Hickman v. CBS Corporation et al

Filing 207

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS- re #150 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Please note that when filing Objections pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), briefing consists solely of the Objections (no longer than ten (10) pages) and the Response to the Objections (no longer than ten (10) pages). No further briefing shall be permitted with respect to objections without leave of the Court. Objections to R&R due by 12/27/2017. Signed by Judge Sherry R. Fallon on 12/12/2017. (lih)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION
GERALD L HICKMAN,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
.)
)
)
)
)

)

Civil Action No. 16-308-LPS-SRF

)
A. W. CHESTERTON COMP ANY, et aL, )
)
Defendants.
)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.

INTRODUCTlON
Presently before the court in this asbestos-related personal injury action is defendant Ford

Motor Company's ("Ford") motion for summaryjudgment. (D.I. 150) 1 For the reasons that
follow, the court recommends GRANTING-IN-PART and DENYING-IN-PART Ford's motion
for summary j-~dgment.

II.

BACKGROUND
· A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Gerald Hickman ("Plaintiff') filed this personal injury action against multiple

defendants on March 15, 2016, in the Superior Court of Delaware, asserting claims regarding his
alleged harmful exposure to asbestos. (D.I. 1, Ex1 1) On April 27, 2016, the case was removed
to this court by Defendant Crane Co. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(l), the federal officer·

1

All briefing associated with this motion can be found at D.L 162; D.I. 179; D.I. 195.

removal statue,2 and 1446. (D.L 1) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on September 12; ..
2016. On June 20, 2017, Ford filed the pending motion for summary judgment. (D.I. 150)

B. Facts
Plaintiff alleges he developed asbestosis and asbestos related pleural disease as a result of
exposure to asbestos-containing materials during his service in the Navy, 3 as well as from his
civilian work with automobiles. (D.I. 49 at ifif 4, 11, 15) Plaintiff contends he was injured due to
exposure to Defendants' asbestos-containing products. (Id. at if 13) Accordingly, Plaintiff
asserts claims for negligence, willful and wanton conduct, strict liability, and conspiracy. (Id. at
11-27)
Plaintiff was deposed on January 31 and February 1, 2017. (D.I. 98) Plaintiff did not
produce any other fact or product identification witnesses for deposition. 4 In relation to Ford,
Plaintiff alleges he experienced secondary exposure to asbestos from living in his family home
from 1946-1958 with his father, who owned and operated Hickman's Service Station. (D.I. 49 at

ifif 15, 16) During the summers and weekends from 1961to1963, Plaintiff worked for Hitchens
Chevron. (D.I. 162, Ex.Bat 73:21-22; 187:2-6) He spent half his time pumping gas, and also
performed oil changes or "lube jobs," assisted customers in the convenience store, and assisted
his uncle with brake work. (Id. at 187:11-189:9) While in the Navy and stationed in Norfolk in
1970, Plaintiff pumped gas part time at Wayson' s Exxon for "two or three'; seasons. (Id. at
2

The federal officer removal statute permits removal of a state court action: to federal court
when, inter alia, such action is brought against "[t]he United States or an agency thereof or any
officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof,
sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office." 28 U;S.C. §
1442(a)(l). ·
3
Because this Report and Recommendation only addresses Ford's motion for summary
judgment, the court will not provide a recitation of the facts in relation to Plaintiffs lengthy
naval career.
4
The deadline for completion of depositions of all co-worker, product identification, and other
exposure testimony witnesses was March 21, 2017. (D.I. 64 at 3-4)
2

107:23-108:3) He did not personally perform any brake work, but was around when mechanics
performed such jobs. (Id. at 107:18-22)
Finally, Plaintiff testified about performing personal automotive work on his first wife's
1970 Ford Mustang, which was new when purchased. (D.I. 179, Ex. A at 155:11-20; 156:19-20;
225:11.;.21) He rebuilt the engine, changed out the exhaust, replaced the valve cover, and
changed the brakes "three or four" times .. (D.I. 162, Ex.Bat 196:5-14)

