious to a layperson
that he intended to kill or harm himself, especially given the fact that medical
professionals had cleared and discharged DeJesus from the infirmary earlier that
day. At most, these statements indicated that DeJesus was possibly experiencing
mental pain and suicidal thoughts. A "mere possibility" that a suicide would be
attempted, however, is not enough to show a particular vulnerability to suicide.

Palakovic, 854 F .3d at 222.

9

B. Whether Defendants Knew or Should Have Known of DeJesus's
Particular Vulnerability to Suicide
The record evidence also does not support a finding that Defendants knew or
should have known about DeJesus' s vulnerability to suicide. Even if a strong
likelihood of suicide exists, a plaintiff must also show that the accused official
"knew or should have known of that strong likelihood." Colburn v. Upper Darby

Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
"should have known" element refers to "something more than a negligent failure to
appreciate the risk of suicide ... though something less than subjective
appreciation of that risk." Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 320 (citation omitted).
Here, even if DeJesus suffered from a particular vulnerability to suicide,
nothing in the record supports a finding that Defendants knew or should have
known about that vulnerability. As explained above, DeJesus did not display any
symptoms or make statements to Defendants that would have made it obvious to a
layperson that he would harm himself. Nothing in the record suggests that DeJesus
expressed thoughts of suicide or self-harm to Defendants or that other
circumstances existed that would have given Defendants reason to believe that
Defendant was contemplating suicide.

10

C. Whether Defendants Acted With Deliberate Indifference

Finally, the record does not support a finding that Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to DeJesus' s particular vulnerability to suicide. The record
does contain inmate testimony that Officer Drace responded with sarcasm to
DeJesus's request for a phone call, D.I. 61 Ex.Cat 14:4-14, that Officers Starkey
and Kirlin laughed when DeJesus was crying while asking for a phone call, id. Ex.
Eat 10:17-20, 12:4-21, and that Officers Starkey and Kirlin "brushed off'
DeJesus's requests, id. Ex.Bat 6:15, Ex. D at 6:2-4. Though perhaps not optimal
or sufficiently sympathetic to DeJesus's emotional state at the time, such responses
and reactions do not amount to deliberate indifference to a particular vulnerability
to suicide. As discussed above, DeJesus did not suffer from a particular

vulnerability to suicide that Defendants knew or should have known about. The
record also contains evidence that Officer Kirlin was negligent in failing to
complete area checks and phone punches in the SHU. But there is no evidence
connecting that failure to DeJesus. And in any event, negligence does not amount
to deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,835 (1994)
(stating that "deliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence").

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D. Summary
Overall, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, does not
support a finding that DeJesus suffered from a particular vulnerability to suicide
that Defendants knew or should have known about. Nor does it support a finding
that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Nothing in the record leaves a
question of material fact on these issues and therefore Plaintiffs' claim against
Defendants fails as a matter of law.

V.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE
As a general matter, government officials sued in their individual capacity

under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity. See Wright v. City of

Philadelphia, 409 F .3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005). Qualified immunity protects
government officials from liability for civil damages unless ( 1) the official's
conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that violated right was
"clearly established." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Because
Plaintiffs' have not established that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
DeJesus' s particular vulnerability to suicide, Defendants have not violated a
federal statute or a constitutional right and they are therefore entitled to qualified
immunity.

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VI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I will grant Defendants' summary judgment
motion on Count II of Plaintiffs' complaint.
The Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

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