Ransom v. Berryhill

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION re pending motions. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 7/30/18. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
SONYAD. RANSOM,
Plaintiff,
C.A. No. 17-939-LPS

V.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,'
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Vanessa L. Kassab, DOROSHOW, PASQUALE, KRAWITZ & BHA YA, Wilmington, DE
Attorney for Plaintiff.

David C. Weiss, United States Attorney, and Dina White Griffin, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Wilmington, DE.
Of Counsel: Nora Koch, Regional Chief Counsel, Region III, and James Mc Tigue, Assistant
Regional Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, PA.
Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

July 30, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware

1

The Court uses the same case caption that the parties have used for their briefing. See
generally Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 25(d) (permitting substitution of parties).

I.

INTRODUCTION
In March and July of 2013 , Plaintiff Sonya D. Ransom ("Plaintiff' or "Ransom") filed

Title II and Title XVI applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income. (See D.I. 8 ("Tr.") at 14) These applications were denied, both upon initial review and
upon reconsideration. (Se e id.) On December 9, 2013 , Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing with
an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), claiming disabilities beginning on August 1, 2012. (Se e
id.) At the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have impairments that meet the

required medical severity under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity ("RFC") to perform light work, and Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the
Social Security Act. (Tr. at 17) Plaintiffs subsequent request for review by the Appeals Council
was denied. (Tr. at 1)
On July 12, 2017, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Defendant" or "Commissioner").
Pending before the Court are (I) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and (ii) Defendant' s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.I. 15, D.I. 21) For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will deny Plaintiffs motion and grant Defendant' s motion.

II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual History

Ransom suffers from multiple sclerosis (MS), degenerative disc disease, obesity, and
shortness of breath. (Tr. at 16) Plaintiff claims disability based only upon the MS. (Tr. at 209)
Ransom was diagnosed with MS on February 8, 2013 , based on symptoms that she reported

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began in August 2012. (Tr. at 247, 209) On April 15, 2013 , Plaintiff saw neurologist Dr. Jason
Silversteen, who confirmed the MS diagnosis. (Tr. at 260) Dr. Silversteen noted Plaintiff
complained of stiffness in her legs, short-term memory issues, significant fatigue, gait
difficulties, and balance issues. (Tr. at 267) Yet, Dr. Silversteen's physical and neurologic
examination notes state that Plaintiff denied fatigue, her mental status was alert and oriented, her
recent memory and attention were normal, and her gait was normal. (Tr. at 268-69)
On May 7, 2013, State agency physician Dr. Michael Borek reviewed Plaintiffs medical
records. (Tr. at 85) Dr. Borek found that Plaintiff did have physical limitations, but also that her
alleged inability to engage in even sedentary activity was only partially credible given the results
of her neurologic exams. (Tr. at 90, 92) Based on Plaintiffs entire medical record, Dr. Borek
determined Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. at 93) He found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform her
past relevant work as a cashier. (See id.)
As part of a process of reconsideration, Dr. Vinod Kataria reviewed Plaintiffs medical
records. (Tr. at 96) Dr. Kataria also determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. at 102-03)
However, he found Plaintiff did not have the RFC to perform past relevant work and was only
capable of sedentary work. (See id.)
During a May 23 , 2013 visit, treating physician Dr. Silversteen once again found Plaintiff
was alert and oriented; her recent and remote memory, attention, and language were all normal;
and her gait was normal. (Tr. at 261) Dr. Silversteen also noted increased deep tendon reflexes
in the upper and lower extremities. (See id.)
Dr. Silversteen made similar findings in October and November 2013. (Tr. at 403-08)
Additionally, while Dr. Silversteen supplied Plaintiff with a prescription for a cane in this time
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frame, he continued to note that Plaintiffs gait was normal. (Tr. at 404)
Plaintiffs February 10, 2014 visit to Dr. Silversteen resulted in the same findings:
Plaintiffs speech was normal, she was alert and oriented to person, place, and time, and her
recent and remote memory, attention, language, fund of knowledge, and gait were all normal.
(Tr. at 400) He again made a note of increased deep tendon reflexes. (See id.) Dr. Silversteen
also gave Plaintiff a prescription for a drug to improve her gait. (Tr. at 401)
On February 11, 2014, Dr. Silversteen completed a Multiple Sclerosis Medical Source
Statement identifying Plaintiffs symptoms of chronic fatigue, weakness, increased deep reflexes,
difficulty remembering, unstable walking, poor coordination, and difficulty solving problems,
among others. (Tr. at 282) He stated that due to these symptoms, Plaintiff needed to use a cane
and she could not lift or carry any amount of weight. (Tr. at 284) Dr. Silversteen estimated that
Plaintiff could use her hands and fingers for about 10% of an 8-hour work day, could sit for ten
minutes before needing to get up, and could stand for five minutes before needing to change
position. (Tr. at 283-84)
In Plaintiffs subsequent visits with Dr. Silversteen, between May 20 14 and July 2015,
Dr. Silversteen made the same findings and notes as he had in prior appointments. (Tr. at 396,
391,386,382,377, 374)

B.