L Plaintiff's Product Identification Evidence
Plaintiff is the sole product identification witness in this case and his deposition occurred
on January 31 and February 1, 2017. (D .I 149 at 5)
Plaintiff alleges he experienced secondary exposure to asbestos from living in his family
home from 1946-1958 with his father, who owned and operated Hickman's Service Station.
(D .I. 49 at ifif 15; 16) He testified that his father performed brake work on trucks and cars and
would use an air hose, which created dust. (D.I. 179, Ex. A at 217:5-10; 222:2-22) Plaintiff
identified Ford, as well as Mack, Chrysler, and Chevrolet, as among the brands of vehicles on
which his father performed work. (Id. at 217 :9-10) His father would return home in his unifortn,
where Plaintiff would "sometimes" hug his father, whose clothes "could have;' remained dusty
from vehicle servicing work. (Id. at 219:2-17) However, he did not know the maintenance
history of the vehicles serviced at Hickman's Service Station. (D.I. 162, Ex.Bat 186:8-15) He
also did not know the manufacturer of any parts removed or installed on any vehicle, including
Fords. (Id. at 186:16-187:1)
While Plaintiff worked for Hitchens Chevron from 1961 to 1963, he assisted his uncle
with brake work. (Id. at 187:11-189:9) He would clean up the dust after his uncle finished
removing and replacing brakes. (Id. at 189:3-9) He has a general recollection of assisting his

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uncle perform brake work on Fords, Chevrolets, and Chryslers. (Id. at 189:10-16) He did not
know the brand or manufacturer of any of the brakes that were removed or installed. (Id. at
190:17-23)
While working at Wayson's Exxon in 1970, Plaintiff was present when mechanics
performed brake work on vehicles. (Id. at 107:18-22) However, this work was "usually done
during the daytime,"· and Plaintiff only worked in the evenings. (Id. at 108 :6-10) On some
·occasions the mechanics continued their work into the night, and when this happened, Plaintiff
would help with the mechanic work or clean up afterwards. (Id. at 108:10-13) Plaintiff could
not recall the specific brands or manufacturers of brakes that were removed or installed. (Id. at
108:14-21)
Plaintiff also performed personal automotive work on his first wife's new 1970 Ford
Mustang from the time it was purchased. (D.I. 179, Ex. A at 155:11-13; 156:19-22) He rebuilt
the engine, changed out the exhaust, replaced the valve cover, and changed the brakes "three or
four" times. (D.I. 162, Ex.Bat 196:5-14) Plaintiff did not recall the brand name or
manufacturer of any of the brakes or gaskets he removed from the vehicle, nor the manufacturer
· of the brakes or gaskets he installed. (Id. at 199:2-6; 201:7-12; 201:20-202:3) Plaintiff first
testified that he did not know what work was performed on his wife's car prior to the time of
their marriage. (Id. at 196: 15-18) However, he later testified that his wife had not had the
brakes changed before he first changed them in 1973. (D.I. 179, Ex. A at 197:9-18)

III.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed:.

4

R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that could affect the 'outcome of the proceeding, and "a
dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
· to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuinely disputed
material fact See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321. The burden then shifts to the non-movant to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial, and the court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891F.2d458, 460-

61 (3d Cir. 1989); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). An assertion that a fact cannot
be-or, alternatively, is-genuinely disputed must be supported either by citing to "particular
parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by "showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A) &
(B). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586; see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005). The
"mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will hot defeat an othe1wise
properly supported motion for summary judgment;" a factual dispute is genuine only where "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nomnoving party."

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see
also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. If the noil-movant fails to make a sufficient showing on an

essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof, then the movant is entitled to ·
judgment as a f!latter oflaw. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Delaware Law

The parties do not dispute that Delaware law applies to all land based claims. (D.I. 129)
Under Delaware law, a plaintiff asserting a claim for asbestos-related injmies must introduce
evidence showing a product nexus between his exposure to a defendant's product and his
asbestos-related injuries. Cain v. Green Tweed & Co., 832 A.2d 737, 741(Del.2003) (citing Jn
re Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d 1116, 1117 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Nicolet, Inc. v.
Nutt, 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987)).

Delaware courts have not followed the "frequency, proximity, and regula1ity" test, 5 first
set forth inLohnnann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986), which has
been adopted as the test in numerous jurisdictions. Happel v. Anchor Packing Co., 2010 WL
7699063, at* 1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2010). Delaware courts simply require a plaintiff show that he
was in proximity to the product at the time it was being used. Nutt v. A . C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d
690, 692 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986). Plaintiff must show "that the asbestos product was used in an
area where the plaintiff frequented, walked by, or worked adjacent to, with the result that fibers
emanating from the use of the product would have been present in the area whete the plaintiff

5

The court, in Lohnnann, stated that to support a reasonable inference of substantial causation
from circumstantial evidence, there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a
regular basis over some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually
worked. Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162-63. The test for substantial factor causation found in
Lindstrom appears to be consistent with.this "frequency, regularity, proximity" test.

