Morris v. Phelps et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 3/29/2021. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JASON MORRIS,

:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
Civ. Act. No. 17-1813-RGA
:
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner,
:
ROBERT MAY, Warden, and ATTORNEY
:
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE,
:
:
:
Respondents. 1
______________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Christopher S. Koyste, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Petitioner.
Kathryn Joy Garrison, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

March 29, 2021
Wilmington, Delaware

Commissioner Claire DeMatteis and Warden Robert May have replaced former Commissioner
Robert M. Coupe and former Warden Dana Metzger, original parties to this case. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(d).

1

/s Richard G. Andrews
ANDREWS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pending before the Court is an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) filed by Petitioner Jason Morris. (D.I. 2) The State filed an Answer
in opposition, to which Petitioner filed a Reply. (D.I. 17; D.I. 18) For the reasons discussed, the
Court will deny Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition.
I.

BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine

(“PWITD”) and second degree conspiracy. (D.I. 16 at 47-61; D.I. 17 at 1-2) On that same day,
the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner as follows: (1) for PWITD, as an habitual offender to
twelve years of Level V incarceration; and (2) for second degree conspiracy, to two years at
Level V, suspended for six months of Level IV confinement, followed by eighteen months of
Level III probation. (D.I. 16 at 60-61; D.I. 17 at 2) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
On March 1, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion to modify his sentence, which the Superior
Court denied on May 18, 2010. (D.I. 16 at 7)
On May 8, 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61 motion”). (D.I. 16 at 8). The Superior
Court appointed the Office of Conflict Counsel to represent Petitioner. (Id.) On April 1, 2016,
Petitioner’s counsel filed an amended Rule 61 motion, asserting that the State violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by failing to inform Petitioner prior to the entry of his plea about
an evidence mishandling scandal at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”). (D.I.
16-6 at 34-89) Petitioner also contended that his lack of knowledge about the OCME evidence
mishandling was material to his decision to plead guilty and, therefore, his guilty plea was
involuntary pursuant to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). (Id.) The Superior

Court denied the Rule 61 motion on November 16, 2016. See State v. Morris, 2016 WL
7229892, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2016). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that
decision on October 18, 2017. See Morris v. State, 173 A.3d 85 (Table), 2017 WL 4711480
(Del. Oct. 18, 2017).
On December 18, 2017, Petitioner filed the § 2254 Petition pending before the Court.
The State asserts that the Petition should be denied as time-barred and, alternatively, as meritless.
The relevant information regarding the OCME evidence mishandling is set forth below:
In February 2014, the Delaware State Police (“DSP”) and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began an investigation into
criminal misconduct occurring in the Controlled Substances Unit
of the OCME.
The investigation revealed that some drug evidence sent to
the OCME for testing had been stolen by OCME employees in
some cases and was unaccounted for in other cases. Oversight of
the lab had been lacking, and security procedures had not been
followed. One employee was accused of “dry labbing” (or
declaring a test result without actually conducting a test of the
evidence) in several cases. Although the investigation remains
ongoing, to date, three OCME employees have been suspended
(two of those employees have been criminally indicted), and the
Chief Medical Examiner has been fired.
There is no evidence to suggest that OCME employees tampered
with drug evidence by adding known controlled substances to the
evidence they received for testing in order to achieve positive
results and secure convictions. That is, there is no evidence that
the OCME staff “planted” evidence to wrongly obtain convictions.
Rather, the employees who stole the evidence did so because it in
fact consisted of illegal narcotics that they could resell or take for
personal use.
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1204-05 (Del. 2015).

2

II.

PETITION IS NOT TIME-BARRED
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) prescribes a one-

year period of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners, which begins to run
from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to statutory and equitable tolling.
See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)
(statutory tolling).
Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition, filed in 2017, is subject to the one-year limitations period
contained in § 2244(d)(1). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The State contends
that the starting date for the limitations period is February 24, 2010, the date on which
Petitioner’s conviction became final. (D.I. 17 at 8) Petitioner, however, appears to assert that he
is entitled to one of two later starting dates for AEDPA’s limitations period under §
2244(d)(1)(D), either: (1) January 14, 2014, because that is the earliest date the OCME evidence
misconduct was discovered (D.I. 2 at 10); or (2) April 15, 2014, because that is date on which
3

the State began to notify defendants in active cases that multiple cases had been compromised by
the OCME evidence scandal. (D.I. 2 at 10).
Petitioner’s primary claim is that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary under Brady v.
United States because the State’s failure to disclose the OCME evidence misconduct scandal
prior to his plea violated Brady v. Maryland. I have previously determined how to address the
timeliness of cases asserting Brady/involuntary guilty plea claims premised on the OCME
evidence misconduct scandal. See Owens v. DeMatteis, 2019 WL 4722654 (D. Del. Sept. 26,
2019); Trower v. DeMatteis, 2019 WL 4722711 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 2019); Wright v. DeMatteis,
2019 WL 4806146 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2019); McNeill v. DeMatteis, 2019 WL 4820035 (D. Del.
Sept. 30, 2019). Basically, for purposes of the inquiry under § 2244(d)(1)(D), whether or not the
OCME misconduct affected, or could have affected, Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty depends
on whether the drugs in his case were tested by the OCME and the results were provided to him
prior to entering a plea. Therefore, in order to trigger a later starting date under § 2244(d)(1)(D)
for the instant involuntary plea/Brady claim, Petitioner must show that (1) the drug evidence in
his case was tested by the OCME and he received the results of the test before entering a plea;
and (2) exercising due diligence, he could not have learned that the evidence in his case may
have been part of the compromised drug evidence involved in the OCME scandal until April 15,
2014. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner has met this burden.
First, Petitioner pled guilty on January 25, 2010. The letter transmitting the OCME
report concerning the drug evidence in this case to Petitioner’s defense counsel is signed and
dated January 4, 2010, and presumably, the OCME report was provided to Petitioner on or
around that date. (D.I. 17-1 at 1) Second, facts sufficient to provide a basis for a good faith
claim that state employees engaged in impermissible conduct were not available to defense
4

counsel representing other prisoners until April 15, 2014 when, as part of its Brady v. Maryland
obligation, the State informed other defendants that all drug evidence housed at the lab was
susceptible to compromise. 2 (D.I. 23 at 7)
Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that AEDPA’s limitations period in this
case began to run on April 15, 2014. 3 Accordingly, to comply with the one-year limitations
period, Petitioner had to file his § 2254 petition by April 15, 2015. See Wilson v. Beard, 426
F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) and (e) applies to
federal habeas petitions); Phlipot v. Johnson, 2015 WL 1906127, at *3 n. 3 (D. Del. Apr. 27,
2

