Mason v. State of Delaware (J.P. Court) et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/17/2018. (jcs)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
STEFANIE D. MASON,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 15-1191-LPS

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE G,P. COURT),
et al.,
Defendants.

Stefanie D. Mason, Newark, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Joseph Clement Handlon, Deputy Attorney General, and Adria Benner Martinelli, Deputy Attorney
General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

September 17, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware

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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Stefanie D. Mason ("Plaintiff") filed this action alleging employment discrimination

by reason of a disability. (D.I. 2) She proceeds prose. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint following dismissal of the original
Complaint and the Amended Complaint. (D.I. 29, 30, 32) Presently before the Court is
Defendants' motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs opposition. (D.I. 35, 38)

II.

BACKGROUND
The Second Amended Complaint contains the following allegations. (D.I. 32) Plaintiff

began her employment with Defendant State of Delaware Justice of the Peace Court ("JP Court") in
May 2004 as a judicial case processor I. A member of the United States Army Reserve, Plaintiff was
deployed in September 2004, March 2007, and October 2009. In each instance she returned to her
employment with the JP Court. During her last deployment, Plaintiff was seriously injured and
hospitalized from April 2010 until Febmai-y 2013. Upon her discharge from the hospital, Plaintiff
was medically retired from the militai-y.
In May 2013, Plaintiff sought to return to work and requested information from Defendant
HR Manager Debbie Manelski ("Manelski") about an ADA accommodation. Plaintiff met with
Manelski in June 2013 to fill out paperwork; she then returned to work in June, was transferred to
the volunta1y assessment center, and promoted to judicial case processor II. She was given the
tasks of opening mail and adding payments into the system, tasks she performed from June 2013 to
Febmai-y 6, 2015.
Between July 2013 and December 2014, Plaintiff contacted Defendant supe1-visor Jeannie
Kruiser ("Kruiser") "to have additional work as the other employees." (D.I. 32 at ,J 15) Plaintiff

1

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filed an EEOC complaint on December 18, 2014 and alleges that she informed Manelski and
Defendant Michael Oliver ("Oliver") about the complaint on December 19, 2014.
Plaintiff alleges that she was forced to have weekly ADA meetings from March 2015 until
July 1, 2015, and during the ADA meetings she received verbal and written reprimands. Plaintiff
alleges that when she met with Oliver, Manelski, and Defendant Mark Hitch ("Hitch") on April 17,
2015, she told them she found the meeting offensive. On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff told Hitch and
Defendant Supervisor Staci Dutton ("Dutton") that she wanted to stop the meeting because she
found the ADA meetings offensive.
Plaintiff alleges that during the July 1, 2015 ADA meeting, Hitch pinned her between the
door and doorframe. Exhibits submitted by Plaintiff include a transcript of the July 1, 2015
meeting between Plaintiff and Hitch when Hitch counselled Plaintiff on failing to follow directions
of her supervisor and Plaintiff's ADA accommodation was discussed. (D.I. 33 at Ex. 28 at 1-5)
Plaintiff threatened to "jump out this

Dbuilding and kill myself, because I deserve to die." (Id. at 8)

On the same day, Defendant HR assistant Patty Moore ("Moore") told Plaintiff to go to the
Employee Assistant Program for evaluation by a social worker before returning to work. That day
she was placed on paid leave, pending a fitness for duty evaluation. (D.I. 36 at Ex. 68)
Plaintiff alleges that from July 2015 to March 2016, 1 Moore "kept on forcing" Plaintiff take
short term disability, but Hartford (the insurer) kept denying the claim. In October 2015, Plaintiff
engaged in unsuccessful EEOC mediation. On November 4, 2015, Plaintiff was advised that if
Moore did not receive Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") papetwork or disability approval, she
would be placed on unpaid status effective November 10, 2015. (D.I. 36 at Ex. 68) Plaintiff

1

The dates seem to be a typographical error as they read from "July 2015 to March 2015."
(D.I. 32 at, 23) The Court presumes the date is March 2016, not March 2015.
2

