Brown v. Colvin

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 6/13/2017. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

CARLA.ANITA BROWN,
Plaintiff,

v.
CAROLYNW. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No.1:16-94-GMS

MEMORANDUM
'I.

INTRODUCTION
On October 19, 2011, Plaintiff Carla Anita Brown ("Brown") filed for disability

insurance benefits under Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, and for supplemental security income
under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 138l-1383f. Brown originally asserted she had become disabled
as of December 5, 2008 due to osteoarthritis, asthma, high blood pressure, sleep apnea, anemia,
and bilateral knee pain. Her claims were denied initially on April 16, 2012, and upon
reconsideration on October 15, 2012. Brown timely requested a hearing before an administrative
-1awjudge ("ALJ"), which was held on June-2, 2014. The ALJ issued a partially favorable
decision on August 18, 2014, finding that Brown was disabled on June 1, 2014 and after, but not
before. (D.I. 9-2 at 33). Because Brown was considered disabled as of June 1, 2014, she was
only entitled to supplemental security income, not disability insurance benefits. Id. Disability
insurance benefits were only available through the date last insured-March 31, 2014. 1 The

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"T o establish a period of disability, you must have disability insured status in the quarter in which you become
disabled or in a later quarter in which you are disabled." 20 C.F .R. § 404.131. As such, if a claimant satisfies the

Appeals Council declined Brown's request for subsequent review on December 28, 2015.
Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Brown filed a complaint with the court seeking
review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on February 17, 2016. (D.I. 2). The Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner") timely answered on June 10,2016. (D.I.
8). Brown filed for summary judgment on August 1, 2016, (D.I. 12), and the Commissioner
cross-moved for summary judgment on September 30, 2016. (D.I. 14). Because the court finds
that the ALJ's decisions were supported ·by substantial evidence as addressed below,.it will deny
Plaintiff's motion and grant summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
II.

BACKGROUND

Brown alleges she has been disabled since December5, 2008. (D.I. 15 at 8). At the time
of the administrative hearing, Brown consulted multiple doctors for .back, knee, and leg pain
stemming from lumbarradiculopathy. (D.I. 12 at 6). Apart from epidural steroid injections,
Brown never had surgery, but underwent physical therapy and took prescribed medications.
(D.I. 12 at 10). On August 18, 2014, the ALJ released his decision currently in dispute. (D.I. 9-

2 at.35).
A. Medical History
1. Dr. McCrossan's Assessments

Brown went to Dr. McCrossan ("McCrossan") with complaints about back pain after a
January 2011 motor vehicle accident. (D.I. 12 .at 6). McCrossan conducted several physical
examfuations; McCrossan noted lumbar tenderness on the left side of Brown's body, and
,discomfort in Brown's right knee. Id. Despite prescribing medication and physical therapy,
McCrossan noted the knee pain and back pain persisted. Id. McCrossan also wrote that Brown's

medical requirements for disability after the date last insured, they will not be entitled to disability insurance
benefits.

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leg pain "has remained disabling~" (D .I. 9-10 at 55). However, McCrossan consistently noted that
Brown had a normal gait. (D.I. 9-9 at 45, 50, 52, 55, 57).

2. Dr. Wilson's Assessments
Dr. Wilson ("Wilson") diagnosed Brown with lumbar radiculopathy with pain and swelling
in the 1eft leg. (D.I. 9-11 at 28). Based on the information gathered, Wilson estimated that Brown

could sit for two to four hours during the course of an eight hour workday, and could stand or walk
for approximately one hour. Id.

In addition, Wilson estimated that Brown should alternate

between sitting and standing every fifteen to twenty minutes to relieve pain. Id. Wilson .also
concluded that Brown never lift more than twenty-five pounds, that she rarely 1ift twenty pounds,
that she could occasionally lift ten pounds, and could frequently lift less than ten pounds. Id. at 29.
Due to her findings, Wilson classified B~own as disabled, as evidenced in a note to the Wilmington
Housing Authority declaring she should be "exempt from community service due to disability."

Id. at 21.

B. ALJ Findings
In his August 18, 2014 decision, the ALJ applied the regulatory five-step sequential

evaluation based on the evidence on record. (D.I. 9-2 at 24-34). If all five steps are satisfied,
then Brown would be classified as disabled, but if any steps fail, then Brown would not be
classified as disabled. Id. at 26. At step one, he determined that Brown did not engage in
substantial gainful activity. Id. at 27. At step two, he concluded that Brown had several severe
impairments, including "degenerative disc disease of the spine, [and] degenerative joint disease
of the bilateral knees." Id. At step three, he determined Brown's impairments did not equal the
severity of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 28. At
step four, he concluded that Brown could not return to her past work given her impairments. Id.