Although the Delaware State Police (“DSP”) began its investigation into compromised drug
evidence on January 15, 2014, and the Attorney General’s office informed defense counsel on
February 21, 2014 that an investigation into the evidentiary practices at the OCME had started on
February 20, 2014, the Court concludes that sufficient facts for the instant argument were not
available until the State provided the relevant information on April 15, 2014. See Biden:
Investigation of State Medical Examiner’s Drug Lab Reveals Systemic Failings, Urgent Need for
Reform, Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen.’s Website (June 19, 2014),
https://news.delaware.gov/2014/06/19/biden-investigation-of-state-medical-examiners-drug-labreveals-systemic-failings-urgent-need-for-reform/.
3

The State relies on Harmon v. Johnson, 2016 WL 183899, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2016) to
support its argument that § 2254(d)(1)(D) is inapplicable and therefore cannot trigger a later
starting date in Petitioner’s case. The Court disagrees, because Harmon is distinguishable.
Harmon argued that his conviction should be vacated because the State violated Brady v.
Maryland by failing to disclose its knowledge of the OCME drug evidence scandal during his
plea process and by waiting until long after his conviction in 2012 to disclose the tampering. See
Harmon, 2016 WL 183899, at *2-3. However, since the drug evidence in Harmon was never
sent to the OCME for testing, the court found that the revelation of the OCME scandal in 2014
could not constitute a new factual predicate for Harmon’s substantive Brady v. Maryland claim.
Id. Here, unlike Harmon, Petitioner argues that the alleged lack of knowledge of the OCME
misconduct was material to his decision to plead guilty, thereby rendering his guilty plea
involuntary under Brady v. United States. In addition, unlike in Harmon, the drug evidence in
Petitioner’s case was sent to the OCME for further testing after the initial field test, and
Petitioner received a copy of the OCME report prior to pleading guilty. Thus, given these
circumstances, the Court concludes that the revelation of the OCME scandal constitutes a new
factual predicate for Petitioner’s instant argument.
5

2015) (AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is calculated according to the anniversary method,
i.e., the limitations period expires on the anniversary of the date it began to run).
Petitioner did not file the instant § 2254 Petition until December 18, 2017, approximately
two years and eight months after the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Therefore,
the Petition is time-barred, unless the limitations period can be statutorily or equitably tolled.
See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)
(statutory tolling).
A. Statutory Tolling
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed application for state collateral review tolls
AEDPA’s limitations period during the time the application is pending in the state courts,
including any post-conviction appeals, provided that the application is filed during AEDPA’s
one-year limitations period. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2000). However,
the limitations period is not tolled during the ninety days a petitioner has to file a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court regarding a judgment denying a state postconviction motion. See Stokes v. Dist. Attorney of Philadelphia, 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir.
2001).
Here, when Petitioner filed his Rule 61 motion on May 8, 2014, twenty-three days of
AEDPA’s limitations period had already expired. The Rule 61 motion tolled the limitations
from May 8, 2014 through October 18, 2017, the date on which the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the motion. The limitations clock started to run again on
October 19, 2017, and ran 59 days until Petitioner filed the instant Petition on December 18,
2017. Therefore, the Petition is timely.
6

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a state’s highest court has adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the

federal court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d). A claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
if the state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a
procedural or some other ground. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may only be granted if the state court’s
decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or the state court’s decision was
an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Appel v. Horn,
250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). This deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies even “when a
state court’s order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been
denied”; as recently explained by the Supreme Court, “it may be presumed that the state court
adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural
principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-100 (2011).
Finally, a federal court must presume that the state court’s determinations of factual
issues are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. This
presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is only
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also
Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341
(2003) (stating that the clear and convincing standard in § 2254(e)(1) applies to factual issues,
whereas the unreasonable application standard of § 2254(d)(2) applies to factual decisions).

7

IV.

DISCUSSION
Following the discovery of the evidence mishandling at the OCME, Delaware’s Office of

Defense Services (“ODS”) and conflict counsel filed more than 700 Rule 61 motions on behalf
of numerous defendants convicted of drug-related charges. Since the underlying legal issues
raised in these motions were largely the same, the Superior Court crafted a procedure for
efficiently and logically addressing the majority of the Rule 61 motions. As the Court explained
in State v. Irwin:
The investigation, although still ongoing, has thus far resulted in
three OCME employees being suspended, two of those employees
being indicted in this Court, and the firing of the Chief Medical
Examiner. However, the full extent of the criminal conduct at the
OCME drug lab is still unknown.
The issues uncovered, and those anticipated to be revealed as the
investigation continues, have prompted hundreds of motions from
indicted and convicted defendants at all stages of the criminal
process. In an attempt to logically and procedurally address these
motions, the Court decided to first attempt to address cases that
were awaiting trial. To do so, the Court reached out to the State
and the defense bar to schedule hearings on pending matters within
that category. With the professional coordination of all parties
involved, the Court has held two hearings to gather evidence
regarding the events at the OCME drug lab. The first hearing,
which started on July 8, 2014, involved defendants Dilip Nyala
(“Nyala”) and Michael Irwin (“Irwin”). The second hearing,
which was held in late August 2014, involved defendants Hakeem
Nesbitt (“Nesbitt”) and Braaheim Reed (“Reed”). During that
August hearing, testimony uncovered that evidence in the Reed
case had a significant discrepancy between what the officers seized
and what was actually tested at the independent lab retained by the
State. As a result, the State entered a nolle prosequi of the Reed
case. Therefore, this Court's decision relates only to the Nesbitt,
Irwin and Nyala cases. By deciding these three cases the Court's
intent is to establish a framework for addressing the volume of
cases awaiting trial for drug offenses that at one time were stored
at the OCME drug lab. The facts surrounding these specific cases
involve drug evidence that was sent to the OCME drug lab for
testing but was never actually tested by a chemist at that location.
However, it is expected that the Court's ruling will also have an
8

