Ringgold v. Phelps et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 9/4/2020. (nmg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
KALIEF RINGGOLD,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
ROBERT MAY, Warden, and ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE,
Respondents 1.
RASHAUN MILLER,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
MARVIN MAILEY, Bureau Chief, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE,
Respondents. 2
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) C.A. No. 17-721 (MN)
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) C.A. No. 17-725 (MN)
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Warden Robert May replaced former Warden Dana Metzger, an original party to the case.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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Bureau Chief Marvin Mailey replaced former Bureau Chief James Elder, an original party
to the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
JOSE PEREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
KOLAWOLE AKINBAYO, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE,
Respondents. 3
JACOB SANTIAGO,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
KOLAWOLE AKINBAYO, Warden,
Community Corrections, and ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE,
Respondents.
DESMOND SCOTT,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
KOLAWOLE AKINBAYO, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.
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) C.A. No. 17-836 (MN)
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) C.A. No. 17-906 (MN)
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) C.A. No. 17-908 (MN)
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Warden Kolawole Akinbayo replaced former Warden Steven Wesley, an original party to
the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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ANDRE L. RAMSEY,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
ROBERT MAY, Warden, and ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE,
Respondents.
NAKEEM WATSON,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
KOLAWOLE AKINBAYO, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.
MAURICE WRIGHT,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
Delaware Department of Corrections,
KOLAWOLE AKINBAYO, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.
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) C.A. No. 17-976 (MN)
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) C.A. No. 17-1197 (MN)
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) C.A. No. 17-1198 (MN)
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
3
J. Brendan O’Neill and Nicole Marie Walker, Office of Defense Services for the State of Delaware,
Wilmington, Delaware.
Counsel for Petitioners Kalief Ringgold, Rashaun Miller, Jose Perez, Jacob Santiago,
Desmond Scott, Andre L. Ramsey, Nakeem Watson, and Maurice Wright.
Matthew C. Bloom, Kathryn Joy Garrison, and Carolyn Shelley Hake, Deputy Attorney Generals,
Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware.
Counsel for Respondents.
September 4, 2020
Wilmington, Delaware
4
NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending before the Court are eight separate but nearly-identical § 2254 Petitions. One
Petition is filed by each of the following: Kalief Ringgold (C.A. No. 17-721-MN); Rashaun Miller
(C.A. No. 17-725-MN); Jose Perez (C.A. No. 17-836-MN); Jacob Santiago (C.A. No. 17-906MN); Desmond Scott (C.A. No. 17-908-MN); Andre Ramsey (C.A. No. 17-976-MN); Nakeem
Watson (C.A. No. 17-1197-MN); and Maurice Wright (C.A. No. 17-1198-MN).
The eight Petitioners were convicted of drug-related offenses between 2010 and 2013.
Petitioner Miller’s conviction was the result of a stipulated bench trial, and the convictions for the
remaining seven Petitioners (Ringgold, Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey, Watson, and Wright) were
the result of guilty pleas. Starting in the spring of 2014, Delaware’s Office of Defense Services
(“ODS”) filed Rule 61 motions 4 in the Superior Court on behalf of the instant Petitioners asserting
the identical claim for relief arising from issues relating to an evidence scandal in the Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”), namely, that the OCME misconduct constituted
impeachment material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The seven Petitioners who
entered guilty pleas (Ringgold, Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey, Watson, and Wright) also argued
that their guilty pleas were rendered involuntary under Brady v. United States, 373 U.S. 742 (1970)
because the State failed to disclose evidence of OCME misconduct prior to the entry of their guilty
pleas. The ODS, which had filed Rule 61 motions on behalf of numerous other defendants
convicted of drug-related charges, chose Ringgold’s, Miller’s, and six others’ Rule 61 motions for
the Superior Court to decide (“Rule 61/OCME Test Case”). See State v. Miller, 2017 WL 1969780,
at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 11, 2017). Because the Rule 61 motions filed by the ODS in numerous
other cases were identical to those in the Rule 61/OCME Test Case, the parties agreed that the
4
A Rule 61 motion is a motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Delaware Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61.
1
Superior Court’s decision in the Rule 61/OCME Test Case would resolve many of the remaining
outstanding Rule 61 motions pending before the Superior Court (including the Rule 61 motions
for the other six Petitioners here: Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey, Watson, and Wright). Id. The
Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motions in the Rule 61/OCME Test Case on May 11, 2017, Id.,
and then denied the Rule 61 motions in the other cases after that disposition. None of the instant
eight Petitioners appealed the denial of their Rule 61 motions.
Instead, they filed the § 2254 Petitions presently pending before the Court. Each Petition
raises the argument that the OCME misconduct constituted powerful impeachment material under
Brady v. Maryland. (D.I. 1 in Ringgold, C.A. No. 17-721-MN; D.I. 2 in Miller, C.A. No. 17-725MN; D.I. 3 in Perez, C.A. No. 17-836-MN; D.I. 2 in Santiago, C.A. No. 17-906-MN; D.I. 2 in
Scott, C.A. No. 17-908-MN; D.I. 2 in Ramsey, C.A. No. 17-976-MN; D.I. 2 in Watson, C.A. No.
17-1197-MN; D.I. 2 in Wright, C.A. No. 17-1198-MN). The seven Petitioners who pleaded guilty
(Ringgold, Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey, Watson, and Wright) also contend that their guilty
pleas were involuntary under Brady v. United States because the State failed to disclose evidence
of the OCME misconduct prior to the Petitioner entering a guilty plea. Soon after filing the instant
Petitions, the parties in each case filed a joint motion to stay briefing until Judge Stark resolved
Boyer v. Akinbayo, C.A. No. 17-834-LPS, a case with the same procedural issue (i.e., whether the
petitioner’s failure to appeal the Superior Court’s denial of his Rule 61 motion precluded habeas
relief due to his purposeful failure to exhaust state remedies). On November 6, 2018, Judge Stark
dismissed Boyer’s habeas petition as procedurally barred and declined to issue a certificate of
appealability. See Boyer v. Akinbayo, 2018 WL 5801545 (D. Del. Nov. 6, 2018). 5 Boyer filed a
5
Several portions of this Memorandum Opinion are identical to what Judge Stark wrote in
Boyer. Although the Court has independently considered the issues raised, it does not see
any reason to reformulate the relevant analysis when Judge Stark’s opinion thoroughly
addresses the issues in dispute.
