United States of America v. Six Hundred Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Eight Dollars and No Cents ($614,338.00) in United States Currency

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 15 motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/7/17. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.
C.A. No. 15-1190-LPS
SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT
DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($614,338.00)
IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
Defendant in rem.

Charles M. Oberly, III and Lesley F. Wolf, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Wilmington, DE
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

John P. Deckers, JOHN P. DECKERS, ESQ., Wilmington, DE
Attorney for Claimant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

March 7, 2017
Wilmington, Delaware

.Presently before the Court is Shawn Baker's motion to dismiss. For the following
reasons, the Court will deny the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
On June 16, 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") seized $614,338.00

from Shawn Baker during a traffic stop. 1 (See D.I. 1 at ifif 4-14; D.I. 16-1 at 8) The DEA
subsequently initiated an administrative forfeiture action as required by the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of2000, 18 U.S.C. § 983, providing notice of seizure to Baker, dated August 10,

.

.

2015. (See D.I. 16-1 at 8) Baker submitted a claim of ownership under 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2), ·
which was received by the DEA oh August 31, 2015. (See id. at 10-11, 16) As relevant here,
Baker swore under penalty of perjury that he "is the lawful owner of said Property and/or
possessed the Property with the knowledge and consent of another person." (Id. at 1 t-12) The
DEA, however, notified Baker by letter dated September 21, 2015, that his claim was defective
for failing to properly state his interest in the property. (See id. at 19) The letter indicated that a ·
"[c]laimant may not state his/her interest in the alternative," and provided Baker twenty days to
cure the noted deficiency. (Id. at 19-20)
On October 12, 2015, Baker submitted a revised claim, which removed the and/or
language and stated that he "owned and obtained and possessed the Property with the knowledge
.

.

and consent of another person." (Id. at 31) Baker also commented that his "submission of a
revised claim form ... is not an admission by Claimant that the initial claim filed by him on

1

The DEA also seized an additional $2,028.00 and some personal property, which were
not included in the United States' civil forfeiture complaint and were returned to Baker. (See
D .I. 17 at 3 n.1)
1

August 26, 2015 ... was legally defective." (Id. at 28) Baker maintained that his earlier claim
"comports with the law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(C)(ii), and [the DEA] has failed to
provide legal authority to state otherwise." (Id.) But Baker nevertheless supplied the revised
documents "to expedite the processing of this claim." (Id.) The DEA received the claim on
October 13, 2015. (Id. at 33)
Two actions in this Court relate to the DEA's seizure of Baker's currency. On December
15, 2015, Baker filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), seeking return of
$616,366.00 - the amount of currency at issue here plus the $2,028 that has now been returned to
Baker. (See 15-mc-338-LPS D.I. 1) In that motion, Baker argued that the United States failed to
file a civil judicial complaint within 90 days of receiving his claim, as required by 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(a)(3)(A). (Id. at if 4) Baker contended that the relevant date from which to measure 90
days is August 31, 2015, the date the DEA received his first claim, which the DEA deemed
defective. (Id. at if 3)
The United States filed the complaint in the present case on December 22, 2015, seeking
forfeiture of the seized currency, within the 90-day period starting from the date of Baker's
second claim. (D .I. 1 at if 1) Because the two actions concern the same seized currency, Baker
stipulated to dismissing without prejudice the first action (see 15-mc-338-LPS D.I. 8), "[f]or
purposes of judicial economy only" (D.I. 16 at 4).

II.

LEGALSTANDARDS
Evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires

the Court to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis, 3 72
F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

2

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims:" In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Court may grant such a morion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc.,

~21F.3d472,

481-82 (3d Cir. 2000)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
However, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that 'raise a
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact)."' Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible
"when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). At bottom, "[t]he complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element" of a plaintiffs claim. Wilkerson
v~

New Media Tech. Charter School I11:c., 522 F.3d 315~ 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
The Court is not obligated to accept as true "bald assertions," Morse v. Lower Merion
Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), "unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co.,
113 F.3d405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997), or allegations that are "self-evidently false," Nami v. Fauver,
82 F.3d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1996).

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III.

