Williams et al v. Somerset County Family Services et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 4/27/2016.(aah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ERICA WILLIAMS and DEWANE
WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs,
V.

SOMERSET COUNTY FAMILY
SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. Action No. 16-089-GMS
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MEMORANDUM
I.

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs Erica ("Erica") and Dewane ("Dewane") Williams ("the plaintiffs"), filed

this lawsuit on February 16, 2016. (D.I. 2.) They appear prose and were granted permission to
proceed informapauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (DJ. 4.) The court now proceeds to
review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

II.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case involves the October 11, 2012 removal of the plaintiffs' children from the State

of Delaware by the Somerset County Department of Social Services for the State of Maryland
("SDSS"), and the children's placement in foster care in Somerset County, Maryland. The
plaintiffs seek the return of their minor children who are under the care and custody of the State
of Maryland.
The plaintiffs filed a similar case in this court in March 2013. See Williams v. Maryland

Circuit Court, Civ. No. 13-441-GMS (D. Del.) The instant complaint and Civ. No. 13-441-GMS
have many of the same defendants including Heather Ruark, Jamie Cuger (spelled Couglar in

Civ. No. 13-441-GMS), Jennifer Goolie, Daniel Long, Master Robert Laird, and Brian Shockley.
In Civ. No. 13-441-GMS, the court abstained from exercising jurisdiction and dismissed the
complaint on September 6, 2013, pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine after the court was
provided with exhibits that indicated the issues raised by the plaintiffs in Civ. No. 13-441-GMS
were being heard in the Maryland Courts. (See Civ. No. 13-441-GMS at D.I. 30.) The court was
advised that Dewane had filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 2013 with regard to the custody of
his children. The appeal was pending as of the date this court dismissed No. 13-441-GMS. It's
disposition is unknown.
The September 6, 2013 memorandum in Civ. No. 13-441-GMS provides a detailed
factual background of the events surrounding custody of the plaintiffs' children, as follows:
The plaintiffs and their children resided in Maryland. In either September or
October 2010 they moved to Delaware. The plaintiffs currently reside in
Delaware. The minor children are currently under the care and custody of the
State of Maryland pursuant to orders issued in child in need of assistance actions.
On August 28, 2012, the Somerset County Department of Social Services
("SDSS") filed child in need of assistance petitions in juvenile court regarding the
minor children. Thereafter, the SDSS began trying to locate the children for the
purposes of placing them in shelter care. With the assistance of the Delaware
authorities, the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services ("MDJS") located the
family and, on October 11, 2012, three of minor children were accepted into
shelter care in Maryland. On October 16, 2012, the three children were placed in
the temporary care and custody of the SDSS. A fourth child was committed to
custody of the MDJS.
Contested child in need of assistance adjudication and disposition hearings were
held on December 20, 2012, January 25, 2013, and February 1, 2013. During the
hearing, counsel for the parents moved to have the case transferred to the State of
Delaware. The court reserved ruling on the issue and ordered the SDSS to
provide a plan as to how it would make reasonable efforts for reunification with
the parents in Delaware. In addition, the parties were to prepare arguments on a
motion to transfer to Delaware or to a close county in Maryland. The court found
that the children were in need of assistance and recommended commitment to the
SDSS's custody for continued foster care placement. The parents filed exceptions
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to the findings and requested a de novo hearing. On June 19, 2013, the juvenile
court in the Circuit Court for Somerset County in the State of Maryland issued an
order that determined the children were in need of assistance and committed them
to the SDSS. The parents were ordered to comply with the Interstate Compact for
the Placement of Children ("ICPC"), an interstate compact that facilitates the
placement of children across state lines. Dewane, but not Erica, appealed the
order on June 19, 2013.

Williams v. Shockley, 2013 WL 4804757, at* 1-2 (D. Del. Sept. 6, 2013)
In the instant complaint the plaintiffs allege violations of their civil rights and
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also allege violations of state
and federal criminal statutes and ask the court to criminally charge all named defendants.
Finally, the plaintiffs ask the court to "enter a law suit[] against Somerset County Family
Services and Somerset County Circuit Court." (D.I. 2 at 4.) They seek compensatory damages.