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At step five, he determined that, despite Brown's impairments, she could still attain work
available in significant numbers in the national economy. 2 (Id. at27, 33--..,.34). To _reach this
conclusion, the ALJ relied on a vocational expert, Linda Augins, who testified that Brown could
work as an addresser, a telephone information clerk, or table worker. (Id. at 32-:33, 63, 65-66).
The ALJ a1so used the medical evidence to conclude Brown was not disabled. After
reviewing the medical evidence, the ALJ reasoned that "the claimant's statements concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely .credible:" (D.I. 9-2
at 30). To support his conclusion, the ALJ pointed out that "the claimant's objective
examination findings [from her doctors] have been quite normal on many occasions" in areas
including respiration, range of motion for lumbar and knees, motor function, strength, sensation,
reflexes, P?Sture, gait, and coordination. Id. In addition, the ALJ noted that Brown did not
always .follow treatment recommendations by her doctors. Id. The ALJ also .considered the
discrepancies between Brown's .complaints and the medical examinations; one such discrepancy
was Brown:s complaints of back and leg pain stemming from lumber radiculopathy did not
match the CT scan performed on February 10, 2012 indicating a radicular-type problem would
not cause Brown's symptoms. Id. at 30-31; (D.I. 9-13 at 34}. The ALJ also noted that
McCrossan's medical conclusion that Brown's leg pain "remained disabling" did not conform to
McCrossan's findings during her multiple physicals that Brown had a normal gait. (D.I. 9-10 at
55; D.I. 9-9 at 45, 50, 52, 55, 57).
Regarding Wilson's conclusions to the Wilmington Housing Authority, the ALJ gave the

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The ALJ noted that prior to June 1, 2014, Brown was considered a "younger individual" according to 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(c). (D.I. 9-2 at 31). According to the ALJ, given Brown's age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Brown could
have performed. Id. On and after June 1, 2014, Brown's age category changed to "closely approaching advanced
age," 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d), which the ALJ found necessitated a finding of disabled. Id. at 33.

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evidence little weight because "the definition of disability used on [that] form [was] not
comparable to the sequential evaluation process used for determining such status" under the Social
Security Act. (D.I. 9-2 at 31). However, the ALJ assigned Wilson's other medical conclusionsfor example, Brown's ability to carry weight or length of time sit or stand-moderate weight. Id.
Regarding McCrossan's conclusions that Brown's symptoms were disabling, the ALJ gave the
evidence little weight because they were conclusions "address[ing] an issue reserved to the
Commissioner" and were inconsistent with other medical findings in the record such as those
discussed above. Id.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW3
A reviewing court must uphold the Commissioner's factual decisions if they are supported

by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178,
1182 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
"[w]here the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, ... [the court is] bound
by those findings, even if ... [it] would have decided the factual issue differently"). "Substantial
evidence" means more than "a mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). "It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The inquiry
is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same determination, but, rather, whether
the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable. See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d

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While the court requires the submission of cross-motions for summary judgment, the summary judgment standard
in no way impacts the court's substantial evidence analysis. The court is aware that its sole function here is to
determine ifthe ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court uses cross-motions
for summary judgment as a procedural tool to apprise itself of the record below and to efficiently facilitate
resolution of the issues on appeal. Cf Nolan v. Heald Coll., 551F.3d1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that where
a court does not consult evidence outside of the administrative record "a motion for summary judgment is merely
the conduit to bring the legal question before the district court and the usual test of summary judgment, such as
whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, does not apply").

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Cir. 1988).

Thus, substantial. evidence may be slightly less than a preponderance.

See

Hanusiewicz v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 474, 476 (D.N.J. 1988). If the ALJ's decision is supported

by substantial evidence, this court must give deference to the ALJ' s determination, and uphold the
ruling as is. Monsour Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986). The court
must also give deference to the interpretation of statutes bythe ALJ, and defer to the interpretation
"so long as it is reasonable." Id. at 1191.
In considering evidence supporting an agency's decision, "the grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record disCloses that its action was
based." Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 44 n.7. Moreover, "a single piece of evidence will not satisfy the
substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by
countervailing evidence." Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983).

IV.

DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the inability "to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner promulgated
regulations for determining disability by application of a five-step sequential analysis. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ, the reviewing Appeals Council, and the Commissioner evaluate
each case according to this five-step process until a finding of "disabled" or "not .disabled" is
obtained. See id. at§ 404.1520(a). The five-step process requires that the Commissioner make a
number of inquiries:
[T]he [Commissioner] determines first whether an individual is currently engaged
in substantial gainful activity. If that individual is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, he will be found not disabled regardless of the medical findings. If an
individual is found not to be engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
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[Commissioner] will determine whether the medical evidence indicates that the
claimant suffers from a severe impairment. If the [Commissioner] determines that
the claimant suffers from a severe impairment, the [Commissioner] will next
determine whether the impairment meets or equals a list of impairments in
Appendix I of sub-part P of Regulations No. 4 of the Code of Regulations. If the
individual meets or equals the list of impairments, the claimant will be found
disabled. If he does not, the [Commissioner] must determine if the individual is
capable of performing his past relevant work considering his severe impairment. If
the [Commissioner] determines that the individual is not capable of performing his
past relevant work, then she must determine whether, considering the claimant's
age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity, he is capable
of performing other work which exists in the national economy.

Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583-84 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
The sequential analysis necessitates evaluation of every medical opinion in the case record.
20 C.F.R. 404.1527(b)-(c). When an ALJ is confronted with conflicting medical opinions, the
ALJ must decide whom to credit and "give some reason for discounting the evidence she rejects."

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). ALJ's consider a variety of factors to
determine the weight given to each medical opinion: (1) the examining relationship; (2) the
treatment relationship; (3) the supportability of the opinion; (4) the specialization of the treating
source; and (5) any other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion.

20 C.F.R.

404.1527(c)(l)-(6). The ALJ need not supply an exhaustive explanation for rejecting evidence or
according it little weight; "in most cases, a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice."

Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d. Cir. 1981). Opinions on some issues are not considered
medical opinions, however, because they infringe on the decision-making powers reserved to the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). It is the Commissioner's duty to review the evidence
and determine if a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. Id. (d)(l ). Statements by
a treating source that a claimant is "disabled" or "unable to work" are thus accorded little, if any,
weight. Id.
The court has distilled the dispute in this case to two main issues: 1) whether the ALJ's
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decision to discount the opinions of both Dr. McCrossan and Dr. Wilson was supported by
substantial evidence; and 2) whether the ALJ needed to afford Brown's testimony additional
weight because of her extensive work history. The court will proceed by analyzing each issue in
turn.

A. The Medical Opinions of Drs. McCrossan and Wilson
Brown argues that the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific reasons for discounting the
opinions of Dr. McCrossan and Dr. Wilson as required under 20 C.F.R. § -404.1527. (D.I. 12 at
5). According to Brown, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 requires that, if the ALJ's assessment conflicts
with the submitted medical opinions, the ALJ must explain why the medical opinions were not
adopted. Id. Brown argues, therefore, that the ALJ needed to explain in detail why the medical
opinions, such as Wilson's letter to the Wilmip.gton Housing Authority, were given the weight he
assigned.
Brown's argument is not consistent with the entirety of the statute; rather, Brown's
argument focuses on one particular section at the expense of the remaining sections. See id. at 511. Although 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) lists five factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a
medical opinion, the next section, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d), clarifies that statements proclaiming
disability or inability to work-opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner-will not
influence the ALJ's final determination. Wilson's letter to the Wilmington Housing Authority,
which diagnosed Brown as disabled, was reasonably classified as holding little weight. For similar
reasons, McCrossan' s medical conclusion that Brown's leg made her disabled was also reasonably
given little weight by the ALJ.
Brown also points to the ALJ's treatment of Wilson's medical form data, which was given
moderate weight, as evidence that the ALJ erred by not explaining in detail why his decision went

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against the recommendations made by Wilson. Tr. at 568-70. Though the ALJ wrote one sentence
on why he assigned Wilson's submission moderate weight, it sufficed to explain his reasoning.
The ALJ is not required to supply a comprehensive explanation for his rejection of evidence. See
Cotter, 650 F.2d at482. Instead, he is only required to do what he didhere: explain why he rejected