2
notice of appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 11, 2019, the Third Circuit
denied Boyer’s request for a certificate of appealability because “[j]urists of reason could not
debate that the District Court properly denied Appellant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition.” (See
D.I. 23 in Boyer, C.A. No. 17-834-LPS)
Following the decision in Boyer, the Court lifted the stay in each of the instant eight
proceedings. Thereafter, the State filed an Answer in opposition to each Petition. In all of the
eight Answers, the State contends that the Court is procedurally barred from reviewing the sole
claim for relief because the Petitioners did not exhaust state remedies for that claim. The State
also contends that six of the eight Petitions are time-barred. (D.I. 13 in Ringgold, C.A. No. 17721-MN; D.I. 14 in Miller, C.A. No. 17-725-MN; D.I. 15 in Perez, C.A. No. 17-836-MN; D.I. 14
in Santiago, C.A. No. 17-906-MN; D.I. 15 in Scott, C.A. No. 17-908-MN; D.I. 15 in Wright, C.A.
No. 17-1198-MN). None of the eight Petitioners filed replies.
The Court has considered each Petition, Answer, and all other materials submitted in each
of the instant eight cases. Because the briefing in the eight cases is nearly identical in all material
with respect to the substantive and procedural legal issues, and particularly with respect to the
exhaustion/procedural bar issue, the Court finds that judicial economy would be served by their
review and disposition together. Therefore, the Court sua sponte consolidates these cases for
decision by a single Memorandum Opinion and Order to be filed in each case. 6 See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 42(a); In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 724 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The purpose of consolidation is
to streamline and economize pretrial proceedings so as to avoid duplication of effort, and to prevent
conflicting outcomes in cases involving similar legal and factual issues.”); Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v.
6
Because the exhaustion/procedural bar issue is identical and dispositive in each of the
cases, the Court will not address the statute of limitations argument raised by the State in
six of the Petitions. For simplicity, the Court’s citations in the remainder of this Opinion
are to the docket for Petitioner Ringgold, C.A. No. 17-721-MN, unless otherwise noted.
3
Atlantic & Gull Stevedores, Inc., 339 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1964) (noting that a court may
consolidate cases sua sponte or on motion of a party). For the reasons that follow, the Court will
dismiss all the Petitions and deny the relief requested.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
OCME CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
The relevant information regarding the OCME evidence mishandling is set forth below:
In February 2014, the Delaware State Police (“DSP”) and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began an investigation into criminal
misconduct occurring in the Controlled Substances Unit of
the OCME.
The investigation revealed that some drug evidence sent to
the OCME for testing had been stolen by OCME employees in
some cases and was unaccounted for in other cases. Oversight of the
lab had been lacking, and security procedures had not been
followed. One employee was accused of “dry labbing” (or declaring
a test result without actually conducting a test of the evidence) in
several cases. Although the investigation remains ongoing, to date,
three OCME employees have been suspended (two of those
employees have been criminally indicted), and the Chief Medical
Examiner has been fired.
There is no evidence to suggest that OCME employees tampered
with drug evidence by adding known controlled substances to the
evidence they received for testing in order to achieve positive results
and secure convictions. That is, there is no evidence that the OCME
staff “planted” evidence to wrongly obtain convictions. Rather, the
employees who stole the evidence did so because it in fact consisted
of illegal narcotics that they could resell or take for personal use.
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1204-05 (Del. 2015).
4
B.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND FOR EACH PETITIONER
1.
Kalief Ringgold (C.A. No. 17-721-MN) 7
On February 7, 2013, Ringgold pleaded guilty to drug dealing with an aggravating factor.
(D.I. 1 at 4; D.I. 1-1 at 3). That same day, the Superior Court sentenced Ringgold to thirteen years
at Level V incarceration, suspended after three years for Level III probation. (D.I. 1 at 4; D.I. 12). Ringgold did not file a direct appeal.
On April 3, 2013, Ringgold filed a pro se Rule 35(b) motion for modification of sentence.
(D.I. 1-1 at 3). The Superior Court granted that motion on April 25, 2014 and modified Ringgold’s
sentence to indicate that he was ordered to undergo a substance abuse evaluation, participate in the
Key Program or its equivalent while at Level V incarceration, and participate in the Crest Program
at Level IV supervision. (D.I. 1-1 at 3). Ringgold filed a second pro se Rule 35(b) motion on
October 29, 2013, which the Superior Court denied on November 6, 2013. (D.I. 1-1 at 3).
Ringgold did not appeal that decision.
On June 19, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion on Ringgold’s behalf based on the
misconduct at the OCME. (D.I. 1-1 at 3). The Superior Court denied Ringgold’s Rule 61 motion
on May 11, 2017. See Miller, 2017 WL 1969780, at *16. Ringgold did not appeal that decision.
On June 12, 2017, the ODS filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Ringgold’s behalf,
asserting that the OCME misconduct constituted impeachment material under Brady v. Maryland
and he might not have pleaded guilty if he had known that he might be able to cast doubt on the
chemical composition of the drugs. (D.I. 1 at 18-19). Ringgold contends that his lack of
knowledge of the OCME evidence scandal was material to his decision to plead guilty and,
therefore, his guilty plea was involuntary pursuant to Brady v. United States. (Id. at 10-19). The
7
The D.I. references in subsections 1 through 8 correspond to the C.A. No. listed in each
heading.