impact on cases where the drugs were tested by the OCME
drug lab, and potentially the hundreds of petitions that have
been filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
Defendants are challenging the State's ability to use drug evidence
at trial through filing various motions in limine. The Court will
first highlight the specific factual and procedural background of
each case, summarize guidance found from other jurisdictions
facing similar drug lab improprieties, decide the principles to be
used for cases involving drug evidence sent to the OCME drug lab
and finally apply those principles to each specific defendant.
State v. Irwin, 2014 WL 6734821, at *1–2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2014) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). Similarly, in State v. Miller, the Superior Court explained:
The instant motions are just a small sample of the influx of filings
made by and on behalf of over 700 criminal defendants following
what has come to be known as “the OCME scandal.” The ODS
hand-selected the motions in these eight cases for the Court to
decide and, because motions filed by the ODS in other cases
are identical to those involved here, its decision in these
matters should resolve many of the pending Rule 61 motions
before the Court.
State v. Miller, 2017 WL 1969780, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 11, 2017) (emphasis added). Two
other pivotal decisions often cited by the Delaware state courts when adjudicating the numerous
other Rule 61 motions based on the OCME evidence mishandling scandal are [Ira] Brown v.
State, 108 A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015) and Aricidiacono v. State, 125 A.3d 677 (Del. 2015).
Petitioner presented in his own Rule 61 motion the same two inter-related arguments
presented by many of the other 700 defendants: (1) the State violated Brady v. Maryland when it
failed to disclose the drug evidence scandal at the OCME during Petitioner’s plea process in
January 2010 (D.I. 16-6 at 53-65); and (2) Petitioner’s lack of knowledge about the OCME drug
evidence scandal was material to his decision to plead guilty, thereby rendering his guilty plea
involuntary pursuant to Brady v. United States. (D.I. 16-6 at 65-67)

9

In his Rule 61 proceeding, Petitioner attempted to distinguish his case from the other
OCME evidence mishandling cases with the following argument:
Recent Delaware Supreme Court cases addressing the OCME
scandal have primarily focused on the impact the scandal has had
on plea cases. However, none of them address whether the State
violated Brady [v. Maryland] when a defendant accepted a plea on
the eve of trial with the potential jury wait[ing] to be selected. In
Ira Brown [v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1204-05 (Del. 2015)], the
Delaware Supreme Court, relying on United States v. Ruiz, [536
U.S. 622 (2002)], held that a defendant who admits his guilt when
he plead guilty, is not permitted to have his case reopen[ed] to
make claims challenging the chain of custody. As previously
argued, Ruiz should only read to apply to fast track cases months
before trial.
Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court
erroneously held that “Ruiz prevents [a defendant] from reopening
his case to make claims that do not address his guilty plea, and
involve impeachment evidence that would only be relevant at
trial.” This is incorrect as the decision to accept the plea is based
in part upon the strength of the State’s case and would include
factoring in information that could be used to challenge the State’s
evidence. [Petitioner’s] acceptance of the plea on the eve of trial
was based upon the notion that the State had provided all Brady [v.
Maryland] information that it possessed and was required to
disclose in anticipation of trial. When the State did not disclose
any Brady [v. Maryland] information on the eve of trial,
[Petitioner] only then decided to accept the plea. The Delaware
Supreme Court’s holding in effect allows the State to withhold
crucial Brady [v. Maryland] information from a defendant in the
hopes that they will accept a plea […].
(D.I. 16-6 at 81-82) Petitioner argued, “Ruiz should only be read to hold that the government is
not required to disclose impeachment information to a defendant in a fast track plea agreement
setting. For a plea on the eve of trial or during trial, the normal requirements of Brady must
apply, as Ruiz does not touch upon this issue.” (D.I. 16-6 at 76)
The Superior Court rejected Petitioner’s interpretation of Ruiz and his attempt to
distinguish his case from the other Rule 61 OCME evidence mishandling cases. Relying on the

10

Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Ira Brown v. State, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s
Rule 61 motion as meritless:
Like other recent Rule 61 movants, [Petitioner] identifies only
impeachment evidence that would have affected his decision to
accept the plea. While the argument headings and several passages
contain passing reference to exculpatory evidence, the argument
itself connects that language with no examples of exculpatory
evidence related to the OCME scandal.
And thus, like other recent Rule 61 movants, [Petitioner’s] plea of
guilty, made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, prevents
him from attacking his plea or conviction on Brady grounds when
his sole allegation is that the State did not provide impeachment
evidence to him. He waived the right to receive such evidence by
his plea. As Ruiz and the Delaware Supreme Court have made
clear, Brady is not implicated by [Petitioner’s] acceptance of a plea
agreement.
There can be no question on this record that [Petitioner’s] plea was
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. He signed his name to
possessing cocaine on not one but two separate forms: the plea
agreement form and the Truth-in-Sentencing form. When asked by
this Court whether he was pleading guilty because he was in fact
guilty, he responded in the affirmative. Nothing in the
circumstances of the plea colloquy or any of the evidence brought
forward by [Petitioner] leads the Court to doubt its earlier
conclusion that [Petitioner’s] plea was valid.
[Petitioner] would have us reverse our Supreme Court's
interpretation of Ruiz, arguing that its holding was “erroneous[ ]”
and “incorrect.” This Court can discern no reason to depart from
our Supreme Court's binding precedent. Nor is it disposed to
search high and low for such a reason:
For it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents, where the same points come again in
litigation: as well to keep the scale of justice even
and steady, and not liable to waver with every new
judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case
being solemnly declared and determined, what
before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is
now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from
according to his private sentiments: he being sworn
11

to determine, not according to his own private
judgment, but according to the known laws and
customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a
new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.
Put in more concrete terms, under the doctrine of stare decisis,
“[o]nce a point of law has been settled by decision of [our
Supreme] Court, ‘it forms a precedent which is not afterwards to
be departed from or lightly overruled or set aside ... and [it] should
be followed except for urgent reasons and upon clear manifestation
of error.” ’ The doctrine “operates to fix a specific legal result to
facts in a pending case based on judicial precedent directed to
identical or similar facts in a previous case in the same court or one
higher in the judicial hierarchy.” The Court thus declines
[Petitioner’s] invitation to depart from the interpretation that has
been settled upon by the Delaware Supreme Court.
His attempt to distinguish his case from all the contrary cases
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court likewise falls far short of
the mark. The essential point of distinction [Petitioner] propounds
is that “none of [the Court's decisions] address whether the State
violated Brady when a defendant accepted a plea on the eve of trial
with the potential jury waiting to be selected.” But it appears that
[Petitioner] has not assiduously examined the record in those cases.
For example, Ira Brown v. State, which [Petitioner] references in
the very same paragraph, involved a defendant who pleaded guilty
on the day he was scheduled for trial.
Because [Petitioner] waived his right to receive impeachment
material when he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded
guilty, he has not asserted a colorable claim that there was a
miscarriage of justice under Brady v. Maryland.
State v. Morris, 2016 WL 7229892, at *4–5 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2016). Petitioner appealed,
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment “on the basis of and
for the reasons stated in its December 12, 2016 order.” Morris, 2017 WL 4711480, at *1.
In this case, Petitioner alleges two Claims for relief: (1) the Delaware state courts
erroneously concluded that Petitioner was precluded from withdrawing his guilty plea made on