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alleges that on December 9, 2015, she filed a request for review before the Delaware Merit Board.
Plaintiff filed for workers' compensation in December 2015. She alleges that Moore never
submitted the paperwork for Plaintiff to receive workers' compensation.
On January 29, 2016, Moore advised Plaintiff that she was considered to have abandoned
her job because the JP Court had not received FMLA pape1work and disability had not been
approved; the JP Court was recommending Plaintiff's dismissal from employment. (D.l. 36 at Ex.
68) Plaintiff was advised that she was entitled to a pre-decision meeting. (Id.) A pre-decision
meeting was scheduled for Febrnary 22, 2016, upon Plaintiff's request. (Id. at Ex. 70) Plaintiff did
not attend the meeting but sent a letter for review. (Id.) A March 4, 2016 letter advised Plaintiff of
her dismissal, effective March 5, 2016. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the JP Court would not allow her
to take workers' compensation and, as a result, her employment was terminated in March 2016 on
the grounds that she had abandoned her job.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination on December 18, 2014, alleging discrimination by
reason of disability, No. 17C-2014-00762, and then filed a charge of discrimination alleging
retaliation after her employer the State of Delaware Justice of the Peace Court received notification
of the charge in Febrnary 2015, Charge No. 530-2015-03643. Charge No. 530-2015-03643 is not
dated, but it appears to have been filed sometime after July 2, 2015. (See D.l. 35 at 9-10) Plaintiff
commenced this action on December 22, 2015. (D.I. 2) On August 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed two
right to sue letters, both dated July 27, 2017, for EEOC Charge Nos. 17C-2014-00762 and 5302015-03643. (D.I. 27)
The Second Amended Complaint asserts: (1) employment discrimination under Title VII
("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of
Titles I and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.;

3

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(3) violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335; and (4) Delaware Merit Rules claims. (See D.I. 32) Plaintiff
alleges that the discriminatory acts occurred from June 2013 through March 2016, when her
employment was terminated.

(See id.) Counts One, Three, Five, and Six are raised against Kn.user,

Manelski, Oliver, Hitch, Dutton, Moore, and the JP Court and allege unfair treatment, retaliation,
denial of employment benefits, and the termination of "Plaintiff's employment was the result of
disability discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,

Dand Delaware Merit Rules."

Count Two is raised against an

unnamed assistant personnel director and employee benefits representative and alleges Plaintiff's
loss of pension "was the result of military se1-vice discrimination in violation of'' USERRA, 38
U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., 20 C.F.R. Part 102, and Delaware Merit Rules. Count Four is raised against
Hitch and Moore and alleges offensive touching in violation of Title 11 2 and Delaware Merit Rules. 3
Plaintiff seeks lost wages and compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants move for dismissal on the following grounds: (1) the Second Amended
Complaint is devoid of a single allegation implicating discrimination based upon a category
protected by Title VII; (2) the ADA claims should be dismissed as a matter of law; and (3) the Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear the USERRA claim against the state, the USERRA claims against the
individual defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed, and the USERRA claims are
deficiently pled.

2

The Second Amended Complaint does not identify a specific provision in Title 11.

3

There are other individuals named in the caption of the Second Amended Complaint who
are not mentioned in the body of the Second Amended Complaint.
4

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III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(6)(6) requires the
Court to accept as hue all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Bttrlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court may grant
such a motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
hue, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief."

Maio v. Aetna, Im:, 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bel/At/. Co,p. v. Twombfy, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A plaintiff must plead
facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. Ci(y of Sheli?_y,
_U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346,347 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect
statements of the legal themy supporting tl1e claim asserted. See id. at 346.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that 'raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact)."' Vidattlic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombfy, 550
U.S. at 555). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At bottom, "[t]he complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element" of a plaintiffs claim.

TVilkerson v. New Media Tech. Cha,ter Sch. Im:, 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

5

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The Court is not obligated to accept as true "bald assertions," 111.orse v. LowerMe,ion Sch. Dist.,
132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), "unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences," Scht!Jlkill Ene,;gy Res., Inc. v. Pennrylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405,
417 (3d Cir. 1997), or allegations that are "self-evidently false," Nami v. Fat1ve1; 82 F.3d 63, 69 (3d
Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her Second
Amended Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." E1ickso11 v. Pardtts, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Title VII

The Court will dismiss the Title VII claims. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer
"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or othe1wise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national oi-igin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The
Second Amended Complaint contains no allegations that Plaintiff is a member of any of tl1e classes
protected from discrimination under Title VIL

In addition, as discussed in the Court's September 14, 2017 memorandum opinion (see D.I.
29), other than the ADA claims, Plaintiff has not provided documents to the Court to satisfy the
administrative exhaustion requirements for any other employment discrimination claims. Plaintiff
must comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Title VII before bringing employment
discrimination claims under Title VII. See Story v. Mechling, 214 F. App'x 161, 163 (3d Cir. Jan. 19,
2007) (plaintiff may not proceed with Title VII claim because he neither received right to sue letter
nor submitted evidence indicating that he requested right to sue letter); Burgh v. Borottgh Cot111cil ef

Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001).

