Shaw v. Pierce et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/23/18. (sar)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
OR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
GEORGE B. SHAW,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 17-076-LPS

v.

SGT. ROBERT MOCK,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff George B. Shaw ("Plaintiff") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of his constitutional rights. (D.I. 3) Plaintiff is incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center (''VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware. He appears pro se and has been granted leave to
proceed in for,na pauperis. (D.I. 6)

II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff recently filed a letter/motion for injunctive relief seeking mental health treatment.

(D.I. 13) His motion is unrelated to the claims raised in his Complaint. Defendant opposes the
motion. (D.I. 16)

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only if: (1) the

plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff;
(3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the
injunction is in the public interest." NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d
Cir. 1999) ("NutraSweet II"). The elements also apply to temporary restraining orders. See

NutriSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Ente,prises., Inc., 112 F.3d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1997) ("NutraSweet I") (stating

temporary restraining order continuing beyond time permissible under Rule 65 must be treated as
preliminary injunction and must conform to the standards applicable to preliminary injunctions).
"[F]ailure to establish any element in [a plaintiff's] favor renders a preliminary injunction
inappropriate." NutraSweet II, 176 F.3d at 153. Furthermore, because of the intractable problems of
prison administration, a request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with
considerable caution. See &sh v. Correctional Med. Services, Inc., 287 F. App'x 142, 144 (3d Cir. July 31,
2008) (citing Gojf v. Ha,per, 60 F.3d 518,520 (8th Cir. 1995)).

IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff states that he has serious mental health issues, and he is not being provided mental

health treatment. He seeks counseling and medication. Plaintiff wants to be in the mental health
program for maximum security inmates. He indicates that he is suicidal and has previously
attempted suicide.
In opposition to the motion, Defendant provides the declaration of Marc Richman, the
Bureau Chief for the Bureau of Correctional Health Care Services for the Delaware Department of
Correction, and also submits his mental health records. (D.I. 16 at Exs. A, B) The medical records
indicate that Plaintiff received and continues to receive mental health treatment though the DOC's
medical provider. He has been seen by several psychologists and had had numerous weekly visits
with clinicians. In addition, Plaintiff was placed in residential treatment centers after apparent
efforts to harm himself.
Dr. Richman indicates that Plaintiff is not a current residential treatment candidate due to
his propensity to display threatening behaviors and disobey orders. However, Plaintiff receives
regular consults from qualified mental health professionals. Dr. Richman indicates that on the day
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Plaintiff authored his motion, he demanded to see a mental health counselor, and he was seen. At
that time, the counselor determined there was no evidence of any acute emotional distress. Plaintiff
agreed to notify mental health in the event there was a risk of harm to himself or to others. Plaintiff
responds that Defendant's response is misleading, and explains that, while he sees a doctor every
other week, he does not get any treatment. (D.I. 18) Plaintiff wants to be returned to the treatment
center.
A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk
of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. See "J-<armer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by "intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, so long as the
treatment provided is reasonable, "a prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical
treatment." Lasko v. Watts, 373 F. App'x 196,203 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison v. Barklry, 219
F.3d 132, 138-40 (2d Cir. 2000)). An inmate's claims against members of a prison medical
department are not viable under § 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but believes that
more should be done by way of diagnosis and treatment and maintains that options available to
medical personnel were not pursued on the inmate's behalf. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107
(197 6). Finally, "mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment" is insufficient to state a
constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff's goal is to return to the treatment center. The evidence of record indicates that,
contrary to the position in his motion, mental health professionals are aware of Plaintiff's condition,
Plaintiff received and continues to receive mental health treatment, and his condition is regularly
monitored through consults by mental health professionals. In light of the foregoing, the Court

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finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated neither the likelihood of success on the merits, nor irreparable
harm to justify the issuance of immediate injunctive relief. Therefore, the motion will be denied.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will deny the motion for injunctive relief. (D.I. 13)
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: March 23, 2018.

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