12

the day of trial 4 when the State failed to comply with its Brady v. Maryland obligations; and (2)
the Delaware state courts erroneously denied Petitioner’s ability to further develop the factual
record in relation to his postconviction claim. (D.I. 2 at 2; D.I. 15 at 2)
A. Claim One: The Effect of the State’s Alleged Violation of Brady v. Maryland on
Petitioner’s Guilty Plea
On the surface, Petitioner’s contention in Claim One appears fairly straightforward,
namely, that the Delaware state courts erroneously concluded that Petitioner was precluded from
withdrawing his guilty plea. (D.I. 2 at 2; D.I. 15 at 2) The Court, however, has found nothing in
the record to indicate that Petitioner formally asked to withdraw his guilty plea during the Rule
61 proceeding, and the Delaware state court decisions do not phrase the issue in Petitioner’s Rule
61 proceeding as a request to withdraw his guilty plea. 5 In addition, Petitioner’s presentation of
the arguments in support of Claim One in this proceeding reveal that the Claim actually consists
of two prongs. 6 First, and what the Court identifies as Claim One (A), Petitioner contends that
4

I assume for the purposes of this opinion that the guilty plea was on the day of trial. The docket
sheet, however, suggests a different gloss on the proceedings. It shows that trial was scheduled
for January 19, 2010. At final case review on January 13, 2010, the docket entry is “Case
Review Calendar Final Case Review Continued. Defendant’s Request-for Plea on 1-25-10.”
There is no entry for January 19th. On January 25th, the entry is, “Trial Calendar/Plea Hearing:
Pled Guilty and Sentenced.” (D.I. 16 at A2, Entries 14, 19, 22). On the other hand, the plea
transcript refers to “today’s plea offer.” (Id. at A47).
5

In fact, the final sentence in Petitioner’s Amended Rule 61 motion uses the following language:
Petitioner’s “conviction and sentence must be reversed and remanded for a trial and the State
must disclose all Brady information to [Petitioner].” (D.I. 16-6 at 88)
6

For instance, the title of Claim One in the Petition and Memorandum in Support is as follows:
“The State courts erroneously concluded that Petitioner was precluded from withdrawing his
guilty plea made on the day of trial when the State failed to comply with its Brady v. Maryland
Obligations.” (D.I. 2 at 10; D.I. 15 at 22) The documents then present three subarguments to
support Claim One: (A) “The State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to provide [Petitioner]
with exculpatory and impeachment information regarding the OCME’s misconduct which
affected the reliability of its work product and the credibility of its employees” (D.I. 15 at 37);
(B) “The State Court erroneously concluded that Petitioner was precluded from withdrawing his
guilty plea due to the State’s failure to timely provide Brady information” (D.I. 2 at 21; D.I. 15 at
13

that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose to Petitioner before he entered his
guilty plea the information about the OCME evidence mishandling scandal, and that the
Delaware state courts unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland and Ruiz in holding otherwise.
(D.I. 18 at 10-12) Second, and what the Court identifies as Claim One (B), Petitioner contends
that the State’s Brady v. Maryland violation amounted to inducement or coercion, and that the
Delaware state courts unreasonably applied Brady v. United States and unreasonably determined
the facts when holding that the State’s Brady v. Maryland violation did not render his guilty plea
involuntary. (D.I. 18 at 12-14) This two-pronged argument mirrors the argument Petitioner
presented in his Rule 61 proceeding 7 which, as previously explained, the Delaware state courts
denied as meritless. Therefore, Petitioner will only be entitled to habeas relief if the Delaware
state court decisions 8 were either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law or, with respect to Claim One (B), constituted an unreasonable
determination of the facts based on the evidence adduced in connection with the Rule 61
proceeding.

44); and (C) “The State failed to consider that the State’s non-disclosure of Brady materials
induced Petitioner into pleading guilty” (D.I. 2 at 24; D.I. 15 at 50). A more in-depth review of
the Petition and Petitioner’s supporting memorandum, however, reveals that subarguments (A)
and (B) really comprise one subargument, namely, that the state courts erroneously applied
Brady v. Maryland and Ruiz in concluding that the State’s failure to timely inform Petitioner
about the OCME evidence mishandling scandal did not violate Brady v. Maryland. Similarly,
subargument (C) presents a separate but related contention, namely, that the alleged Brady v.
Maryland violation rendered Petitioner’s guilty plea involuntary under Brady v. United States.
7

(D.I. 16-6 at 74-88)

8

The Delaware Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Superior Court’s decision “on the basis
of and for the reasons stated” in that decision. Therefore, the Court will refer to the Delaware
state courts rather than the Delaware Supreme Court. Morris, 2017 WL 4711480, at *1.
14

1. Claim One (A): Brady v. Maryland and United States v. Ruiz
Petitioner contends that the Delaware state courts unreasonably applied Brady v.
Maryland and Ruiz in holding that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland by failing to
timely disclose material exculpatory and impeachment materials regarding the OCME evidence
mishandling. For the following reasons, the Court rejects Petitioner’s argument.
The clearly established federal law governing the State’s disclosure requirements to a
defendant is articulated in Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, United States v. Ruiz. Pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland, “[p]rosecutors have an affirmative duty ‘to disclose [Brady] evidence ... even
though there has been no request [for the evidence] by the accused,’ which may include evidence
known only to police.” Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 834 F.3d 263, 284 (3d Cir. 2016).
“To comply with Brady, prosecutors must ‘learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf.’” Id. In order to prevail on a Brady v. Maryland claim, a
petitioner must establish that: (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either
because it was exculpatory or it had impeachment value; (2) the prosecution suppressed the
evidence, “either willfully or inadvertently;” and (3) the evidence was material. See Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 252 (3d Cir. 2004).
In Ruiz, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that the Government is not
constitutionally required to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. The Ruiz Court explained:
It is particularly difficult to characterize impeachment information
as critical information of which the defendant must always be
aware prior to pleading guilty given the random way in which such
information may, or may not, help a particular defendant. The
degree of help that impeachment information can provide will
depend upon the defendant’s own independent knowledge of the
prosecution’s potential case—a matter that the Constitution does
not require prosecutors to disclose.
15

Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
Turning to the first prong of the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry, the Court notes that the Delaware
state courts correctly identified the Brady v. Maryland and Ruiz standards applicable to Claim
One (A). Consequently, the Delaware state court decisions were not contrary to clearly
established federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (“[A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision
applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner’s case [does]
not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause”).
The Court’s inquiry is not over, because it must also determine if the Delaware state
courts unreasonably applied the Brady v. Maryland and Ruiz standards to the facts of Petitioner’s
case. 9 Significantly, as recognized by the body of Delaware caselaw concerning the OCME
misconduct scandal, the OCME evidence mishandling constitutes impeachment evidence that
would only be useful if Petitioner had decided to go to trial. See Ira Brown, 108 A.3d at 120506, n.30 (holding that OCME evidence mishandling investigation constitutes impeachment
material in Brown’s case and in fact patterns like it); State v. Miller, 2017 WL 1969780, at *6
(Del. Super. Ct. May 11, 2017) (stating that all the hundreds of Rule 61 motions asserting similar
Brady v. Maryland claims argue that State suppressed valuable impeachment evidence when it
failed to disclose that drugs submitted to OCME were being tampered with and/or stolen from
lab). Since Ruiz specifically held that the Government is not constitutionally required to disclose
material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant, the

9

As previously explained, Petitioner contends that the Delaware state courts improperly relied
upon Ira Brown in denying Claim One. However, since the Ira Brown Court based its denial of
Brown’s OCME evidence misconduct claim upon Brady and Ruiz, the proper focus here is
whether the Delaware Supreme Court unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland and Ruiz in
Petitioner’s case.
16

Delaware state courts reasonably applied clearly established federal law in denying Claim One
(A). See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633.
Petitioner, however, contends that Ruiz is inapplicable to his case because it should be
interpreted as only applying to “guilty pleas which occur weeks and/or months prior to a trial
date, in contrast to guilty pleas entered only moments before a trial begins.” (D.I. 15 at 46) The
Court is not persuaded. First, and most importantly, Petitioner has not identified, and the Court
has not found, any Supreme Court case limiting the rationale of Ruiz to the context of “fast
track” plea bargaining. In fact, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that “a guilty plea makes
[case-related constitutional defects that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea] irrelevant to
the constitutional validity of the conviction,” “[b]ecause the defendant has admitted the charges
against him.” Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798, 805-06 (2018). The absence of any clearly
established federal law supporting Petitioner’s interpretation provides a sufficient reason for
denying relief under § 2254(d)(1).
The Court also is not persuaded by Petitioner’s interpretation of Ruiz. Although the
defendant in Ruiz was offered a “fast track” plea bargain, the Ruiz Court did not limit its holding
to fast track cases. Rather, the Ruiz Court framed the issue in broader terms. It summarized the
appellate decision as a guilty plea not being voluntary “unless the prosecutors first made the
same disclosure of material impeachment information that the prosecutors would have had to
make had the defendant insisted on a trial.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629. The Court then stated, “We
must decide whether the Constitution requires that preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment
information. We conclude that it does not.” Id. In addition, the Ruiz Court did not use limiting
language in its holding but, instead, stated broadly that “the Constitution does not require the
Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a

17

criminal defendant.” Id. at 633. Finally, Ruiz’s holding was based primarily on the nature of
impeachment evidence and its much greater importance to ensuring a fair trial rather than on
ensuring a voluntary guilty plea. Id. at 629.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Delaware state courts did not
unreasonably apply Brady v. Maryland and Ruiz in holding that Petitioner was precluded from
withdrawing his guilty plea despite the State’s failure to inform him before he entered his plea
about the OCME evidence mishandling scandal.
2. Claim One (B): Voluntariness of plea under Brady v. United States
Next, Petitioner argues that the Delaware state courts unreasonably applied Brady v.
United States when denying his argument that the State’s failure to disclose the OCME evidence
mishandling scandal before he entered his plea rendered his guilty plea involuntary. (D.I. 18 at
14-16) According to Petitioner, the Delaware state courts erred by focusing on his admission of
guilt during his plea colloquy, instead of “considering all of the relevant circumstances
surrounding” how the State secured his plea agreement, when holding that the failure to inform
him about the OCME evidence mishandling did not induce him to enter a guilty plea. (D.I. 2 at
25; D.I. 15 at 45)
Petitioner presented this argument to the Superior Court in his Rule 61 motion. The
Superior Court rejected the argument as meritless, relying on prior state court decisions
(Aricidiacono and Ira Brown) and Brady v. United States. See Morris, 2016 WL 7229892, at *3.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s holding for the reasons provided in
the Superior Court’s decision. Therefore, Petitioner’s argument that the Delaware state courts
improperly rejected his involuntary plea argument will only warrant habeas relief if the Delaware
state court decisions were either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Brady v. United

18

States, or constituted an unreasonable determination of facts based on the evidence adduced in
the Rule 61 proceeding.
In Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea is not rendered
invalid merely because it is entered to avoid a harsher sentence. In the Court’s words:
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755; see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)
(explaining a defendant may challenge a conviction based on a guilty plea on the ground that the
plea was not “voluntary and intelligent.”); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (noting that
the “longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents
a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative choices of action open to the
defendant.”). The Supreme Court further explained that a plea is involuntary if it is induced by
“actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant,”
or if the defendant is so “gripped” by fear or hope of leniency that he cannot “rationally weigh
the advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.” Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. at 750. But a plea is not involuntary “whenever motivated by the defendant’s
desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of
possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for
the crime charged.” Id. at 751.
“[T]he voluntariness of [a defendant’s] plea can be determined only by considering all of
the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 749. Although
19

the Supreme Court did not set forth in Brady v. United States a comprehensive list of the
“relevant circumstances” to be considered when assessing the voluntariness of a plea, the
Supreme Court specifically noted that a plea is not unintelligent just because later events prove
that going to trial may have been a wiser choice:
Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the
defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by
the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be
offered and accepted. Considerations like these frequently present
imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers;
judgments may be made that in the light of later events seem
improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time. The
rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not
require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did
not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision.
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he
discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus
misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely
penalties attached to alternative courses of action. More
particularly, absent misrepresentation or other impermissible
conduct by state agents, a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently
made in the light of the then applicable law does not become
vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the
plea rested on a faulty premise.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756–57.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970), where it held:
[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently
involves the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts
normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and
cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often be in
dispute. In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and
his counsel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the
State’s case . . . Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the
good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn
out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court’s
judgment might be on given facts.
Id. at 769-70 (1970). Thus,
20