(See D.I. 2 at civil cover sheet.)

III.

LEGAL STAND ARDS
This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis actions

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.

Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007). Because the plaintiffs proceed prose, their pleading is liberally construed and
their complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a
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complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant the plaintiffs leave
to amend their complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A

plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See
Johnson v. City ofShelby, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed,

however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at
346.
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (I) take note of the elements the plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
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give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir.
2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the
facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." Id.

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Statute of Limitations

The plaintiffs allege that their children were "kidnapped" on October 11, 2012. To the
extent that the plaintiffs seeks to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights, as alleged, the claims are time-barred.
For purposes of the statute of limitations, § 1983 claims are characterized as personal
injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1983). In Delaware,§ 1983 claims are
subject to a two-year limitations period. See 10 Del. C. § 8119; Johnson v. Cullen, 925 F. Supp.
244, 248 (D. Del. 1996). In Maryland, § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations
periods. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101; Arawole v. Gaye, 2002 WL 32356684,
at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2005), aff'd, 46 F. App'x 206 (41h Cir. 2002) (unpublished). Section 1983
claims accrue "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action
is based." Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that generally must be raised by the
defendant, and it is waived if not properly raised. See Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth

Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006); Fassett v. Delta

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Kappa Epsilon, 807 F .2d 1150, 1167 (3d Cir. 1986). "[W]here the statute of limitations defense
is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the factual record is required to
determine whether dismissal is appropriate, sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is
permissible." Davis v. Gauby, 408 F. App'x 524, 526 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (quoting

Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10 1h Cir. 2006)).
Here, the plaintiffs complain of acts occurring on October 11, 2012 and they filed the
instant complaint on February 16, 2016. Hence, it is evident from the face of the complaint that
all claims that accrued prior to February 16, 2014 (in Delaware) and February 16, 2013 (in
Maryland) are barred by Delaware's two-year, and Maryland's three-year, limitations period.
Because the plaintiffs allegations are time-barred the court will dismiss the § 1983 claims as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

B.

Deficient Pleading

The complaint's scant and conclusory allegations fail to meet the pleading requirements
of Iqbal and Twombly. The civil cover sheet names 18 defendants, but Somerset County Family
Services, Craig Mathies, and Jennifer Goolie are the only defendants mentioned by name in the
complaint. In addition, the complaint does not provides dates or places where the alleged
wrongful acts committed by these three defendants took place. Moreover, the allegations are
conclusory. Having reviewed the allegations, the court finds that the complaint fails to state
plausible claims for relief.

C.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

It appears in reading the complaint that the plaintiffs seek only to sue Somerset County
Family Services and Somerset County Circuit Court given that the complaint states, "we would

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like to enter a law suit[] against" these two entities. 1 Both Somerset County Family Services and
Somerset County Circuit Court are immune from suit.
The Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions in the federal courts against states and their
agencies. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F .2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981 ); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). "Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or
Congress has overridden it ... a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the
relief sought." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781 (1978)).
It is well-settled that a circuit court is an arm of the state and that Maryland has not

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Alexander v. District Court of Maryland for
Charles Cnty., 2008 WL 6124449, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2008). Accordingly, the court will
dismiss the claims against the Maryland Circuit Court of Somerset County and its Family
Services Program as immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

D.

Criminal Charges

In reading the complaint it appears that the plaintiffs wish to bring criminal charges
against all named defendants. To the extent that the plaintiffs seek to impose criminal liability
upon the defendants pursuant to the criminal statutes upon which they rely, they lack standing to
proceed. See Allen v. Administrative Office ofPennsylvania Courts, 270 F. App'x 149, 150 (3d
Cir. 2008) (unpublished); see United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996)
("[T]he United States Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of all criminal cases within his

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The complaint does not name the Somerset County Circuit Court as a defendant. The
Family Services Program falls under the umbrella of the Circuit Court of Somerset County. See
http://www.mdcourts.gov/circuit/somerset/familyservices.html (Apr. 12, 2016).
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or her district."). The decision of whether to prosecute, and what criminal charges to bring,
generally rests with the prosecutor. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979).
Therefore, the criminal claims will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
E.