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The Title VII claims fail as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion to
dismiss the Title VII claims.

B.

ADA

The Second Amended Complaint raises employment discrimination claims based upon a
disability and retaliation claims based upon the exercise of rights under Title I and Title V of the
ADA. The claims are raised against the JP Court and individual State employees.
Title I of the "ADA prohibits certain employers, including the States, from discriminating
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms conditions, and privileges of employment." Koslow v. Pe111t.[Jlva11ia, 302 F.3d
161, 177 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Board ifTmstees if the Univ. ifAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360-61
(2001) (alterations in original)). Section 12203 of Title V of the ADA prohibits retaliation "against
any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the
ADA]." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Claims under Title I and V of the ADA brought to recover
money damages from a State are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360;

see also Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524,551 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits
seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA."); Karam v. State if Delaware

Division if Services for Children, Yottth and Their Families, 2010 WL 5343182, at *3-5 (D. Del. Dec. 15,
2010) (State immune from Title V retaliation claims premised upon Title I claims).
In addition, the discrimination claims raised against the individual defendants fail as a matter
of law as there is no individual liability under Title I. See Koslow, 302 F.3d at 178 (no individual
liability for damages under Title I of the ADA). Although the Third Circuit has not yet decided the
issue of individual liability under Title V of the ADA, other courts have concluded that there can be
no individual liability under Title V when the claim is based on retaliation for the exercise of rights
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under Title I of the ADA. See e.g., Btttler v. Ciry of Prairie Village, Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir.
1999); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 471-72 (4th Cir. 1999); Smilry v. DaimlerChrysle,~ 538 F. Supp. 2d
711, 719 (D. Del. 2008); Domis v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391,397 (E.D. Pa. 2002), cif!'d, 100 F.
App'x 126 (3d Cir. May 13, 2004); see also Datto v. Hanison, 664 F. Supp. 2d 472,491 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(inte1preting § 12203 to prohibit individual claims of liability is "appropriate in employment cases
because, under§ 12203(c), retaliation claims in that context apply the remedies of Title I of the
ADA, which incorporates the remedies of Title VII"); Blades v. Mosaic of Delaware, 2017 WL 3868238
(D. Del. Aug. 31, 2017) (dismissing Title VADA retaliation claim against individual defendants).
Considering the foregoing, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs Title V retaliation claim may not be
maintained against tl1e individual defendants.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the ADA claims raised by
Plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint.
C.

USERRA

The USERRA was enacted to ensure that civilian employees are not adversely treated by
employers, within the context of civilian employment, because of the employee's milita1y status. See

Tucker v. 1,TJ)nne, Inc., 2009 WL 2448520, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2009). USERRA's provisions are to
prevent and/ or compensate service members for employment discrimination based on militaiy
status. See Gordon v. Wawa, 388 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2004).
As previously discussed, the Second Amended Complaint is brought against the JP Court
and individual JP Court employees. It does not indicate if the claims raised against the individual
defendants are brought against them in their individual capacities, their official capacities, or both.
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction against the JP Court and against the individual
defendants for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted.

8

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An employer violates USERRA if "the person's membership [in the military] is a motivating
factor in the employer's action." 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1). An employer, however, does not violate
the Act if "the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such
membership." Id.
USERRA articulates three separate types of claims and identifies which courts have
jurisdiction over those claims, as follows:
(b) Jurisdiction. (1) In the case of an action against a State (as an
employer) or a private employer commenced by the United States,
the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction over the
action. (2) In the case of an action against a State (as an employer)
by a person, the action may be brought in a State court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the State. (3) In the case
of an action against a private employer by a person, the district courts
of the United States shall have jurisdiction of the action.
38 u.s.c. § 4323(b).
Plaintiff's action arises under§ 4323(b)(2), as she commenced this action against the State as
her employer and she is a person. Although there is no Third Circuit or District of Delaware
precedent, several courts have found that§ 4323(b)(2) divests federal courts of jurisdiction against
States as employers. See MmMillan v. Penn,[Jlvania AirNat'I Gttard, 2018 WL 2730883, at *1 (W.D.
Pa. 2018). "Section 4323(b)(2)'s seemingly permissive language (i.e., 'may be brought') has been
interpreted to constrain jurisdiction to state courts in USERRA actions against states as employers."