[t]he rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does
not require that plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant
did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his
decision. A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely
because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his
calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757. In other words, “the Constitution, in respect to a
defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require complete knowledge of the
relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea . . . despite various forms of
misapprehension under which a defendant might labor.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630 (emphasis
added).
Finally, it is well-settled that a petitioner challenging the voluntary nature of his plea on
habeas review faces a heavy burden. See Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1994). The
“representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as
any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any
subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption
of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). Notably, there is
no requirement in the Constitution that defendant must be
permitted to disown his solemn admissions in open court that he
committed the act with which he is charged simply because it later
develops that the state would have had a weaker case than the
defendant had thought or that the maximum penalty then assumed
applicable has been held inapplicable in subsequent judicial
decisions.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757.
Turning to the first prong of the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry, the Court notes that the Delaware
state courts in Petitioner’s case correctly identified the Brady v. United States standard applicable
to Claim One (B), as did the Delaware Supreme Court decision (Aricidiacono) referenced by the

21

Delaware state courts. Therefore, the Delaware state courts’ denial of the instant involuntary
plea argument was not contrary to clearly established federal law.
The Court must also determine if the Delaware state courts unreasonably applied Brady v.
United States to the facts of Petitioner’s case when denying Claim One (B). The instant case is
just one in a series of cases concerning the OCME evidence mishandling that have been filed in
the District of Delaware. I have already considered and denied as meritless arguments identical
to Petitioner’s instant argument that the Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady v. United
States by focusing on the defendant’s admission of guilt during the plea colloquy. In McNeill v.
DeMatteis, for example, this Court held that the Delaware state courts’ reliance on Aricidiacono
when denying McNeill’s involuntary plea/Brady v. United States argument demonstrated that the
state courts had reasonably applied Brady v. United States’ “totality of the circumstances”
standard when rejecting McNeill’s involuntary plea/Brady v. United States claim. See McNeill,
2019 WL 4820035, at *6 -*13. The Third Circuit recently declined to grant a certificate of
appealability in McNeill, opining:
Jurists of reason would not dispute the District Court’s conclusion
that the Delaware Supreme Court’s rejection of [McNeill’s] claim
was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Brady v.
United States. [. . .] Among other things, jurists of reason would
reject [McNeill’s] contention that the Delaware Supreme Court
added a threshold test to the standard in Brady and did not consider
the relevant circumstances of the plea agreement as required by
Brady.
(See D.I. 27 in McNeill v. DeMatteis, Civ. A. No. 16-822-RGA (D. Del)).
Since the Delaware state courts relied on Aricidiacono when rejecting Petitioner’s
argument that his lack of knowledge about the OCME misconduct induced him to enter a guilty
plea, the Court applies the same reasoning as in McNeill and concludes that the Delaware state
courts did not unreasonably apply Brady v. United States by focusing on Petitioner’s admission
22

of guilt during the plea colloquy as one of the relevant circumstances required by Brady v.
United States as a basis for denying Claim One (B). Significantly, Petitioner does not dispute
that the drugs seized and tested in his case were not what they were purported to be; he admitted
his guilt during the plea colloquy; he does not assert his actual innocence; and he received a
benefit by pleading guilty because he was originally charged with four drug charges, three of
which were dropped as a result of his plea bargain. (D.I. 17 at 19-20; D.I. 18)
In addition, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Court finds that the Delaware state
courts did not unreasonably determine the facts in rejecting Claim One (B). Once again
expressing his disagreement with the Delaware state courts’ reliance on the Delaware Supreme
Court decision in Ira Brown, Petitioner contends, the “Delaware Supreme Court failed to
recognize that the factual environment had drastically evolved since its decision in [Ira] Brown.”
(D.I. 2 at 23-24; see also D.I. 15 at 48-50)
To reiterate, the Delaware state courts relied on several prior state court decisions – and
explicitly cited Aricidiacono and Ira Brown – when denying Petitioner’s argument that the
failure to disclose the OCME misconduct rendered his guilty plea involuntary. In Aricidiacono,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that “the poor evidence-handling practices at the OCME,
however regrettable,” did not entitle defendants who had freely admitted their guilt when
pleading guilty to relief under Rule 61. See Aricidiacono, 125 A.3d at 678-79. The Aricidiacono
Court found that, even if it were assumed that the conduct at the OCME amounted to egregious
government misconduct, “this conduct did not materially affect any of the pleas.” Id. at 680
n.24. Consistent with Aricidiacono, and as noted by Petitioner, the Delaware Supreme Court
found in Ira Brown, “There is no evidence to suggest that OCME employees tampered with drug
evidence by adding known controlled substances they received for testing” or that they had

23

“planted” evidence. See Ira Brown, 108 A.3d at 1204-05. By relying on Ira Brown and
Aricidiacono, the Delaware state courts in Petitioner’s case implicitly adopted the same factual
determination that Petitioner’s case was not affected by the overall evidence mishandling at the
OCME.
Petitioner, however, complains that Delaware state courts in his case erred in relying on
Ira Brown and Aricidiacono, because the following “facts” had changed after Ira Brown and
Aricidiacono were decided:
Forensic Chemist Irshad Bajwa was suspended and later
terminated after evidence he certified as cocaine was found to not
be any illegal substance. The Delaware Courts were also not
aware at the time of its decision in Ira Brown how pervasive the
misconduct at the OCME was. More specifically, the Delaware
Courts were not aware that the forensic chemist Patricia Phillips
would be terminated after three reported incidents of evidence
mishandling. Nor were the Delaware Courts aware that Bipin
Mody would be terminated for disregarding OCME policies and
procedures and for failing to timely perform drug analyses,
information that the DOJ erroneously concluded was not Brady.
(D.I. 15 at 50) In essence, Petitioner appears to argue that the Delaware state courts
unreasonably determined that the circumstances of his case did not differ sufficiently enough
from the circumstances in Ira Brown and Aricidiacono to find a link between the overall OCME
evidence misconduct and Petitioner’s decision to enter a guilty plea.
Since Petitioner challenges the factual basis of the Delaware state court decisions, the
relevant inquiry is whether those decisions were “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
When performing this inquiry, the Court must presume that the Delaware state courts’ factual
findings are correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1).