5
State filed an Answer asserting that Ringgold’s Petition should be dismissed as procedurally barred
because Ringgold, like Boyer, did not present his claim to the Delaware Supreme Court on direct
or post-conviction appeal. (D.I. 13 at 14-23). The State alternatively asserts that the Petition
should be dismissed as time-barred. (Id. at 7-14).
2.
Rashaun Miller (C.A. No. 17-725-MN)
On September 7, 2010, following a stipulated trial wherein Petition waived a jury trial and
did not contest the State’s evidence established at the suppression hearing, the Superior Court
found Miller guilty of possession with intent to deliver heroin (“PWITD”) and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”). (D.I. 2 at 4; D.I. 12-2 at 4). The Superior
Court sentenced Miller to fifteen years at Level V incarceration, suspended after ten years for
decreasing levels of supervision. (D.I. 2-2; D.I. 12-4 at 5; D.I. 14 at 2). Miller appealed, and the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on August 11, 2011. See Miller
v. State, 25 A.3d 768 (Del. 2011).
On October 12, 2011, Miller filed a pro se Rule 61 motion, which the Superior Court denied
on March 24, 2013. (D.I. 2-1 at 6-10). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision on
January 14, 2014. See Miller v. State, 83 A.3d 738 (Table), 2014 WL 169804, at *4 (Del.
Jan. 14, 2014).
On April 30, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief on Miller’s
behalf based on the OCME misconduct. (D.I. 12-27) . The Superior Court denied Miller’s Rule
61 motion on May 11, 2017. See Miller, 2017 WL 1969780, at *16.; (D.I. 1-3). Miller did not
appeal that decision.
On June 12, 2017, the ODS filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Miller’s behalf, asserting
the same claim that the OCME misconduct constituted impeachment material under Brady v.
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Maryland as already described above with respect to Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 2 at 10-14). The
State filed an Answer asserting the same failure to exhaust/procedurally barred argument it made
in connection with Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 14 at 11-24). The State alternatively asserts that
Miller’s Petition should be dismissed as time-barred and as moot. (D.I. 14 at 6-11, 20-24).
3.
Jose Perez (C.A. No. 17-836-MN)
On September 17, 2012, Perez pleaded guilty to Tier 5 possession. (D.I. 3 at 4; D.I. 3-1 at
1). On that same day, the Superior Court sentenced Perez to ten years at Level V incarceration,
suspended after two years for eighteen months Level III probation. (D.I. 3-2). Perez did not appeal
his conviction or sentence.
On December 6, 2012, Perez filed a pro se Rule 61 motion, which the Superior Court
withdrew at Perez’s request on January 25, 2013. (D.I. 3-1 at 2-3). On December 12, 2012, Perez
filed a pro se Rule 35(b) motion for modification of sentence. (D.I. 3-1 at 2). The Superior Court
denied the Rule 35(b) motion on January 3, 2013, and Perez did not appeal that decision. (D.I. 31 at 2).
On December 18, 2013, Perez filed a second pro se Rule 35(b) motion, which the Superior
Court denied on January 10, 2014. (D.I. 3-1 at 3). Perez did not appeal that decision.
On May 9, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion on Perez’s behalf based on the
misconduct at the OCME. (D.I. 3-1 at 3; D.I. 16-8). The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion
on June 21, 2017. (D.I. 3-4). Perez did not appeal that decision.
On March 12, 2015, while Perez’s Rule 61 motion was still pending and he was serving
the probationary portion of his sentence, the Superior Court found that he had violated his
probation (“VOP”) due to his January 13, 2015 arrest for shoplifting under $1,500. (D.I. 3-1 at 34). The Superior Court sentenced him for the Tier 5 possession conviction to eight years at Level
7
V, suspended for eight years at Level IV VOP Center, suspended in turn after 120 days for eighteen
months of Level III probation. (D.I. 3-1 at 4; D.I. 15 at 3; D.I. 18-8). Perez did not appeal.
On June 21, 2017, the Superior Court denied Perez’s Rule 61 motion. (D.I. 3-4). Perez
did not appeal that decision.
On June 22, 2017, the ODS filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Perez’s behalf, asserting
the same OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim as already described above with respect
to Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 3 in Civ. A. 17-836-MN) The State filed an Answer asserting the
same failure to exhaust/procedurally barred argument it made in connection with Ringgold’s
Petition. (D.I. 15 at 14-23 in Civ. A. 17-836-MN) The State alternatively asserts that the Petition
should be dismissed as time-barred and as moot. (Id. at 8-14, 23-26)
4.
Jacob Santiago (C.A. No. 17-906 (MN)
On June 6, 2012, Santiago pleaded guilty to drug dealing with an aggravating factor. (D.I.
2 at 4; D.I. 2-1 at 2). The Superior Court immediately sentenced him to ten years at Level V
incarceration, suspended after six months for decreasing levels of supervision. (D.I. 2-2).
On January 16, 2013, Santiago filed a motion for modification of sentence. (D.I. 2-1 at 2).
The Superior Court granted the motion on January 28, 2013, modifying the home confinement
portion of Santiago’s sentence to home confinement or GPS monitoring. (D.I. 2-1 at 2; D.I. 124). On July 18, 2013, Santiago filed a motion for correction of sentence, which the Superior Court
denied on August 5, 2013. (D.I. 2-1 at 2-3; D.I. 12-5; D.I. 12-6). On April 9, 2014, the Superior
Court found that Santiago had violated the term of his probation, and sentenced him to nine years
at Level V, suspended after two years for six months of probation. (D.I. 2-1 at 4; D.I. 12-8).
Santiago appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the VOP September 30, 2014. See
Santiago v. State, 2014 WL 4930679 (Del. Sept. 30, 2014).
