Noble v. Stark

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 5/22/2018. (nms)

I
I
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
In re:
Misc. Action No. 17-358-RGA

THOMAS E. NOBLE,
Movant.

THOMAS E. NOBLE,
Petitioner,

v.
CHIEF JUDGE LEONARD STARK,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM
1.

Introduction.

Movant Thomas A. Noble ("Movant"), a pro se litigant

incarcerated at FDC Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, sought leave to file a
new complaint as required by an order enjoining him from filing any pro se civil rights
complaints without prior approval of this Court.

See Noble v. Becker, Civ. No. 03-906-

KAJ, D.I. 12. On January 9, 2018, I denied Movant leave to file a new complaint. (D.I.
6, 7).

Movant then filed for reconsideration, and I denied his motion. (D.I. 13, 14).

Movant has now filed a motion to stay and vacate the order and to enjoin me from
further adjudicating the case.

(D.I. 15). While not stated specifically, he seeks my

recusal.
2.

Discussion.

Movant contends that neither I, nor any judge in the District

of Delaware, or any judge under the jurisdiction of United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, can ethically adjudicate the case.

Movant alleges that I have a

conflict, I have lied to cover up for Judge Stark, and I have wrongly categorized the
case.

Movant also contends that the order enjoining him from filing civil rights cases

without prior permission is unconstitutional and was not served upon him.
3.

A judge is required to recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test for recusal
under§ 455(a) is whether a "reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would
conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," In re Kensington
Int'/ Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004), not "whether a judge actually harbors bias

against a party," United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012).

Under

§ 455(b)(1 ), a judge is required to recuse himself "[w]here he has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party."
4.

Under either subsection, the bias necessary to require recusal generally

"must stem from a source outside of the official proceedings." Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994); Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155,
167 (3d Cir. 2004) (beliefs or opinions which merit recusal must involve an extrajudicial
factor).

Hence, "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
5.

Movant takes exception to this Court's judicial rulings. This serves as his

only basis to seek recusal. A reasonable, well-informed observer could not believe that
the rulings were based on impartiality, bias, or actual prejudice by the undersigned.
Nor do my rulings demonstrate the Court acting in such manner when ruling in the
cases wherein Movant is a party. After careful and deliberate consideration, I have

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concluded that the Court has no actual bias or prejudice towards Movant and that a
reasonable, well-informed observer would not question the Court's impartiality.

In light

of the foregoing standard and after considering Movant's assertions, the undersigned
concludes that there are no grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
6.

Finally, a stay is not warranted and there is no basis to vacate orders

entered in this matter.
7.

Conclusion.

For the above reasons, the Court will deny Movant's motion

to stay, vacate the order, and to enjoin.

(D.I. 15). An appropriate order will be

entered.

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