Crawford v. New Castle County Housing Authority, Section 8 et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 8/19/2019. (nms)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ROBERTA CRAWFORD ,
Plaintiff,
: Civil Action No. 18-255-RGA
V.
NEW CASTLE COUNTY HOUSING
AUTHORITY, SECTION 8, et al. ,
Defendants.
Roberta Crawford , Wilmington , Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Colleen K. Norris, Esquire , and Mary A. Jacobson , Esquire , New Castle County Law
Department, New Castle, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants New Castle County
Housing Authority Section 8, Robert Rizzo, Patricia Dennis, and Terry Stu iber.
Barry M. Willoughby, Esquire, and Laure Elizabeth Moak Russell , Esquire , Young ,
Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor LLP , Wilmington , Delaware . Counsel for Kathryn
McGinnes.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
/9 ,
2019
August
WilmingtI/,, Delaware
A
~ 1 trict Judge:
~
Plaintiff Roberta Crawford filed this action on February 14, 2018 , alleging
violations of her civil rights . (D.I. 2) . Plaintiff appears prose and has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4) . Before the Court are Defendants' motions
to dismiss. (D.I. 23 , 24) . Plaintiff opposes. Briefing is complete .
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was a housing voucher recipient through the U.S. Department Housing
and Urban Development's Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistance Housing Choice
Voucher Program administered by New Castle County Housing Authority. Plaintiff's
"voucher was terminated due to missed inspection and annual recertification. " (D.I. 2 at
4). Plaintiff alleges that she requested rescheduling via email and the voucher "was still
terminated ." (D .I. 2 at 4; D.I. 5 at Ex. ).
Plaintiff received a letter, described as a notice to her landlord to terminate , dated
October 18, 2017 , from Defendant housing assistant Patricia Dennis advising Plaintiff's
landlord and Plaintiff that her Section 8 Voucher was subject to termination from the
New Castle County Housing Authority effective December 31 , 2017. (D.I. 5 at 1). In the
letter, Plaintiff was advised that she could request an informal hearing. (/d.). A notice ,
also dated October 18, 2017 , was sent directly to Plaintiff regarding her termination from
the voucher program . Both letters were sent to the same address, but Plaintiff alleges
that she did not receive the letter addressed solely to her through the mail. She alleges
that it was given to her at the informal hearing . (/d.).
Plaintiff requested a hearing , and , on November 8, 2017 , Plaintiff attended the
informal hearing , and was represented by counsel. (D.I. 2 at 5; D.I. 2-1 at 1). Hearing
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officer Kathryn McGinnes conducted the hearing . (Id.). Also present were Dennis and
Defendant supervisor Terry Stuiber. (Id.). Plaintiff's attorney argued "improper notice,
improper wording , and the fact that [Plaintiff] had not received notice of the hearing ."
(D.I. 2 at 5). Plaintiff was given time to provide proof of verification of appointments but
was still denied . (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to explain that her children
had been assaulted and this took up her time and impacted her mental state. (Id. ). She
later contacted Defendant Robert Rizzo "who did nothing ." (Id.).
Plaintiff was notified of the decision by letter dated December 6, 2017 signed by
McGinnes. (D.I. 2-1 at 1). The letter states that the New Castle County Department of
Community Services had notified Plaintiff that it was going to terminate Plaintiff's
housing assistance for violation of the "Family Obligations" due to Plaintiff's failure to
attend two rescheduled recertification appointments and two annual inspection
appointments. (Id.) . The December 6, 2017 letter referenced Plaintiff's testimony at the
hearing that she had some understanding of the reason for the proposed termination of
her housing assistance. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that she could not attend the
recertification appointments because she had important appointments for her daughter
and a court date and , as to the annual inspections, on one date, she "had to leave ," and
on the other date, she did not get proper notice. (Id.)
At the informal hearing , Plaintiff argued that the termination notice was deficient.
Plaintiff was therefore given an additional ten days for the submission of documentation
as to why she was unable to attend the scheduled appointment and inspections. (Id. at
2) . Plaintiff submitted documentation that was considered by McGinnes whose opinion
was that there was "sufficient documentation and evidence to support and/or indicate
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beyond a reasonable doubt that [Plaintiff] failed to attend [two] recertification
appointments and failed to permit access for [two] annual inspections. " (/d.) . McGinnes
opined that based upon the documentation, testimony and evidence presented at the
hearing/review, the New Castle Department of Community Services was within its rights
to terminate Plaintiff's participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program.
