Alston v. Coons et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM ORDER re 14 MOTION for Recusal filed by EShed Alston is DENIED; 13 14 REQUESTS for Default as to K. Brady, Christopher A. Coons filed by EShed Alston are DENIED; Plaintiff is given an additional sixty (60) days to effect proper service. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/21/18. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ESHED ALSTON,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 17-551-LPS

V.

SENATOR CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
At Wilmington this 21 st day of September, 2018, having considered the pending motions

(D.I. 13, 14);
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiff's motion for recusal (D.I. 14) is DENIED;
(2) Plaintiff's requests for entry of default (D.I. 13, 14) are DENIED as premature; and (3) Plaintiff
is given and additional sixty (60) days to effect proper service.
1.

Introduction. Plaintiff EShed Alston ("Plaintiff'') seeks entries of default and

recusal of the undersigned.
2.

(D.I. 13, 14) He appears pro se and has paid the filing fee.

Recusal. Plaintiff appears to seek the undersigned Judge's recusal on the grounds

that the Court has not ruled on Plaintiff's motions in another case he has pending in this Court and
because there has been no entry of default in this case. Plaintiff also alleges "unlawful racial bias."

(D.I. 14)
3.

A judge is required to recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality

might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S .C. § 455 (a). The test for recusal under § 455 (a) is
whether a "reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned," In re Kensington Int'! Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir.
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2004), not only "whether a judge actually harbors bias against a party," United States v. Kennecfy, 682
F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012). Under § 455(b)(1), a judge is required to recuse himself "[w]here he
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party."
4.

Under either subsection, the bias necessary to require recusal generally "must stem

from a source outside of the official proceedings." Litek v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994);
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see also Seikridge v. United of Omaha Ufa Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating beliefs or
opinions which merit recusal must involve extrajudicial factor). Hence, "judicial rulings alone
almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
Similarly, claims of bias or partiality cannot be based on "expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, [or] even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even
after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at
courtroom administration -- even a stem and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom
administration -- remain immune." Id. at 555-56.
5.

It is evident in reading Plaintiff's motion that he takes exception to this Court's prior

rulings in other cases. This serves as one of his reasons for seeking recusal. He also makes
conclusory allegations, but provides no rational basis for his claims of alleged bias. A reasonable,
well-informed observer could not believe that the rulings were based on partiality, bias, or actual
prejudice by the undersigned Judge. Nor do the rulings demonstrate the Court acting in such
manner when ruling in the cases wherein Plaintiff is a party. After careful and deliberate
consideration, the undersigned Judge has concluded that the Court has no actual bias or prejudice
towards Plaintiff and that a reasonable, well-informed observer would not question the Court's
impartiality. In light of the foregoing standard and after considering Plaintiff's assertions, the
undersigned Judge concludes that there are no grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
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6.

Request for Default. Plaintiff seeks entry of default as to both Defendants.

Defendants oppose the motion on the grounds that proper service has not been effected and, in
particular, that there has been no service upon the United States Attorney of the District of
Delaware or the Attorney General of the United States, as is required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2) and
(3). The Court docket supports Defendants' position. Entry of default is inappropriate and
premature. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
7.

Service. To date, the parties have not been properly served. Given Plaintiffs prose

status, the Court exercises its discretion and gives Plaintiff additional time to effect service. See Bolry

v. Kqymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997). Plaintiff is given an additional sixty days to effect
service upon Defendants.

HONORABLE LEONARD P . STARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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