The Administrative Hearing

On October 28, 2015, an ALJ held a video hearing to determine whether Plaintiff was
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. at 13) Both Ransom and a
vocational expert ("VE"), Marilyn J. Stroud, testified. (Tr. at 65)

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a.

Ransom's Testimony

Ransom testified that she lives alone in a handicapped accessible unit (for which she
needed to qualify). (Tr. at 36, 53) She reported receiving assistance from family members to
complete household activities, such as cleaning the bathroom, washing dishes, and sweeping, but
stated that she is able to take care of her own personal hygiene. (Tr. at 60, 62)
Cognitively, Ransom reported symptoms impacting concentration, memory, and
awareness. (Tr. at 37-39, 47) She testified about difficulties interpreting and understanding
directions. (Tr. at 47) She explained that these difficulties contributed to her current
unemployment. (Tr. at 47) Physically, Ransom complained of aches and pains, inability to sit or
stand for long periods, and inability to lift heavy equipment. (Tr. at 47) Ransom further testified
that she uses a cane for stability and coordination due to weakness and muscle spasms in her
legs. (See D.I. 50, 52)

b.

VE Testimony

VE Stroud was asked to consider a hypothetical individual of Ransom' s age, education,
and work experience, who could perform work at a light exertion level. (Tr. at 71) The ALJ
stated that such an individual could occasionally perform postural activities, but never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, should avoid even moderate exposure to hazards, and could only
perform simple, unskilled work. (Tr. at 71) Based on this information, the VE testified that such
an individual could perform two of Ransom' s past jobs: benefits clerk and telephone solicitor.
(Tr. at 73)
The VE was then asked to consider several other hypotheticals, some in which a cane was
used for balance and ambulation, and some in which frequent grasping would be required. (Tr. at
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75) The VE testified that the positions of benefit clerk and telephone solicitor would still be
available to such an individual. (Tr. at 75) These positions would be unavailable only if the
individual also had to take unscheduled breaks every 15 minutes throughout the day, was
incapable of occasional fingering and grasping, and used a cane for balance. (Tr. at 77)

C.

The ALJ's Findings

On December 24, 2015, the ALJ issued the following findings:
1.

The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31 , 2017.

2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
August 1, 2012, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.,
and 416.971 et seq.).

3.

The claimant has the following severe impairments: multiple
sclerosis, degenerative disc disease, obesity, and shortness of
breath (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925
and 416.926).

5.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except she must be able to alternate between sitting and
standing every 20 minutes. The claimant can frequently push/pull
with bilateral lower extremities. She can occasionally perform
postural maneuvers; however, she can never climb ladders, ropes,
and scaffolds. The claimant can frequently finger and grasp
bilaterally. She can tolerate occasional exposure to extreme
temperatures and hazards, such as unprotected heights and moving
machinery. The claimant can tolerate occasional exposure to
atmospheric irritants, such as dust, odors, fumes, and gases. She
also needs a cane for balance and ambulation.

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6.

The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a
benefits clerk, II and customer service representative/telephone
solicitor. This work does not require the performance of workrelated activities precluded by the claimant' s residual functional
capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7.

The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from August 1, 2012, through the date of this
decision (20 CFR 404.1520(±) and 416.920(±)).

(Tr. at 15-23)

Ill.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, " [t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S . 574, 585-86 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be- or,
alternatively, is - genuinely disputed must be supported either by "citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by "showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A) & (B). If the
moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court will "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,

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and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ." Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586; see also Podobnik v. US. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating
party opposing summary judgment "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks
omitted). The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;" a factual dispute is genuine
only where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50
(internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S . 317, 322 (1986) (stating
entry of summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party' s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial"). Thus, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in
support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment; there must be "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find" for the nonmoving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S . at 252 .
The same standard applies to cross-motions for summary judgment. See Appelmans v.

City of Phi/a., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987). "The filing of cross-motions for summary
judgment does not require the court to grant summary judgment for either party." Bentzen v.

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Astrue, 46 F. Supp. 3d 489, 498 (D. Del. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B.