8
On May 9, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion on Santiago’s behalf based on the OCME
misconduct. (D.I. 12-9). The Superior Court denied Santiago’s Rule 61 motion on June 27, 2017.
(D.I. 2-4). Santiago did not appeal that decision.
On July 6, 2017, the ODS filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Santiago’s behalf,
asserting the same OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim as already described above
with respect to Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 2). The State filed an Answer asserting the same failure
to exhaust/procedurally barred argument it made in connection with Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 14
at 9-17). The State alternatively asserts that the Petition should be denied as time-barred. (Id. at
5-9).
5.
Desmond Scott (C.A. No. 17-908-MN)
On October 26, 2010, Scott pleaded guilty to trafficking in heroin. (D.I. 2 at 4; D.I. 2-1 at
2). The Superior Court immediately sentenced Scott to ten years at Level V incarceration,
suspended after three years for eighteen months of Level III probation. (D.I. 2-2). Scott did not
file a direct appeal.
On June 7, 2013, the Superior Court found Scott to be in violation of his probation and
sentenced him to seven years at Level V incarceration, suspended after eighty-eight days for
twenty-seven months of decreasing levels of supervision. (D.I. 13-4). On December 19, 2014,
the Superior Court found Scott in violation of his probation again, and sentenced him to three years
at Level V incarceration with no probation to follow. (D.I. 13-8).
On May 13, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion on Scott’s behalf. (D.I. 13-5). The
Superior Court denied the motion on June 27, 2017. (D.I. 2-4). Scott did not appeal that decision.
On July 6, 2017, the ODS filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Scot’s behalf, asserting
the same OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim as already described above with respect
9
to Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 2). The State filed an Answer asserting the same failure to
exhaust/procedurally barred argument it made in connection with Turner’s Petition. (D.I. 15 at
15-25). The State alternatively asserts that Scott’s Petition should be dismissed as time-barred.
(D.I. 15 at 7-15).
6.
Andre L. Ramsey (C.A. No. 17-976-MN)
On January 17, 2013, Ramsey pleaded guilty to one count of drug dealing, one count of
possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”), and identity theft. (D.I. 17-12 at 61).
On April 5, 2013, the Superior Court sentenced Ramsey as follows: (1) five years at Level V for
the identity theft conviction; (2) five years at Level V for the PFBPP conviction; and (3) eight
years, suspended after two years for decreasing levels of supervision, for the drug dealing
conviction. (D.I. 17-4). The Superior Court corrected the sentence two times: (1) on April 8, 2013,
to give Ramsey credit for 264 days served and to reflect that Ramsey’s eight year sentence for
drug dealing was to be suspended for two years at a Level IV halfway house, to be suspended, in
turn, after six months for eighteen months of Level III probation; and (2) on April 23, 2013, to
reflect that the 264 days credit was only for the identity theft conviction. (D.I. 16 at 3; D.I. 17-5;
D.I. 17-6). Ramsey appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Ramsey’s convictions
and sentence. See Ramsey v. State, 77 A.3d 272 (Table), 2013 WL 5522598 (Del. Oct. 3, 2013).
On May 29, 2013, Ramsey filed a pro se motion to suspend or reduce his sentence for
PFBPP. (D.I. 17-1 at 5). The Superior Court denied the motion. (D.I. 17-8). Ramsey did not
appeal.
On April 30, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion on Ramsey’s behalf based on the
OCME misconduct. (D.I. 17-16). The Superior Court denied Ramsey’s Rule 61 motion on
July 7, 2017. (D.I. 2-4). Ramsey did not appeal that decision.
10
On July 18, 2017, the OPD filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Ramsey’s behalf,
asserting the same OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim as already described above
with respect to Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 2). The State filed an Answer asserting the same failure
to exhaust/procedurally barred argument it made in connection with Ringgold’s Petition. 8 (D.I.
16 at 10-18).
7.
Nakeem Watson (C.A. No. 17-1197-MN)
On October 11, 2013, Watson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine
(“PWITD”), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”), and assault in
a detention facility. (D.I. 15-9). On January 17, 2014 the Superior Court sentenced him to ten
years at Level V incarceration, suspended after five years for decreasing levels of supervision.
(D.I. 2-2; D.I. 14 at 1-2). Watson did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
On May 16, 2014, Watson filed a pros se Rule 61 motion. (D.I. 15-1 at 7). On
November 21, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion on Watson’s behalf, based on the OCME
misconduct. (D.I. 15-1 at 8; D.I. 15-12). On August 21, 2017, the Superior Court denied the ODS’
Rule 61 motion in Watson’s case, and denied Watson’s pro se Rule 61 motion on
September 19, 2018. (D.I. 2-4; D.I. 15-31).
On August 24, 2017, the ODS filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Watson’s behalf,
asserting the same OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim as already described above
with respect to Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 2). The State filed an Answer asserting the same failure
8
Since filing his Petition, Ramsey has pleaded guilty to new crimes and found to be in
violation of probation for prior convictions, and he has filed numerous motions concerning
his sentence(s) in the Delaware Superior Court, all of which have been denied. (D.I. 16 at
4-5).
11
to exhaust/procedurally barred argument it made in connection with Ringgold’s Petition. 9 (D.I.
14 at 6-14).
8.
Maurice Wright (C.A. No. 17-1198-MN)
On September 30, 2010, Wright pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a
narcotic schedule II controlled substance. (D.I. 13-3). The Superior Court immediately sentenced
him to fifteen years at Level V incarceration, suspended after six months for eighteen months of
decreasing levels of supervision. (D.I. 2-2). Wright did not appeal his sentence or conviction.
On July 25, 2012, the Superior Court found that Wright had violated his probation and
sentenced him to five years at Level V, suspended after four years for one year at Level III
probation. (D.I. 13-4).
