Chang v. Strine et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 4/3/2018. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

WEIH STEVE CHANG,
Plaintiff,
V.

THE HON. LEO E. STRINE, JR.,
THE HON. JAMES T. VAUGHN, JR., and
THE STATE OF DELA WARE,
Defendants.

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C.A. No. 16-1050-GMS

MEMORANDUM
I.

INTRODUCTION
On November 14, 2016, the Plaintiff, Weih Steve Chang ("Plaintiff'), initiated this action

against The Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Honorable James T. Vaughn, Jr., and the State of
Delaware, ("Defendants") alleging what the court believes to be violations of the Equal Protection
Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 1.) 1 Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (D.1.
4.) The court will grant Defendants' Motion.

II.

BACKGROUND
On July 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

("RICO") Act action in the Superior Court of Delaware alleging sexual molestation by a judicial
officer on behalf of hundreds of alleged victims. (D.1. 1,

,r 2.) The RICO

action was bifurcated

from a civil action originally filed in the Court of Chancery of Delaware on October 22, 2017.

1
This case was originally before Judge Sue Robinson and, upon her retirement from judicial service, was
reassigned to this judge on August 2, 2017.

(D.I. 1, ,r,r 4-5.) The Chancery Court dismissed the action "primarily beC?ause Plaintiff is not an
attorney." Id. Plaintiff alleges that on October 21, 2016, Defendant Justice Vaughn "denied
Plaintiffs Petition [for legal representation] without performing the "Matthews Test" or the
"Tabron Test" and on November 6, 2016, Defendant Chief Justice Strine "ordered that Plaintiff
submit his opening brief by November 14, 2016, without legal representation." (D.I. 1, ,r,r 20-23.)

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal where the

plaintiff "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
considering a motion to dismiss, the court "accept[s] all factual allegations as true, construe[s] the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine[s] whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plainti:ff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,233 (3d Cir. 2008). A Plaintiffmust provide sufficient factual allegations
"to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). This requirement of plausibility is sc1;tisfied when "the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009).

IV.

DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs action arising from the Defendants' failure "to perform

the Matthews Test and/or the Tabron Test on Plaintiffs Petition for Court-Appointed Counsel[]"

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should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (D.I. 4); (D.I. 1, ,r 26.)2 _
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for at least
two reasons. (D.I. 4.) First, Defendants allege that the Complaint expressly acknowledges that
there is a pending state court appeal relating to Plaintiff's instant claim. Id. at 2. Second,
Defendants argue that the claims are otherwise barred by absolute judicial immunity and qualified
immunity. Jd. 3 The court agrees.

A. Immunity
To state a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff must show "(l) that the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the.
plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

2

Defendants ask the court to require that any dismissal include a provision requiring Plaintiff obtain leave of
court before filing further litigation against the State. (D.I. 4 at 3.) While Plaintiff has filed numerous actions against
the State, the court will decline to institute such requirement. It is well known that every litigant is entitled to their day
in court. The court, however, takes notice of the volume of cases Plaintiff has filed.
Initially, Plaintiff began filing cases involving a false claims action and claims relating to his child custody issues
but expanding to general claims regarding prosecution of crimes of child molestation. Chang v. Children's Advocacy
Center ofDelaware [CA<;], et. al., C.A. No. 15-442 SLR (D. Del.) (false claims action against CAC involving claim
that CAC does not use a mandated multi-disciplinary team approach when conducting child abuse investigation and
treatment; motions to di&miss and to amend the complaint pending); Chang v. Mayo, C.A. No. 15-901 SLR (sealed
complaint against State Family Court Commissioner Jennifer L. Mayo, alleging judicial misconduct; case voluntarily
dismissed after Plaintiff's request for a stay was denied); Chang v. State of Delaware, et al., C.A. No. 15-963 LPS
(seven count complaint against Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families, CAC, City
of Wilmington and others, relating to child custody issues; dismissed on 9/27/16, and appealed,pro se, on 10/27/16);
Chang v. Bradley, et al., C.A. No. 16-1008 SLR (claims against Delaware's Office of Management and Budget,
Pensions and Division of Revenue, asserting claims on behalf of alleged victims of child molestation and claiming
that the State agencies are improperly paying pension benefits to a former state judge; motion to dismiss to be filed);
Chang v. Children's Advocacy Center ofDelaware, Inc., C.A. No. 121632-VCS (Del. Ch.) (complaint purportedly on
behalf of child victims, alleging claims against numerous state officials, employees and state deputy attorneys general
regarding alleged deficiencies in protecting children; case dismissed for failure to state a claim and lack of standing;
appeal pending; opening brief overdue); Matter ofPet. ofChangfor Writ ofMandamus, 2016 WL 4382643 (Del. Aug.
18, 2016) (dismissing mandamus petition seeking arrest of former state judge); Chang v. Mayo, C.A. No. Nl5C-10100 EMD, 2016 WL 3640260 (Del. Super. June 28, 2016) (as in federal case 15-901, alleging claims against
Commissioner Mayo; dismissed due to absolute judicial immunity, lack of a private right of action, and sovereign
immunity); Matter of Pet. of Chang for Writ of Mandamus, 2016 WL 5899243 (Del. Aug. 18, 2016) (dismissing
second mandamus petition seeking arrest of former Judge Bradley).
3
The court recognizes the limited circumstances to which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies and, therefore,
addresses the motion on other grounds. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), overruled on other
grounds by D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (The doctrine "is confined to ... cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.").

