Tucker v. Carlin et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 2/27/17. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
LYNELLB. TUCKER,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 16-3S2-LPS

v.

FRANCIS CARLIN, et al.,
Defendants.

Lynell B. Tucker, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

February 27, 2017
Wilmington, Delaware

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Lynell B. Tucker ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, alleging

violations of his constitutional rights.! (OJ. 6) Plaintiff is incarcerated at the James 1'. Vaughn
Correctional Center (''VCC'') in Smyrna, Delaware. He appears pro se and has been granted leave to
proceed informa pauperis. (OJ. 8) Plaintiff filed a motion for injunctive relief and a request for
counsel when he commenced this action. (O.r. 1, 2)

recently filed a combined motion for an

expedited review or request for counsel and request for injunctive relief. (OJ. 17) The Court
proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(a).

II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff suffers from mental health issues. He alleges that upon his transfer to the VCC, he

was prescribed non-psychotropic medication, was placed in solitary confinement despite his
extensive mental health history, and his medications were discontinued. He also alleges that
Defendant Dr. John ("Dr. Doe") prescribed medication to which he was allergic, despite his medical
records noting the allergy. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Doe prescribed the medication without
understanding or comprehending that the medication he had taken in the past had caused the
allergic reaction. He alleges that he was given the medication, suffered a reaction which resulted in
priapism, and was left in a medical emergency situation for more than 17 hours before receiving
treatment.
Medical was informed of Plaintiffs condition by correctional officers. Plaintiff was
ultimately seen by medical personnel and by Defendant nurse practitioner Bernard Addogoh

lPursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a
federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. See
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1

("Addogoh")

when he came on shift

before Defendant was taken to the emergency room.

Plaintiff alleges that he is not provided appropriate mental health treatment. He seeks injunctive
relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of

28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cit. 2013); see also 28 U.s.C § 1915(e)(2) (injorma

pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County ifAllegherty, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cit. 2008);

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally
construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

W'i'jliams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court
may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a
"clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wi/son

v. Mckmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cit. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d
Cit. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to
give it back).

2

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscherv.lvlcCuifough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cit. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U .S.c. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant a
plaintiffleave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grcryson

v. Mqyview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cit. 2002).
A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes
that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entidement to relief." BelIAt!. Corp. v. Twomb!y, 550
U.S. 544,

(2007). Though "detailed factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must do

more than simply provide "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action." Davis if. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cit. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See William.r v. BASF Catalysts llC, 765 F.3d 306,
315 (3d Cit. 2014) (citingAshcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and TwomblY, 550 U.S. at 570).
Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See

Johnson v.

rif Shel~y, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346,347 (2014).

A complaint may not dismissed for

imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See zd. at 346.
Under the pleading regime established by Twombfy and Iqbal, a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are

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not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausihly give rise to an
entitlement to relief. See ConnellY v. Lane Const. Cop., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). Elements are
sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausihle will be a
"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Id.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A.

Personal Involvement

Francis Carlin ("Carlin"), the statewide director of mental health for Connections, and Kathy
D. McKay ("McKay"), the director of Connections, CSP are named as defendants, apparently based
upon their supervisory positions. As is well-established, supervisory liahility cannot he imposed
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.2 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Monell v. Department ojSocial

Seroices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); RiZZo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). "'A[n individual government]
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability
cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.'" Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d
347,353 (3d

2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Purpose

rather than knowledge is required to impose liability on an official charged with violations arising

2In Iqbal, the plaintiff alleged supervisory officials violated his rights because one official was
the "principal architect" of the policy, and another was "implemental" in adoption and execution of
the policy. See 556 U.S. at 669. The Supreme Court found the allegations facially insufficient. See id.
at 676 (quoting Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888), for proposition that "[a] puhlic officer
or agent is not responsihle for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or
negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed
by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties").

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from his or her superintendent responsibilities. 3 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "Absent vicarious liability,
each Government official, his or her tide notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct." Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff does not associate any of his allegations with Carlin or McI<ay
and, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Tberefore, the claims against
Carlin and McKay will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(I).
However, since it appears plausible that Plaintiff may be able to articulate a claim against the
defendants (or name alternative defendants), he will be given an opportunity to amend his pleading.

See O'J)dl v. United States Gov't, 256

App'x 444 (3d Cir. Dec. 6,2007) (stating leave to amend is

proper where plaintiffs claims do not appear "patendy meridess and beyond all hope of
redemption") .

B.

Medical

The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. See Estel/e

1).

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05

(1976). However, in order to set forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (i) a serious medical
need and (n) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.

See id. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cit. 1999). A prison official is deliberately
indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take
reasonable steps to avoid the harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official
may manifest deliberate indifference by "intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care."

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.

3In light of Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of personal knowledge, with nothing more,
provides a sufficient basis to impose liability upon a supervisory official. See Bqyer v. Monroe Cn(y.
Children and Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cit. 2009).

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An inmate's claims against members of a prison medical department are not viable under
§ 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but believes that more should be done by way of
diagnosis and treatment, where the inmate maintains that options available to medical personnel
were not pursued on the inmate's behalf. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Moreover, allegations of
medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation. See White v. Napoleon,
897 F.2d 103,108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Daniels v. Wiliiams, 474 U.S. 327,332­
34 (1986) (negligence is not compensable as Constitutional deprivation). Finally, "mere
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment" is insufficient to state a constitutional violation.

See Spmill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
when reading the Complaint in the most favorable light to Plaintiff, it fails to state an
actionable constitutional claim against Dr. Doe and Addogoh for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical

Rather, the claims sound in negligence and, therefore, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted under § 1983. The claims against Dr. Doe and Addogoh will be
dismissed pursuant to 28 V.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). However, since it appears
plausible that Plaintiff may be able to articulate a claim against the defendants (or name alternative
defendants), he will be given an opportunity to amend his pleading.

C.

Motion for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in form of removal from his current housing assignment and
housing in the correct place/treatment facility for appropriate treatment, advocacy and protection.
He also

necessary mental health treatment and medical treatment. (D.I. 1)
A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only if (1) the

plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff;

G

(3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the
injunction is in the public interest." NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d
Cir. 1999). "[F]ailure to establish any element in [a plaintiff's] favor renders a preliminary injunction
inappropriate." NutraSweet II, 176 F.3d at 153. Because of the intractable problems of prison
administration, a request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with considerable
caution. See Abrabam v. DanbefJ!" 322 F. App'x 169, 170 (3d Cir. Apr. 24,2009) (citing Griff v. Harper,
60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995».
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff sought similar relief in Tucker v. Connections

Medical, Civ. No. 16-049-LPS. Therein, the Court ordered a response, reviewed it (see id. at D.l. 8)
and found that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that injunctive relief was appropriate. The same is
true in the instant case. Notably, it was represented to the Court that Plaintiff receives ongoing
mental health care. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion without prejudice.

D.

Request for Counsel

Plaintiff proceeds pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and requests
counsel. The Court determines that it is appropriate to encourage legal representation for Plaintiff
by an attorney in this case. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff's request for counseL (D.I. 2)

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) deny the motion for injunctive relief without

prejudice (D.I. 1); grant the request for counsel (D.I. 2); (3) deny as moot the combined motion for
an expedited review or request for counsel and request for injunctive relief (D.I. 17); and (3) dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 USc.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), with leave to amend upon acceptance of the matter for
representation by a member of the Federal Civil PaneL An appropriate Order follows.

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