On May 6, 2014, the ODS filed a Rule 61 motion on Wright’s behalf. (D.I. 13-5). On
September 23, 2015, while the Rule 61 motion was pending, Wright filed a pro se Rule 35 motion
for sentence correction. (D.I. 13-15.). The Superior Court denied the Rule 35 motion on
December 23, 2015.
(D.I. 13-17).
The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion on
August 21, 2017. (D.I. 2-4). Wright did not appeal that decision.
On August 24, 2017, the ODS filed in this Court a § 2254 Petition on Wright’s behalf,
asserting the same OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim as already described above
with respect to Ringgold’s Petition. (D.I. 2). The State filed an Answer asserting the same failure
to exhaust/procedural default argument it made in connection with Turner’s Petition. (D.I. 15 at
9
The Superior Court found that Watson violated his probation on two separate occasions:
July 12, 2016 and March 9, 2018. (D.I. 15-1 at 9-11). On March 9, 2018, the Superior
Court sentenced Watson to four years at Level V, with credit for 179 days previously
served, suspended after six months with no probation to follow. (D.I. 15-30). Watson’s
sentence in this case, however, was not set to begin until February 15, 2022, after he
completed his prison term in another case. (D.I. 14-1).
12
15-24). The State alternatively asserts that the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred. (Id.
at 6-15).
II.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“the
AEDPA”) “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences . . . and to
further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202,
206 (2003). Pursuant to the AEDPA, a federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state
prisoner only “on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The AEDPA imposes procedural requirements and
standards for analyzing the merits of a habeas petition in order to “prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’
and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
B.
Exhaustion and Procedural Default
Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the
petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b);
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).
The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to give “state
courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of
the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45; see also Werts
v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by
fairly presenting all claims to the state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or in a postconviction proceeding, in a procedural manner permitting the court to consider the claims on their
13
merits. See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351
(1989).
A petitioner may be excused from exhausting state remedies when there is either an absence
of an available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances, such as futility or
inordinate delay, that render such processes ineffective.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B);
Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981). Situations falling within the “ineffective corrective
process” exception to the exhaustion requirement include those instances when “(1) the state
corrective process is so deficient as to render any effort to obtain relief futile []; (2) acts of state
officials have, in effect, made state remedies unavailable to the petitioner []; or (3) ‘inordinate
delay’ in state proceedings has rendered state remedies ineffective.” Kozak v. Pennsylvania, 2012
WL 4895519, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct 15, 2012). When a failure to exhaust is excused due to an
ineffective corrective process, the court may review a claim on its merits without engaging in the
procedural default analysis. See, e.g., Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2004); Story v.
Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405-06 (3d Cir. 1994); Woodruff v. Williams, 2016 WL 6124270, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 19, 2016).
If a petitioner’s failure to exhaust, however, does not fall within the aforementioned
“ineffective corrective process” exception, and state procedural rules bar the petitioner from
seeking further relief in state courts, the claims, although technically exhausted, are procedurally
defaulted. See Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 750-51 (1991). Similarly, if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state’s highest court,
but that court “clearly and expressly” refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an
independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim is technically exhausted but procedurally
defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64 (1989). A federal
14
court cannot consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner establishes
cause and prejudice to excuse the default, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result
absent review of the claims. See Lines, 208 F.3d at 160.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Exhaustion
All eight Petitioners acknowledge that they did not exhaust state remedies for their habeas
claim due to their failure to appeal the denial of their Rule 61 motions to the Delaware Supreme
Court. (D.I. 1 at 4). Instead, they present three arguments as to why the Court should excuse their
failure to exhaust on the basis of futility: (1) exhausting state remedies by appealing the Superior
Court’s Rule 61 decision would have been futile because of the Superior Court’s inordinate delay
in adjudicating his Rule 61 motion (“inordinate delay” excuse); (2) appealing the denial of their
Rule 61 motions to the Delaware Supreme Court would have been futile because that court has
rejected identical claims based upon the OCME misconduct in other cases for postconviction relief
(“futility on the merits” excuse); and (3) appealing the denial of their Rule 61 motions to the
Delaware Supreme Court would have been futile because Rule 61 does “not provide an adequate
opportunity for [Petitioner]s to obtain relief” (“futility due to deficiency of Rule 61 proceedings”
excuse). (D.I. 1 at 4-7). The State contends that Petitioners’ failure to exhaust should not be
excused for any of these futility reasons and, because state criminal procedural rules preclude them
from returning to the state courts for further review, the claim is now technically exhausted but
procedurally defaulted. (D.I. 14 at 14-19). The Court will discuss Petitioners’ arguments in
seriatim.
15
1.
Futility Due to Inordinate Delay During Rule 61 Proceeding
“[I]nexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing claims for relief may render
the state remedy effectively unavailable,” thereby warranting excusing the exhaustion
requirement. Story, 26 F.3d at 405. “The existence of an inordinate delay does not automatically
excuse the exhaustion requirement, but it does shift the burden to the state to demonstrate why
exhaustion should still be required.” Lee, 357 F.3d at 341.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has defined the specific
amount of time that constitutes inordinate delay in a petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings. As
explained by the Third Circuit,
We stated in Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir.
1986), that “inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in
processing claims for relief may render the state remedy effectively
unavailable.” In that case, thirty-three months had passed after the
petitioner’s PCRA filing without resolution. Id. This, we found,
excused the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state court remedies.
Id. at 356. The thirty-three month delay in Wojtczak remains the
shortest delay held to render state collateral proceedings ineffective
for purposes of the exhaustion requirement.
Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2002) (refusing to excuse exhaustion in the face of
twenty-seven month delay); see also Lee, 357 F.3d at 343-44 (excusing exhaustion after eight year
delay); Coss v. Lackawanna County Dist. Att’y, 204 F.3d 453, 460 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(excusing exhaustion after seven year delay), rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 394 (2001); Story,
26 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 1994) (excusing exhaustion after nine year delay). Generally, courts in
the Third Circuit have excused a petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies where the following
three factors are present: (1) the delays in the state court proceedings have amounted to three, five,
eleven, or twelve years; 10 (2) no meaningful action towards resolution has been taken in the state
10
See Story, 26 F.3d at 405-06 (citing cases).
