Brown v. Delaware Department of Labor et al.
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 10/26/2016. (nmg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
DEVON ANTHONY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
: Civil Action No. 16-624-RGA
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, et aI.,
Defendants.
Devon Anthony Brown, New Castle, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
October ?1" , 2016
Wilmington, Delaware
AN~~.~ge:
Plaintiff Devon Anthony Brown filed this action on July 22, 2016. He appears pro
se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (0.1.4). The Court
proceeds to review and screen the complaint and amended complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (See 0.1. 1,5).
INTRODUCTION
According to Plaintiff's complaint (0.1. 2), which was filed in this Court on July 22,
2016, the following has occurred.
On May 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed with the Delaware Department of labor, Office of
Industrial Affairs a charge of discrimination against his employer. He did this by
submitting an anti-discrimination intake questionnaire. On May 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed a
complaint against a Delaware Department of labor ("DDOl") employee, which, in
essence, seems to have been for rudeness. Plaintiff was told via email that there would
be a thorough investigation of his complaint. He alleges nothing further has been
received regarding this complaint.
"During the week of June 14,2016," Plaintiff hand delivered a written complaint
to Defendant DDOL. It is not crystal clear what this complaint was about, although it
seems to have been a "complaint against the office of Industrial Affairs," and to refer to
the events of June 14, 2016. He alleges that, despite numerous telephone calls made
to various individuals, Defendant Patrice Gilliam Johnson and her staff did not respond
to the complaint and they have "shunned their responsibility by not responding or taking
any action."
Plaintiff explains that when he arrived for an appointment on June 14, 2016, to
finalize the charge of discrimination against his employer, he discovered that the intake
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questionnaire did not contain correct information. Plaintiff pointed out the mistakes to
Defendant Brenda Sands, an Industrial Affairs representative. Sands asked Plaintiff to
write the "brief statement of allegation" for her and her office and Plaintiff responded that
he had already provided the necessary information, that there was no indication he was
required to make an additional statement, and that he would need time to think about
what additional statement he would make. Sands left the office and returned with her
supervisor, Defendant Daniel McGannon.
McGannon requested that Plaintiff write an additional statement. McGannon
advised Plaintiff to change the charge of discrimination from retaliation to race
discrimination and told Plaintiff that the DDOL "may, or may not be the correct
jurisdictional place for [the] charge to be filed." (0.1. 2 at 11). Plaintiff, Sands, and
McGannon discussed the matter while the DDOL's security officer (named as a
defendant) paced the office corridor and peered into Sands' office.
On June 20, 2016, Plaintiff returned to the DDOL to finalize the charge of
discrimination against his employer and spoke to the DDOL security officer who
gestured for Plaintiff to come to him. The security officer's actions made him
uncomfortable. The security officer "shadowed" Plaintiff to his meeting with Sands.
When Plaintiff met with Sands, he advised her that he had filed a complaint against her,
her supervisor, and her office requesting different Industrial Affairs representatives.
Plaintiff stated that Johnson's assistant had promised him this. During this time, the
security officer arrived and sat inches away from Plaintiff, directly in front of him. The
security officer told Plaintiff that Sands and the Office of Industrial Affairs were drawing
up a document for Plaintiff to sign that permitted the security officer to sit inside the
office for the finalization of the charge of discrimination against Plaintiff's employer. The
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security officer clasped Plaintiff's hands and touched Plaintiff's right knee. Plaintiff
asked the security officer to "stop touching" him.
The security officer returned at a later time with the document for Plaintiff's
signature. The document stated that Plaintiff has requested the security officer's
presence. Plaintiff alleges the document was false, that he had not requested the
security officer's presence, and he was reluctant to sign the document. Plaintiff alleges
that the security office stated that, if Plaintiff refused to sign the document, he would not
be allowed to file the charge of discrimination against his employer. Sands returned to
the office with another document for Plaintiff's signature. That document "essentially
gave her and her office power of attorney over [his] charge of discrimination." (/d. at
12). The document stated that Sands, the DDOl and the Office of Industrial Affairs
could at any time after the finalization of charges against [Plaintiff's] employer change,
and edit the form entitled "Anti-Discrimination Questionnaire, and that [Plaintiff's] refusal
to sign was signifying [his] noncooperation, and would disallow [Plaintiff] from utilizing"
DDOloffices. (Id.) Plaintiff objected to the demands and Sands told him that he would
not be permitted to file a charge of discrimination against his employer, and that he
needed to file it with the EEOC.
Plaintiff asserts that the actions of Defendants harmed him because the DDOl
and its employees "dared [him] to react" after inappropriate touching and sexually
suggestive behavior by the security officer. He also alleges that he was denied the right
to use the Office of Industrial Affairs, DDOl for its intended purpose. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages and injunctive relief in the form of the charges against his
employer moving forward at DDOl, and by forbidding DDOl from disclosing
information.
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DISCUSSION
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F .3d 448, 452 (3d Cir.
2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d
Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). 8ecause Plaintiff proceeds pro
se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94.
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(i), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). The
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(8)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(8».
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the
Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be
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inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hasp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive
plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A
complaint may not dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory
supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346.
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the
plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane
Canst. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint "show" that
the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2».
Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
Liberally construing the complaint as the Court must, Plaintiff appears to raise
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 The Complaint raises what appear to be
110nfrivolous and cognizable procedural due process claims against McGannon, Sands,
When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person deprived him or
her of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color
of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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and Johnson for refusing to accept Plaintiff's charge of discrimination against his
employer. See, e.g., New York State Nat'! Org. for Women
V.
Pataki, 228 F. Supp. 2d
420,423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (procedural due process violated when intake rules
authorized personnel to refuse arbitrarily to accept the filing of valid discrimination
complaints). The Complaint also appears to raise a supplemental state law claim for
battery against DDOL security officer. See, e.g., Atamian v. Hawk, 842 A.2d 654, 660
(Del. Super. 2003) (to state a claim for assault and battery, a plaintiff must allege an
intentional, unpermitted contact upon the person of another which is harmful or
offensive).
The complaint names the State of Delaware and the DDOL as defendants. The
Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in
federal court regardless of the kind of relief sought. Pennhurst State School & Hasp.
V.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,100 (1984). "Absent a state's consent, the Eleventh
Amendment bars a civil rights suit in federal court that names the state as a defendant."
Laskaris V. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama
V.
Pugh, 438
U.S. 781 (1978». Delaware has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court;
although Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, it did not do so through
the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Brooks-McCollum
V.
Delaware, 213 F. App'x
92, 94 (3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claims against the State of
Delaware and the DDOL as they are immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915( e )(2)( B )(jji).
CONCLUSION
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For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) dismiss the State of Delaware and the
DDOL as they are immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); and
(2) allow Plaintiff to proceed against remaining Defendants Daniel McGannon, Brenda
Sands, Patrice Gilliam Johnson, and DDOL security officer.
An appropriate order will be entered.
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