Rider v. Green et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 01/28/2020. (mal)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JAMES DOUGLAS THOMAS RIDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER REA GREEN, et al.,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 16-997 (MN)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James D. T. Rider, Sussex Correctional Institution, Georgetown, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Carla Anne Kingery Jarosz, Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants Rea Green, Keshaw Travies, and Wayde
Campbell.
Dana Spring Monzo and Kelly Elizabeth Rowe, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware.
Counsel for Defendant Connections Community Support Program.
January 28, 2020
Wilmington, Delaware
NOREIKA, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff James D. T. Rider (“Plaintiff”), who appears pro se and was granted permission
to proceed in forma pauperis, is an inmate at the Sussex Correctional Institution (“SCI”) in
Georgetown, Delaware.
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
(“JTVCC”) in Smyrna, Delaware, when he commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
(D.I. 3).
Before the Court is Defendant Connections Community Support Program’s
(“Connections”) unopposed motion to dismiss.
I.
(D.I. 45).
BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges delay or denial of medical care in violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
(D.I. 3).
Plaintiff alleges that on November 16, 2014, he suffered
excessive force at the hands of correctional officers Defendants Rea Green (“Green”), Keshaw
Travies (“Travies”), and Wayde Campbell (“Campbell”).
seen by medical personnel and prescribed Motrin.
(Id. at 5).
(Id at 5, 14).
The next day Plaintiff was
Plaintiff was referred to a nurse
practitioner but did not see one until January 18, 2015, almost three months after he was injured.
(Id. at 14).
The nurse practitioner recommended an MRI consult for Plaintiff but, as of
February 24, 2015, it had not taken place. (Id.).
The medical grievance decision attached to the
Complaint indicates that Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel on several occasions between
December 19, 2014 and March 13, 2015 and, in March, physical therapy was ordered and Plaintiff
was taught range of motion exercises.
(Id. at 15).
On an unspecific date the MRI was performed
with the finding, “Your test result is not within normal limits.
Further studies are required and
you will be notified when a follow up apt is scheduled for you.”
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(Id. at 5).
Plaintiff alleges
When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state
law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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there was no follow-up and that he is “still in very bad pain.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages.
II.
SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff requested counsel in October 2016, and his requests were denied without prejudice
in March 2017. (See D.I. 5, 6, 13). He again sought counsel in December 2018, and the request
was denied in March 2019. (See D.I. 38, 43). On May 17, 2019, Connections filed its motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and its certificate of service alerted the Court that
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (“HRYCI”) in
Wilmington, Delaware.
(D.I. 47).
Mailings sent to Plaintiff at HRYCI were returned
“undeliverable” and, upon request by the Court, the Delaware Department of Correction provided
an address for Plaintiff at SCI. (D.I. 50).
On December 12, 2019, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not
be dismissed for his failure to prosecute, noting that he had not filed an opposition to the motion
to dismiss, had not updated his address with the Court, and that the last action he had taken
occurred in December 2018. (D.I. 51). Plaintiff responded that “things have been hard for him,”
he needs an attorney, and he had not been in touch with the Court because he was waiting for the
Court to provide him counsel. (D.I. 52). Plaintiff states that he still dealing with his physical
condition. The Court considers Plaintiff’s response and finds he has shown cause why the
Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
In reviewing a motion to dismiss filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept
all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading
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is liberally construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. A court may
consider the pleadings, public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint, and documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be granted only if, accepting the wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
complainant, a court concludes that those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to
relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
“Though ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required, a complaint must do more than
simply provide ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.’” Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). The Court is “not required to credit bald assertions or legal conclusions
improperly alleged in the complaint.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198,
216 (3d Cir. 2002). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, “for imperfect statement of the
legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
A complainant must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has “substantive
plausibility.” Id. at 347. That plausibility must be found on the face of the complaint. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the [complainant] pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [accused] is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679.
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IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Medical Needs
Connections seeks dismissal on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim for
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate
medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-105 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable
claim, an inmate must allege (i) a serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials
that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v.
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he
knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to
avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest
deliberate indifference by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 537 (3d Cir. 2017) (a
delay or denial of medical treatment claim must be approached differently than an adequacy of
care claim).