Younger Abstention/Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
1.

Younger Abstention

As discussed above, this court was provided with exhibits in Civ. No. 13-441-GMS that
indicate the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this court have been, or currently are being, heard in
the Maryland Courts. To the extent cases remain pending in the Maryland State Court and there
has been no final resolution on the issues raised, this court must abstain by reason of the
abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 2 Under the Younger
abstention doctrine, a federal district court must abstain from hearing a federal case which may
interfere with certain state proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In addition,
under Younger, federal courts are prevented from enjoining pending state proceedings absent
extraordinary circumstances. 3 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass 'n, 457
U.S. 423, 437 (1982). Abstention is appropriate when: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings
that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the

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The court may raise the issue of Younger abstention sua sponte. O'Neill v. City of
Philadelphia, 32 F.3d785, n.l (3d Cir. 1994).
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The abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), provides
that federal courts are not to interfere with pending state criminal proceedings. The Younger
doctrine has been extended to civil cases and state administrative proceedings. Middlesex Cnty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd, 420 U.S.
592 (1975).
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state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Lazaridis v.
Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010). The doctrine applies to proceedings until all

appellate remedies have been exhausted, unless the matter falls within one of the Younger
exceptions. 4 Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). Additionally, the state
proceeding need not be ongoing at the time the federal complaint is before the court as long as
the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to resolve the federal issue in a state proceeding.
Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. at 608.

The Younger elements have been met here and none of the its exceptions apply. In this
case there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding and the guardianship/custody issue is on appeal
before the Maryland Courts. As to the second factor, the State of Maryland has a substantial
interest in the fair administration of child custody and parental rights proceedings. See Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427 (1979) (recognizing such an interest in child abuse cases). Finally, the

state court proceedings provide the plaintiffs with an adequate opportunity to present their federal
(i.e., due process) claims. See e.g., Al-Mansour v. Shraim, 2012 WL 983785 (D. Md. Mar. 21,
2012) (Maryland state court has a strong interest in deciding issues regarding child support and
can appropriately consider federal statutory or constitutional issues). Accordingly, pursuant to
Younger and its progeny, the court must abstain. See Pennzoil Co. v, Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1,15

(1987) (stating that Younger abstention is favored even after the plaintiffs failed to raise their
federal claims in the ongoing state proceedings).
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Exceptions to the Younger doctrine exist where irreparable injury is "both great and
immediate," Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, where the state law is "flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions," id. at 53, or where there is a showing of "bad faith,
harassment, or ... other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief." Id. at 54.

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Based upon the foregoing, under the Younger abstention doctrine, the court must abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims regarding the care and guardianship/
custody of their children.

2.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

To the extent the Maryland Courts have reached a final judgment on the plaintiffs' claims
regarding the care and guardianship/custody of their children, the court has no authority to review
the final judgment of the Maryland courts. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set
forth by the Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of

Columbia Court ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Federal district courts are courts
of original jurisdiction and have no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial
proceedings. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see Power v. Department of

Labor, 2002 WL 976001 (D. Del. 2002). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to the extent that
this is a case "brought by [a] state-court loser []complaining of injuries caused by the state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280 (2005).
As stated above, to the extent Maryland courts have entered judgment on the plaintiffs'
claims, the instant complaint falls within the purview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Allowing
the plaintiffs' claims to proceed against the defendants would allow them to use the federal
courts to appeal state court judgments and, thus, would run afoul of these principles. Therefore,
the court cannot exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will: (1) dismiss the case as frivolous, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, and pursuant to the defendants' immunity from suit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii), and (iii); and (2) abstain from exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine or, in the alternative, the RookerFeldman doctrine. The court finds amendment futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d
Cir. 2004); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 1 I I (3d Cir. 2002); Borelli v. City of
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 95 I-52 (3d Cir. I 976).
An appropriate order will be entered.

II