16
court; and (3) the delay was not attributable to the petitioner. See Simmons v. Garman, 2017 WL
2222526, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2017).
Federal courts consider the degree of progress made by the state courts when determining
whether a delay is inordinate. See Lee, 357 F.3d at 342. In cases where courts have excused
exhaustion due to an inordinate delay, the delay in petitioners’ state post-conviction proceedings
was still ongoing at the time of federal habeas review. See Wojtczak, 800 F.2d at 354 (unresolved
after thirty-three months); cf. Cristin, 281 F.3d at 411 (concluding that thirty-three month delay
did not excuse exhaustion under the inordinate delay exception as state court ruled on Cristin’s
state post-conviction petition one week after he filed his federal habeas petition); Wallace v.
Dragovich, 143 F. App’x 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that petitioner’s failure to exhaust was
not excusable on basis of inordinate delay, where previously stalled state habeas proceeding had
resumed). The Court has not identified any cases holding that a petitioner’s failure to exhaust can
be excused on the basis of a delay in a state post-conviction proceeding when that delay has already
ended. See, e.g., Vreeland v. Davis, 543 F. App’x 739, 741-42 (10th Cir. 2013).
Here, none of the eight Petitioners appealed the denial of their Rule 61 motions. In fact,
they admit they purposefully decided to forgo post-conviction appeals in order to proceed
immediately with federal habeas petitions. (D.I. 1 at 4). Petitioners assert that the average threeyear span between the filing of their Rule 61 motions and the Superior Court’s adjudication of
those motions constitutes inordinate delay and the possibility of continued delay in the Delaware
Supreme Court “unnecessarily risk[ed] mooting [Petitioners’] federal claims before [they] [would
be] able to reach Federal Court.” (D.I. 1 at 6).
The court rejected an almost identical argument in Boyer, because Boyer’s post-conviction
proceeding was not in a state of suspended animation when he filed his habeas Petition. See Boyer,
17
2018 WL 5801545, at *4-5. The court also noted that Boyer’s mistrust of the Delaware Supreme
Court’s ability to decide his post-conviction appeal within a certain time-frame was insufficient to
excuse him from exhausting state court remedies for his claim. See Boyer, 2018 WL 5801545, at
*4-5.
Like Boyer, Petitioners did not file their Petitions while their Rule 61 motions were in a
state of suspended animation. As a result, Petitioners also cannot rely on allegations of inordinate
delay to excuse their failure to exhaust.
2.
Futility on the Merits
Petitioners also ask the Court to excuse their failure to exhaust on the ground that it would
have been futile to present their claim to the Delaware Supreme Court, because that court has
already considered and rejected numerous identical or similar OCME misconduct claims. (D.I. 1
at 5-6). But futility on the merits does not constitute cause for a procedurally defaulted claim.
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982) (petitioner “may not bypass the state courts simply
because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim”). The Third Circuit has applied Engle’s
reasoning in the context of exhaustion, opining that “likely futility on the merits [] in state court
of a petitioner’s habeas claim does not render that claim exhausted within the meaning of
§ 2254(b)(1)(A) so as to excuse the petitioner’s failure to exhaust that claim by presenting it in
state court before asserting in a federal habeas petition.” Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 64
(3d Cir. 2005). More specifically, “[a]llowing petitioners to bypass state court merely because
they believe that their constitutional claims would have failed there on the merits would fly in the
face of comity and would deprive state courts of a critical opportunity to examine and refine their
constitutional jurisprudence.” Id.
18
Both the procedural history of Petitioners’ Rule 61 proceedings and the instant “futility on
the merits” argument are substantially similar to the procedural history of Boyer’s Rule 61
proceeding and Boyer’s “futility on the merits” argument. See Boyer, 2018 WL 5801545, at *45. Applying the reasoning in Engle and Parker, the Court declined to excuse Boyer’s failure to
exhaust his claims on the basis of “likely futility on the merits.” Boyer, 2018 WL 5801545, at *5.
The Third Circuit agreed; it declined to grant Boyer a certificate of appealability, explicitly stating,
“[w]e have rejected the argument that likely futility on the merits of a claim in state court excuses
a habeas petitioner’s failure to exhaust that claim.” (See D.I. 23 in Boyer, C.A. No. 17-834-LPS).
Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that Petitioners’ failure to exhaust state remedies
is not excused on the ground of likely futility on the merits.
3.
Deficient Rule 61 procedures
In their last attempt to justify the failure to exhaust state remedies, Petitioners contend that
Rule 61’s procedures are so deficient that the Rule would not have provided them with an
opportunity to obtain relief, thereby demonstrating that it would have been futile to present their
claim to the Delaware Supreme Court on post-conviction appeal. (D.I. 1 at 7). However, “[f]ederal
courts may upset a State’s postconviction relief procedures only if they are fundamentally
inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights provided.” Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Jud.
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009). Federal courts may excuse the exhaustion requirement
when “it appears that the prisoner’s rights have become an ‘empty shell’ or that the state process
is a ‘procedural morass’ offering no hope of relief.” Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 250
(3d Cir. 1991).
Here, Petitioners do not substantiate their contention that Rule 61 is inadequate, nor do
they cite any case finding that Rule 61 is a deficient corrective process. In fact, this Court has
19
consistently found that Rule 61 is an independent and adequate state procedural ground that
precludes federal habeas review. See, e.g., Trice v. Pierce, 2016 WL 2771123, at *4 (D. Del.
May 13, 2016); Maxion v. Snyder, 2001 WL 848601, at *10 (D. Del. July 27, 2001). Petitioners’
conclusory allegations about the inadequacy of Rule 61 do not demonstrate that its procedures are
an “empty shell” or a “procedural morass offering no hope for relief.”