24

After reviewing Petitioner’s argument in the context of the entire record, the Court
concludes that Petitioner has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence rebutting the
Delaware state courts’ implicit factual determination that Petitioner failed to distinguish his
circumstances from those in Ira Brown and Aricidiacono sufficiently enough to demonstrate a
link between the general OCME evidence mishandling scandal and his case. Although Petitioner
contends that “the factual environment [had] drastically evolved from the time [the Delaware
Supreme Court] decided Ira Brown,” (D.I. 15 at 38), Petitioner fails to demonstrate how the
alleged “drastic” change affected his case. For instance, the “newly evolved” information
regarding the misconduct of chemists Bajwa and Mody is irrelevant because those individuals
did not analyze the drugs in Petitioner’s case. Rather, forensic chemist Theresa Moore analyzed
the drugs in his case. (D.I. 17-1 at 3) Also irrelevant is the fact that forensic chemist Patricia
Phillips was subsequently terminated for disregarding OCME policies, because: (1) Phillips did
not analyze the drugs in Petitioner’s case; and (2) Phillips’ alleged misconduct occurred in 2014
and 2015, 10 long after the evidence in Petitioner’s case was tested in 2010.
In addition, during a recorded interview with the police, Petitioner admitted that he “sells
crack cocaine to help pay the bills.” (D.I. 16-9 at 64) As for the discrepancies “in the reported
weights of the marijuana and cocaine” — which Petitioner does not explain — the Court
presumes Petitioner means any difference between the weight of the drugs at the time of seizure
(D.I. 16 at 36-39) and the different weights attributed to the drugs seized from Petitioner and one
of his co-conspirators that were included in the OCME report (D.I. 16 at 46). 11 However, while
“[T]hree incidents of evidence mishandling le[d] to [Phillips’s] suspension and resignation […]
in 2015.” Miller, 2017 WL 1969780, at *8. (See D.I. 16-3 at A355 & A359; D.I. 16-4 at A423).
10

11

It is a stretch to say the differences between the police reports and the OCME report are
“discrepancies.” The police report describes crack cocaine seized during a car stop as
“approximately 0.1 gram” and the OCME report describes it as having “a net weight of 0.16
25

such differences provide a basis for cross-examination and may result in impeachment, the
differences are not exculpatory, and are not indicative of actual innocence. See Word v. Carroll,
2004 WL 1941342, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 31, 2004). Finally, Petitioner’s conviction for PWITD
(16 Del. Code § 4751) did not depend upon the weight of the controlled substances, nor did the
offenses for which he was indicted. (D.I. 16 at 39-45). After considering these circumstances
together with Petitioner’s failure to assert his factual innocence during the plea colloquy or in
this proceeding, the Court concludes that the Delaware state courts did not unreasonably
determine the facts by holding that the existence of overall misconduct at the OCME was
insufficient to establish that Petitioner’s case was tainted by the same misconduct.
As explained by the Superior Court in State v. Irwin, another Delaware post-conviction
case concerning the OCME misconduct cited by the Aricidiacono Court: 12
[T]o the extent that there are discrepancies between the drugs
seized from a defendant and those tested by the lab, the individual
possibly responsible for that conduct has not been identified. . . .
[A]s best the Court can ascertain, and the parties have not provided
evidence to the contrary, none of the cases in other jurisdictions
that have led to the investigation of a particular crime lab have ever
resulted in all of the evidence being found unreliable and
inadmissible simply because that evidence was stored or tested at
the lab that has been compromised.
*

*

*

grams” (compare D.I. 16 at A31 with A41). The police report describes crack cocaine seized
from another person as five bags weighing “approximately 2.5 grams” and the OCME report
describes it as five bags “with a total net weight of 2.07 grams (compare D.I. 16 at A33 with
A41). In any event, to the extent this would be useful impeachment information, it was timely
disclosed.
12

Citing Irwin, the Aricidiacono Court stated, “In our prior decisions, we found that when
defendants freely admitted their guilt by admitting that they possessed illegal narcotics, their lack
of knowledge that the OCME’s evidence-handling practices were seriously flawed and that some
OCME employees had engaged in malfeasance, did not invalidate their pleas.” Aricidiacono, 125
A.3d at 678-78.
26

There is no evidence to date to suggest that proper testing of drugs
submitted did not occur, or that the chemists were submitting false
reports, or that critical evidence was withheld by the lab, or that
there was any misconduct by the police in violation of a
defendant’s rights. When the smoke clears, what we have is a lab
that suffered from systematic failures in protocol resulting in
evidence being stolen, for either sale or personal consumption, and
in some instances replaced with other drugs. While the defendants
urge this Court to find any evidence stored at the OCME drug lab
is ipso facto unreliable due to a lapse in management and protocol,
the Court finds that such a blanket ruling is inappropriate.
State v. Irwin, 2014 WL 6734821, at *7, *9 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2014).
In short, the OCME evidence mishandling scandal constitutes impeachment evidence that
cannot provide a basis for rendering a defendant’s counseled decision to enter a guilty plea
involuntary, especially when that defendant participated in a plea colloquy in open court, freely
acknowledged his guilt, and has not asserted his factual innocence. Although knowledge of the
OCME evidence mishandling scandal may have provided Petitioner with more bargaining
leverage, it cannot be said that the lack of that knowledge rendered his guilty plea involuntary.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Delaware Supreme Court did not
unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply Brady v. United States to the facts of
Petitioner’s case when it held that Petitioner’s guilty plea was not rendered involuntary due to his
lack of knowledge about the OCME evidence mishandling scandal. Accordingly, the Court will
deny Claim One (B) for failing to satisfy the standards set forth in § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).
3. Claim Two: The Superior Court Prevented Petitioner From Developing
Factual Record/Request for Evidentiary Hearing
Although Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing in his Rule 61 proceeding, the
Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion without holding a hearing and without addressing the
request. Petitioner alleges in Claim Two of his Petition:

27

In the present case, [Petitioner] was denied all ability to further
develop the factual record through compelled testimony.
Specifically, the State Court denied [Petitioner’s] request for an
evidentiary hearing to question various members of Delaware’s
Attorney General Office and former employees of the OCME
about their communications with one another and their knowledge
of the problems at the OCME. This information was critical to the
determination of the true scope and magnitude of the State’s Brady
violation. The State Court also denied [Petitioner] the ability to
investigate and create a factual record of the chain of custody of
the alleged drug evidence in this case as the State did not provide
nor was the State ordered to produce the necessary chain of
custody documents. Lastly, the State Court denied [Petitioner] the
ability to investigate and compel testimony in relation to the
OCME’s failure to test all of the alleged drug evidence in this case.
As the State Court denied [Petitioner] the ability to fully
investigate and to have a full and fair hearing in relation to his
Brady claim, the State Court did not provide [Petitioner] with
adequate factfinding procedures to create an adequate factual
record to rule upon [Petitioner’s] Brady claim. Thus, this Court
must hold an evidentiary hearing to allow for a complete and
accurate factual record to be created in relation to [Petitioner’s]
claim.
(D.I. 2 at 27 (footnote omitted)) Petitioner argues in his Memorandum filed in support of the
Petition:
Although Due Process required the State Courts to hold an
evidentiary hearing to allow [Petitioner] to further develop the
factual record in relation to his postconviction claim, the State
Courts concluded that no further expansion of the factual record
was necessary and erroneously denied [Petitioner’s] request for an
evidentiary hearing. As such, [Petitioner] respectfully requests that
this Court hold an evidentiary hearing to allow [Petitioner] to
present witnesses and evidence concerning his Brady claim.
(D.I. 15 at 54) Based on the foregoing, it appears that Claim Two alleges both a due process
violation as a ground for relief and a request for an evidentiary hearing. For the following
reasons, the Court concludes that neither assertion is availing.

28

1. Due process argument
It is not the province of a federal habeas court to determine whether state courts have
properly applied their own evidentiary rules. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
Rather, the only question for a habeas court is “whether the [challenged evidentiary decision or
instruction] by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates Due
Process.” Id. at 72.
Here, Petitioner has not shown that the absence of an evidentiary hearing for his Brady v.
Maryland claim denied him rights guaranteed by the due process clause. Delaware Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61(h) grants the Superior Court discretion in deciding whether to conduct
an evidentiary hearing in connection with a Rule 61 post-conviction relief motion. See Del.
Super. Ct. R. 61(h)(1),(3). The Superior Court does not abuse its discretion in denying an
evidentiary hearing request if the record is sufficient to establish that the petitioner’s claims lack
merit. See Johnson v. State, 129 A.3d 882 (Table), 2015 WL 8528889, at *4 (Del. Dec. 10,
2015).
In his Rule 61 proceeding, Petitioner asked the Delaware Superior Court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing “to compel testimony in relation to the scope of knowledge that various
members of the Attorney General’s Office were possibly aware of, but did not disclose to
[Petitioner].” (D.I. 16-6 at 71) Petitioner also sought to create a “chain of custody” for
“documents relating to the suspected cocaine and marijuana.” (D.I. 16-6 at 72) However, the
Superior Court had before it the transcript of Petitioner’s plea colloquy, the Rule 61 affidavit
from Petitioner’s defense counsel (D.I. 16-8 at 8-9), the State’s response to the Rule 61 motion
(explaining in depth the alleged discrepancies in weight of the drug evidence) (D.I. 16-8 at 1013), the information Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel collected regarding the OCME

29

evidence mishandling scandal during his independent investigation for Petitioner’s Rule 61
motion, and the formal results of the Delaware Department of Justice’s investigation into the
OCME evidence mishandling scandal, all of which provided a sufficient basis for the Superior
Court to decide Petitioner’s Rule 61 motion. See Pennewell v. State, 884 A.2d 512 (Table), 2005
WL 578444, at * 2 (Del. Jan. 26, 2005).
Permitting Petitioner to present additional impeachment evidence or further explore
issues he waived by virtue of his 2010 guilty plea would not have aided the Superior Court in
ruling on Petitioner’s Brady claim. For instance, taking testimony from Deputy Attorneys
General about their knowledge of OCME issues would have added nothing to Petitioner’s Rule
61 motion. Petitioner pled guilty on January 25, 2010, yet the discovery of the OCME
discrepancies did not occur until January 14, 2014.
Likewise, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing to trace the chain of custody of
Petitioner’s drug evidence, because Petitioner waived the right to pursue any possible
suppression motion on that basis when he pled guilty in 2010 and accepted the benefits of the
State's plea offer.
Finally, Petitioner's catchall argument that an evidentiary hearing was needed to create a
complete factual record for his Brady claim fails for the same reason — Petitioner waived the
right to learn about Brady impeachment evidence when he pled guilty in January 2010. At the
January 25, 2010 Superior Court guilty plea colloquy, Petitioner was specifically asked if he
admitted his guilt to the PWITD cocaine charge, and he answered “Yes.” (D.I. 16 at 56) As
previously explained, Petitioner is bound by the admissions he made during his 2010 guilty plea
colloquy. See supra at Section IV.A.2; see also Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74. Since he is

30

bound by his prior incriminatory admissions, Petitioner had no right to an evidentiary hearing to
explore further subjects he waived by virtue of his January 25, 2010 guilty plea.
Thus, to the extent Claim Two asserts that the Delaware state courts violated Petitioner’s
due process rights by denying his Rule 61 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, the
Court will deny the argument as meritless.
2. Request for an evidentiary hearing in this proceeding
A habeas petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in most cases. The Supreme
Court has explained that “[a]lthough state prisoners may sometimes submit new evidence in
federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discourage them from doing
so.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 (2011). Typically, requests for an evidentiary
hearing in a federal habeas proceeding are evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which
provides:
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a
claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows
that
(A) the claim relies on –
(i)
a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
31

“In cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from obtaining
an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a
hearing rests in the discretion of the district court.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.465, 468
(2007); see also Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. When deciding whether to grant a hearing, the “court
must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual
allegations,” taking into consideration the “deferential standards prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §
2254.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. An evidentiary hearing is not necessary if the issues can be
resolved by reference to the record developed in the state courts. Id.
The Court has determined that Petitioner’s claims are meritless under § 2254(d)(1) and
(2), and Petitioner’s assertions do not demonstrate how a hearing would advance his arguments.
Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
IV.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether

to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). A certificate of
appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right” by demonstrating “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Court has concluded that Petitioner’s habeas claims do not warrant relief. In the
Court’s view, reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. 13 Accordingly,
the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
13

I acknowledge the very similar opinions by my colleagues on the same issues raised by the
same counsel. See Rust v. Phelps, 2021 WL 965582 (D. Del. March 15, 2021); King v.
32

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny Petitioner’s Application for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

DeMatteis, 2020 WL 5822018 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2020). I have independently considered the
issues even though much of the language in this opinion is the same as in the earlier opinions.
33