DISCUSSION
The parties agree that the issue presently before the Court - whether the government met

the deadline for seeking forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 983 -turns on which one of Baker's claims
triggers the 90-day period during which the government must file a complaint. If the first claim
is operative, it is undisputed that the complaint here was filed after 90 days. But if the second
claim is the effective one, then the complaint was timely filed .
...
As a threshold matter, Baker moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, 56. (See D.I. 15at1) Several circuit courts have
concluded that the deadlines imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 983(a) are claim-processing rules, not
jurisdictional requirements. See United States v. Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.
2014) (analyzing§ 983(a)(l)(A)); United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 795-97 (4th Cir. 2012)
(analyzing§ 983(a)(3)(A)); see also Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 825
(2013). 2 Taking this view, that the requirement is non-jurisdictional, Rule 12(b)(6)- and not
12(b)(l)- is the proper avenue for dismissal of claims that do not comply with the statutory
deadlines. See Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 132 (3d Cir.
2016). With respect to whether this motion should be ~onsidered un~er Rule 56, although the
paiiies rely on documents that Baker attached to his motion to dismiss, those documents - a
notice of violation and property receipts from the date of the seizure, the notice of seizure sent by
the DEA, Baker's August and October claims of ownership, and the DEA's September letter (see
D.I. 16-1)- are undisputedly authentic and are integral underpinnings to the complaint. See City

2

N either the parties nor the Court have found a binding decision from the Third Circuit on
this issue.
4

ofPittsburgh v. W Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 1998); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 11Q6 (3d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court
need not convert the motion to one for summary judgment to consider these documents.
Turning to the core dispute, 18 U.S.C. § 983 establishes a procedure by which the
government may effect a civil forfeiture. First, subject to some exceptions, the government must
send written notice to interested parties no more than 60 days after the date of the seizure. See 18
U.S.C. § 983(a)(l)(A)(i). After receiving notice, a person seeking to reclaim the seized property
may file a claim with the appropriate official. See id. § 983(a)(2)(A). The statute sets forth three
requirements for the claim: it must "(i) identify the specific property being claimed; (ii) state the
claimant's interest in such property; and (iii) be made under oath, subject to penalty of perjury."
Id. § 983(a)(2)(C). Then, no later than 90 days after a claim has been filed, the government must

file a complaint for forfeiture. See id.. § 983(a)(3)(A). In the event that the government does not
file a complaint, or obtain a criminal indictment and take other steps to maintain custody of the
property, "the government shall promptly release the property." Id. § 983(a)(3)(B).
Baker contends that his first claim included all of the statutorily-required elements,
making it a valid claim that triggered the 90-day clock for the government to file a forfeiture
complaint. (See D.I. 16 at 1) The government undisputedly did not file the complaint within 90
days from the receipt of Baker's initial claim. But the government maintains that Baker's initial
claim did not clearly articulate his interest in the seized property, as required by

§ 983(a)(2)(C)(ii). See United States v. Thompson, 351 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
In particular, the government takes issue with Baker's use of an and/or statement to describe his
interest: he stated that he "is the lawful owner of said Property and/or possessed the Property

5

with the knowledge and consent of another person." (D.I. 16-1 at 19)
The Court is not persuaded that Mr. Baker's initial claim failed to state his interest in the
property, especially in light of the claim the DEA deemed valid. The government contends that
based on the initial claim, "it is unclear whether Claimant is asserting that he was actually the
owner of the property, simply possessing someone else's property, or perhaps some of each."
(D.I. 17 at 6) However, the government does not argue that either of these property interests
independently is insufficient to bring a claim under§ 983(a). See,

e.g., Munoz-Valencia v.

United States, 169 F. App'x 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2006) (ownership or possessory interest is
sufficient when claimant demonstrates dominion or control over property). The government also
suggests that Baker "failed to specify what po11ion of the Currency was connected to each
interest." (Id.) But the government's critiques of Baker's first claim apply with nearly equal
.

.

force to Baker's second claim, in which he stated that he "owned and obtained and possessed the
Property with the knowledge and consent of another person." (D.I. 1_6-1 at 32) That the DEA
accepted the second claim suggests that the first claim also sufficiently stated Baker's interest.
· Nor is the Court persuaded that the and/or statement renders meaningless the perjury requirement
of§ 983(a)(2)(C)(iii). Accordingly, the Com1 agrees that Baker's first claim triggered the 90-day
deadline.
The government suggests, however, that even accepting that Baker's earlier filing
triggered the 90-day time period to file the civil forfeiture complaint, that deadline should be
equitably tolled. 3 A number of district courts have determined that the 90-day deadline set out in

3

The government also suggests that B8;ker' s second claim reset the filing deadline. See
United States v. Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Dollars ($9630.00) in U.S. Currency, 2006
WL 3813590, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 21, 2006). The Court finds it unnecessary to decide this issue
6

§ 983(a)(3)(A) is subject to equitable tolling under appropriate circumstances. See United States

v. $34, 796.49, more or less, in US. Currency, 2015 WL 1643582, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 13,
2015); United States v. $229,850.00 in US. Currency, 50 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1179-85 (D. Ariz.
I