In sum, for the aforementioned reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioners’ failure to
exhaust state remedies does not fall within the narrow “futility” exception to the exhaustion
doctrine.
B.
Procedural Default
Having determined that Petitioners’ intentional failure to appeal the denial of their Rule 61
motions is not excusable, Petitioners’ habeas claim remains unexhausted. At this juncture, any
attempt by Petitioners to exhaust state remedies by presenting the claim in new Rule 61 motions
would be barred as untimely under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1) and as
successive under Rule 61(i)(2). See Del. Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(1) (establishing a one year
deadline for filing Rule 61 motions); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring second or
successive Rule 61 motion unless certain pleading requirements are satisfied). Consequently, the
Court must treat the claim as technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, which means that
the Court cannot review the merits of the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or that a
miscarriage of justice will result absent such review. See Lines, 208 F.3d at 160.
To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that “some objective
factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural
rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner
20
must show “that [the errors at trial] worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting
his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Id. at 494.
Alternatively, a federal court may excuse a procedural default if the petitioner demonstrates
that failure to review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Edwards v.
Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2001). A
petitioner demonstrates a miscarriage of justice by showing a “constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
Actual innocence means factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). In order to establish actual innocence, the petitioner must present new
reliable evidence – not presented at trial – that demonstrates “it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” House v. Bell,
547 U.S. 518, 537-38 (2006); see also Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 522-24 (3d Cir. 2002).
To the extent Petitioners’ three-pronged futility argument should also be viewed as an
attempt to establish cause for their procedural default, the argument is unavailing. In order to
establish cause, Petitioners must demonstrate that an external factor prevented them from
appealing the denial of their Rule 61 motion. Nothing prevented Petitioners, however, from filing
post-conviction appeals – they simply elected not to do so. Thus, Petitioners’ belief that it would
have been futile to present their claim to the Delaware Supreme does not constitute cause for their
procedural default.
In the absence of cause, the Court does not need to address prejudice. The Court further
concludes that the miscarriage of justice exception does not excuse Petitioners’ procedural default.
Although the seven Petitioners who pleaded guilty (Ringgold, Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey,
Watson, and Wright) contend that there is a reasonable probability that they would not have
21
pleaded guilty had they known about the OCME misconduct, and also that they may have sought
and received “a substantial reduction in the plea-bargained sentence as a condition of forgoing a
trial” (D.I. 1 at 18), neither of these assertions constitutes new reliable evidence of their actual
innocence. Similarly, although Petitioner Miller – who was convicted after a stipulated bench trial
– contends that “there is a significant likelihood that the prosecutor’s response to respondent’s
discovery request misleadingly induced defense counsel to believe that the chemist and lab results
could not be impeached on the basis of the widespread thefts and failures at OCME,” and also that
it is “unrealistic to believe that an experienced attorney armed with this information would have
chosen to stipulate to evidence supporting an essential element of an offense” (D.I. 2 at 13 in
Miller, C.A. No. 17-725-MN), neither of these assertions constitutes new reliable evidence of
Miller’s actual innocence. Accordingly, the Court will deny the instant Petitions as procedurally
barred from federal habeas review.
IV.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
As an alternative request for relief, Petitioners summarily ask the Court to “hold an
evidentiary hearing and allow full briefing on his claim.” (D.I. 1 at 19) It is unclear whether they
request an evidentiary hearing on the underlying OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim
or on the procedural default of that claim.
A.
Evidentiary Hearing On OCME Misconduct/Involuntary Guilty Plea Claim
The AEDPA permits evidentiary hearings on habeas review in a limited number of
circumstances. 11 See Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000). For instance,
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) provides:
11
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, “the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing was
generally left to the sound discretion of district courts.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007). Evidentiary hearings, however, were mandatory in six specific
circumstances: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;
22
(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed
to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State
court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless the applicant shows that –
(A) the claim relies on –
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The “initial inquiry” when determining whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing is whether the petitioner has “failed to develop the factual basis” of the claim in state court.
See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e) (2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 433 (2000). “Under the opening
clause of § 2254(e)(2), a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless
there is a lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s
counsel.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 433. “Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and
fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the
material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair
fact hearing. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled on other grounds by
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). Although the AEDPA has not changed the
“basic rule” of leaving the decision to grant an evidentiary to the discretion of the district
courts, it has imposed certain limitations on the exercise of that discretion via § 2254(e)(2).
See Cristin, 281 F.3d at 413.
23
a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Id.
at 437. When determining if a petitioner has been diligent, “[t]he question is not whether the facts
could have been discovered but instead whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts.” Id. at
435. In short, if the factual basis of the claim was not developed but the petitioner was diligent in
pursuing the claim in state court, the opening phrase of § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary
hearing. See Lark v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 614 (3d Cir. 2011).
However, “a petitioner who diligently but unsuccessfully seeks an evidentiary hearing in
state court still is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court under AEDPA. Rather,
[. . .] whether to hold a hearing for a petitioner who is not at fault under § 2254(e)(2) remains in
the discretion of the district court, and depends on whether the hearing would have the potential to
advance the petitioner’s claim.” Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 444 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in
original); see Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473 (explaining that the “basic” pre-AEDPA rule leaving the
decision on whether to grant an evidentiary hearing to the “sound discretion of district courts” has
not changed under AEDPA). “Where a petitioner fails to forecast to the district court evidence
outside the record that would help his cause or ‘otherwise to explain how his claim would be
advanced by an evidentiary hearing,’ a court is within its discretion to deny the claim.” Buda v.
Stickman, 149 F. App’x 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2005).
