Fields v. Department of Correction et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 12/2/2016. (lmm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

ISAIAH JAMAAL FIELDS,
Plaintiff,

v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
et aI.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. Action No. 16-629-GMS
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MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Isaiah Jamaal Fields ("Fields"), an inmate at the Sussex Correctional
Institution ("SCI"), Georgetown, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. 1 (D.I. 1.) Fields appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed informa
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915. (D.I. 6.) The court proceeds to review and screen the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(I).

I.

BACKGROUND
Fields injured his ankle/foot on February 1,2016. He was sent to medical and given

medication and ice for the ankle. Fields had severe pain. He presented for his chronic care
appointment on February 4,2016, and was seen by the defendant nurse practitioner Louise Ryan
("Ryan). He advised Ryan that he had pain and a burning sensation in his foot/ankle traveling up
his calf. Ryan conducted the normal chronic care examination and sent Fields back to his tier,
apparently without providing treatment for the ankle/foot condition.

IWhen bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988).

Fields continued to have pain and submitted sick call slips and medical grievances to
receive medical care. He also wrote to prison personnel regarding his severe pain and
discomfort. Fields was seen by the defendant nurse practitioner Chris Starr ("Starr") who
provided Fields a brace and pain medication for 30 days. There has been no follow-up. Fields
alleges that the brace has caused his condition to worsen and makes his ankle/foot burn even
more. He submitted another medical grievance asking for diagnostic testing and to be seen by an
outside medical provider.
Fields seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief in the form of
medical care.

II.

ST ANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions

of28 U.S.C. § 19l5(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (injormapauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with
respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true
and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County ojAllegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Fields
proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

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An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327­
28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court
must grant Fields leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A
plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See
Johnson v. City ofShelby, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346,347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed,
however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at
346.

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Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Canst. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir.
2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the
facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context­
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." [d.

III.

DISCUSSION
Fields raises medical needs claims. The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel

and unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical
care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-105 (1976), In order to set forth a cognizable claim,
an inmate must allege a serious medical need and acts or omissions by prison officials that
indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a
prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the
harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate
indifference by "intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care," Estelle, 429 U.S. at
104-05.

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However, "a prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment," so
long as the treatment provided is reasonable. Lasko v. Watts, 373 F. App'x 196,203 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-140 (2d Cir. 2000)). Moreover,
allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation. White
v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986) (negligence is not compensable as a Constitutional
deprivation). Finally, "mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment" is insufficient to
state a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted).
To the extent Fields raises medical negligence claims, they must be dismissed as
negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. As to Ryan, the allegations are
that he provided medical care to Fields, albeit not to Fields' liking. As such, the claims against
Ryan are frivolous and, again, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Therefore,
Ryan will be dismissed as a defendant.
The complaint also names Jane Does Nos. 1,2, and 3 as well as other Jane/John Does,
and Delaware Department ("DOC") Commissioner Robert Coupe ("Coupe") as defendants.
However, there are no allegations directed towards any of the foregoing defendants. "A[n
individual governmentJ defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.
Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, under the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a), Fields' claims against the Doe

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defendants and Coupe fail to allege facts that, if proven, would show personal involvement by
them. A civil rights complaint is adequately pled where it states the conduct, time, place, and
persons responsible. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Boykins v.

Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1980). The complaint fails to include any of
those elements with regard to the foregoing defendants. Therefore, the court will dismiss the
claims as frivolous.
Finally, the defendant DOC, an agency of the State of Delaware, is immune from suit.
The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal
court regardless of the kind of relief sought. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 100 (1984). "Absent a state's consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil rights suit
in federal court that names the state as a defendant." Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23,25
(3d Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). Delaware has not waived its
immunity from suit in federal court; although Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Brooks-McCollum v.

Delaware, 213 F. App'x 92, 94 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
Accordingly, the court will dismiss the claims against Starr, the DOC, Coupe, and the
Doe defendants, as the claims are frivolous and the DOC is immune from suit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii) and § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Fields may proceed against Connections
and Ryan.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will dismiss the medical negligence claims and all claims

against Starr, the DOC, Coupe, and the Doe defendants, as the claims are frivolous and the DOC

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is immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii) and § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Fields may proceed against Connections and Ryan.
An appropriate order will be entered.

_----.o<k'---"""-----'' -<-...:...--_, 2016
Wilmington, Delaware

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