Cain v. State of Delaware et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 8/10/2018. (crb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
PAUL CAIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civ. No. 16-1073-LPS

STATE OF DELAWARE, et al.,
Defendants.

Paul Cain, Otero County Prison Facility, Chaparral, New Mexico, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

August 10, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Paul Cain (''Plaintiff'), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of his constitutional rights.1 (D .I. 1) Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Otero County Prison
Facility in Chaparral, New Mexico. He appears prose, and has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. (D.I. 6) The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(a).

II.

BACKGROUND
Kristy L. Wilson (''Wilson"), a non-party, filed a petition to modify custody of Plaintiffs

minor child from their joint custody to her sole custody. (D.I. 1) Plaintiff states that the custody
dispute began because he refused to sign permission for a passport for the minor child. The minor
child resides in Delaware. Plaintiff is a convicted sex offender, incarcerated in the State of New
Mexico. Plaintiff explains that he was recently charged with failing to register as a sex offender and
his parole was automatically revoked.
Plaintiff alleges that, with regard to the custody dispute, the laws of the State of Delaware
have placed him in an untenable position that makes it impossible for him to produce documents
required because the New Mexico Adult Parole Board is not allowed to disclose his files. Instead, a
court must request the records. On December 3, 2015, the Family Court of the State of Delaware in
and for Kent County granted Wilson sole legal and physical custody of the child. (D.I. 1 at Ex.
Order for Modification of Custody)

1

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a
federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. See
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

1

The order notes there is a rebuttable presumption against unsupervised visitation, custody or
residence of a child to a sex offender and that Plaintiff was not able to provide the necessary
evidence to overcome the presumption. The order further notes that Plaintiff is appealing his
conviction and, that if the conviction is overturned, the matter would be reviewed under the more
lenient standard for modification of custody under Delaware law. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his
parental rights were unconstitutionally severed. He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.

III.

LEGAL STAND ARDS
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (informa

pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a prose plaintiff. See Phillips v. Counry ofAlleghef!J, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds prose, his pleading is liberally
construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzk e v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court
may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is " based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a

2

"clearly baseless" or " fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wilson

v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to
give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscherv. McCulloitgh, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant a
plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grqyson

v. Mqyview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes
that those allegations " could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." BellAtL Corp. v. Twomb/y, 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though " detailed factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must do
more than simply provide "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action." Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF Cata/ysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306,
315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twomb/y, 550 U.S. at 570).
Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See

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Johnson v. Ciry of Shelby, _U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346,347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed for
imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346.
Under the pleading regime established by Twomb!J and Iqbal, a court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief. See Connel!J v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). Elements are
sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a
"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Id.

IV.

DISCU SSION
It is clear in reading the complaint that Plaintiffs claim revolves around his dissatisfaction

with the State Court's custody ruling. To the extent Plaintiff seeks review and rejection of the
Family Court's decision, the claim falls under the purview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and,
therefore, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction.2 In the alternative, to the extent the custody matter
is on appeal, remains pending in State court, and has not yet reached final resolution, the Court must
abstain by reason of the abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Hanis, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which
has been extended to civil cases and state administrative proceedings. See Middlesex Cnry. Ethics

2

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Rooker v.
Fideliry Tmst Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Cohtmbia Court ofA ppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983). Because the doctrine divests the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, it may be raised at any
time by the Court sua sponte. Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. Ciry of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411,419 (3d Cir. 2003);
Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2003).
4

Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Httjfman v. Pttrstte Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).

In addition, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this type of dispute in the first
instance. While the parties are diverse, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over cases involving
domestic relations. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); see also Magaziner v.

Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Domestic relations is a field peculiarly suited to state
regulation and control and peculiarly unsuited to control by federal courts.").
Based upon the foregoing, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction at least pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for want of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the domestic relations exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction and, in the alternative, will abstain under the Younger abstention doctrine.3
An appropriate Order follows.

3

Dismissal is also appropriate as the State of Delaware is immune from suit. See Pennhttrst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment protects states and
their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of kind of relief sought).
Delaware has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court; although Congress can abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See BrooksMcCollum v. Delaware, 213 F. App'x 92, 94 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2007). In addition, the complaint contains
no allegations directed towards the unknown Attorney General. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) ("A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the
operation of respondeat sttperior."). The Court notes that the Family Court order at issue indicates that
both parties proceeded pro se.

5