(Id. at 3) . McGinnes advised Plaintiff that the Housing Authority was not bound by her
decision and that further questions should be directed to New Castle Department of
Community Services. (/d.) .
Plaintiff alleges that Stuiber, Dennis , and McGinnes violated her rights and
refused accommodation in terminating the voucher. (0 .1. 2 at 6) . She seeks
reinstatement of the housing voucher and reasonable accommodation due to a mental
disability as well as compensatory damages. (Id. at 7).
Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . Plaintiff opposes
on the grounds that she did not receive a fair hearing prior to termination of her housing
voucher.
LEGAL STANDARDS
In reviewing a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factua l
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89 , 94 (2007) . Because Plaintiff proceeds prose , her
pleading is liberally construed and her complaint, "however inartfully pleaded , must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson ,
551 U.S. at 94 . A court may consider the pleadings, public record , orders , exhibits
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attached to the complaint, and documents incorporated into the complaint by reference.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd. , 551 U.S. 308 , 322 (2007) . A Rule 12(b)(6)
motion maybe granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the complainant, a court concludes
that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Bell At/. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 558 (2007) .
'Though 'detailed factual allegations' are not required , a complaint must do more
than simply provide 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action ."' Davis v. Abington Mem 'I Hosp ., 765 F.3d 236 , 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). I am "not required to credit bald assertions or legal
conclusions improperly alleged in the complaint. " In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. , Inc. Sec.
Litig. , 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002) . A complaint may not be dismissed , however,
"for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. " Johnson v.
City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014) .
A complainant must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has "substantive
plausibility." That plausibility must be found on the face of the complaint. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [complainant]
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
[accused] is liable for the misconduct alleged ." Id. Deciding whether a claim is
plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense ." Id. at 679.
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges this Court is vested with jurisdiction by reason of federal question
but does not reference a federal statute in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . The
civil cover sheet under the "cause of action" section states, "Housing Act, 42 U.S.C."
(0.1. 2-2). Other documents Plaintiff provides refer to the New Castle County Section 8
Administrative Plan and 24 C.F.R. § 982 .551 (i.e., obligations of participant) . Liberally
construing her pleadings as the Court must, Plaintiff seems to assert a due process
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "There are undoubtedly circumstances in which a litigant
can invoke§ 1983 to remedy the violation of a right conferred under the Housing Act. "
Brooker v. Altoona Haus. Auth., 2013 WL 2896814, at *19 (W.D. Pa . June 12, 2013)
(citing Robinson v. District of Columbia Haus. Auth., 660 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D .C.
2009)) .
When bringing a§ 1983 claim , a plaintiff must allege that some person has
deprived her of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 , 48 (1988) .
Municipal Liability. Named as a defendant is the New Castle County Housing
Authority, Section 8. A municipality may only be held liable under §1983 when the
"execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury." Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia , 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990). While a government policy is
established by a "decisionmaker possessing final authority," a custom arises from a
"course of conduct. . . so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law."
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
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New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)) . Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to recover from a
municipality must (1) identify an allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom ,
(2) demonstrate that the municipality, through its deliberate and culpable conduct, was
the "moving force" behind the injury alleged ; and (3) demonstrate a direct causal link
between the municipal action and the alleged deprivation of federal rights . Board of the
County Comm'rs v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397 , 404 (1997) .
There are no allegations that New Castle County Housing Authority, Section 8
was the "moving force " behind any alleged constitutional violation . Indeed , the
Complaint contains absolutely no allegations against it, and it is named only in the
caption of the complaint. Absent any allegation of a custom or policy established by the
New Castle County Housing Authority, Section 8, the § 1983 claim cannot stand.
Due Process. Section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f,
creates the housing choice voucher program . Individuals such as Plaintiff who qualify
for the voucher program must comply with its rules and regulations . See 42 U.S.C. §
1437f(a) & 24 C.F .R. pt. 982 . Failure to do so exposes an individual to termination from
the program . See 24 C.F.R § 982 .552(a)(1 ), (c)(1)(i) .
Participation in a public housing program is a property interest protected by due
process. Woods v. Willis , 515 F. App 'x 471 , 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Davis v.