2014); In re Return of Seized $11,915 in US. Currency, 2012 WL 2921221, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July
17, 2012); Beck v. United States, 2011WL862952, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2011); United States

v. Thirty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Nine & 001100 Dollars ($34,929.00) in US.
Currency, 2010 WL 481250, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010); United States v. $114,143.00 in
US. currency seized from Michael J. Ca/ash's vehicle, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1322 (S.D. Fla.
2009); $9,630, 2006 WL 3813590, at

~3;

Hammoud v. Woodard, 2006 WL 381642, *4 (E.D.

Mich. Feb. 17, 2006); United States v. $39,480.00 in US. Currency, 190 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932-33
(W.D. Tex. 2002); see also Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758, 767-68 (3d Cir. 2003)
(allowing equitable tolling.of civil forfeiture statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1621).
"[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements:
(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Equitable tolling is not
available to cure "a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple miscalculation
that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline." Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651 (2010)
(intemal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 77 (3d
Cir. 2004); Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1998).
Consistent with other principles of equity, equitable tolling decisions "must be made on a
case-by-case basis," allowing for flexibility and "avoiding mechanical rules." Holland, 560 U.S.

in light of its decision on equitable tolling.
7

at 649-50.
_The Court agrees with the government that equitable tolling of the 90-day deadHne is
warranted here. The Court finds that the government acted diligently and in good faith in
pursuing forfeiture. Under the DEA's view that Baker's first claim was inadequate, the
government's complaint complied with the 90-day deadline, starting from the receipt of Baker's
second claim. There is no indication that the government was acting in bad faith or attempting to
prolong the proceedings, see $39,480.00, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 932, and the DEA is authorized to
reject claims that fail to comply with the statutory requirements, see Santos v. United States,
2008 WL 896155, at *4 (D.R.I. Mar. 31, 2008). The Court's disagreement with the
government's position as to the validity of the claim do.es not suggest that the DEA rejected the
claim in bad faith. Nor did the government negligently miscalculate the deadline. Rather, the
government adopted the position that Baker's use of an and/or statement did not clearly articulate
his interest in the property and, therefore, was not a valid claim. The government communicated
this concern to Baker to allow him to amend his claim and provided additional time jo re-file.
That the government took steps not required by the statute to ensure that Baker was aware of its
view of the claim's deficiency, see In re Seizure of $143,265. 78fi"om Checking Account No.

1851349546 & $28,687.40/i"om Checldng Account No. 1080022185, 384 F. App'x 471, 475 (6th
Cir. 2010), supports a finding of good faith.
Additionally, the "lack of clear, consistent, and binding authority" about how a claimant
must describe his claim to the seized property presents the type of circumstances that indicate
that equitable tolling is appropriate. $229,850.00, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 1184-85. The parties
identify few cases on point, and those that address the issue simply announce that the claim must

8

"clearly aiiiculate Defendant's interest and claim in the property." Thompson, 351 F. Supp. at
694. The parties present a genuine dispute over whether Baker's first claim clearly identifies a
property interest as required by the statute. The government's position as to the inadequacy of
Baker's original claim is not unreasonable, which weighs in favor of tolling the deadline. See,

e.g., $114,143.00, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1323; $11,915, 2012 WL2921221, at*3.
As a result of tolling the 90-day deadline, Baker· will experience a minor delay in the
adjudication of his claim·, but the Court isnot persuaded.that tolling is inequitable. See, e.g.,

$229,850.00, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 1184;

$39,480~00,

190 F. Supp. 2d at 932-33. The government

filed the complaint in the present action 106 days after the DEA received Baker's initial claim
and just one week after Baker initiated proceedings to recover the seized currency under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (g). Baker will still have the opportunity to dispute the merits of
the seizure before this Court. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c); see also $229,850.00, 50 F. Supp. 3d at
1184; Beck, 2011 WL 862952, at *5; $39,480.00, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 933. Further, there is a
"strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits when possible, instead of determining the
outcoine solely on technical or procedural grounds." $39,480.00, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 933; see

also $34, 796.49, 2015 WL 1643582, at *6; Beck, 2011WL862952, at *5; $34,929.00, 2010 WL
481250, at *3.
In sum, the Court concludes that Baker's first claim triggered the 90-day deadline. The

Court, however, determines that equitable tolling of that deadline is warranted here.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Baker's motion to dismiss.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Baker's motion to dismiss. An appropriate
Order follows.

10