Here, although evidentiary hearings were not held in any of the eight Petitioners’ Rule 61
proceedings, Petitioners do not explain how the factual basis of their claim needs further
development as part of their federal habeas review. 12 In fact, two of the eight Petitioners –
12
At the risk of repetition, the Court emphasizes that all of the Rule 61 motions filed by the
instant Petitioners presented the identical OCME misconduct impeachment evidence
claim, as well as the related involuntary guilty plea argument in seven of the Rule 61
motions, the Superior Court denied the eight Rule 61 motions for substantially the same
reason, namely, because Petitioners either stipulated to the drug evidence (Miller) or
24
Ringgold (C.A. No. 17-721-MN) and Miller (C.A. No. 17-725-MN) – knowingly decided to forego
a Rule 61 evidentiary hearing when they agreed with the Superior Court’s assessment that an
evidentiary hearing was not warranted in their Rule 61 proceedings because the issues were legal
in nature. 13 (See D.I. 14-26 at 7-8, 35 in Ringgold, C.A. No. 17-721-MN). With respect to those
two cases, the Superior Court explained that, “factually the critical factor appears to be whether
the defendant pleaded guilty or proceeded to trial,” and it was “willing to rule on th[e] outstanding
[Rule 61] Motions based upon the pleadings filed to date,” subject to the parties’ agreement. Id.
at 8. In turn, although it is not entirely clear, it appears as though the remaining six Petitioners
(Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey, Watson, and Wright) may have implicitly agreed to forego an
evidentiary hearing in their cases. 14 Given these circumstances, the Court is inclined to find that
there was no failure to develop the factual basis of the claim at the state court level which, in turn,
would eliminate the need for an evidentiary hearing here. Nevertheless, exercising prudence, the
Court will continue with its analysis.
knowingly and voluntarily admitted during their plea colloquy that they committed the
drug crimes (Ringgold, Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey, Watson, and Wright).
13
The fact that Ringgold and Miller knowingly waived an evidentiary hearing in state court,
and admitted that the issue was legal in nature, suggests that they may not be seeking an
evidentiary hearing on the substantive claim presented in this proceeding but, rather, that
they are seeking an evidentiary hearing on the issue of procedural default.
14
In a letter filed in all eight cases, the ODS asserted that, “[o]n March 21, 2017, [the
Superior] Court stated that it ‘will proceed to rule on the OCME motions currently pending
in New Castle County based upon the submissions which have been made.’” (D.I. 16-25
at 1 in Perez, C.A. No. 17-836-MN). Attached to that letter is a list of numerous individuals
with pending Rule 61motions premised on the OCME misconduct, and the names of all
eight Petitioners are on that list. (Id. at 3-8). Because, in that same letter, the OPD did not
challenge the Superior Court’s expressed intent to rule on the Rule 61 motions on the basis
of the filings, it would appear that the remaining six Petitioners (Perez, Santiago, Scott,
Ramsey, Watson, and Wright) knowingly waived an evidentiary hearing.
25
Although Ringgold and Miller explicitly agreed to forego an evidentiary hearing, it appears
that they technically satisfied § 2254(e)(2)’s diligence requirement because, at a minimum, the
Superior Court’s letter indicates that they originally sought an evidentiary hearing in the manner
prescribed by state law. The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to the remaining six
Petitioners (who may or may not have implicitly agreed to forego an evidentiary hearing). Because
it appears that Petitioners exercised the type of diligence contemplated by § 2254(e)(2), § 2254(e)
does not bar an evidentiary hearing, 15 which means that the Court retains discretion over the
decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Nevertheless, Petitioners have not met their burden of showing that an evidentiary hearing
would be meaningful in relation to the OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim. Their
single-sentence request for a hearing does not forecast any evidence beyond that existing in the
record that would help their cause, nor does it explain how a new hearing would advance their
claim. Indeed, none of the eight Petitioners filed replies to the State’s argument that an evidentiary
hearing is not warranted. Moreover, given either their stipulation regarding the drug evidence
during a stipulated bench trial (Miller) or admission of guilt during their guilt plea colloquy and
their failure to assert their actual innocence (Ringgold, Perez, Santiago, Scott, Ramsey, Watson,
and Wright), Petitioners have not alleged facts that, if true, would permit them to prevail on their
OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim. Accordingly, the Court concludes that an
15
Alternatively, even if the Court were to conclude that Petitioners did not satisfy the
diligence requirement of § 2254(e)(2), then the Court would only be permitted (but not
required) to hold an evidentiary hearing if Petitioners demonstrated that their cases fell
within the very limited circumstances set forth in § 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B). Given that
Petitioners’ single-sentence request for an evidentiary hearing does not come close to
satisfying the requirements of § 2254(e)(2)(A) or (B), in this alternate scenario,
§ 2254(e)(2) would bar the Court from holding a hearing in all eight cases.
26
evidentiary hearing on the OCME misconduct/involuntary guilty plea claim is not warranted in
any of the instant cases.
B.
Evidentiary Hearing on Procedural Default
The Third Circuit has held that § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary hearing to
determine if a petitioner can establish cause and prejudice to avoid a procedural default.
See Cristin, 281 F.3d at 416-17 (holding that “the plain meaning of § 2254(e)(2)’s introductory
language does not preclude federal hearings on excuses for procedural default at the state level.”).
Consequently, it is within the Court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing on Petitioners’
excuses for their failure to appeal the denial of their Rule 61 motions.
As previously discussed, 16 the Court has considered, and rejected, Petitioners’ reasons for
the procedural default, and they do not indicate any other evidence/reason that may excuse their
failure to appeal the denial of their Rule 61 motions. Therefore, the Court will not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of procedural default.
V.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether to
issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A
certificate of appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right” by demonstrating “that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see
also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
16
See supra at III. A and B.
27
The Court has concluded that the instant eight Petitions do not warrant relief. Reasonable
jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court will not issue a
certificate of appealability in any of the instant seventeen cases.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court concludes that all eight Petitions must be denied. An
appropriate Order will be entered.
28
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