6

worked." Cain, 832 A.2d at 741. "Implicit within this product nexus standard is the requirement
that the particular defendant's product t? which the plaintiff alleges exposure must be susceptible
to releasing fibers which are capable of ingestion or respiration into the plaintiffs body." In re
Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 1651968, at * 19 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2007), as corrected (Jtine
25, 2007) (quoting Merganthaler v. Asbestos C01p. ofAmerica, 1988 WL 116405 at *1"'"2 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1988)).
This standard, known as the "product nexus standard," is meant to ensure that the
plaintiff presents "a factual connection in space and time between a particular plaintiff and a
particular defendant's product." Id. Delaware courts have held that a plaintiff can survive
summary judgment if there is testimony that asbestos-containing products were used at a
worksite dming the time plaintiff was employed there. Happel, 2010 WL 7699063, at *1.
However, it is insufficient to overcome summary judgment if the "time and place" testimony is
based on speculation or conjecture. Id. (citing In re: Asbestos Litigation, 509 A.2d at 1117-18).

IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Negligence Claim
L Plaintiff's Exposure to a Ford Asbestos-Containing Product
The court should deny-in-part Ford's motion for summary judgment with respect to

Ford's liability for Plaintiffs injuries allegedly caused by asbestos-containing brakes. Plaintiff
has presented sufficient evidence that Ford supplied original asbestos-containing brakes; and that
Plaintiff was exposed to this asbestos when he p~rformed personal automotive work on his first
wife's new 1970 Ford Mustang.
Bernhardt v. Ford Motor Co. is persuasive authority to reject Plaintiffs general and
conclusory testimony with respect to exposure he relates to working in service stations in some

7

proximity to his uncle and father who performed maintenance, including brake maintenance, on,

inter alia, Ford vehicles. 2010 WL 3005580, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 30, 2010). In
Berhnhardt, the court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff failed to
specify the vehicles he worked on, or whether the brakes he replaced were original to the
vehicles. Id. at *l. In the case at bar, Plaintiff identified Ford as a type of vehicle serviced at,
both Hickman's Service Station and Hitchens Chevron, but he could not recall specifically what
model or type of Ford vehicle he encountered. (D.I. 179, Ex. A at 217:9-10; D.I. 162, Ex.Bat
189:10-16) Plaintiff did not know the maintenance history of the vehicles serviced, nor did he
know the manufacturer of any parts removed or installed on any vehicle. (D.I. 162, Ex. B at
108:14-21; 186:8-15; 186:16-187:1; 190:17-23) As such, there is a foundation lacking to create
a material issue of fact as to when, how, and to what manufacturer's asbestos-containing product
Plaintiff was allegedly exposed.
However, unlike in Bernhardt, Plaintiff testified that he perfom1ed all of the maintenance
work on his first wife's 1970 Ford Mustang, which was new when purchased. (D.I. 179, Ex. A
at 155:11-13; 156:19-20) He rebuilt the engine, changed out the exhaust, replaced the valve
cover, and replaced the brakes "three or four" times. (D.I. 162, Ex.Bat 196:5-14) He testified
that he first replaced the brakes in 1973, and that his wife had not had the brakes replaced before
this time, meaning he removed and replaced the original brakes. (Id. at 197:9-18) Ford has not
addressed this specific testimony in its briefs, other than a general denial that Plaintiff was in
contact with an original, factory-installed Ford asbestos-containing part. (See D.I. 162; D.I. 195)
While Ford appears to dismiss the testimony as self-serving and inconsistent with other parts of
Plaintiffs testimony, the court finds it is based on Plaintiffs first-hand experience on a particular