When a plaintiff relies upon a theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation liable,
he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference. Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d Cir. 1989); Miller v. Correctional Med. Sys., Inc., 802 F. Supp.
1126, 1132 (D. Del. 1992). To establish that Connections is directly liable for the alleged
constitutional violations, Plaintiff “must provide evidence that there was a relevant [Connections]
policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation[s] [plaintiff] allege[s].”
Natale v. Camden Cty. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (because respondeat superior or
vicarious liability cannot be a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a corporation under
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contract with the state cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under those
theories). Assuming the acts of a defendant’s employee have violated a person’s constitutional
rights, those acts may be deemed the result of a policy or custom of the entity for whom the
employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable under § 1983, where the inadequacy of
existing practice is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. See Natale, 318 F.3d at
584 (citations omitted).
“‘Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish . . . policy
with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy or edict.’” Miller v. Corr. Med.
Sys., Inc., 802 F. Supp. at 1132 (alteration in original) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that
a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so wellsettled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480;
Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Connections contends that the pleading is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. It
argues dismissal is appropriate because the “scant details” do not allege that Plaintiff requested
further care or that it specifically denied or delayed care. Connections also argues that the
allegations indicate Plaintiff received some treatment and Plaintiff does not point to specific
medical personnel actions. In addition, Connections argues that Plaintiff fails to establish that
Connections maintained a policy, practice, or custom that caused constitutional harm to Plaintiff.
As is well-established, the legal standard when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions is identical
to the standard used when screening a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C .§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
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standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The Court previously
reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations and found that he stated what appear to be cognizable and nonfrivolous § 1983 claims against Connections for delay or denial in providing him medical care for
serious medical needs. Nothing has changed since that ruling. Nonetheless, the Court has
revisited the allegations, liberally construed them, as it must, and finds that Plaintiff adequately
raises medical needs claims under the Eighth Amendment.
In addition, there is no dispute that Connections is responsible for inmate incarcerated
within the Delaware Department of Correction. It is alleged that Plaintiff has a serious medical
condition and that there was a delay in providing treatment to Plaintiff, and that delay continues to
date. Plaintiff is not required to recite the specific text or official policy. He must only place
Connections on notice as to its alleged improper conduct and the policy in place that created such
conduct.
Liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff adequately states a claim against
Connections. The Complaint pleads facts that indicate there was delay in providing Plaintiff
medical care despite its necessity which is sufficient to allege a custom or court of conduct by
Connections. While discovery may show that Connections acted properly, at this stage of the
litigation, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to proceed against it. Therefore, the Court will deny
the motion to dismiss claims raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Connections also seeks dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
Connections notes that Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding
medical care and obtaining an MRI. Connections argues, however, that the Complaint does not
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indicate that Plaintiff submitted a grievance seeking “post-MRI treatment,” and, therefore,
dismissal is appropriate.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, a prisoner must pursue all available
avenues for relief through the prison’s grievance system before bringing a federal civil rights
action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“[A]n inmate
must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative
avenues.”). Section 1997(e) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). The exhaustion
requirement is mandatory. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); Booth, 532 U.S.
at 742 (holding that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures
“regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures”).
An inmate must fully satisfy the administrative requirements of the inmate grievance
process before proceeding into federal court. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004);
see also Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F. App’x 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006) (providing that “there
appears to be unanimous circuit court consensus that a prisoner may not fulfill the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement by exhausting administrative remedies after the filing of the complaint in
federal court”). Courts have concluded that inmates who fail to fully, or timely, complete the
prison grievance process are barred from subsequently litigating claims in federal court. See e.g.,
Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); Bolla v. Strickland, 304 F. App’x 22 (3d Cir.
2008). Finally, the “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and
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prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff.” Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d
203, 207 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013)).
The Complaint alleges there was a grievance procedure available where Plaintiff was
housed, he filed a grievance, and the grievance process was completed. (D.I. 3 at 8). The face
of the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. There is nothing
before the Court to indicate otherwise. Connections’ position is not a basis for dismissal at the
pleading stage.
In light of the foregoing, the Court will deny Connections’ motion to dismiss for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, the Court will deny Connections’ motion to dismiss.
(D.I. 45).
An appropriate order will be entered.
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