probative evidence in enough detail that the reviewing court can determine whether his reasons
were proper. Id. The ALJ explained that "Dr. Wilson's opinion is still excessively restrictive,
when considered in connection with the conservative treatment history and many normal objective
findings set forth above:" (D.I. 9-2 at 30). Brown's objective examinations revealed "normal
respiratory function, no knee effusion, stable bilateral knees, full knee range of motion, normal
lumbar range of motion, negative straight leg raising, normal motor function, normal strength,
normal sensation,_ normal reflexes, normal posture and gait, and norma] coordination." Id. at 30.
Further, Brown never underwent surgery nor did she receive a recommendation to do so in the
applicable period. Id. The court finds such an explanation sufficient for it to conclude that the
ALJ' s determination is supported by substantial evidence.
Brown also contends that the ALJ should have ordered a medical expert to testify if he
believed McCrossan's and Wilson's opinions were inconsistent with the underlying record. (D.I.
12 at 16). An ALJ is not required to call a medical expert to testify at a claimant's hearing before
coming to a decision; the regulations give the ALJ the discretion to call for a medical expert.
Miguel v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 129 F. App'x 678, 680 (3d Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.l529(b).

There are two exceptions to the ALJ's discretion regarding medical experts: (1) when no new
medical evidence is received but the ALJ believes a judgment of equivalence may be reasonable,
or (2) additional medical evidence is given to the ALJ, and the new evidence could change the
State agency's medical or psychological expert's original finding that the impairment is not

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equivalent to an impairment listed jnthe list of impairments. SSR 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34466-01
(July 2, 1996).4 In this case, the ALJ was not faced with either possibility, concluding "the clinical
signs and diagnostic findings clearly show that this impairment does not meet or medically equal
any of the entries in the Listing of Impairments:" (D.I. 9-2 at 29). Since the ALJ's conclusions
are supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err by not calling for a medical expert.
Jakubowski-v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 215 F. App'x 104, 107 (3d Cir. 2006).

Brown also contends that the ALJ should have contacted McCrossan and Wilson to resolve
any questions he had regarding their conclusions. (D.I. 12 at 16). Statutory regulations do.not
require an ALJ to contact a doctor if an· ambiguity exists; if the ALJ can make a determination
based on substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ does not need to contact a doctor for
clarifications. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(b), 416.920b(b).
Finally, Brown contends that the ALJ should have sent the entire record back to the State
agency, or to a medical expert for further review. (D.I. 12 at 16). Such action was not necessary
since the record was complete; the ALJ had a complete record in which to form a conclusion, and
his conclusion was based on substantial evidence within the record. See Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). As such, the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and
he did not abuse his discretion by not ordering a medical expert.
B. Brown's Work History
Brown also argues that the case should be remanded to allow for evidence of Brown's work
history to be admitted. According to Brown, "the ALJ is required to consider a claimant's excellent
work history:" (D.I. 12 at 18). Although case law has indicated that strong work history can play

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The regulations regarding the ALJ's discretion on medical experts have been revised since Brown's appeal was
filed. Although the court recognizes these changes have occurred, its decision will refer to and apply the regulations
as they were when the ALJ made his decision, and when Brown's appeal was filed.
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a role in the ALJ's decision, it only added to the claimant's credibility when substantial evidence
of a disability already existed. See, e.g., Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir.
1979) (holding that the claimant's long work history bolstered the credibility of her pain
allegations when the claimant's testimony was not contradicted by any medical evidence on
record).
In the instant case, it is unlikely that Browri' s work history would bolster -her testimony

because the ALJ noted clear discrepancies between the treating physicians' opinions and the
objective medical evidence. Further, it appears that the ALJ was aware of_Brown's work history,
yet it played no part in his consideration. See Tr. 51-52 ("I can see that you had a fairly steady
work history all the way until 2008 or so."). The court finds that the ALJ did not commit error by
failing to consider or credit such evidence. Even ifthe court were to conclude that the ALJ should
have explicitly considered Brown's long work history, case law has repeatedly held that failure to
do so does not require remand. See Salazar v. Colvin, No. CIV.A. 12-6170, 2014 WL 6633217,
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2014) ("The fact alone that claimant has a long work history does not require a
remand, particularly when medical evidence does not support a claimant's testimony of the extent
of her limitations."); Lee v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 12-0782, 2012 WL 4932019 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17,
2012); Miller v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 10-2247, 2012 WL 2500326 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2012).
Therefore, the court finds Brown's argument unpersuasive.
V.

CONCLUSION
The ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ provided ample

justification for the weight he accorded to Dr. McCrossan's and Dr. Wilson's medical opinions.
The ALJ was also not obligated to consider Brown's long work history, especially in the situation
where Brown's testimony clearly co:ri:flicted with objective medical evidence on the record. Thus,

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the court will grant the Commissioner's motion for
for summary judgment.

Dated: June

I

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'2017

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s~mmary judgment,

and deny Brown's motion