Id (citing Wood v. Florida Atlantic Univ. Bd. efTrttstees, 432 F. App'x 812, 815 (11th Cir. June 23,
2011)); McIntosh v. Pmtridge, 540 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2008) (after examining text of statute in
current and prior forms, finding no unmistakable clear intention by Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity by allowing individuals to bring USERRA claims against states as employers in
federal court); see also Velasqttez v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Congress's intention to
limit USERRA suits against states to state courts is unmistakable."); Townsend v. University efAlaska,
543 F.3d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court correctly dismissed suit against State for lack of
9

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subject matter jurisdiction); Bodrog v. New Jersry State Police, 2018 WL 2411615 (D.N.J. May 29, 2018)
(USERRA claim barred by Eleventh Amendment). In light of the foregoing, the Court will grant
Defendants' motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff names JP Court employees as defendants, the claims are not
actionable given that Plaintiffs employer was the State. In this regard, the Court adopts the
reasoning of Townsend, 543 F.3d at 486:
USERRA expressly creates only two private causes of action: (1) an
action brought by an individual against a State (as an employer) ... ;
and (2) an action brought against a private employer. . . See 38
U.S.C. § 4323(a)(2). Despite the plain text of the statute, Townsend
argues that USERRA also creates a cause of action against the
supervisors, because the Act defines "employer" to include "a
person, institution, organization, or other entity to whom the
employer has delegated the performance of employment-related
responsibilities," 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(i) ... , and the supervisors
are persons. The USERRA cause of action, however, arises against
"a State (as an employer)." See id. § 4323(a)(2). Individual
supervisors are not included in the definition of "State." See id.
§ 4303(14) (defining "State"). Although the cause of action can be
brought against a "State (as an employer)," "as an employer"
describes the capacity in which the State can be sued; it does not
create a cause of action against individual state employees even if they
exercise supervisory responsibility. Thus, an action under USERRA
is available only against the State "as an employer," and not in some
other capacity. . . . Thus, Townsend's attempt to sue individual
supervisors under the cause of action which the Act provides against
a "State (as an employer)" fails. Nor are the individual state
supe1visors "private employers." While the supervisors may fit
under the definition of "employer," we agree with the district court
that it would do violence to the language of the statute to consider a
state employee-supe1visor a "private employer."

See also Rimando v. Alt11n Rock Union Elementary Sch. Disttid, 356 F. App'x 989, 991 (9 th Cir. Dec. 15,
2009) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs individual liability claim against supe1visor because it was
"foreclosed by [the court's] holding in Townsend'). Plaintiffs claims against the JP Court employees
are not cognizable and, therefore, they will be dismissed.
Defendants' motion to dismiss the USERRA claim will be granted.
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D.

Delaware Merit Rules

Finally, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff's unfair treatment violated
Delaware Merit Rules, but it is simply not clear how this may have occurred. To the extent the
Merit Rules apply to Plaintiff, the Merit System of Personnel Administration provides "[t]he
exclusive remedy available to a classified employee for the redress of an alleged wrong, arising under
any misapplication of any provision of this chapter, the merit mles, or the Director's regulations
adopted thereunder, is to file a grievance in accordance with the procedure stated in the merit mles."

Gmnbs v. Delaware Dep't of Labo,~ 2016 WL 3475217, at *2 (Del. Super. June 16, 2016) (quoting 29
Del. C. § 5943(a)). The Merit Rules provide a grievance process after which the matter proceeds to
the Merit Employee Relations Board, and then, if an employee is not satisfied with the decision, he
or she may take an appeal to the Superior Court. Id. As pled, the Court cannot discern if Plaintiff
was considered a classified employee and, if so, whether she followed the proper procedure before
raising this claim in the Second Amended Complaint. Finally, the Delaware Merit Rules claims are
pled in a conclusoty manner and do not meet the pleading standards of Twomb/y and Iqbal.
The Court will dismiss the Delaware Merit Claims.

E.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

Because the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a federal claim, the Court declines to
exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's supplemental Delaware Merit Rule claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367; De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc~, 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) grant Defendants' motion to dismiss (D.I. 35); and

(2) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Amendment of the federal claims is futile.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

11