8

vehicle and is sufficient to create an issue of fact on product nexus, precluding summary
judgment.
Moreover, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to
Ford's knowledge that its brakes contained asbestos. Mark Taylor, Ford's corporate
representative, testified at a deposition in 2012 that from 1950 through the 1970s, all of Ford's
cars had asbestos-containing brakes. (D.I. 179, Ex.Bat 32:14-24) Ford did not begin its phaseout of asbestos-containing brake products from its vehicles until the "1983 model year Ranger
vehicle, although celiain other vehicle applications, such as those used in emergency vehicles,
did not use asbestos prior to this date.'; (D.1. 179, Ex. F at Ans. to Interrogatory No. 4) Mr.
Taylor testified that, as such, "every single car through .1984 had asbestos at least in the drum
brakes," and "was designed by Ford to have asbestos brakes ... in order to meet the performance
characteristics as outlined by Ford ':lnd not have noise or any other performance issues." (D.1.
179, Ex. C at 147:10-148: 10) Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury or fact finder
could find that Ford supplied the original, asbestos-containing brake·s to which Plaintiff was
exposed, which raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Ford's liability for
Plaintiffs injuries.
Because.Plaintiff has established product nexus, the court should deny-in-part Ford's
motion for summary judgment with respect to Ford's liability for Plaintiffs injuries allegedly
caused by asbestos-containing brakes.
2. Ford's Duty to Warn
The couli should deny-in-part Ford's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Ford's duty to warn.
Plaintiff argues that under Delaware law, Ford· had a duty to warn about the dangers of

9

asbestos in its automobiles. (D.I. 179 at 13) First, under Delaware law, Ford does not hav~ a
duty to warn of the hazards of asbestos incorporated in component parts manufactured by
different companies. Bernhardt, 2010 WL 3005580, at *2 ("The Court d[oes] not hold Ford to
an understanding of another manufacturer's asbestos-containing products."); Wilkerson v. Am.
~

.

Honda Motor Co., Inc., 2008 WL 162522, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2008) ("The duty to warn
does not 'require a manufacturer to study and analyze the products of others and to warn users of
risks of products."'); Angelini v. Abell-Howe Co., 1991WL215720, at *5 (Del. Super. Oct. 4,
1991) ("[A] manufacturer has no duty to warn about dangers associated with the use of another
manufacturer's products, even when those products may be used in conjunction with the
manufacturer's own [products]."). In Bernhardt, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of Ford, rejecting the plaintiff's argument based on foreseeable harm. Id. The plaintiff
unsuccessfully argued that Ford knew or should have foreseen the need for replacement of the
brakes in its originally manufactured vehicles with asbestos-containing brake components
manufactured by other companies. Id. Because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any evidence
of exposure to an original Ford part and establish product nexus, the court found that the
foreseeability of harm was too "attenuated" to hold Ford liable for the plaintiff's alleged asbestos
related injuries. Id.
However, there is a duty to warn based upon the characteristics of the manufacturer's
own product, and any necessary warning must be tailored to the risks associated with the
reasonably anticipated use of the manufacturer's own product. Bernhardt, 2010 WL 3005580, at
*2; Wilkerson, 2008 WL 162522, at *2. And unlike in Bernhardt, the record at bar provides
evidence of asbestos exposure due to an original Ford part. Plaintiff performed all of the
maintenance work on his first wife's 1970 Ford Mustang, which was new when purchased. (D.I.

10

179, Ex. A at 155:11-13; 156:19-20) The maintenance work included removing and installing
brakes, which Ford knew contained asbestos. (D.I. 162, Ex.Bat 196:5-14) Therefore, the
foreseeability of harm is not too "attenuated" to hold Ford liable for Plaintiffs alleged asbestos
related injuries. Plaintiff has presented testimony based on his first-hand exposure to a particular
Ford vehicle that is sufficient to create an issue of fact on the duty to warn of foreseeable harm,
precluding summary judgment.
Therefore, the court should deny-in-part Ford's motion for summary judgment with
respect to Ford's duty to warn.

B. Willful and Wanton Claim
Ford's motion for summary judgment should be granted-in-part with respect to Plaintiffs
punitive damages claim. In Count VI of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges

For~,

and other

defendants, acted "willfully and wantonly, for their own economic gain and with reckless
indifference to the health and safety of Plaintiff Gerald L. Hickman" in including asbestos in
their products and failing to warn of the associated hazards. (D.I. 49

at~

31)

Punitive damages are limited to situations where "a defendant's conduct is 'outrageous,'
owing to 'gross negligence,' 'willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the-rights of others,'
or behavior even more deplorable." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008)
(internal citations omitted). "Punitive damages are not intended to compensate the plaintiff for a
loss suffered, but instead are 'imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.'" In re
Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 2014 WL 3353044, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014) (quoting
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)).

