Julius Cephas et al v. International Longshoremen's Association et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM ORDER Denying 33 MOTION to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 3/1/2017. (nms)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE JULIUS CEPHAS, PAUL CUTLER, EMMETT FOSTER, and SALLY CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. No. 16-cv-316 (RGA) INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, HAROLD J. DAGGETT, WILLIAM AsHE, JR., and BRIAN WITIW, Defendant. MEMORANDUM ORDER Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint charging them with improperly imposing a trusteeship on Local 1649-1 and disciplining Plaintiffs without proper notice and without a fair hearing. As a threshold matter, I will not review the hearing transcript because it is not appropriate material for a 12(b)(6) motion. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may consider "the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim." Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 nt. 3 (3rd Cir. 2004). A court that considers other documents converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3rd Cir. 1997). Relevant here, "a court that examines a transcript of a prior proceeding to find facts converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp., 181 F.3d 410, 427 nt. 7 (3rd Cir. 1999); see also Matthews v. Postmaster Gen., 1999 WL 232013, at *3 (D. N.J. Apr. 12, 1999) (converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because of reliance on documents including a hearing transcript). I decline to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment at this stage and thus will not consider the hearing transcript. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count I is DENIED. Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to raise a plausible claim that the Executive Council lacked a proper purpose when imposing the trusteeship. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II is DENIED. Plaintiffs' allegations, when considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, are sufficient to raise a plausible claim at least that they were effectively denied cross-examination and thus deprived of a fair hearing. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count III is DENIED. Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to raise a plausible claim that Plaintiff Cephas was not given adequate notice that he would be barred from running for office and thus that the Executive Council violated 28 U.S.C. ยง 411(a)(5). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count IV is DENIED. Because Plaintiffs' allegations otherwise state plausible claims that the Executive Council acted impermissibly, Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to raise a plausible claim that 2 i i I ! I I I I the Executive Council violated its own Constitution in imposing the trusteeship and other punishment against Plaintiffs. IT IS SO ORDERED this_) day of March 2017. United States 3

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