Review of the ALJ's Findings

The Court must uphold the Commissioner's factual decisions if they are supported by
"substantial evidence." See 42 U.S .C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); see also Monsour Med. Ctr. v.
Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence" may be satisfied by less
than a preponderance of the evidence but requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). As the United States Supreme Court
has noted, substantial evidence "does not mean a large or significant amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner' s findings, the
Court may not undertake a de nova review of the Commissioner' s decision and may not re-weigh
the evidence ofrecord. See Monsour, 806 F.2d at 1190-91. The Court' s review is limited to the
evidence that was actually presented to the ALJ. See Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593-95
(3d Cir. 2001 ). However, evidence that was not submitted to the ALJ can be considered by the
Appeals Council or the District Court as a basis for remanding the matter to the Commissioner
for further proceedings, pursuant to the sixth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Matthews, 239
F.3d at 592. "Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ and only should be
disturbed on review if not supported by substantial evidence." Gonzalez v. Astrue, 537 F. Supp.
2d 644, 657 (D. Del. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Third Circuit has explained that a "single piece of evidence will not satisfy the
substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by

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countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence,
particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) - or if it really
constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion." Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir.
1983). Thus, the inquiry is not whether the Court would have made the same determination but,
rather, whether the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable. See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d
1211 , 1213 (3d Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing Court would have decided the case differently,
it must give deference to the ALJ and affirm the Commissioner' s decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence. See Monsour, 806 F .2d at 1190-91.
C.

Disability Determination Process

The Social Security Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent
persons under the Social Security Income ("SSI") program. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). A "disability"
is defined for purposes of SSI (and for purposes of disability insurance benefits) as the inability
to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(l)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is disabled "only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B);

see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22 (2003).
In determining whether a person is disabled, the Commissioner is required to perform a
five-step sequential analysis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d

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422, 427-28 (3d Cir. 1999). If a finding of disability or nondisability can be made at any point in
the sequential process, the Commissioner will not review the claim further. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
At step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in any
substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I) (mandating
finding of nondisability when claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity). If the claimant
is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, step two requires the Commissioner to determine
whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment or a combination of impairments that
is severe. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (mandating finding of nondisability when
claimant's impairments are not severe), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant's impairments are
severe, the Commissioner, at step three, compares the claimant's impairments to a list of
impairments that are presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful work. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. When a claimant's
impairment or its equivalent matches an impairment in the listing, the claimant is presumed
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If a claimant' s impairment,
either singly or in combination, fails to meet or medically equal any listing, the analysis
continues to steps four and five. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant retains the RFC to
perform his past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv) (stating
that claimant is not disabled if claimant is able to return to past relevant work); Plummer, 186
F.3d at 428. A claimant's RFC is "that which [the] individual is still able to do despite the
limitations caused by his or her impairment(s)." Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir.

10

2001). "The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to her past relevant
work." Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.
If the claimant is unable to return to her past relevant work, step five requires the

Commissioner to determine whether the claimant' s impairments preclude her from adjusting to
any other available work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g) (mandating finding of
nondisability when claimant can adjust to other work) ; Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. At this last
step, the burden is on the Commissioner to show that the claimant is capable of performing other
available work before denying disability benefits. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. In other
words, the Commissioner must prove that "there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in
the national economy which the claimant can perform, consistent with her medical impairments,
age, education, past work experience, and [RFC]." Id. In making this determination, the ALJ
must analyze the cumulative effect of all of the claimant's impairments. See id. At this step, the
ALJ often seeks the assistance of a vocational expert. See id.

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

The ALJ's Finding as to Plaintiff's RFC

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the
ALJ's findings regarding Ransom' s RFC were supported by substantial evidence. (See D.I. 15,
21) Plaintiff contends that they were not, while the Commissioner takes the opposite position.
A claimant' s RFC is the most a person can do despite his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545( a). This assessment is based on all of the relevant evidence in the case record. See
id. In Plaintiffs view, the ALJ improperly characterized the medical evidence, failed to consider
all of the relevant limitations in the record, and, thus, erred in finding Plaintiff could perform

11

light work activities. (See D.I. 17 at 16)
Light work is defined (in part) as:
lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds ... [A] job is in this
category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing ....
Relatively few unskilled light jobs are performed in a seated
position.
SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251 (Jan. 1, 1983).
In arguing against the RFC found by the ALJ, Ransom points to medical impairments

noted by Dr. Silversteen, such as chronic fatigue, balance problems, increased deep tendon
reflexes, difficulty with memory, instability while walking, poor coordination, and difficulty
solving problems.2 (Tr. at 282) Additionally, although Dr. Kataria did not find Plaintiff to be
disabled, he did state that Plaintiff did not have the RFC to perform light work, but only for
sedentary work. (Tr. at 110) This is in conflict with Dr. Borek's finding that Plaintiff did have
the RFC to perform the light work. (Tr. at 93) Plaintiff also argues that while she lives
independently, she accomplishes tasks only with outside assistance or in a great amount of pain.
(See D.I. 17 at 12) (citing Bentzen, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 498)