Plaintiff fails to produce any evidence to show that Ford's conduct was willful, wanton,

11

or reckless. 6 Therefore, the court should grant-in-part Ford's motion for summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiff's punitive damages claim.

C. Strict Liability Claim
The court should grant-in-part Ford's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Plaintiffs strict liability claim. Since the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Cline v.
Prowler Industries ofMaryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980), Delaware courts have refused to
extend strict liability to cases involving the sale of a product even where it is alleged that the
product is inherently dangerous. See Bell v. Celotex Corp., 1988 WL 7623 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan.
19, 1988); Hammond by Hammond v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 565 A.2d 558 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1989). In Bell, the court refused to apply _a strict liability action because it found that the sale
of asbestos products was not an abnormally dangerous activity, and that Delaware cases reject
the concept of strict liability in the realm of sales. Bell, 1988 WL 7623, at *3; see also Johnson
v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. 1980) ("The doctrjne of strict liability has been
pre-empted in this State in sales cases by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.").
Moreover, Plaintiff failed to set forth any legal argument in response to Ford's motion for
summary judgment as to the strict liability claim. Therefore, the court should grant-in-part
Ford's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's strict liability claim.

D. Conspiracy Claim
Ford's motion for summary judgment should be granted-in-part with respect to Plaintiff's
conspiracy claim. In Count VIII of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges Ford, and other defendants,
"knowingly and willfully conspired among themselves to perpetuate the actions and omissions
6

As to Ford's alleged willful and wanton conduct, Plaintiff fails to raise any factual argument in
his answering brief. (See D.I. 179 at 17) Instead, Plaintiff only responds with a single
conclusory sentence citing to a Delaware Superior Court Proceeding Worksheet wherein the
court denied Ford's motion for summary judgment on punitive damages. (D.I. 179, Ex. CC)
12

referred to herein, as well as aided and abetted their co-defendants . . . in keeping the Plaintiff
Gerald L. Hickman ... ignorant of the risks [he] faced when exposed to asbestos and asbestoscontaining products knowing that [he] would not discover or realize the danger or would fail to
protect [himself] against it." (D.I. 49 at if 48)
Civil conspiracy requires the combination of two or more persons for an unlawful
purpose or for the accomplishment of a lawful purpose by unlawful means, which conspiracy
results in damages. Nutt, 517 A.2d at 694 (internalcitations omitted). Civil conspiracy is not an
independent cause of action in Delaware, but requires an underlying wrong which would be
actionable absent the conspiracy. See Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 560 F. Supp.
1372, 1388 (D. Del. 1983); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F. Supp. 749, 752 (D. Del. 1978),
a.ff'd, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1979). With regard to asbestos litigation, the court found in Nutt
that a conspiracy claim is stated if it is alleged that an asbestos company agreed with other
asbestos companies to suppress knowledge of the dangers of asbestos; and pursuant to this
conspiracy, the companies intentionally marketed their asbestos products without effective
warnings; and that the plaintiffs were injured by such products of at least one of the conspirators.
517 A.2d at 695.
Plaintiff failed to set forth any legal argument in response to Ford's motion for summary
judgment as to the conspiracy claim. (See D.I. 179) As such, Plaintiff has not produced any
evidence regarding Ford's agreement with other defendants to suppress knowledge of the
dangers of asbestos, or that they intentionally marketed their asbestos products without effective
warnings. Nutt, 517 A.2d at 695. Therefore, the court should grant-in-part Ford's motion for
summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs conspiracy claim.

V.

CONCLUSION

13

For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends GRANTING-IN-PART and
DENYING-IN-PART Ford's motion for summary judgment. (D.I. 150)
This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B), Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(l), and D. Del. LR 72.1. The parties may serve and file specific written objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objection and responses to the objections are limited to ten (10) pages ·

each. The failure of a party to object to legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de
novo review in the District Court. See Sincavage v. Barnhart, 171 F. App'x 924, 925 n.1 (3d Cir.
2006); Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987).
The parties are directed to the court's Standing Order For Objections Filed Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72, dated October 9, 2013, a copy of which is available on the court's website,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov.
Dated: December \ i

, 201 7

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