Mansfield Metro. Haus. Auth ., 751 F.2d 180, 184 (6th Cir.1984)). Due process requires
that Housing Program participants receive adequate notice of the grounds for
termination , and they must be afforded an informal hearing prior to termination . See
Davis, 751 F.2d at 185 & n.4 ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 266-71 (1970) ("[T]he
stakes are simply too high ... and the possibility for honest error or irritable
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misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the recip ient a chance ,
if [she] so desires , to be fully informed of the case against [her] so that [she] may
contest its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal. ").
Here , Plaintiff alleges that even though she had reasons for missing the annual
inspections and recertification appointments and was given additional time to provide
proof of verification of appointments that caused her to miss them , she "still was
denied. " (0 .1. 2 at 5). In essence, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her due
process rights when her benefits were terminated and her informal hearing/review
appeal was denied .
"Due process in this context requires a decision maker to state the reasons for
his or her decision and indicate the evidence he or she relied upon. " Baldwin v.
HousingAuth. of the City of Camden , 442 F. App'x 719 , 720 (3d Cir. 2011). The
Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations governing housing
assistance termination provide, 'The person who conducts the hearing must issue a
written decision stating briefly the reasons for that decision." 24 C.F .R. § 982.555(e)(6) .
Attached to Plaintiff's Complaint is a copy of the hearing officer's decision . Therein ,
McGinnes set forth in detail the evidence she relied upon and the reasons for her
decision . (See 0.1. 2-1 at 1-3).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that she did not receive proper notice , the notice
issue was cured at the hearing when Plaintiff was given additional time to provide
documents to support her position . In addition , it is clear that Plaintiff had some actual
notice as she requested a hearing and appeared with counsel who presented her
defense. The notice of cancellation is required to enable participants the opportunity to
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prepare a defense, Escalera v. New York City Haus. Auth ., 425 F.2d 853 , 862 (2d Cir.
1970), and therefore, it must only be "sufficiently specific for it to enable an applicant to
prepare rebuttal evidence to introduce at his hearing appearance," Billington v.
Underwood, 613 F.2d 91 , 94 (5th Cir. 1980). As pied, and with regard to the notice
issue, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted .
Finally, in her opposition , Plaintiff contends that McGinnes resolved all credibility
issues against her.1 (D.I. 25 at 1). If it is Plaintiff's intent to allege new facts , she may
not amend her Complaint through her opposition brief, and the new facts may not be
considered by the Court on the instant motion to dismiss. See Commonwealth of Pa. ex
rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988). Nonetheless, the
Court addresses the claim.
Due process requirements in Section 8 Housing termination proceedings require
a decision by an impartial hearing panel. See 42 U.S.C . § 1437d(k)(2); 24 C.F.R. §
982.555(e)(4). Agencies are provided the benefit of the doubt with regard to
impartiality, and there is a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators . See Cobb v. Yeutter, 889 F.2d 724 , 730-31 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Withrow
v. Larkin , 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)) . The Supreme Court has acknowledged only two
cases where something less than actual bias violated due process : 1) the "adjudicator
has a pecuniary interest in the outcome;" and 2) the adjudicator has been the "target of
personal abuse or criticism from the party before him ." See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 .
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I note that this case does not purport to be an appeal from the Hearing Officer's decision . Further, there
is no suggestion that there is any appeal process that would involve a federal court.
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There are no allegations of either. Indeed , to the extent Plaintiff alleges
McGinnes was not an impartial hearing officer, it is a bald assertion without supporting
facts and does not suffice to state a claim .
Finally, in the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a reasonable accommodation due to
mental disability. She seems to allege that she attempted to explain that assaults upon
her children impacted her mental state , but her mental state was not considered by
Defendants. (0.1. 2 at 5) . Other than the assertion that her "mental state [was] more
worse," without allegations of a diagnosis, there is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff
was suffering from a disability or that she argued to the Hearing Officer that she had
some mental disability. The claim does not contain sufficient factual allegations to
support liability.
Because Plaintiff proceeds prose , she is given some latitude. It may be that she
could amend to state a claim against Defendants or alternative defendants. Therefore,
she will be given leave to file an amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons , the Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss. (0 .1.
23 , 24) . Given Plaintiffs prose status she will be given leave to file an amended
complaint.
An appropriate order will be entered .
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