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States." Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011 ). Plaintiff does not plead any conduct
relating to the State of Delaware in his Complaint and, therefore, the claim against the State is
frivolous and devoid of any merit. (D.I. 1.) Because there are no facts to support any·claim against
the State of Delaware, the court will grant Defendants' motion as to the State. 4
Next, Plaintiffs sole assertion against Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., and Justice James T.
Vaughn, Jr. is that they violated the Due Process Clause by "refusing to perform the Matthews
Test and/or the Tabron Test on Plaintiffs Petition for Court-appointed Counsel[]." (D.l. 1, ~ 26.) 5
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, and compensatory damages for the expenses accumulated during
litigation. (D.I. 1 at 5-6.)
Judicial officers are immune from damage suits arising out of their official duties. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he
took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of authority.... " Sparkman, 435 U.S.
at 356. Judicial immunity may only be overcome in limited circumstances when: (i) the challenged
actions were not taken in the judge's judicial capacity; or (ii) the challenged actions, "though
judicial in nature, were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Although the Supreme Court has held that a cause of action for injunctive
relief may be maintained against judicial officers or the federal government, see Larson v.
Domestic &Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), immunity principles still apply, and,

4

The court recognizes that the State is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment ofUnited States Constitution protects a nonconsenting
state or state agency from suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens, regardless of relief sought).
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The court believes the "Matthews Test" to which Plaintiff refers is the test to determine whether an individual
has received due process under the Constitution of the United States. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This
test is inapplicable here. Turning to the Tabron Test, "Section 1915(d) gives district courts broad discretion to request
an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant. Such litigants have no statutory right to appointed counsel" Tabron
v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997); Tabron v. Grace,
6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).

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except in very limited circumstances, judges are immune from suits for injunctive relief. See Rush

v. Wiseman, 2010 WL 1705299 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2010) Gudge's immunity from civil liability
can only be overcome for non-judicial actions and where actions of judicial nature are taken in the
"complete absence of all jurisdiction."); Klein v. U.S. Bank, 2010 WL 5018881 (M.D. Pa. Nov.
15, 2010). Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that "injunctive relief shall not be
granted" in an action brought against a judicial official for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(abrogating in part Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (holding judicial immunity is
not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judge acting in her judicial capacity)).
Here, Plaintiffs factual allegations are based solely on the judicial actions taken by Defendants.
While Plaintiff disagrees with the decision-making process, nothing in Plaintiffs complaint can be
interpreted as an allegation that any of the Defendants acted outside of their judicial functions or
in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Even if these rulings were in error or in excess of authority,
there is no plausible allegation that they were undertaken without appropriate jurisdiction. The
court will, therefore, grant Defendants' motion as to Defendants Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
and Justice James T. Vaughn, Jr.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss in full. (D.I.

4.)
Dated: April _l_, 2018

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