Jones v. Recovery Innovations International

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION regarding 3 Complaint. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 6/1/2017. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
MATTHEW JONES,
Plaintiff,

v.

: Civil Action No. 17-396-RGA

RECOVERY INNOVATIONS
INTERNATIONAL,
Defendant.

Matthew Jones, Greenwood, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

June { , 2017
Wilmington, Delaware

Plaintiff Matthew Jones, who appears pro se and has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, filed this action in March 2017 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Recovery Innovations
International located in Ellendale, Delaware. 1 The matter was transferred to this Court
on April 11, 2017. (D.I. 4). Jones asserts jurisdiction by reason of a United States
government defendant, a federal question, and federal diversity. (D.I. 1-1 at 2). The
Court proceeds to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
BACKGROUND
Jones alleges that on January 31, 2017, after his mother called Recovery
innovations and the Delaware State Police arrived at their home, he was taken for a
psychiatric evaluation. He was arrested and held at the Seaford Nanticoke Hospital for
over 12 hours and transported to Recovery Innovations. Jones alleges that when the
hold expired, Nanticoke could find no reason to hold him, and Recovery Innovations
(who diagnosed Jones as schizophrenic) said a hold had been placed by the Delaware
State Police.
Jones was held at Recovery Innovations for approximately 24 hours. He alleges
that the food was spoiled and rancid with mold, and that he was seen by a "television
psychiatrist, long distance." (D.I. 1-1 at 3). From there, he was transferred to Dover
Behavioral Health. Jones alleges that from January 31 to February 1, 2017, there is a
"past history of vile persecution and citizen rights deprivation meant to immorally,
1

RI International is a global organization with four primary business units that offer
services in crisis, health, recovery, and consulting. See https://riinternational.com/
about-us/ (last visited May 23, 2017).

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illegally main, injure, kill the plaintiff, cause him to commit suicide." (D.I. 1-1 at 2). As
alleged in Jones v. Kent County Superior Court, Civ. A. No. 14-394-RGA, two court
hearings were held at the Kent County Superior Court while Jones was at Dover
Behavioral Health, Jones was unable to attend the hearings, and an order was entered
for him to continue treatment for schizophrenia, take medication, and see a psychiatrist.
Jones alleges numerous violations of federal criminal law, Delaware state law,
and amendments of the United States Constitution. (Id. at 4-7). He seeks two billion
dollars in damages.
DISCUSSION
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir.
2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a prose plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d
Cir. 2008).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(i), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).

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The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)).
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the
Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002).
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and, therefore, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
"Though 'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than
simply provide 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.'" Davis v. Abington Mem'I Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to
show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby,

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_U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed, however, for
imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346.
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court should follow a three-step
process: (1) consider the elements necessary to state a claim; (2) identify allegations
that are merely conclusions and therefore are not well-pleaded factual allegations; and
(3) accept any well-pleaded factual allegations as true and determine whether they
plausibly state a claim. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir.
2016); Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014). Deciding
whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009).
The allegations in the complaint are legally and factually frivolous. As pied, there
is no legal basis for Jones' claims. At most, Jones alleges that he was served inedible
food during his very short stay at Recovery Innovations. The Court finds the allegations
are conclusory and somewhat delusional. Based on the Court's experience, the
Complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e )(2)(B)(i).
To the extent Jones attempts to raise supplemental state claims, because the
Complaint fails to state federal claims, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
any supplemental state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; De Asencio v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003).

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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The Court finds amendment futile.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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