Defendant counters that Plaintiffs medical history often contradicts her claimed
impairments. (See D.I. 22 at 15) Defendant cites Dr. Silversteen' s frequent inconsistent medical
findings. (Tr. at 268, 284) Additionally, Defendant argues that Dr. Silversteen' s neurologic
examination notes state Plaintiffs speech, comprehension, memory, and gait were all normal.
(See D.I. 22 at 7) Defendant also points to Plaintiffs independent living situation, as Plaintiff

prepares meals, vacuums, and does laundry. (Tr. at 217)

2

The issue of whether Dr. Silversteen' s medical opinions were accorded enough weight
by the ALJ is addressed in the next section.

The Court agrees with Defendant that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ' s
findings on Plaintiffs RFC. Substantial evidence does not need to be a large amount of
evidence, but may be simply enough relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. See Pierce, 497 U.S. at 565.
Dr. Borek determined that Plaintiff had the capacity for light work. (Tr. at 93) The
opinions of State agency medical physicians "can be given weight only insofar as they are
supported by evidence," including "the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole,
including other medical opinions, and any explanation for the opinion provided by the State
agency medical ... consultant or other program physician." S.S.R. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at
*2 (July 2, 1996). Substantial evidence (as cited throughout this Opinion) - including Dr.
Silversteen' s repeated findings upon examination of Plaintiff - are consistent with the RFC
found by Dr. Borek. While Dr. Kataria found that Plaintiff had the RFC only for sedentary (and
not also light) work, Dr. Kataria also concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. at 109, 111 ),
so Dr. Borek's opinion is not so inconsistent with the overall record as to fail to be supported by
substantial evidence.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs first issue on appeal does not provide a meritorious basis for
granting her motion or for denying the Commissioner' s motion.

B.

The ALJ's Decision as to the Weight to Give Dr. Silversteen's Opinions

The parties seek summary judgment on the issue of whether the ALJ's analysis of Dr.
Silversteen's medical opinions was supported by substantial evidence. (See D.I. 15, 21)
Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner erred in not according adequate weight to Dr.
Silversteen's opinions, as required by Social Security Ruling 96-5p, which provides: " [O]pinions

13

from any medical source on issues reserved to the Commissioner must never be ignored." (D.I.
17 at 22 (citing SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 (July 2, 1996))) In support, Plaintiff cites 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2), which states:
If we find that a treating source's medical opinion on the issue(s)
of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling weight.

Defendant responds that Dr. Silversteen's opinions were entitled to "little weight" (as the
ALJ found (Tr. 21 -22)) because they were unsupported by, and are instead inconsistent with,
substantial evidence in the record. (See D.I. 22) Defendant notes numerous instances in which
objective testing conflicts with Dr. Silversteen's statements. (See D.I. 22 at 14) Additionally,
Defendant contends Plaintiffs neurologic exams were largely normal, thereby failing to support
Dr. Silversteen' s opinion that Plaintiff is incapable of performing any work. (See id.)
It is not for the Court to re-weigh the medical opinions in the record. See Gonzalez, 537

F. Supp. 2d at 659. Rather, the Court must determine whether substantial evidence exists to
support the ALJ' s weighing of those opinions. See id. Here, the ALJ considered all relevant
factors in determining how much weight to accord Dr. Silversteen's opinion, and identified
inconsistencies between Dr. Silversteen' s opinion and his treatment notes. (Tr. at 22)
For example, during an August 7, 2014 office visit, Dr. Silversteen noted that Plaintiff
had gait difficulties. (Tr. at 389) Yet, during that same visit, Dr. Silversteen observed in his
detailed neurologic exam that Plaintiffs gait was normal. (Tr. at 391) Similar discrepancies
appear throughout Dr. Silversteen's records. (See, e. g. , Tr. at 381,383) (noting Plaintiffs leg
was dragging, but also writing Plaintiff's gait was normal and she had full strength in limbs)

14

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Dr. Silversteen's medical opinions
were inconsistent with his treatment notes and conflicted with two State agency physicians'
findings. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision not to accord controlling or
even substantial weight to his opinion even though he is a treating source. Bentzen, 46 F. Supp.
3d at 501.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs second issue on appeal does not provide a meritorious basis for
granting her motion or for denying the Commissioner's motion.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court will grant Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order
follows.

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